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Preface
During the six years spent preparing this study, the European gas market has
changed radically, and so has the public attention for it. While in 2002 news-
papers wrote relatively little on gas, currently I have to exercise restraint in
following the news, because otherwise my entire day will be dedicated to
sifting through all those interesting news clippings. Furthermore, the pitying
look that used to appear on the faces of friends and relatives when I told them
I was working on gas issues, has recently changed into genuine interest. The
first question they ask me no longer is how I manage to spend so much time
on such a boring subject, but rather if I can bring down the gasoline prices
and restrain Putin.
This renewed attention, which is not expected to fade away any time soon,
makes this subject extremely interesting, also in the years to come. I hope that
this study is able to pass on to the reader at least a part of my enthusiasm
for this market.
Finally, writing a thesis can be a lonely affair, especially when it is written
on a subject that is largely foreign to the rest of the section or the Faculty.
Nevertheless, I have never felt lonely during the time I spent in Leiden, which
is a big compliment to my colleagues and supervisors in Leiden. I guess that
the never-ending discussions on football are an important element in this.
Leiden, 10 September, 2008 Aldo Spanjer
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1 Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This study is concerned with the regulation of the European gas market. It
investigates whether existing gas regulation can be expected to continue to
reach its energy policy goals – supply security, competitiveness and sustain-
ability – in the years to come. One important reason for this choice of subject
is that European gas markets are currently in the midst of a process of liberal-
ization, which creates anxiety concerning the policy goals. Another reason
is the observation regularly put forward by the European Commission (CEC,
2005a, e; 2007c) that the liberalization of the European gas market is not
working as anticipated. A third and related cause concerns the discussion on
whether the competition-oriented approach currently adhered to by the Com-
mission is applicable to the European gas market. This chapter elaborates on
these reasons. Furthermore, it provides the necessary background information
on the European gasmarket. To this end, section 1.2 discusses the early devel-
opment of natural gas in Europe, following which section 1.3 presents the
structure of the pre-liberalization European gas market. A major advantage
of this monopolistic structure was that it facilitated the investments required
to satisfy European energy demand and to develop the European gas grid.
Section 1.4 then provides a few illustrations of the mounting pressure on the
traditional organization. The upshot of this pressure has been a new, fashion-
able, alternative – liberalization. Section 1.5 discusses the energy policy goals
and their relation with liberalization. While the idea was that liberalization
would improve all policy goals, this has by no means been guaranteed. One
important observation resulting from this section is that while liberalization
may be necessary to reach the policy goals, it is not sufficient. Secondly, the
real issue concerning each of the policy goals is how to secure investments.
Liberalization must be viewed as a very powerful and useful measure that
in conjunction with the appropriate regulatory provisions may create a more
competitive gas market on which the policy goals can be reached. Thirdly,
all three policy goals are considered as public service obligations in need of
regulatory intervention because they all exhibit market failures. This is due
to the fact that under regulation’s current assumptions, market failure is a
ground to argue for regulatory intervention. Section 1.6 argues that the liberal-
ization process is inherently fraught with problems and conflicts. In order to
assess liberalization fairly, a distinctionmust bemade between transitory and
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fundamental problems. Section 1.6 closes by putting to the fore a number of
market shifts that in conjunction with each other are fundamentally changing
European gas markets. The consequences of these changes for current gas
regulation are a main theme in this study. Finally, section 1.7 provides the
research questions, research methodology and outline of this study.
1.2 THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET
Although gas was used as early as the nineteenth century to provide street
and home lighting in northwestern Europe (Wybrew-Bond, 1999, p. 6), the
European natural gas market is of relatively recent origin. Gas was originally
manufactured, that is produced from coal and/or oil. Natural – as opposed
to manufactured – gas discoveries in Italy and France in the 1940s made it
possible to establish transmission systems in these countries. The modest scale
of the discoveries restricted them to local use. This town gas with its limited
distribution range dominated until the SecondWorldWar. Until 1955, natural
gas consumption in Western Europe accounted for less than 1 percent of the
total energy consumption (Estrada et al., 1998, p. 9). Natural gas took off due
to large discoveries along the Continent. Themost notable discovery occurred
in 1959 when the very large Groningen field at Slochteren in the Netherlands
was discovered. Its size opened up the possibility to trade gas internationally.
To this end, in the mid 1960s, the Dutch developed international low-calorific
pipelines to transport their Groningen gas to northwestern Europe. In con-
junction with the first major pipeline from Russia, a European natural gas
market was beginning to emerge on a substantial scale (Stern, 1998, p. 15, 16).
Until the 1970s, the Netherlands were the largest gas producer in Europe –
at the time of the 1973/74 oil price shock, Dutch gas accounted for over 75
percent of internationally traded gas supplies in western Europe. Under the
influence of the two oil companies responsible for the discovery of the Gronin-
gen field, Shell and ExxonMobil, an ingenious construction was developed.
Dutch gas sold outside the Netherlands would have to be competitive with
other fuels, in order to generate maximum revenues for both the government
and the holder of the Groningen concession, the Nederlandse Aardolie Maat-
schappij (NAM, a 50/50 joint venture of Shell and ExxonMobil) (Correljé and
Odell, 2000, p. 20). Gas was priced in accordance with oil and contracts were
concluded on a long-term basis with take-or-pay (TOP) and destination clauses
(more on these clauses in the next section).
These arrangements facilitated the development of the infrastructure for
trading Dutch gas across Europe, which offered a vital contribution to the
development of a European gas market. The development of gas markets and
infrastructure in Europe stimulated other producers, such as the UK, Germany,
Denmark, Norway, Russia and Algeria, to also engage in the production of
gas. This process was facilitated by the rising oil price of the 1970s. Selling
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gas became profitablewhen gas prices rose on back of oil prices. Furthermore,
the oil crises meant that gas, with its indigenous availability, wasmore reliable
thanMiddle Eastern oil. Increasing supplies from these countries to European
firms facilitated a further expansion of European gas infrastructure and effect-
ively created a European gas market.
1.3 THE TRADITIONAL MARKET STRUCTURE
Six main types of players can be distinguished on the European gas market:
1) producers, 2) national transmission companies, 3) large industrial consumers,
4) local – oftenmunicipal – distribution companies (LDCs), 5) small consumers
and businesses and 6) the government. Figure 1.1 depicts a stylized overview
of the traditional market structure of the European gas market and illustrates
the focus of this study.
Figure 1.1: Stylized structure of the European gas market
Own elaborations
 
Producers 
Gazprom, Gasunie 
National transmission companies 
Ruhrgas, SNAM, Gasunie 
LDCs 
Nuon, Eneco 
Small consumers/businesses 
Individuals and small and medium 
sized industrial users 
Large industrial consumers 
Power generation 
Upstream 
Midstream/Transmission 
EU regulation 
Downstream/distribution 
EU/national regulation 
Midstream/Transmission 
EU regulation 
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The European gas market developed at both the national and the European
level (see Estrada et al., 1998, Percebois, 1999, Correljé et al., 2003 and Finon,
2004). The national level – the downstream/distribution section in figure 1.1
exemplified by the lowest two rectangles – was characterized by national
monopolies. These monopolies, which on the Continent were dominated by
the government, developed ‘their’ own national market, taking into account
market specifics such as resource endowment, energymix, etcetera. This study
focuses on the European level – the upstream and midstream/transmission
sections in the upper three rectangles of figure 1.1.
The producers were responsible for exploration and production activities.
They sold their gas to the national transmission companies via the upstream
pipeline network under long-term contracts which usually ranged from fifteen
to twenty years. We can distinguish exporter transmission companies and those
of the importing countries. The exporting transmission companies – pre-
dominantly Russia’s Gazprom, Algeria’s Sonatrach, Norway’s GFU and
Holland’s Gasunie1 – held a national export monopoly and handled the
volumes of domestically produced gas. On a European scale, they formed an
oligopoly, which Finon (2004, p. 185) refers to as the oligopoly of sellers or
producers. Finon also identifies an oligopoly of purchasers consisting of the
Continental European national transmission companieswhich imported their
gas andwere in a monopoly (or quasi-monopoly) position for wholesale supply
in their country. Examples are Germany’s Ruhrgas,2 Belgium’s Distrigas,
France’s Gaz de France, Italy’s SNAM, Austria’s OMV, Spain’s Gas Natural and
Holland’s Gasunie.3 The European upstream gas market was consequently
a two-sided oligopoly.4
The national transmission companies played a pivotal role in the traditional
market structure. Virtually all Member States except Germany (Scheib et al.,
2006) had one transmission company.5 National governments owned or were
involved in almost all transmission companies, providing themwith an oppor-
tunity to use gas rents for social or wider economic purposes (more on this
at the end of this section). The transmission companies shared the following
additional similarities: they weremonopoly wholesale sellers of gas, monopoly
transmission system operators and monopsony buyers of gas from the pro-
1 As of September 2006, Gasunie is the name of the infrastructure company which has been
unbundled from the trading company Gasterra.
2 E.ON/Ruhrgas since 2003.
3 Gasunie – now Gasterra – appears in both the oligopoly of purchasers and of sellers, since
it held statutory monopolies as exporter, importer, and wholesale supplier on the Dutch
natural gas market.
4 Finon excludes the British market because as a consequence of its isolation from the
Continent until 1997, it ‘has long since differed from the Continental market’ (p. 185).
5 Germany had about 15 regional transmission companies (some of which had direct access
to import and production) and over 700 local distributors, or ‘stadtwerke’. However, despite
the fact that the regional transmission companies were dominant in their own regions,
Ruhrgas played a dominant role on the international scene (Stern, 1998).
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ducers. Their vertical relations with gas producers took the form of long-term
contracts which contained three specific clauses.
The first contractual clause was the take-or-pay clause which compelled
the transmission companies to pay for the gas even if less than the contractual-
ly agreed quantity was taken from the system. Hence, volume risk was borne
by the transmission companies. Due to themonopolist position of the national
transmission companies on their home markets, competition came from sub-
stitutes the consumers could switch to rather than new entrants. In conse-
quence, in the early 1960s, after the 1959 discovery of the Groningen field,
gas prices were fixed at the level of competing fuels in order to obtain and
retain a market share for gas. Since oil was the main substitute available, gas
prices were linked to those of oil. This oil price linkage is the second main
contractual clause. Residential gas prices were linked to those of heating oil
and industrial prices to heavy fuel oil. The revenue to the producers was
derived from the end-user prices by means of netbacking. This meant that
the costs of transportation, storage and ancillary serviceswere subtracted from
the end-user price of the competing fuels to arrive at the commodity price
of gas. This explains why the oil price linkage is often referred to as a netback
market value approach. Maisonnier (2006, p. 26) provides the following
example of a typical European gas pricing formula:
P = P0 + A*(G-G0) + B*(F-F0),
where P is the monthly price paid for gas from a producer; G denotes the
average heating oil price over 3, 6, or 9 months; and F indicates the average
heavy fuel oil price over the same intervals. The index 0 indicates the values
at the initial date of contract implementation. The margin to the transmission
company has been predetermined and will not change if, for example, prices
fall. In fact, the lower revenues resulting from lower prices are passed on to
the producers, indicating that they are the ones bearing a price risk.6,7 The
third and final clause is the final destination clause. A final destination clause
prohibits transmission companies from reselling purchased gas in order to
guarantee that this gas could not be sold elsewhere in competition with a
producer’s other gas supplies. This effectively partitioned national markets,
which obstructed inter-Member State trade and de facto created a patchwork
of national energy markets.
6 Dailami andHauswald (2000) provide empirical evidence on risk sharing regarding relation-
specific investments. They have studied the Ras Gas LNG (liquefied natural gas) Project
in Qatar, which delivers LNG on a long-term take-or-pay basis to South Korean Kogas
(who resells it to the Korean Electric Power Company). It is shown that risks are shared
in that volume risk is borne by Kogas, while price risk remains with Ras Gas.
7 In addition to adjusting prices to changes in prices of competing fuels, prices were also
typically revised at regular intervals (and based on defined criteria) in order to adapt them
to changes in market circumstances (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p. 152, 155).
6 Introduction
These contracts shared price and volume risks between producers and
transmission companies, which facilitated investments (see below). They also
had an impact on the fulfillment by the transmission companies of their two
main tasks: keeping supply and demand in balance and developing the
required national and international infrastructure in order to develop the
European market (Stern, 1998, p. 12-18).
First, the task of keeping supply and demand in balance was impacted
by the take-or-pay clause. This clause meant that if the transmission company
bought too much gas, it would have to pay for it without taking the gas, or
it would need to sell into other, lower-value sectors (see below). If it bought
too little gas, it would be unable to honor its own contracts. Governments
played an important role in this regard, because they wanted a restricted use
of gas. This was especially prevalent in the power generation sector. Before
the gas discoveries, electricitywas predominantly generated by coal or nuclear
energy. If these industries would convert to gas, the governments feared
politically undesirable consequences for employment and the balance of
payments. For instance, British and German power-generation gas use was
discouraged in order to protect the coal industry – in Britain through the
licensing regime which allowed the government to control the type of gener-
ation capacity; in Germany predominantly through subsidization of coal.
France had a similar stance to protect its nuclear industry (ibid., p. 62-63).
In addition, after the first oil shock in 1973, import dependency anxieties
shifted the balance away from gas (Newbery, 1999, p. 150). Imported gas
supplies were considered scarce, insecure and therefore in the long-run ex-
pensive, in contrast to indigenous coal or domestically produced nuclear
power. Consequently, gas was considered too expensive for a low-value use
such as power generation. Rather, this premium fuel should be restricted to
high-value uses such as residential consumption or in commercial sectors
(Stern, 1998, p. 30, 31). The national transmission companies were satisfied
with this low-growth situation, because focusing on high-value markets
enabled them to extract the maximum value from the gas they sold. This
provides a second rationale for the netback market value approach indicated
above: by pricing gas just below the price of competing fuels, the maximum
value could be extracted without inducing demand substitution.
The second task of the national transmission companies, developing the
national and international gas (transmission) infrastructure in cooperationwith
the producers, was greatly facilitated by the above contractual structure. The
market’s immaturity required many investments in pipelines into Europe,
interconnectors betweenMember States, transmission systemswithinMember
States and LNG trains. The long-term contracts with purchase obligations
provided the producerswith security of demand (and revenues), which stimu-
lated them to invest in production and export infrastructures. Furthermore,
the contractual structure allowed the transmission companies to obtain a
diversified portfolio of long-term contracts and sole access to pipelines, which
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furthermore facilitated investments. This policy proved very successful. Accord-
ing to Stern (1998, p. 16), gas pipeline8 development in Europe grew from
61.4 thousand kilometers to 211.3 between 1965 and 1990. In addition, there
was also a growth in LNG, predominantly in France and Spain. Of the 254
billion cubic meter (bcm) of gas that was internationally traded in 1996, 21
bcm concerned LNG (ibid., p. 18). In fact, these investments were so successful
that by the end of the 1990s, most of the European gas grid could be con-
sidered mature – both from a physical and an economic perspective. Physical
maturity means that future investments will not be made in new infrastructures
with the purpose to meet demand, but rather will predominantly concern
extensions of and interconnections between the main corridors. Economic
maturity results from most of the infrastructure having been amortized (cf.
Ellis et al., 2000, p. 3 and IEA, 2000, p. 24).
The national transmission companies sold their gas via the high-pressure
midstream or transmission system to the LDCs and large industrial consumers.
This was arranged through medium-term contracts which ranged from one
to five years. LDCs were largely captive to the national transmission company.9
They often cooperated with the transmission companies in order to develop
an appropriate status quo. The LDCs used their low-pressure distribution
system to deliver gas to small consumers and businesses on the basis of short-
term supply agreements. The LDCs constitute the third level of oligopoly.
The above indicates that the traditional European gas market was being
controlled by the national transmission companies and governments. The
degree of horizontal integrationwas generally high. The national transmission
companies acted as monopoly wholesale sellers on their national markets
which ensured that LDCs were captive. In addition, their monopsony buying
position ensured a strong bargaining position towards the producers. Some
governments (notably the Dutch and Norwegian governments) placed limits
on the volumes of gas allowed to be produced and determined were the gas
was to be sold. Producers were often obliged to sell to the national trans-
mission company. However, the vertical relations between the parties discussed
above ensured that the profitability in this situation was sufficient to remove
the incentive to break the status quo. Essentially, all parties had similar in-
centives to ensure that gas prices were relatively high.
In addition to this horizontal integration and the indicated vertical con-
tractual clauses, another widespread phenomenon in the industry was vertical
integration. Economies of scale and scope (see Annex) offered an important
rationale for vertical integration. The international oil companies responsible
for gas production on the Continent were also present further down the gas
8 Defined as national and international gas (transmission) infrastructure.
9 In a few European countries, such as France and the UK, distribution had been integrated
with transmission (IEA, 2000, p. 24), as a result of which the transmission company con-
trolled distribution too.
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chain, in for example transmission and trade companies, in order to capture
part of the downstream profits. Examples are Shell and ExxonMobil whowere
responsible for the production of gas in the Netherlands and the North Sea
whilst also holding important downstream ownership positions in Gasunie
and BEB, a German pipeline and storage operator. National transmission
companies were partly owned by the producers. This integration in conjunction
with the fact that these owners were relatively indifferent to the distinction
between up- or downstream profits, provides one possible explanation for
the observation that the national transmission companies did not, despite their
strong position and contrary to expectations, bargain down the price for the
gas they imported (Radetzki, 1999, p. 19).10
In sum, the monopolistic structure and the controlled manner in which
the European gas market was being developed worked to the extent that they
facilitated the necessary investments (IEA, 2008a, p. 38, 39). We highlight two
additional advantages of the traditional structure. First, energy is considered
vital from an economic (by contributing to GDP and employing thousands of
people), political (as a redistributive vehicle) and strategic (controlling strategic
infrastructures in case of a war or crisis) perspective, providing incentives to
retain all control within the realm of the national government (Geradin, 2006,
p. 6, 7). Second, it was relatively easy to secure the public service obligations
(PSOs). It was customary to grant monopoly franchises to a utility delivering
gas. In exchange for this monopoly franchise, the utility was either a regulated
private player as in the United States, or under state ownership as for the
greater part of Europe, with a mandate to operate in the public interest (New-
bery, 1999, p. 86). These franchise monopolies could recoup investment costs
by passing them on to consumers.
1.4 PRESSURES FOR CHANGE
Around the end of the 1970s, pressure began to mount on this managed
market. With no intention of being exhaustive, we provide four important
reasons for this development, in chronological order.
The changing perception of scarcity
It had become customary to use the size of proven reserves as an upper bound
to production. Since the size of proven reserves could be adjusted upwards
when needed through, for instance, an intensification of production and
exploration efforts, a reevaluation of reserves or higher prices, energy reserves
were fixed at a lower than realistic level. In addition, the 1973/74 and 1979/80
10 A second reason put forward by Radetzki is that several national transmission companies
were publicly owned utilities, required to provide a ‘normal’ return on capital as opposed
to maximizing profits.
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oil shocks created fears of being too dependent on unreliable oil producers.
This extended to gas with European governments also designating gas supply
security as vital (Stern 1988, p. 24). Such security of supply anxieties offered
a major justification for the emergence of the government-dominated market
structure. The oil shocks increased the oil price and, due to the oil price
linkage, also the gas price. This boosted production and exploration efforts
as well as investments in transport facilities. In 1986, oil and gas prices declined
again which mitigated the scarcity threat and removed an important raison
d’être for state intervention. It also facilitated the idea that market forces were
more efficient than state intervention. According to Radetzki (1999, p. 19, 20),
the 1986 price decline undermined the traditional structure in three additional
ways. First, until 1986, high oil and gas prices had led to a lowmarket growth.
Although the market had a clear potential for expanding, the producers were
satisfied and accepted the stagnantmarket as long as prices and rents remained
high. The price fall, however, loweredwholesale gas prices without significant-
ly increasing the market share of gas. Accordingly, producers grew increasingly
dissatisfied with the monopolistic structure. Second, the producers’ discomfort
with the old structure was increased by the reduced costs resulting from
technological advancements. These lower costs increased the potential for a
larger production and profit level, but the low market growth limited this
potential. The third effect of the oil price collapse, according to Radetzki, was
that it induced in the government a new attitude towards the energy sectors.
This was most notable in the UK. The lower oil and gas prices sent a signal
that supplies were sufficient and that there was consequently no reason for
the government to intervene, for instance by creating or allowing national
monopolies, from a supply security perspective. Accordingly, the support for
the traditional monopolistic structure crumbled further.
Power generation
Recall from the previous section that in the traditional structure, gas was
considered scarce, which restricted large-scale gas use for low-value applica-
tions such as power generation. In addition, in countries like the UK, Germany
and France, gas use was prohibited in order to protect domestic coal and
nuclear power. Until the end of the 1980s, the European Union did not stimu-
late gas use for power generation. In addition to the above premium fuel and
protection of domestic industries arguments, another important argument for
restricting gas use was to prevent dependence on Russian gas (Newbery, 1999,
p. 150). Nevertheless, around the 1990s, gas finally became the fuel of choice
for power generation, as a result of, for instance, gas’ environmental ad-
vantages as compared to oil and coal. Technological breakthroughs, especially
the development of combined cycle gas turbines, further stimulated the use
of gas for power generation (see also section 2.8). This unlocked the potentially
huge power generation gas demand, creating a new and important market
for gas.
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New pipelines create gas-to-gas competition
In addition, in the 1990s, commercial initiatives began to develop which
undermined the status quo. The construction of additional pipelines built on
a partly speculative basis allowed small, uncontracted volumes of gas to be
traded outside themanaged system. In the managedmarket, a securedmarket
existed for gas transported through a pipeline. The availability of uncontracted
gas flows changed this situation. The secured gas now had to compete with
uncontracted gas (or alternative fuels), which created a situation in which the
managed market became less and less tenable. Two notable examples are
Wintershall’s pipeline initiatives and the UK Interconnector.
The first is the pipeline competition that developed in Germany from
November 1989 on (Stern, 1998, p. 139, 140 and Radetzki, 1999, p. 20, 21). In
that month, Wintershall, a small West German gas producer and the oil sub-
sidiary of chemical manufacturing company BASF, decided to construct a 560
km pipeline – Midal – from Emden to Ludwigshafen, the location of the main
BASF plants. This was a response to a dispute between BASF and its supplier
Ruhrgas concerning the price for gas (which was determined through the
netback market value approach referred to in the previous section). Midal
bypassed Ruhrgas, the dominant transmission company, and consequently
BASF became directly involved in the German gas market. This created an
independent supplier of gas that competedwith the traditional supplier, which
resulted in some gas-to-gas competition. Less than a year later, in October 1990,
Wintershall moved into the East German gas market, which had become
available after the reunification between East andWest Germany (Stern, 1992,
p. 88, 89). Wintershall signed a cooperation agreement with Gazprom which
created a joint venture company – Wingas – to market Russian gas in Eastern
Germany. To this end the Stegal pipeline was built. It ran through Slovakia
and the Czech Republic andwas connected toMidal in Germany. The compe-
tition between Ruhrgas and Wingas resulted in additional pipelines – with
Ruhrgas emphasizing Norway supplies (the Netra pipeline), while Wingas
remained focused on Russian gas supplies (the Jagal pipeline) – that were
partly constructed in parallel with existing pipelines, providing direct gas-to-
gas competition (Stern, 1998, p. 142). According to Radetzki (1999, p. 20), these
developments indicate that producers are willing to break the status quo of
themanagedmarket if they see commercial opportunities. Furthermore, these
competitive pressures are considered to have facilitated competition in neigh-
boring countries, and possibly even the rest of Europe (ibid., p. 21 and Stern,
1998, p. 155).
A second major pipeline initiative was the construction in 1998 of the
Interconnector between Bacton in the UK and Zeebrugge on the Continent.
The Interconnector created a bi-directional link between both markets (Stern,
1998, p. 56). Due to the supply surplus that had emerged in Britain in the mid-
1990s, British producers and marketers considered the Interconnector as a
useful means of exporting surplus volumes to the Continent. Consequently,
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the Interconnector was initially developed as an export line for gas from the
UK Continental Shelf. The pipeline’s maximum British export capacity to the
Continent is 20 bcm per year. At a later stage, after the turn of the century,
the UK was expected to become a net importer due to its dwindling reserves.
In consequence, gas was expected to also flow in the opposite direction (at
a maximum capacity of 8.5 bcm per year). According to Futyan (2006, p. 26),
in October 1998 around 8 bcm of gas supplies to the Continent was contracted
for through long-term agreements. Consequently, significant uncontracted
volumeswere available (around 12 bcm) for short-term and spotmarket sales,
which increased both gas-to-gas competition and market liquidity. As above,
these uncontracted volumes provided a source of competition to the secured
gas on the Continent, lowering the tenability of the traditional status quo.
Market maturity
The monopolistic structure and the managed market development were no
problem as long as substantial investments were required to develop the
immature European gas market. As indicated in the previous section, around
the end of the 1990s large parts of the European gas market had matured as
a consequence of the investments that were made – as well as due to the
pipeline initiatives discussed above. In amature gas market, the initial invest-
ments have been amortized. The penetration of gas into most markets is well
advanced. Accordingly, new investments are primarily required in expansion
and interconnection rather than new infrastructures, as a result of which the
rationale for a managed market becomes less obvious. Accordingly, the em-
phasis shifts from stimulating new investments towards more efficiently
deploying existing investments.
The corollary of these and other factors was the arrival of a new alternative
to govern European gas markets. On back of the successful liberalization
operations in the US and the UK, a consensus arose concerning the need for
liberalization of the European gas market, which culminated in a 1985 White
Paper on the internal market (CEC, 1985). Liberalization is supposed to trans-
form the rigid and constrained gasmarket into a European internal gas market
governed by unfettered competition. The essence of liberalization is to intro-
duce competition where possible.
However, the cost characteristics of the European gas market require a
substantial level of monopolization even after liberalization. The costs of
transmission and distribution networks are generally considered to be sub-
additive. Costs are subadditive when one firm is able to produce at a lower
cost than two or more firms (see Annex). With subadditive costs over the
relevant production range, the first operator obtains a natural monopoly
position since he will be able to undercut the prices of potential entrants. The
lowest cost solution in this case is to have one company supplying the entire
market with gas. Consequently, the naturally monopolistic network – the
pipelines – should remain a natural monopoly. Efficiency is supposed to be
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improved by regulating the pipelines to drive down network costs towards
marginal costs (referred to as ‘asset sweating’). On the other hand, regarding
the services over the network – transport and trade of gas11 – efficiency-
improving competition should be introduced. To this end, two EU Gas Direct-
ives have been introduced, the first one in 1998 (CEC, 1998), followed and
replaced by a second one in 2003 (CEC, 2003). A third set of legislativemeasures
has been proposed (CEC, 2007h). Chapter four discusses these and other Euro-
pean legislative initiatives.
1.5 LIBERALIZATION AND THE ENERGY POLICY OBJECTIVES
The legislativemeasures are intended to satisfy the threemain policy objectives
of energy policy: supply security, competitiveness and sustainability. Prior
to liberalization, government franchises were responsible for reaching these
objectives and they recouped the associated costs on consumers. Governments
consequently had a strong hand in the managed market described above.
A major theme in this study is that the liberalization approach is founded
on neoclassical guiding principles, aiming to achieve perfect competition
through the internal gas market (see chapters three and four). Once liberal-
ization has created perfect competition, the neoclassical argument goes, no
detailed market intervention and/or regulation is required and consequently
a government’s (and regulator’s) role is restricted to that of a market facilitator
enabling competition. In such a world, regulators or governments should
intervene if themarket fails to reach perfect competition. Consequently, regula-
tory intervention in European gas markets is currently determined bymarket
failure.12 This section discusses the policy objectives and highlights some
possible effects of liberalization.We point out that there is no intrinsic conflict
between liberalization and the policy objectives, and that, given the proper
regulatory environment, liberalization may improve these objectives. Further-
more, we identify investments as a key element in reaching any and all of
the objectives. Finally, we show that each policy objective is currently treated
as a public service obligation (PSO) that requires regulatory intervention, since
for all of themwe can identify a market failure. Since chapter three elaborates
on the market failures that can be identified on the European gas market, we
provide here a concise treatment of market failure.
11 Gas production is not mentioned here, since it has been a competitive activity prior to the
inception of liberalization. Unless specified otherwise, the term transport includes trans-
mission and distribution of gas. Gas trade refers to the resale of gas on the wholesale and
retail markets.
12 Chapter three elaborates on the neoclassical perspective andwhy it considersmarket failure
to be a ground for regulatory intervention.
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1.5.1 Liberalization and security of supply
According to Frei (2004), security of supply is themost important energy policy
objective. He argues that the energy policy objectives can be stratified into
an energy policy needs pyramid similar toMaslow’s pyramid of human needs,
implying that we are dealing with a hierarchy of energy policy needs, rather
than the generally assumed trade-off. Frei argues that as long as a lower-order
need such as security of supply is not satisfied, higher-order needs such as
efficiency or environmental concerns cannot be adequately dealt with.
Security of supply comes down to guaranteeing gas supplies now as well
as in the future. It encompasses a range of short- and long-term issues, most
importantly 1) the long-term availability of gas supplies, 2) the extent to which
consumers can be assured, within foreseeable circumstances, of gas delivery
and 3) the prevention of international crises and, in case of a crisis, control
of the consequences.
Ever since the inception of liberalization, the possibly adverse effects of
liberalization on (long-term) supply security have exercised many minds. As
indicated, the traditional market structure allowed supply security to be
guaranteed relatively easily, albeit at high costs. Liberalization shifts supply
security responsibilities tomarket participants, which has created anxiety that
increased incentives for lower prices, cost reduction and efficiency might
impede supply security. Fears range from lagging investments and soaring
production levels to low-quality networks and supply shortages.
The lasting presence of such fears notwithstanding, the emphasis lies
increasingly on the conditions under which liberalization and supply security
can be mutually reinforcing (or at least not preclude one another). The main
issue in this regard is stimulating investments. The common view is that
competitive markets and investments can co-exist, but that the specifics of
energy markets may nevertheless pose problems. Joskow and Tirole (2005)
illustrate this by considering the theory ofmerchant transmission investments.
Although Joskow and Tirole apply this theory to electricity transmission, they
note that similar issues are expected to arise when considering merchant
investment in gas transmission pipelines. The theory goes that investment in
electricity transmission lines can be secured without regulatory intervention
provided that the investor is allowed to reap the congestion revenues. In this
case, both generation and transmission can be completely deregulatedwithout
negative repercussions for investments. However, Joskow and Tirole also argue
that the assumptions underlying thismodel are quite restrictivewhen consider-
ing the specifics of energy markets. Examples of complicating factors, which
may create inefficiencies when completely relying on merchant investments,
are market power in wholesale markets and the lumpiness of investments.
Von Hirschhausen et al. (2004) endorse the view that there is no fundamental
tension. They argue that the specification of the regulatory system is what
matters for attracting investments, as opposed to the generic ownership form.
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Europe’s rising import dependence adds to supply security anxieties by
increasing Europe’s dependence on foreign suppliers. Although forecasts vary,
there is a consensus that European gas import dependence will rise to ap-
proximately two thirds of the supply by 2020.13 According to Stern (2002,
p. 12-14), this exposes the EU to three kinds of dependence (and risk): 1) source
dependence, 2) transit dependence and 3) facility dependence.14 Source de-
pendence follows from Europe’s dependence on a limited number of gas
suppliers. A good example is provided by Russian exports into Europe. Transit
dependence arises because most European gas imports are delivered by pipe-
lines which must cross several transit countries before reaching the European
consumer markets. Examples of risks in this regard are the disputes between
Russia and the countries through which their export pipelines pass (mainly
Ukraine and Byelorussia). Chapter two more elaborately discusses the issues
regarding source and transit dependence. Facility dependence creates the risk
of a supply disruption due to the destruction of amajor, not easily replaceable,
facility. An example is the 1998 Longford incident in which an explosion in
the only plant that supplied gas to Victoria, Australia led to a two-week cut
in supplies to Victoria (CPB, 2006, p. 47). Britain’s dependence on the Bacton
and St. Fergus LNG receiving terminals makes it vulnerable to facility-induced
supply disruptions (Stern, 2004, p. 1975, 1976). A similar situation arises
concerning the Continent’s gas supply which is concentrated on a relatively
small number of large Russian pipelines such as Brotherhood, Yamal and
possibly Nord Stream (under construction). Note the close similarity with
transit dependence in the latter case.
While acknowledging that historical experiences provide no guarantees
for future developments, Stern’s (2002, p. 16, updated in Stern, 2006b, p. 17-19)
empirical observations regarding gas security incidents in OECD Europe over
the last 25 years provide interesting anecdotal insights. Stern points out that
between 1980 and 2001 Europe was confronted with a few source and transit
incidents related to the Russian gas transiting the Ukraine. No significant
facility incidents occurred.15 From 2001 on, three serious facility incidents
were identified: a liquids contamination of the Interconnector in 2002, a fire
a Algeria’s Skikda liquefaction plant in 2004 and a 2006 fire at the Rough
storage plant in the UK. Other incidents were Russia’s 2004 dispute with
Belarus, which resulted in a 24 hour interruption of supply to Belarus, and
the 2006 crisis between Russia and the Ukraine, which resulted in short supply
interruptions to Europe. Based on these observations, Stern concludes that
13 Table 2.2 provides an overview of different scenarios.
14 Weisser (2007, p. 2) supplements this categorization with structural risks. These are 1) the
pipeline-bound character of gas supply and 2) the responsibility for security of supply that
shifts from monopoly provision under the traditional structure to market players on
liberalized markets.
15 One facility-related incident, an explosion on the Trans Mediterranean Pipeline which cut
Algerian gas flows to Italy, could be labeled a terrorist attack according to Stern.
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there have been very few security incidents over the past 25 years, and that
there is no evidence of imported supplies being less secure than indigenous
supplies. In fact, most gas supply disruptions appear to have domestic origins.
Facility incidents seem to have increased in recent years. This offers some
perspective on the sometimes not so tacit assumption that import dependence
automatically aggravates security of supply hazards. Another conclusion from
the above is that, as argued by Stern (2006b, p. 2), present-day supply security
anxiety is not so much due to a discrepancy with liberalization, but rather
has3 a geopolitical origin (see chapter two).
The above indicates that concerns arise on Europe’s liberalizing gas markets
regarding all three components of supply security – the long-term availability
of gas supplies, the extent to which consumers can be assured, within fore-
seeable circumstances, of gas delivery and the prevention of international crises
and control of the consequences. A common denominator is that all compo-
nents require investments – in gas exploration and production to develop
sufficient volumes, and in transmission, distribution, transit and LNG infra-
structures to properly transport the gas to the consumers. The issue is whether
these investments can be facilitated by themarket alone – and the government
or regulator can step back from the market – or if regulatory intervention is
required. Due to its neoclassical guiding principles (see chapter three for an
elaborate exposition), any market failure is a candidate for regulatory inter-
vention.16 Section 3.4 extensively discusses six important market failures on
the European gas market – failure of competition, public goods, externalities,
incomplete or missing markets, information failures and uninsurable risks.
In consequence, we provide a concise treatment of the main market failures
at this point.
The first market failure is failure of competition, both on the Continent
as well as regarding the relationship with the producers. Competition is also
undermined because contrary to early European expectations, producing
countries appear less willing to allow the predominantlywestern oil companies
a stake into their energy sectors (these issues are addressed in section 2.3).
Furthermore, a closer look at Europe’s gas suppliers reveals that the European
gas market is quite segmented – Russian supply largely concentrates on central
and eastern Europe, Norwegian supplies mostly arrive in northern and western
Europe and Algeria focuses on southern Europe. Although this is perfectly
understandable when considering transport costs, this division nevertheless
hampers competition between suppliers. A second market failure consists of
missing markets. Gas trading is developing, but mainly in the Northwestern
part of Europe (see section 4.10.1). Import contracts between producers and
16 While a market failure is sufficient ground to think about regulatory intervention, actual
intervention should only materialize in practice if the costs of the market failure outweigh
the costs of the government or regulatory failure that accompanies the intervention (see
section 4.4 and chapter 5).
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European consumers are still predominantly bilateral and long-term – as is
a large proportion of gas trade between Member States. There is no world
gas market (as there is for oil). LNG will improve the situation, but it is un-
certain if and to what extent this will lead to a sufficiently liquid world gas
market, based on hub-to-hub trading. Therefore, missingmarkets will remain
a problem for a considerable period of time to come. Thirdly, import de-
pendence satisfies the non-rivalry and non-exclusivity conditions that define
a public good, because 1) an extra person enjoying low import dependence
does not obstruct others from enjoying it and 2) import dependence cannot
be split up in parts and sold on a market. Import dependence is therefore a
public bad. Fourth, externalities play a role here. Natural gas is an essential
input in many industrial processes and consumer applications, and conse-
quently is complementary to the rest of the economy. Therefore, according
to Helm (2005a, p. 10):
‘the costs of excess supply and excess demand are asymmetric. Therefore, optimal
capacity is greater for the economy as a whole than would result from the sum
of individual investment decisions. This usually requires some form of government
intervention – except, of course, when the system is in general excess supply, as
in the 1980s and 1990s’.
Facility and transit dependence predominantly boil down to the infrastructure
which provides two additional market failures: information failures and
uninsurable risks. Information is imperfect because it is impossible for Euro-
pean consumers to perfectly observe the quality of the facilities throughwhich
their gas is imported. As indicated, large scale gas infrastructure investments
are extremely costly (up to 8-10 billion dollars), require long cost-recovery
periods andmust be implemented in their entirety at once. (The last condition
invites the question of exactly what kinds of investment – storages, LNG facil-
ities or pipelines – would qualify as potentially uninsurable. This discussion,
however, falls outside the scope of the present study).
These market failures provide scope for government intervention to guar-
antee supply security. A range of European initiatives have been and are being
developed to this end (cf. CEC, 2000, 2004b, 2005c, 2007b). Some initiatives
– such as stimulating energy efficiency and promoting renewables – emanate
from apredominantly environmental point of view but nevertheless positively
influence gas supply security by lowering gas demand. Also, following oil,
a solidarity mechanism – strategic gas stocks – between Member States has
been proposed. These initiatives attempt to reduce gas consumption and soften
the consequences of a supply disruption. Furthermore, diversification may
also lower supply security risks. Gas supply diversification has several dimen-
sions: 1) geographical diversification between suppliers, 2) diversification
between pipelined and liquefied gas, 3) diversification between several facilities
and 4) diversification between energy forms. Their merit is not difficult to
comprehend: the first lowers import dependence on a single supplier, the
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second is supposed to create arbitrage opportunities between gas markets,
the third lowers facility risk and the fourth lowers dependence on hydrocarbon
energy sources.
All in all, we emphasize three points. First, there is no inherent tension
between liberalization and supply security. Second, investments are vital
concerning all three elements of security of supply – the long-term availability
of gas supplies, the delivery of supplies and the prevention of international
crises and their consequences. Consequently, facilitating investments is a vital
factor in securing supply security on a liberalizing European gasmarket. Third-
ly and finally, the identified market failures may require regulatory interven-
tion.
1.5.2 Liberalization and competitiveness
Liberalization is also supposed to improve the competitiveness of the European
economy by improving efficiency. Improved efficiency should lead to lower
prices of supplies, which enhances the competitiveness of energy-intensive
users and lowers the energy expenditures of small consumers. We explore
the subject in light of the three economic efficiency criteria.
The first form of efficiency is productive efficiency. Productive efficiency
is defined as producing a good at the lowest possible unit cost. By subjecting
operators to competitive forces, liberalization should induce them to behave
more efficiently and lower production costs, consequently improving pro-
ductive efficiency and lowering prices. Productive efficiency can also be
enhanced by improvements in fuel efficiency, operational efficiency or utiliza-
tion of production capacity. The restructuring of the US wholesale gas market
is often considered a prime example for the benefits of competition and liberal-
ization as well as a blueprint for restructuring efforts in other regulated in-
dustries and countries (Leitzinger and Collette, 2002, p. 79). The same applies
to the UK restructuring experience (Bolle and Breitmoser, 2006, p. 18).
As indicated in section 1.4, separating transport and trade activities is an
important measure for liberalizing gas markets. In the US this took the form
of open-access transportation after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) issued Order 436 in 1985. Open access entails that gas users, LDCs and
small consumers, buy their gas directly from gas producers, following which
the interstate transporters transport this gas on non-discriminatory terms. This
separates transmission and trading activities and is supposed to ensure non-
discriminatory access to the transmission pipelines for consumers. Granderson
(2000) has examined US open-access gas transportation. Based on a data set
that comprises 20 US interstate natural gas pipeline companies from 1977 to
1989, he concludes that open access has slightly lowered transport costs and
increased cost efficiency (meaning that firms are producing their output levels
more efficiently compared to the most efficient firm). The positive influence
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of competitive forces on productive, or operating, efficiency is not undisputed.
Leitzinger and Collette (2002) argue that the US restructuring indeed resulted
in billions of dollars of savings. However, they submit that these savingswere
not due to competition, but rather accrued because restructuring resulted in
stranded costs (see section 1.6) which were absorbed by producers and trans-
porters.
Regarding the UK market, an influential study on electricity restructuring
has been undertaken by Newbery and Pollitt (1997). They conducted a cost-
benefit analysis of the restructuring of the British Central Electricity Generating
Board (CEGB) which generated and transmitted all Welsh and UK public elec-
tricity until 1990. Their conclusion is that the benefits outweighed the costs,
the main gains coming from the operating efficiencies of the generating com-
panies. Regarding the British gasmarket, SERIS (2006, p. 4) reaches a conclusion
similar to Leitzinger andCollette’s above: improvements regarding for instance
capacity utilization were duemore to regulatory intervention than to competi-
tion. However, the US and UK experiences also show that the restructuring
process as a whole, comprising competition and regulatory intervention, has
in all likelihood improved operating efficiency.
Allocative efficiency is achieved if the benefits of lower operating costs
are transferred to consumers through lower prices. If competition works,
operators will cut their costs and lower prices accordingly (to the level of
marginal costs under perfect competition). The European Commission provides
some figures on the expected allocative gains from its liberalizationmeasures,
notably its unbundling proposals (CEC, 2007d, p. 38, 39). The Commission
compares the electricity prices of Member States with andwithout ownership
unbundling.17 These calculations indicate that separating ownership from
trade weakens the market power of vertically integrated companies, which
will decrease electricity prices. The Commission notes (ibid., p. 39) that similar
calculations cannot yet be made for gas, because too fewMember States have
implemented ownership unbundling for gas transmission to make a com-
parison statistically significant.
According to Pollitt (2008, p. 709), there is a lack of definitive econometric
evidence on the effects of restructuring initiatives in gas markets, which is
why a large part of empirical research is devoted to electricity studies. One
gas study by Ernst and Young (2006) for the British Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI, disbanded when the Department for Business Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform (BERR) was created on 28 June 2007), argues that gas prices
fall under liberalization, as compared to a situation without liberalization.
Specifically, they (ibid., p. 2) find ‘a strong degree of correlation between
17 Ownership unbundling is one option to remove the natural monopoly problem discussed
in section 1.4. Ownership unbundling separates the ownership of the natural monopoly
(the pipelines) from the trading activities. It is the most far reaching measure to this end.
See section 3.5.1 for other options.
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border and consumer prices and the degree of liberalization, particularly
unbundling and the creation of an independent TSO’. Steiner (2001) tests
whether regulation and restructuring – emphasizing unbundling, ownership
and third party access initiatives – have improved capacity utilization and
reserve margins on the electricity market for a panel data set of 19 OECD
countries from 1986-1996. She shows that capacity utilization is positively
correlated to unbundling and private ownership, while the effect on reserve
margins is ambiguous. Furthermore, she argues that liberalization and competi-
tion may in the long-run improve allocative efficiency by lowering electricity
prices.
These studies confirm that liberalization may also improve allocative
efficiency. However, CPB (2006) notes that the presence of market power
complicates matters. It argues that, in the case of electricity, market power
can be used to raise prices by for instance withholding supplies from the
market or withdrawing generators with lower marginal costs, even if the price
equals the marginal costs of the most expensive unit. CPB (ibid., p. 29) states
that ‘given the vulnerability of liberalized energy markets to market power
(…), European energy markets are at risk of not performing well in terms of
allocative efficiency’. This means that productive efficiency is necessary but
not sufficient to lower consumer gas prices. For example, with a single, un-
regulated supplier, higher productive efficiency will likely not result in lower
gas prices, but will instead increase producer profits. This illustrates the
importance of regulatory and structural reformmeasures: only if market power
is curbed, either through competitive forces or by a regulator, can we expect
productive gains to be passed on to the consumers. Crew and Kleindorfer
(2006, p. 74) point out the inadequacy of a policy that focuses solely on pro-
ductive efficiency by arguing that the traditional assumption ‘of economic
efficiency maximizing the size of the pie irrespective of the distribution of the
resulting benefits’ is one of the fundamental shortcomings of traditional
regulatory economics.
Another issue regarding allocative efficiency pertains to the distinction
between large and small consumers. Gas prices for large users have fallen in
most Member States, in contrast to those for small consumers and house-
holds.18 Small users apparently do not reap all the perceived efficiency gains.
Possible explanations for this include a larger bargaining power for larger
consumers and a lack of real-time metering data for small users which pre-
cludes them from responding to short-term price changes (cf. Joskow and
Tirole, 2006).
Finally, productive and allocative efficiency potentially create an efficient
equilibrium at a particular point in time. However, for this static equilibrium
to also be efficient in the longer term, dynamic efficiency (i.e., investments)
18 See the benchmarking reports by the European Commission, at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/
gas/benchmarking/index_en.htm.
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must be guaranteed too. Liberalization might, by increasing competition,
provide agentswith incentives to reduce operating costs and outperform others
by making innovative investments. One potential drawback results from the
competition’s anticipated effect on reducing overinvestments. The citation of
Helm (2005a) in the previous section implies that the social costs of under-
investments exceed those of overinvestments, hence that some degree of
overinvestment – gold plating –may be the preferred strategy. From a different
perspective, liberalization and its accompanying unbundling may decrease
firm size and consequently hamper investments (cf. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005),
implying that market power may facilitate innovation by generating funds
for investments.
MacAvoy (2007) studies the deregulation of the US gas and electricity
markets, and makes a number of interesting observations regarding liberal-
ization and investments. As we will see in this study, liberalizing gas and
electricity markets requires regulatory reform. One measure to this end is
deregulation, that is, removing or simplifying restrictions or regulations in
order to facilitate competition.MacAvoy looks into the deregulation of prices,
that is, whether prices should be determined by market forces. The goal of
the US deregulation was to create open entry and access to the facilities of
incumbent producers in order formarkets for network services to be populated
by independent sources of supply that would generate price reductions and
service improvements (ibid., p. 36). However, at the transmission level, new
entry was minimal. Furthermore, because the transmission grid could not be
broken up into independent entities, competition did not develop sufficiently
to eliminate price controls (ibid.). Because the markets for final services were
released from price controls, a situation of partial deregulation arose. A main
argument in MacAvoy’s book is that this partial deregulation is not only
unavoidable19 but also unsustainable, because the capped prices for basic
services were above marginal but below average costs, hampering invest-
ments.20
Focusing on investments in infrastructures, WRR (2008) provides a less
negative assessment. It disagrees with the notion that competition should be
rolled back (therewith implicitly acknowledging that there is no fundamental
tension between liberalization and dynamic efficiency), but shares the concerns
many people have whether the current institutional arrangements are able
19 According to page 13 of the preface, ‘the prospect of completely deregulating market
structures where there are large numbers of approximately uniform services has not been
realized because these industry networks have been driven by technologies that limit the
number of service provides’. In otherwords, competing transmission networks is impossible,
as a consequence of which price controls remain necessary to prevent abuse of the (natural-
ly) monopolistic position of the transmission network owner (see also Annex).
20 See especially chapter four of MacAvoy (2007) which provides a case study of the per-
formance of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, which went bankrupt after deregulated
wholesale market prices became higher than those capped at the retail level.
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to guarantee the adequacy of existing infrastructures in the future. It argues
that up to now, the emphasis has been on short-term (Type 1) issues, which
has been pretty successful. However, nowadays long-term (Type 2) issues have
become important, and the institutional arrangements must be able to accom-
modate these additional requirements. The vital issue concerning these Type 2
issues is investments. WRR furthermore argues that it appears to be the case
that the institutional and legal arrangements have such a strong short-term
emphasis that these long-termobjectionswill likely not be adequately secured
(ibid, p. 14).
Finally, Von Hirschhausen’s (2008) view on liberalization and dynamic
efficiency is more positive. He provides a case study of the US natural gas
industry and concludes that liberalization – through restructuring and vertical
unbundling – did not impede investments. He also notes that while these
results are not easily extended to other gasmarkets, they nevertheless provide
a reasonable working hypothesis for future studies on the subject.
A general observation deriving from the above is that determining the effect
of liberalization on competitiveness becomes quite intricate once we look
beyond productive efficiency and consider allocative and dynamic efficiency.
However, there is once again no intrinsic conflict between competitiveness
and liberalization. The issue boils down to creating the circumstances – such
as the appropriate regulatory regime – under which liberalization improves
competitiveness and efficiency. Most attention must be paid to dynamic
efficiency, once again placing investments center stage.
The market also fails with respect to competitiveness. According to the
above exposition on efficiency, the main issues in this respect are market
power, which may harm productive and allocative efficiency, and a lack of
investments, whichmay obstruct dynamic efficiency. Hence, failure of compe-
tition and uninsurable risk arguments also apply in this case. A specific failure
of competition in this regard is provided by the link between oil and gas prices.
To achieve competitive gas prices, pricing formulas must be adjusted to allow
gas scarcity, rather than oil prices, to determine gas prices. In addition, long-
term contracts should give way to shorter-term contract forms that allow gas
prices to bemore often adapted tomarket conditions (the latter argument was
instrumental in the Distrigas case study in chapter seven). Furthermore, another
important failure is due to the missing markets. As indicated, gas trading
exchanges such as Endex and the Amsterdam Power Exchange are developing,
but markets are still missing or incomplete since there is not as yet a complete
set of spot, future, forward and risk markets. Finally, information problems
also appear regularly. Russian gas prices, for instance, are non-transparent,
sincemost Russian gas trade traditionally takes the form of package deals with
an element of barter trade (IEA, 2002). Furthermore, according to a report by
Transparency International (2008), the transparency of the leading gas and
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oil companies concerning payments and operations leaves a lot to be desired.21
This makes it difficult for consumers to ascertain how much they are paying
for which services. These market failures provide a rationale for regulatory
intervention.
Consequently, we emphasize the same three points as regarding security
of supply above: 1) the absence of an inherent tension between liberalization
and competitiveness, 2) the necessity to facilitate investments and 3) the
presence of market failures which may require regulatory intervention.
1.5.3 Liberalization and sustainability
Sustainability comes down to guaranteeing a clean environment for everyone,
now as well as in the future. The use of fossil fuels creates emissions of
amongst others greenhouse gasses responsible for the problem of global
warming. Global warming, and, in its slipstream, environmental policy, is
quickly gaining (political) recognition as an energy policy spearhead. The
urgency of measures is illustrated by the current trend in CO2 emissions:
atmospheric concentrations have risen from pre-industrial levels of 270 parts
per million (ppm) to 350 ppm currently. Extrapolating the current trend puts
CO2 concentrations in the realm of 750 ppm at the end of this century while
the safety threshold is estimated at around 450 ppm (Helm, 2005b).Mitigating
these emissions provides the backdrop for EU andMember State environmental
policy.
As above, most empirical studies analyze electricity liberalization and
restructuring. Theoretical and empirical studies once again fail to provide an
unambiguous answer regarding the impact of liberalization (Sevi, 2004).
Burtraw et al. (2000) corroborate this view. They (ibid., p. 14-29) identify a
number of channels through which electricity restructuring impacts the en-
vironment: 1) changes in electricity demand in reaction to prices of other
goods, 2) substitution among fuels in electricity production, 3) efficiency
improvements due to the introduction of competition and 4) the interaction
of firm behavior and market structure with existing and new incentive-based
approaches to environmental regulation. If we translate this to gas, the im-
portant determinants for gas liberalization’s impact on the environment are
the initial position of gas in the energy mix, power generation gas use, com-
bined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) efficiency and the effectiveness of environmental
regulations. Furthermore, the other factors impacting the overall outcome
21 The companies are classified into three groups based on an assessment of their transparency.
Group 1 comprises highly transparent companies like Shell, StatoilHydro and Petrobras.
Group 2 companies, like BP, Chevron, Gazprom and Sonatrach, are middle performers,
while ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco and Petroleos de Venezuela, for example, are very non-
transparent.
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include the initial market situation, the degree of market opening and the
specific environmental measures in a Member State. These different channels
result in different effects of liberalization on sustainability, making it difficult,
if at all possible, to provide a definitive conclusion concerning the effect of
liberalization on the environment. CPB (2006) provides an overview of empirical
evidence on the relationship between liberalization and the environment from
which it concludes that a definitive verdict is very hard to reach, because
‘according to the theoretical literature the single effects can be either positive
or negative’ (ibid., p. 63).
A few examples are in order. European gas liberalization might lessen
environmental concerns by for instance promoting power sector gas use at
the expense of coal and lignite, both of which are more polluting (cf. Pearson,
2000; see also section 2.8). This would enable the least polluting fossil fuel –
gas – to form the bridge towards a sustainable energy economy based onwind,
hydro power, biomass, solar and eventually hydrogen. On the other hand,
gas liberalization may also entail dangers to the environment. The initially
anticipated (relatively) lower gas prices can have negative influences on the
demand and supply side. On the demand side, lower gas prices obviously
may raise total energy consumption and emissions. A danger on the supply
side comes down to low gas prices making the less developed but cleaner
renewable energy options less competitive. This threat subsides if the external
costs of polluting emissions are fully internalized into energy prices through
energy taxes or emissions trading. Kemfert et al. (2003), taking a game-theoretic
approach, study the strategic behavior of energy suppliers and their impact
on the economic and environmental situation in the liberalized European
electricitymarket. They argue that in the absence of full internalization, liberal-
ization may provide incentives to apply low-cost technologies which are more
polluting than gas – especially if we consider that current gas prices are much
higher than those of, for instance, coal.
In sum, similarly to both policy objectives above, the paramount issue
regarding sustainability is not so much an intrinsic conflict with liberalization,
but rather how liberalization should be complemented with regulatory pro-
visions in order to take account of market specifics like the global nature of
climate change or a Member State’s energy mix. Ensuring sustainability
requires investments in emissions reduction – for instance in measures that
improve energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies. Consequently, the
sustainability objective can also be considered as an investment problem.
Sustainability also exhibits market failures which may justify regulatory
intervention, as illustrated in the next section.
Governments frequently intervene regarding environmental issues – think
of, most notably, the Kyoto Protocol and the European emissions trading
scheme. One rationale is that environmental issues exhibit externalities that
result inmarket failure. A private entrepreneurwill not automatically consider
social costs, but will have an incentive to focus on his private costs when
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maximizing his profit, which renders his output inefficiently high or low. Due
to the negative external effects of pollution, the latter applies. Second, the
environment is a public good. The benefits of one country’s domestic reduction
of emissions are not confined to that particular country; neighboring countries
benefit from the cleaner air too. This creates an incentive to free-ride on
emission reduction investments, obstructing efficient investments. Missing
markets are a third market failure. The European emissions trading scheme
has been introduced to efficiently reduce emissions by introducing markets
that were previouslymissing. A number of promising initiatives are developing
on the Continent: Intercontinental Exchange (via the European Climate
Exchange); the European Energy Exchange; Nord Pool; and the New Values
exchange (via Climex) all offer carbon contracts.22 Whether these market
initiatives will eventually develop sufficiently and whether trading in the
remaining greenhouse gasses – such as NOx, CH4 and N2O – will be embraced
is uncertain, but prospects are certainly promising. A final market failure is
information failure because future developments are unclear. Examples include:
1) uncertainty on the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period, 2) the
political will and commitment to keep reducing emission levels even when
the low-cost, easy to achieve, options are exhausted and 3) prospects on nuclear
and sustainable energy.
The discussion of the energy policy objectives brings to the fore three
important observations. First, the energy policy objectives are not principally
at odds with liberalization. In fact, liberalization is likely to have positive
effects. However, liberalization is necessary but not sufficient, which renders
a complete reliance on market forces a utopia. Helm (2007a, p. 7) submits that
‘This [AS: liberalization] agenda has much merit, but is at best necessary. It
is very far from sufficient’. Liberalization must therefore not be viewed as a
panacea that solves all problems, but rather as a very powerful and useful
measure that in conjunction with the appropriate regulatory provisions may
create a more competitive gas market on which the energy policy objectives
are secured. A second observation is that due to its neoclassical guiding
principles, current gas regulation considers that the energy policy objectives
may require regulatory intervention because each exhibits market failures.
In otherwords, current regulation treats the energy policy objectives as public
service obligations (PSO), i.e., obligations that are not adequately securedwhen
left to the market. Securing the PSOs is complicated because they may contra-
dict each other. For instance, ensuring a sustainable energy supply requires
renewable technologies which become viable at high gas prices that diminish
competitiveness. Another example is that supply security may require the
inclusion into the energy mix of more polluting energy sources like coal.
22 For more information on these trading initiatives, see their websites at respectively
www.theice.com; www.europeanclimateexchange.com; www.eex.de; www.nordpool.com;
www.newvalues.nl and www.climex.com.
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Hence, the PSOs are characterized by multiple market failures (Helm, 2001,
p. 301-305). Securing the PSOs requires an energy policy that simultaneously
solves all market failures. Our third observation is that investments are vital
to secure any and all of the policy objectives. Consequently, despite their
multiple market failures, stimulating investments is a way to simultaneously
improve all PSOs.
1.6 PROBLEMS WHEN MOVING TOWARDS COMPETITIVE GAS MARKETS
It has been indicated that liberalization radically changes the European gas
market. It requires fundamental restructuringwhich impacts all players along
the value chain as well as other stakeholders. This implies that the transition
to amore competitive gasmarket will not be smooth, but rather amessy affair
inherently fraught with problems and conflicts. Some of these are transitory,
that is, due to the market adjusting to a new setting. Others are permanent.
The former are no long-term issue because they should in principle eventually
vanish. Permanent problems, on the other hand, are problematic as they
indicate more fundamental problems and impact the envisaged equilibrium.
In addition, implementing wrong solutions to transitory problems may make
them permanent and consequently afflict the liberalized gas market’s efficiency.
Therefore, in order to adequately judge the liberalization movement, a dis-
tinctionmust bemade between transitory and structural problems. This section
discusses three common transitory problems of moving towards competitive
gas markets. These are related to 1) contracting, 2) cross-subsidies and 3)
technology (Helm and Jenkinson, 1998, p. 10-16).
First, competition is supposed to shorten contract duration. Depending
on the way competition is introduced, rigid long-term contracts may possibly
be eliminated and replaced with short-term, possibly spot contracts.23 This
increases uncertainty for the incumbent. Twomain consequences of increased
uncertainty are 1) that an investor will demand a higher rate of return on his
investment to compensate for the higher risk (see section 2.9) and 2) that the
incumbents may want to integrate vertically to lower uncertainty. Chapter
five elaborates on the latter. At this point it suffices to note that both conse-
quences impact the end state: a higher rate of return translates into higher
consumer prices, and increased vertical integration may prevent competition
from working satisfactorily.
Stranded assets are another important contractual problem. Assets are
stranded when they become unprofitable after liberalization. The UK experience
provides an example (Waddams Price, 1998, p. 113). Former UK gasmonopolist
23 Complete removal of long-term contracts is possible only if perfect competition materializes.
See chapter three for an elaborate discussion. Inmore realistic settings, long-term contracts
are likely to be necessary also in the future (cf. Slot, 2000, p. 303).
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British Gas (BG) had signed contracts with North Sea producers to procure
gas and supply it to the UK market during the 1980s and early 1990s. The UK’s
privatization and liberalization policy at that time lowered BG’s market share.
As a consequence, contracted quantities, which were based on contracts con-
cluded under BG’s assumption that it would remain monopoly supplier to the
market, became too large. The rigid nature of these contracts prevented BG
to scale down the quantities. Matters were aggravated by the UK spot price
falling below the long-term price for which BG had bought its gas supplies.
The result was that BG was unable to sell its excess supplies at a reasonable
price. The upshot of this example is that liberalization can inflict substantial
costs on incumbents by stranding their assets. Stranded assets are a potential
threat on the Continent too. This is illustrated by the Gas Directives explicitly
reckoning with this problem (see chapter 4). Beard et al. (2003, p. 832, 833)
make an interesting observation in this respect. They point out that the
presence of stranded assets creates a fundamental dilemma for the regulator.
On the one hand, stranded assets reflect costs made on the understanding of
their eventual recoverability. On the other hand, remunerating these costs
results in higher prices, which runs counter to one of the fundamental goals
underlying energy policy. Hence, the regulator is caught between his obliga-
tions towards the investors and the desire to deliver the benefits of competition
– lower prices – to consumers. Chapter four shows that this trade-off inherently
arises when regulating a gas market.
A second transitional problem is cross-subsidization. Affordable energy
for every citizen is an important objective of energy policy. In order to ensure
this, substantial cross-subsidies developed. These cross-subsidies are most
visible in electricity. For instance, universal service obligations oblige each
supplier to within reasonable bounds supply electricity to everyone against
a reasonable price. This implies that a consumer that can be supplied only
at very high costs should also pay a reasonable price. If supply costs exceed
the price the electricity supplier is allowed to ask, this consumer is effectively
receiving a subsidy. To be able to provide this subsidy, the supplier will
subsequently ask a price to the low-cost consumers that is above the costs of
supplying them. Low-cost consumers therefore cross-subsidize high-cost
consumers. Although universal service obligations do not apply to gas, gas
does have cross-subsidies. An example pertains to an integrated company
which undertakes both non-competitive infrastructure activities and potentially
competitive trading activities. If the integrated companywas to generate high
profits from its infrastructure activities, these could be used to cross-subsidize
its competitive activities.
In a perfectly competitive environment, prices should equal supply costs.
Cross-subsidies impede this process by severing the tie between prices and
supply costs. Consequently, cross-subsidies should vanish. Tariff rebalancing
in order to obviate cross-subsidies will create winners and losers, the losers
being those who previously profited from the cross-subsidies. These losers
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have incentives to organize themselves and obstruct liberalization, even if the
total benefits outweigh total costs. According toWaddams Price (1998), another
problem is that the cross-subsidized consumers are often the most vulnerable
ones. She (p. 125-127) argues that removing their subsidization may result in
serious payment problems. Although the risk of rebalancing resulting in higher
tariffs to the vulnerable consumers has been played down somewhat in her
more recent research,Waddams Price (2005, p. 141, 142) nevertheless upholds
that low-income consumers are more vulnerable to price increases due to the
higher share of energy in their incomes. Furthermore, rebalancing may run
counter to more general policy objectives such as a fair income distribution.
Technology is a third transitional problem. Introducing competition into
gasmarkets is supposed to increase efficiency by allowing consumers a choice
of supplier. This requires consumers who are able (and willing) to switch
between suppliers. Technology is an important constraint. For example, in-
adequate metering facilities impede switching which lowers the benefits of
competition. Efficient switching requires sophisticated information technology.
For example, short-term metering must be possible, billing procedures must
be adequate, and the large data stream that follows a switch must be handled.
This requires substantial investments.
All these problems may be temporary: contractual problems are non-
existent if sufficiently liquid short-term spot markets have developed; distri-
butional problems as a consequence of cross-subsidies may be overcome by
a smart redistribution policy and technologywill develop if the correct invest-
ment signals are provided by a fully competitive gas market. They may,
however, become permanent. Aswill be shown in chapter five, the contractual
problems will likely not be solved entirely. A regulator’s information deficit
poses problems for implementing a proper redistribution policy (see section
4.4.2). Finally, the development of technology depends on the investment
climate (see chapters 2 and 5). Therefore, without the appropriate precon-
ditions, these transition problemsmaywell develop into permanent problems
that afflict the efficiency and efficacy of the envisaged liberalized internal gas
market.
1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE
This study argues that the problems indicated so far are relevant but only part
of the story, because we are currently experiencing a multitude of shifts on
the international gasmarket which put together fundamentally reshape Euro-
pean gas markets. The market shifts can be classified in the following four
broad categories:
· A shift in international relations – the emergence of a seller’s market rather
than a buyer’s market;
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· A shift in energy policy objectives with security of supply having become
the top priority, while climate change has also climbed up the ladder;
· An increasing need for investments along the entire value chain. Total EU-
27 investment requirements amount to roughly 1800 billion Euro of which
around 12 percent – 216 billion Euro – is required for gas (CEC, 2007a,
p. 17);
· An increasing influence of politics on energy relations.
Chapter two elaborates on these shifts and illustrates that they create a new
context for gas regulation. This study analyzes whether the current approach
towards liberalization is appropriate for satisfying the energy policy objectives
in this new context. As indicated in section 1.5, facilitating investments is vital
in satisfying any and all of the policy objectives. Therefore, our main interest
is with facilitating investments in the new context.
Given the problems indicated above, and the significant amount of re-
structuring required to transform the traditional market into a competitive
one, it is not surprising that liberalization hasmet with considerable opposition
and that problems inevitably arise. This is illustrated by the observation that
liberalization is not working as expected (cf. CEC, 2004a, 2005a, 2007c) and that
the current industrial and regulatory conditions appear to be struggling to
deliver the necessary investments (IEA, 2008a, p. 8). As chapter four points
out, the European Commission interprets this as a sign of insufficient compe-
tition. Consequently, the proposed prescription is tomore vehemently pursue
competition, that is, to move closer to the internal gas market by more
vigorously pursuing the Commission’s current liberalization proposals (IEA,
2008b, p. 57). In effect, it is assumed that all current problems are transitory
and can be overcome once the internal gas market has developed. Therefore,
the Commission’s underlying assumption is that the current approach is also
adequate in the new context for gas regulation.
However, the unsatisfactory state of liberalizationmay also be interpreted
as an indication that the current neoclassically-inspired, competition-oriented
approach is incompatible with the changed characteristics of the European
gas market. This would imply that current regulation is no longer adequate
in the new context. A weak point of existing gas regulation is that since it was
founded on a theory that assumes competition to eventually become perfect,
it by definition rules out the presence of a discrepancy between market char-
acteristics and liberalization. That is, it is assumed that any arising discrepancy
will eventually be removed by either competition or regulatory intervention
which will restore the competitive equilibrium. This study fills this gap by
considering whether such an assumption is correct, i.e., whether the current
regulatory approach is the proper one for the European gas market in its new
context.
This study approaches this issue by contrasting two economic perspectives:
the neoclassical and the transaction cost perspective. The neoclassical perspect-
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ive is used because it provides the guiding principles for the current regulation
(see chapters 3 and 4). The transaction cost perspective is introduced as an
alternative because it explicitly incorporates all the criteria that are identified
as important in the new context (see chapters 2 and 5). The distinction between
both perspectives is captured byWilliamson’s framework of analysis, depicted
in figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 The Williamson framework
Source: Williamson (1998), Groenewegen (2005) and CIEP (2006)
This framework identifies 4 layers of institutional analysis and forms the basis
for the transaction cost perspective on economics. Chapter five discusses this
framework extensively and applies it to the European gas market, which is
why at this point a concise overview of the basic issues suffices. This overview
serves two purposes. First, it illustrates some important differences between
both economic perspectives. Second, it motivates this study’s focus.
Level one comprises the informal institutions, such as the basic societal
values, norms and traditions, that create the level of social embeddedness for
individuals. These informal institutions are the underlying determinants of
a society’s basic view on market reform and energy policy. For gas, these
informal institutions comprise issues such as the perceptions about sovereignty
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over energy resources, beliefs about state versus markets and the energy policy
objectives discussed in section 1.5 (CIEP, 2006, p. 22). Furthermore, the market
reform principles – unbundling, access and competition – are determined at
this level.
The informal institutions influence the formal institutions at level two
where the polity, judiciary and bureaucracy are located. One could at this level
think of (inter)national treaties and laws laying down the ground rules for
the behavior of market actors. Market design takes place at this level, based
on the energy policy objectives and reform principles. The Gas Directives and
the national Gas Acts that emanate from the transposition of the Directives
into national law as well as competition policy provisions belong to this level.
Levels one and two comprise what Davis and North (1971) refer to as the
institutional environment.
The institutional environment forms the basis for the institutional arrange-
ments which are designed at the third level. The laws and treaties at the second
level are at this level transposed byMember States into actual regulation, such
as contracts, guidelines or tariffs. These institutional arrangements are the focus
of transaction cost economics (TCE), which determines the most appropriate
mode of governance given the prevailing property rights, rule of law and
regulations. This study analyzes existing European gas regulation, and
consequently emphasizes this third institutional level.
At the fourth and final level, the institutional arrangements drive the
behavior of market actors who try to achieve their specific objectives. Their
behavior determines prices, quantities and investments, which adapt more
or less continuously in response to changing market conditions. This is what
neoclassical economics is concerned with.
In sum, according to CIEP (2006, p. 22), theWilliamson framework illustrates
that ‘the structure and operation of amarket evolve as a consequence of market
design processes, driven by the traditional principles of market reform
(unbundling, access and competition) and modified by specific objectives of
energy and other policies’.
Originally, this frameworkwas developed to illustrate the position of New
Institutional Economics (NIE) among different levels of social analysis. Broadly
spoken, NIE, which is primarily based on TCE, concentrates on levels 2 and 3.
TCE is concerned with the third level, while the neoclassical perspective can
be found at level 4. As indicated, this study is interested in whether the neo-
classical perspective still suffices in the changed circumstances orwhether the
TCE provides a superior perspective for the regulation of the European gas
market. This study’s main research question can be specified as follows:
Chapter 1 31
Is existing gas regulation able to secure the PSOs given the new context it must operate
in?
To answer this question, the following subquestions are specified.
1 How has the international gas market changed and what are the conse-
quences for gas regulation?
2 What are the theoretical underpinnings of current regulation and what
does it try to achieve?
3 What kind of doubts arise concerning the appropriateness of this regulatory
scheme in light of the criteria that are pivotal in the new regulatory context
– investment irreversibility, risks and uncertainty?
4 What does the TCE perspective look like, and is it better suited to the
properties of the new context for gas regulation?
5 Which criteria for assessing existing regulation follow from this perspect-
ive?
6 Where does existing regulation go wrong under the new circumstances?
7 Which amendments are required to the provisions of the current Gas
Directives?
The first piece of information required concerns the changes in the international
gas scene. Therefore, in order to answer the first subquestion, chapter two
provides an overview of seven market shifts that in conjunction are creating
a new context for gas regulation. From these shifts, the following criteria are
derived which are elementary in a regulatory regime that satisfies the policy
objectives in this context: investment irreversibility, risks and uncertainty. These
criteria imply that in the new context, the purpose of a regulatory regime is
to create a governance structure that properly facilitates investments. This new
context is compared to the context in which existing regulation has been
instigated. This indicates that the context for gas regulation has fundamentally
changed. For example, due to the market maturity as a consequence of the
managedmarket (see sections 1.2 and 1.3), there was in the traditional structure
much less need to stimulate new investments.
The theoretical underpinnings of gas regulation determine whether the
existing regulation is able to adjust to the new context. This is the second
subquestion, which is answered in chapters three and four. This study argues
that existing gas regulation is based on neoclassical guiding principles. This
is shown by firstly setting out the neoclassical perspective on economics and
its implications for gas regulation. To this end, chapter three discusses the
main assumptions of the neoclassical approach, its view on competition, its
view on regulatory intervention and finally its policy prescriptions for re-
structuring the European gas market. Chapter four sets out the process and
contents of current gas legislation, emphasizing the Gas Directives. It provides
an overview of the legislative measures that have so far been proposed to
induce the structural and regulatory reforms necessary to liberalize the Euro-
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pean gas market, and compares these to the neoclassical recommendations.
It shows that current gas regulation is firmly embedded in the neoclassical
perspective. Chapter four furthermore provides an overview of practical
initiatives that emanate from gas regulation. These initiatives are also shown
to follow the neoclassical perspective.
Chapter four’s conclusion that current gas regulation is firmly embedded
in the neoclassical perspective towards economics and regulation answers the
second subquestion. Once this conclusion is combined with the neoclassical
prescriptions in chapter three and the market shifts in chapter two, doubts
arise concerning the applicability of the neoclassical view to the issues that
arise in the new context. None of the criteria identified in chapter two –
investment irreversibility, risks and uncertainty – are explicitly recognized
or analyzed by neoclassical economics. This answers the third subquestion.
The next step is to look for a theoretical perspective that is better aligned with
the new context. An obvious candidate is transaction cost economics (TCE),
because it has been developed specifically to deal with issues such as irrevers-
ible investments and uncertainty. Chapter five answers the fourth and fifth
subquestions by discussing TCE’s analytical framework and specifying the set
of criteria for a proper regulatory regime according to the TCE perspective.
Having set out the two contrasting economic perspectives, both perspectives
are then combined into an encompassing theoretical framework. The goal is
to specify when to use which perspective. The final step in the theoretical
critique is to apply this framework to the European gas market in order to
determine whether the conditions of the European gas market in its new
context justify the TCE perspective. To that end, the transactional characteristics
of the European gas market in its new context are identified. Subsequently,
we consider whether these transactional characteristics satisfy all TCE criteria.
The upshot is that these criteria are satisfied by the European gas market in
its new context and that the TCE perspective will therefore result in more
desirable market behavior than the neoclassical perspective.
In order to answer subquestions six and seven, the theoretical critique must
be substantiated by empirical observations on the actual behavior of market
players. The effect of regulation on market behavior, and by extension on
investments and securing the PSOs, is an empirical issue. The TCE perspective
is superior in actual practice to the neoclassical perspective only if it can be
shown to better explain and predict actual regulatory behavior. In this light
it is important to observe that several amendments have been made to Euro-
pean gas regulation that appear to follow the TCE line of reasoning. Two
notable examples are the possibility to exempt certain investments from the
obligation to provide third party access, and the enlarged scope for concluding
downstream long-term gas supply contracts. This study conducts two case
studies to analyze both amendments. Consequently, the remaining two sub-
questions are answered by the two case studies in chapters six and seven.
Chapter six analyzes the exemptions from the third party access provisions;
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chapter seven examines downstream long-term supply contracts. The goal of
both case studies is to assess whether the theoretical critique holds in practice.
This is done by describing the regulatory process in order to trace the kind
of changes to regulation that have been implemented, why these changes were
made and which arguments were voiced by the relevant stakeholders. Based
on this description, it can be determined to what extent current regulation
has implemented provisions that deviate from the neoclassical perspective,
andwhether this perspective is able to explain the amendments. An important
observation in both case studies is that the implemented amendments can only
be explained from the TCE perspective. Consequently, the TCE perspective
indeed explains actual regulatory behavior better. The final issue is to infer
whether the implemented changes sufficiently incorporate the TCE perspective.
This is assessed by tracing whether these changes incorporate all TCE criteria.
It turns out that the implemented changes offer significant adaptations to the
neoclassical paradigm but nevertheless insufficiently incorporate the TCE
perspective. Current regulation appears to be stuck between both perspectives.
Chapter eight summarizes and concludes this study.
Finally, this study analyzes the identified issues from an economic perspect-
ive. Consequently, current European gas regulation and legislation is being
assessed on economic criteria. Some chapters, especially chapters four and
seven, have a strong legal component. However, the emphasis in these chapters
is not on the legal aspects, but instead on the economic issues at stake. One
consequence of this approach is that in discussing the legislation, no attempt
is made to provide a comprehensive overview of all legal provisions. Rather,
a selected number of provisions are concisely discussed in order to set the
scene for this study’s economic analysis.

2 Market shifts
2.1 INTRODUCTION
An important element in this study is the changed landscape on the inter-
national gas market which has developed recently. This chapter sets out the
environment the European gas market and its regulation have to operate in.
This new environment results from a number of market shifts (cf. Helm, 2007a).
This chapter discusses these shifts and traces their consequences for gas
regulation.
The shifts in question create a gas market that is fundamentally different
from the one from which existing gas regulation originates. This begs the
question whether gas regulation can adapt in order to also secure the energy
policy goals in the new context in which gas regulation operates. Sections 2
to 8 below discuss the shifts which are impacting both the supply side and
the demand side, starting with the supply side. Section 2.9 traces the implica-
tions of these shifts for regulation. It is argued that the context for regulation
has changed from one that emphasizes asset sweating and where supply
security is not a main issue, into one in which the focus lies on investments,
risks, uncertainties and governance. These are the criteria that regulationmust
take into account order to adequately reach the energy policy objectives in
the changed world. Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2 EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE AND LONG-TERM VULNERABILITY
An important development in the European gas market is the rapid growth
of European gas demand during the last decade, combined with decreasing
gas production (cf. CIEP, 2006, p. 6). The resulting growing dependence of
Europe on foreign gas imports is increasingly creating anxieties. Table 2.1
provides statistics that depict Europe’s external dependence in 2006.
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Table 2.1: Europe and its gas suppliers, 2006
Russia Iran Qatar Nigeria Algeria Norway EU-25 Rest world
Proven
reserves
- percent
worlda
26.3 15.5 14.0 2.9 2.5 1.6 1.3 35.9
- bcm 47650 28130 25360 5210 4500 2890 2430
Production
- percent
worlda
21.3 3.7 1.7 1.0 2.9 3.0 6.6 59.2
- bcm 612.1 105.0 49.5 28.2 84.5 87.6 190.0
R/P 77.8 >100 >100 >100 53.3 33.0 12.8
Consumption
- percent
worlda
15.1 3.7 0.7 Na 0.8 0.2 16.3 63.2
- bcm 432.1 105.1 19.5 Na 23.7 4.4 467.4
Source: Own calculations from BP (2007).
a) percent world: percentage of world total.
The table shows that EU-25 consumption outweighs production and proven
reserves – reserves which are shown by geological and engineering data to
be recoverable with reasonable certainty in future years from known reservoirs
under existing economic and operating (BP, 2007, p. 22) – are low. Europe is
quite import-dependent, with some easternMember States completely depend-
ent on Russian supplies. Long-term projections aggravate the anxieties. Accord-
ing to CEC (2007i, p. 13), without policy changes, EU gas import dependence
will rise from 51 percent in 2000 to 81 percent in 2030. Projections of the
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007, p. 85-88) confirm the picture of rising
import dependence. According to IEA’s reference scenario, between 2000 and
2030 OECD Europe’s1 gas demand will rise from 477 to 771 bcm. Maturing
European gas fields cause gas production to level off and then decline. IEA
projects OECD Europe’s gas production to fall from 304 bcm in 2000 to 251 bcm
in 2030. The gap between consumption and production, which is expected
1 OECD Europe comprises all European Member States of the OECD, i.e. Austria, Albania,
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia andMontenegro, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and United Kingdom.
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to rise from 173 bcm in 2000 to 520 bcm in 2030, must be filled by imports
(consequently, imports will make up 67 percent of gas demand in 2030).
The reserves to production (R/P) ratio shows how many years current
proven reserves will last with current production levels. If current production
remains unchanged, all currently proven EU reserves will be depleted in 12.8
years. Some producers have abundant reserves, as indicated by the R/P ratios
in the table. Globally, the reserve picture is quite positive (BP, 2007, p. 26):
existing world proven reserves are sufficient to satisfy global gas demand for
approximately another 65 years. Hence, the global amount of reserves does
not yet pose a real threat. This is even more so because of the consensus that
the undiscovered, potential reserves are very large.2 The location of reserves
may create some anxieties, however. Most of the proven – and also undis-
covered – reserves are located outside Europe (BP, 2007, p. 26). For instance,
theMiddle East possess by far the largest R/P ratio of over 200 years, quadrupl-
ing that of Europe and Eurasia combined, which is just over 50 years. There-
fore, Europe will increasingly have to rely on imported gas supplies, the
geographical spread ofwhichmay put Europe in a vulnerable position.More-
over, these anxieties are exacerbated by political risk and ownership concerns.
Regarding the former, Röller et al. (2007, p. 7) argue that around 70 percent
of global reserves are located in medium and high risk areas. They also argue
that Russian gas should be considered as a (much) higher political risk than
indigenous volumes. Hence, Europe’s increasing import dependence will
increase (political) security of supply risks.
Constantini et al. (2007) provide an overview of a number of long-term
scenarios regarding Europe’s vulnerability – the EUWorld Energy and Technol-
ogy Outlook (WETO); the IEA World Energy Outlook 2002; the US Department
of Energy’s (EIA-DOE) outlook and the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) with theWorld Energy Council (WEC) outlook. Table
2.2 reproduces these projections.
2 This is confirmed by Adelman and Lynch (2002), who argue that in the very long-term
supply fears due to geological constraints are overstated.
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Table 2.2: European gas dependence and vulnerability
2000
(basis)
2030
WETO
2030
IEA
2025
EIA
2030
IIASA
A1
PHYSICAL DIMENSION
Dependence
- Net import percent of TPES 34.0 67.0 70.0 60.0 50.0
- Share of EU imports on world
Imports
33.0 35.0 60.0 67.0
Vulnerability supply side
- Supply concentration (trade) 0.12 0.32 0.40 Na Na
- Supply concentration
(production)
0.12 0.23 0.20 Na 0.19
- Shannon-Wiener index 0.99 0.67 1.02
Vulnerability demand side
- Share of electricity produced
With gas
16.0 24.0 39.0 - -
- Gas use per capita (toe/ab) 0.64 1.15 1.37 1.73 1.25
ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Dependence: value of gas imports
(billion $)
23.3 - 85.5
($2000)
- -
Vulnerability supply side: gas consump-
tion per $ of GDP (toe/mil 1995$PPP)
0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Source: Constantini et al. (2007, p. 219).
Although the outcomes diverge widely, the general picture is quite clear.
European net imports will increase – both as a share of total primary energy
supply (TPES) and as a share of global imports. If the share of European imports
in global imports was to rise to around two-thirds as suggested by the IIASA
scenario, a possibly powerful position as the main global gas importer could
counteract some of the import dependence anxieties (provided Europe will
be able to speak with one voice). Regarding supply side vulnerability, all
scenarios confirm that supply concentration, measured by the Hirschmann-
Herfindahl Index,3 will increase strongly in both trade and production. The
Shannon-Weiner diversity index provides an indicator of supply diversity:4
3 A value of 0 indicates low concentration; 1 indicates a monopoly.
4 See Von Hirschhausen (2005). The formulaic expression is: [- ∑xi ln xi bi](1+ gi), whereby
ln xi is the natural logarithm of the market share of supplying country i; bi is an index
of political stability in producing country i; and gi represents the share of indigenous energy
production. As opposed toHHI, this diversitymeasure places weight on smaller participants
and its value ranges from 0 (low diversity) to 2 (high diversity).
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the higher this index, the higher the level of diversification and consequently
the lower is vulnerability. The WETO is quite negative concerning the scope
for diversification. IEA, on the other hand, envisages some – albeit very little –
room for supply diversification (through for instance new import routes). The
demand side vulnerability indicators affirm a higher vulnerability. According
to the table, gas use in electricity generation will increase sharply (see section
2.8), while per capita gas use will rise too. These figures indicate a higher
future gas intensity. This translates directly into the economic dependence
figures which show that the value of gas imports will rise. This is caused by
higher import volumes, but higher gas prices play an important part too. In
money terms, as opposed to per capita terms, gas consumption is projected
to remain stable during the coming decades. To sum up, table 2.2 illustrates
a consensus that Europe’s gas supply vulnerability will increase.
2.3 PRODUCER BEHAVIOR
Given the forecasts above, producer behavior becomes a vital parameter for
European energy policy. The original expectation in Europe was that the
producing countries would gradually embrace Europe’s liberalization approach.
That is, producers were expected to welcome foreign direct investments into
their energy sectors, grant access to their reserves and to privatize their energy
incumbents.
2.3.1 Access to reserves and state ownership
Current developments indicate a changing balance between the international
oil majors (IOCs) and the national oil companies (NOCs) of the producing
countries. These changing dynamics have urged the Financial Times (2007a)
to speak of the ‘new seven sisters’. The traditional seven sisters – the seven
biggest IOCs, reduced to ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron and BP after consolida-
tion – currently produce around 10 percent of global oil and gas and hold
about 3 percent of global reserves (Worldbank, 2008, p. 3). The new seven
sisters comprises seven NOCs – Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, China National
PetroleumCorporation, National IranianOil Company, Petróleos de Venezuela,
Brazil’s Petrobras and Malaysia’s Petronas – who collectively control about
one-third of global oil and gas production and over one-third of global oil
and gas reserves. Each of these new seven sisters is to a large extent owned
or controlled by its respective government, creating apprehensions of energy
being deployed as a strategic asset or even weapon to further political, non-
energy goals to the detriment of European consumers.
Zanoyan (2004, p. 3) narrows the scope to gas. He argues that IOCs have
full equity access – which allows them to book reserves to replace their de-
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pleting reserve stocks in order to uphold or increase their market value – to
around 10 percent of global gas reserves. These are reserves in countries where
the governments themselves are not involved in the exploitation. The remain-
ing 90 percent of the global gas reserves are found in countries where govern-
ments are actively involved through an NOC. A small part of these reserves,
8 percent of global reserves, are open to IOCs. Both Russia’s 31 percent share
of the global reserve base and the remaining 51 percent in other countries are
accessible, in a limited manner, through service contracts rather than equity
contracts.
Production sharing agreements provide an example of such service con-
tracts (Bindemann, 1999). Under a production sharing agreement, the state,
through the NOC, allows an IOC as a contracter to provide technical, financial
and management services, in exchange for a share of the receipts.5 However,
the reserves remain the property of the state. In economic terminology, this
is a principal-agent problem with the resource rent at stake. The principal –
the producer government, represented by the NOC – needs to design an in-
centive contract that induces the agent – the IOCs – to behave in a manner that
maximizes the principle’s welfare (Pongsiri, 2004).
Views on the prospect for cooperation between IOCs and NOCs differ. On
the one hand, Al-Moneef (2006) downsizes the concerns by arguing that energy
security is a shared concern of both producer and consumer nations and that
there is scope for fruitful cooperation between both. This is corroborated by
Zanoyan (2004, p. 11) who argues that cooperation between IOCs and govern-
ments/NOCs is not a zero sum game. There is ample room for mutually bene-
ficial cooperation because their activities are generally complementary rather
than competitive: producing nations have the subsoil resources the IOCs are
looking for, while the IOCs have the skills producers generally lack to optimally
exploit the resources. From this perspective, partnerships between NOCs and
IOCs should result in adequate and timely investments whichmitigate concerns
on both sides.
This positive view is not universally shared, however. Marcel (2006) pro-
vides some insights.6 As indicated, the needs of IOCs and NOCs differ. IOCs
generally want 1) access to reserves to increase their market value, 2) accept-
able rates of return, 3)mechanisms for enhanced recovery and 4) opportunities
for additional future investments. NOCs, on the other hand, are in need of 1)
capital, 2) management skills and 3) technology to develop their resources.
In addition, NOCs are often bound by their governments to pursue additional
considerations such as maintaining sovereign control over their resources,
optimize resource development and improve domestic prosperity. These
5 This is the basic mechanism. In practice, bilaterally negotiated production sharing agree-
ments will differ from one another.
6 Marcel considers the case of oil. Nevertheless, the basics of the IOC/NOC relationship are
also applicable to gas.
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differences create tensions between the players which hamper cooperation.7
For example, optimizing resource development is a long-term planning decision
which may in the short-run require below-capacity production. Furthermore,
a government’s responsibility for its citizensmay urge it to subsidize domestic
gas prices, as happens in Russia.8 This increases domestic gas demand at the
expense of export volumes. These goals contrast with those of IOCs, who
typically have incentives to develop an existing resource base as fast as possible
– for economic reasons, but also to expose themselves to political risks for as
short a period as possible. According to Marcel (2006, p. 6), another problem,
in addition to differing objectives, relates to the blurring distinction between
NOCs and IOCs. She provides two examples. First, the strategy of many NOCs
has changed. The internationalization strategies pursued by for instance
Algeria’s Sonatrach andMalaysia’s Petronas imply that these NOCs are increas-
ingly engaging on IOC territory. Second, public ownership of NOCs becomes
less clear following for example the partial privatizations of Norway’s Statoil
(merged into StatoilHydro in December 2006) and Brazil’s Petrobras.
The outcome of the relationship between an IOC and an NOC, and the
corresponding distribution of rents, depends on both players’ relative nego-
tiating positions. This is a function of, amongst others, the principal’s
possession of the resources and the agent’s technical expertise for developing
these resources. If one expects a high need of NOCs for capital or technical
expertise, then the producers are expected to be relatively favorable to IOCs
entering theirmarkets, large investments can bemade and consequently large
amounts of reserves can be developed and traded. At the time of the inception
of liberalization, the low oil and gas prices, added to the fact that NOCs had
little technical expertise, an uneducated workforce and in some cases (Saudi
Arabia and Abu Dhabi) management support from the IOCs (cf. Marcel, 2006,
p. 4) created a favorable bargaining position for the IOCs. In such a situation
we can expect access to reserves being provided relatively easily and on
relatively favorable terms. On the other hand, if this need is limited because
NOCs have developed their own expertise and management skills or have the
funds available to hire these elsewhere, the balance shifts to the NOCs as a
result of which IOC access to reserves is hampered. Consequently, as Marcel
argues, this maturation of the NOCs results in the conclusion of new production
sharing agreements without equity access provisions and renegotiation of
existing agreements. In addition, the typically more conservative exploitation
7 Matters are furthermore complicated by differing objectives between a producer government
and its ownNOC (Zanoyan, 2004, p. 8).WhereNOCs are conservative and try tomaximize
the resource base and retain control over resources, national governmentsmay have stronger
preferences towards short-term revenue generation (Marcel, 2006, p. 4). Hence, an NOC
will typically implement a more conservative depletion policy than an IOC or producer
government.We do not explicitly consider this complication in the remainder of this study.
8 See Stern (2005) and Spanjer (2007a).
42 Market shifts
strategy of an NOC will result in lower availability of gas supplies on the
market which may increase importer fears of a supply disruption.
As indicated above, most NOCs are controlled by their governments. We
close this section by narrowing the scope to the European gas market in
particular. Table 2.3 shows that in 2004, European gas production accounted
for a mere 37 percent of demand, the rest being provided by government-
dominated exporters.
Table 2.3: State ownership of main gas exporters to Europe, 2004
% of
demand
Main exporting
company (NOC)
Status State ownership %
Norway 17 Statoil Monopoly 70
Russia 29 Gazprom Monopoly 51
Algeria 13 Sonatrach Monopoly 100
Nigeria 1 BBOC Monopoly 100
Qatar 1 Qatargas Monopoly 65
EU production 37
Source: Röller et al. (2007, p. 7).
Gazprom stands out it this regard: it supplies 29 percent of European gas
demand. As indicated, Russia holds 31 percent of global gas reserves. Gazprom
is controlled by the Russian government, as indicated by its 51 percent share.
In addition, according toHelm (2007b, p. 24-26), Russia is currently renational-
izing its gas reserves as well as renegotiating existing PSAs, with the Sakhalin-2
project as a notable example (p. 25).9
This situation, in combination with producers’ growing assertiveness on
back of their rising energy incomes, creates concerns in Europe.10 In sum,
the combination of lower access to reserves and increasing state ownership
which is changing the balance of power between NOCs and IOCs, signifies a
fundamental shift – a shift which European gas regulation has to reckonwith.
2.3.2 Producer cooperation
The above fears are exacerbated by anxieties concerning producer collusion.
This explains why the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), established in
2001, causes some concern for the importing countries. GECF is an informally
9 See Stern (2005, p. 145-152) for background information regarding the Sakhalin projects.
10 See, for instance, De Kort and Spanjer (forthcoming) for an analysis of these concerns in
light of the relationship between Europe and Russia.
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structured group of the world’s leading gas producers which is aimed at
representing and promoting their mutual interests.11 Collectively, GECF cur-
rently controls around 74 percent of global proven reserves, contributes to
45 percent of production and takes care of 91 percent of LNG trade.12 Due
to this collective strength, some importers fear that GECF may evolve into a
gas-OPEC or Gaspec. GECF denies this and has posited, in September 2001, that
its intention is merely to enhance ‘the role of stable and transparent energy
markets for the health of the world economy, security of supply and demand,
and expansion of the global trade in energy sources’ (Global Gas Reporting,
2003). Anxieties have flared up again following a recent GECF meeting (April
2007) where a number of members – predominantly Venezuela and Iran –
explicitly expressed interest in creating a Gaspec. Producers’ views on aGaspec
are more diverse this time: Russia, Egypt and Qatar, as opposed to Venezuela
and Iran, expressly denied intentions of creating a Gaspec, stressing that the
GECF’s main impetus is and will be to cooperate with consumers in a trans-
parent manner.
With the promoting of mutual interests as one of its explicit goals, GECF
to a certain extent brings suspicion upon itself, because preventing oversupply
and low gas prices clearly is a mutual interest of gas producers. Microeconomic
theory tells us that the socially optimal gas supply will always be considered
to be oversupply by a profit maximizing producer with market power. How-
ever, two main impediments to the creation of a gas cartel similar to OPEC are
the regional nature of gas and the higher price elasticity of power generator
gas demand as compared to oil. First, gas is traded chiefly through bilateral
long-term contracts and is transported through regional pipelines, whichmakes
it virtually impossible for Gaspec to influence the price level in the way OPEC
can. Second, the effect of gas price increases will probably be smaller, because
unlike in the case of oil, where the transport sector’s oil demand is very
inelastic due to a lack of substitution possibilities, there are substitution
possibilities for dual-fired electricity generators.13
Academic views on the likelihood of a Gaspec differ. According to Odell
(2003), the emphasis of EU liberalization on creating a competitive gas supply
system exposes producers to uncertainty concerning their upstream invest-
ments, which provides them with an incentive to collude in response to EU
11 Membership has fluctuated, but members include Algeria, Bolivia, Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial
Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Libya,Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Trinidad& Tobago,
the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. Turkmenistan has been involved in the past,
and Norway participates as an observer.
12 Calculated from BP (2007).
13 There is, however, some uncertainty on the viability of these substitution possibilities. This
is because switching to oil becomes increasingly unattractive due to climate change consider-
ations, nuclear energy is still suffering from a lack of political acceptability and sustainable
alternatives are still too expensive. Hence, most new power generation facilities are built
for gas firing.
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liberalization. Wagbara (2007) conducts a comparative study of the prospects
and constraints regarding the development of Gaspec in light of OPEC’s ex-
perience. He argues that the potential for cooperation among the gas-rich
countries is great. Nevertheless, he identifies a number a significant constraints
(ibid., p. 1229-1231) of which we mention three. One important constraint is
the lack of spare capacity required to control themarket in theway OPEC does.
Second, he observes that the gas markets of the GECF members are at different
stages of development, with consequently differing gas policies. Different gas
policies in turn impede fruitful cooperation. Third, a general lack of informa-
tion and transparency makes it difficult to coordinate actions and to detect
cheating, which lowers the effectiveness of a cartel. Hallouche (2006, p. 52)
submits that the buyers’ market motivated producers to cooperate and set up
Gaspec. In the current sellers’ market with high prices and tight supplies,
however, the need for collusion among producers is not very great. If market
conditions were to change again, GECF may however become more proactive
in regulating long-term oversupply (ibid., p. 54).
Regarding the scope for producers to prevent oversupply, the following
is instructive. If producers were to succeed at this task, an oversupplied
European gasmarket would be a relic of the past and consequently the current-
ly developing seller’s market will be here to stay. This rather grim outlook
is not universally shared. Kjärstad and Johnsson (2007) argue that the combined
2010 export projections of the three main suppliers to Europe – Russia, Algeria
and Norway – sum up to around 315 bcm, which comes close to the projected
EU import needs of approximately 340 bcm. Contracts with alternative suppliers
are expected to deliver around 81 bcm and hence more than make up for the
difference, possibly creating another gas bubble. The likelihood of these
planned projects materializing depends on at least two vital conditions: the
incentives for and scope of cooperation among gas producers (as indicated
above), and the investments needed for supplying Europe actuallymaterializ-
ing (see section 2.9). A main theme in this study is that neither is guaranteed
beforehand.
These studies on Gaspec imply that the incentives for collusion among
gas-rich countries do exist. However, for the time being, the practical con-
straints to such collusion developing into a cartel are substantial, which renders
the fears of a Gaspec exaggerated. However, a certain degree of production
coordination should not be ruled out. In conclusion, the changing position
and behavior of gas-producing countries constitutes a structural break with
the past in several respects – a break European gas regulation will have to
reckon with.
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2.4 MORE LONG-DISTANCE SUPPLY
As indicated, due to Europe’s dwindling domestic production, future gas
supplies will increasingly come from countries outside Europe, hereby traveling
long distances. Transport costs and in turn supply costs will rise. Also, gas
transport is very capital-intensive which results in a large share of fixed costs
within total costs. The larger the transport distance, the longer and bigger
pipelines need to be. This increases the share of fixed costs, which urges
producers to reduce spare capacity and utilize a pipeline to its maximum in
order to spread their fixed costs over as large a volume of gas as possible.
The result is a low level of over-capacity and a limited ability to offer flexible
off-takes. Flexibility is important to the receivers of the gas, the EU transmission
companies, who supply their gas to the local distribution companies (LDCs)
and large industrial consumers. In addition, flexibility is vital to LDCs because
their small consumers are much less able to adapt their gas consumption than
the large users towhom the transmission companies deliver their gas.Without
flexibility it will be very hard, if at all possible, to satisfy the capricious gas
demand. In addition to unsatisfied consumers, this situation could also result
in high imbalance fines. Since the producers cannot be expected to provide
such flexibility, the transmission companies and/or LDCs need to create flexibil-
ity themselves, which will increase the demand for flexibility in Europe. This
may result in the building of seasonal gas storages. Up to 2025, a projected
45 to 60 bcm of seasonal storage working volume will be needed, requiring
substantial additional investments (CIEP, 2005).
Another important effect of gas traveling larger distances is that it stimu-
lates the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG).14 As gas delivered by
pipeline becomes more expensive, the attractiveness of LNG as an alternative
to pipelined gas increases. Jensen (2004, p. 7) provides estimates of the costs
of LNG versus pipelines. He shows that LNG becomes more competitive with
distance, and after about 3000 miles, an LNG train is the cheapest option
available. LNG’s attractiveness is furthermore increasing because of 1) its lower
transit risks compared to pipeline gas supply, which usually transits several
countries before reaching its final destination, 2) the emphasis on diversifying
gas supplies and 3) the large reduction in LNG costs. LNG may partly offset
the above dependency concerns by increasing flexibility and enabling con-
sumers to diversify suppliers. LNG is much more flexible than pipelined gas,
which is mostly dedicated. On the other hand, LNG’s flexibility also benefits
producers as it facilitates diversification of consumers.
In theory, LNG can be delivered by ship to any receiving terminal with
sufficient capacity. In future, price developments could determine where an
14 See Jensen (2003, 2004) and CIEP (2003).
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LNG ship delivers its cargo.15 For this reason LNG is regarded as an important
vehicle to increase competition and integration between consumer centers such
as Europe, the United States and Asia. However, LNG’s flexibility is determined
in part by the degree of long-term contracts in the LNG chain. As with pipe-
lines, long-term contracts have been the main vehicle to share risks along the
value chain. The large up-front investments involved in an LNG project render
a degree of long-term contracting necessary. Therefore, it is likely that long-
term contracts will remain themainstay of the LNG business (Jensen, 2004, p. 1
and Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p. 205). Nevertheless, despite these
limitations, one effect of LNG has been to make gas trade less regionally
oriented.
2.5 INCREASING TRANSIT FLOWS
LNG trade will grow, but is not expected to surpass pipeline trade. Pipelines
will remain the mainstay of the European gas industry, which means that
increasing imports will increase transit. Russia is themost prominent example:
more Russian pipelines will, given Russia’s existing pipeline system, result
in more transit through Ukraine and Byelorussia. Transit could and does lead
to disputes between Russia and these transit countries, which threatens Euro-
pe’s gas deliveries.16 Transit problems are not only harmful to Europe; Russia
also wants to avoid transit problems as much as possible. An interruption in
Russian gas supply could have detrimental consequences for Russia’s reputa-
tion as a secure gas supplier and would result in lower Russian gas profits
since Europe is a premium17 market for Russian gas. In the long-run, transit
problemsmight urge Europe to increasingly undertakemeasures to move away
from Russian gas (through for instance supply diversification or energy effi-
ciencymeasures). The significance of transit to Russia is illustrated by the Blue
Stream, Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, which are to a large extent
built to avoid transit.
2.6 DELINKING AND RELINKING
Structural shifts have also occurred on the demand side. We discuss three
important demand shifts below. The two oil crises of the 1970s have facilitated
15 Obviously, there can and will be bottlenecks at sea too, such as the Suez Canal or the Strait
ofMalacca. Therefore, arbitrage opportunities will not only be influenced by transport costs,
but also by the ability to reach a certain port with favorable conditions.
16 There have been a few transit incidents, for example betweenRussia and Byelorussia (Bruce,
2005) and Russia and the Ukraine (Stern, 2006a).
17 Russian gas is currently sold to Europe at much higher prices than to Russian or FSU
(former Soviet Union) consumers, cf. Stern (2005) and Spanjer (2007a).
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a delinking of economic growth from energy use (CEC, 2005c, p. 47). Prior to
the crises, energy demand growth was linked to GDP growth, meaning that
GDP growth determined the projections for investments in new infrastructure.
The crises prompted European economies to rethink their energy policies. One
spearhead became to lower energy intensity. As an illustration, German energy
intensity has declined by 30 percent since the 1970s, while the Frenchmanaged
a 40 percent reduction (ibid., p. 12). For Europe as a whole, energy intensity
has decreased by an average of 1.6 percent per year until 2002 (ibid., p. 47).
The economic downturn which followed the crises facilitated economic re-
structuring. As a result, economic activity shifted away from the relatively
unattractive energy-intensive industries towards less energy-intensive service
sectors like finance (as well as to Asia and Japan). Furthermore, rising energy
prices lowered energy demandwhich enhanced energy efficiency. Due to these
factors, energy demand grows around 1 percent per year which is much lower
than GDP growth of approximately 2.4 percent per year (ibid., p. 47). Hence,
these shifts have lowered, but not obviated, European energy demand growth.
This is confirmed by IEA demand projections which over the last few years
show a decline in the still rising trend (Honoré and Stern, 2007, p. 226).
Global gas demand growth, on the other hand, has not been delinked from
GDP growth. Rather, several countries see their economic growth, and their
energy use on back of it, rise to unprecedented heights. Prime examples are
found in Asia – especially China, India and Indonesia – and Africa, but also
Latin America and theMiddle-East. These countries are reaching an industrial-
ization phase in which mobility is taking off, resulting in a sharply rising
energy demand. Hence, global energy demand growth has become relinked
to GDP growth, i.e., the global ratio of energy growth to GDP growth is increas-
ing (Shell, 2005, p. 28).
The global picture is one of growing energy demand – predominantly in
Asia and Africa, but also in Europe. For Europe, the upshot of this is a shift
towards increased competition for imports sinceMiddle-Eastern, Caspian and
Russian gas supplies are within economic reach of all importing regions. The
expected rise of LNG makes gas trade more flexible and expands the range
of gas deliveries also to the US, further increasing competition among con-
sumers. The overall increase in demand, as well as the competition that might
develop between regions, may increase the commodity price of gas and aggra-
vate supply security fears.
2.7 GROWING AWARENESS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The awareness of climate change is growing primarily because global economic
growth exhibits increasing carbon intensity. Whereas up to 1997 carbon in-
tensity in GDP was clearly declining, as a consequence of for example the
declining importance of the coal industry and improvement in energy effi-
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ciency, this trend has since reversed (Helm, 2007a, p. 14). The industrializing
countries above are expected to achieve the highest growth rates. Their in-
dustrialization not only creates an explosive growth in energy demand, but
also in carbon emissions, which reinforces the awareness of emissions that
has developed due to the greenhouse effect. As indicated in section 1.5.3,
atmospheric CO2 concentrations have risen from pre-industrial levels of 270
parts per million to a current 350 ppm, while extrapolating the current trend
puts CO2 concentrations in the realm of 750 ppm at the end of this century
compared to the safety threshold which is estimated at around 450 ppm (Helm,
2005b).
These developments have rendered the mitigation of such hazards a vital
parameter for energy policy. In the words of Sioshansi (2005), climate change
has evolved from an academic issue into a public policy challenge and has
become a significant risk factor for the business community, especially the
energy-intensive industries. Accordingly, the growing importance of sustain-
ability is a structural shift which induces energy policy to be concerned not
only with the volume of supplies but to an increasing extent also with their
content.
2.8 A SHIFT IN DEMAND TOWARDS POWER GENERATION
Power generation gas demand has occupied Europe for over thirty years
(Söderholm, 1998). As indicated in section 1.3, the managed market resulted
in a restrictive use of gas for power generation. During the 1990s, however,
natural gas became the fuel of choice for power generation, predominantly
at the expense of coal. Since then power generation gas demand has increased
substantially, and this trend is expected to continue in the coming years. Table
2.2 shows the increasing share of electricity produced with gas. Power gener-
ation accounts for an increasing share of gas demand, changing the com-
position of gas demand. Honoré and Stern (2007, p. 227) argue that approxi-
mately 70 percent of the total demand increase until 2030 is currently expected
to be attributable to power generation. They identify three reasons for this
dash for gas: 1) the economics and efficiency – due to lower capital costs, lower
construction lead times and higher economies of scale – of new combined cycle
gas turbine (CCGT) power plants, 2) the low emissions of gas and 3) the adapt-
ability, flexibility and availability of gas in an open power sector. Opinions
differ, however. For instance, De Jong (2004, p. 94, 96) mentions that these
growth figures tend to overlook 1) the opaqueness of the gas market which
makes the use of more transparent options, for example oil, more attractive
and 2) the complexity inherent in developing a gas supply chain which could
divert choice away from gas.
In addition, the soaring oil and gas prices are creating substantial un-
certainties concerning the future of gas demand from power generators. High
Chapter 2 49
gas prices slow down gas demand. Coal and nuclear powermay becomemore
attractive fuels of choice for power generators. Consequently, the development
of new CCGT plants may be delayed or existing ones may run at low load
factors (Honoré, 2006, p. 14).18 Honoré illustrates possible effects on gas
demand. She assumes the load factor of power plants that run baseload at
75 percent (ibid., p. 25, 26).19 If, in contrast, power plants run at peak load,
with an assumed load factor of 20 percent, EU 25 power generation gas demand
would be slashed by 60 bcm by 2015 (ibid., p. 14).20 According to Stern and
Honoré (2007, p. 229), gas-fired power plants will not run baseload in either
Northwest or East Europe – only the UK, Spain and Italy have the possibility
for baseload gas-fired power generation at current prices. Both studies conclude
that while EU-25 power generation gas demand will definitely increase, the
current projections will only materialize at substantially lower prices than the
current ones. The growth will furthermore be confined predominantly to the
UK, Spain and Italy. Gas supply security anxieties create additional un-
certainties. As long as gas import dependence and supply security remain
political threats (whether justified or not), incentives will be strong to base
power generation on domestically available supplies like coal, nuclear power,
lignite or hydro.
Therefore, in sum, we can say that an increasing share of gas-fired power
generation will change the composition of gas demand. However, current
projections appear to be overly optimistic and the precise effect of this market
shift on gas demand is still quite uncertain and unclear.
2.9 A NEW CONTEXT FOR GAS REGULATION
As set out in the introduction, the shifts on the international gas market can
be divided into four main categories:
· A shift in international relations between producers and consumers – the
emergence of a seller’s market as opposed to a buyer’s market;
· An increasing influence of politics on energy relations;
· A shift in energy policy objectives with security of supply having become
the top priority, while climate change has also climbed up the ladder;
· An increasing need for investments along the entire value chain. Total EU-
27 investment requirements amount to roughly 1,800 billion Euro of which
18 A load factor is the ratio of actual production to maximum production capacity.
19 A power plant runs baseload if it serves the minimum amount of power that a utility or
distribution company must make available to its consumers, or the amount of power
required to meet minimum demands based on reasonable expectations of consumer require-
ments.
20 A peak load power plant only runs in case of very high (peak) demand. It serves the
maximumpower requirement of a system at a given time, or the amount of power required
to supply consumers at times when need is greatest.
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around 12 percent – 216 billion Euro – is required for gas (CEC, 2007a,
p. 17). In addition, the energy policy objectives are essentially also an
investment problem (see section 1.5).
These shifts create a new context for European gas regulation. The issue boils
down to stimulating investments on a seller’s market where political considera-
tions are gaining importance. The two sections below elaborate on the conse-
quences of these market shifts compared to the context from which current
regulation emanates. This discussion allows us to specify the criteria which
a regulatory policy must satisfy in this new context.
2.9.1 Investment characteristics
Investments in gas markets are required along the entire value chain, compris-
ing exploration and production, transmission, distribution and ancillary ser-
vices. Investments in exploration, production and transmission including LNG
are predominantly irreversible (sunk). Examples are costs for project identifica-
tion, investment planning and construction, which imply that the economic
viability of a project is not guaranteed beforehand (Hubert, 2007, p. 63). In
addition, transmission and distribution are considered a natural monopoly
due to economies of scale and scope. Other segments exhibit scale and scope
economies too. In descending order we have gas storage and blending (i.e.,
quality conversion); exploration and production; and gas trading.
Many future investments will relate to the production and transport of
gas. The irreversibility creates the largest risks. For instance, once laid, a gas
pipeline has very limited, if any, alternative use. This creates a quasi-rent,
which is the difference between an investment’s pay-off in its current use and
its highest alternative use. Furthermore, the decision to build a pipeline is
usually based on negotiations between a specific consumer and a specific
producer. This locks both parties into a bilateral dependency which changes
through time and which affects the appropriation of the quasi-rent. Prior to
the investment, the producer/investor has a relatively strong bargaining
position, as the consumer or its regulator depends on him for undertaking
the investment.21 Ex-post, however, the limited alternative use of its sunk
investment ties the investor to the market for the foreseeable future, which
shifts the bargaining power to the regulator. This provides the regulator with
an incentive to adapt his policy in order to increase his own or society’s rents
at the expense of the investor’s through arrogating the quasi-rent.22 This can
21 We refer to investor and regulator throughout this study.
22 Society’s rents increase because most regulatory models specify a social welfare function
that attaches a higher weight to consumer benefits than to producer benefits. See Baron
and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986).
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be achieved through renegotiation or expropriation. The former entails a
regulator using information obtained during the regulatory process to increase
welfare in the subsequent period(s) at the expense of the investor. Expro-
priationmeans that a regulator creams-off the investor’s profits via for instance
determining low prices or by cheaply or freely permitting entry. Both adapta-
tions may obstruct or hold-up investments. The key element in this regard
is regulatory risk.
The bilateral dependency and lock-in discussed above are primarily due
to asset specificity (whichwill be elaborated upon in chapter 5).23 Gasmarkets
exhibit several forms of asset specificity. The first is locational specificity, which
is due to the spread of gas reserves. Because potential gas producers are
limited, importers often largely depend on a specific producer. Second, the
network-bound character of gas creates physical asset specificity. This most
clearly manifests itself in the distribution segment where consumers are
commonly connected to appliances that support a specific range of gas specifi-
cations. Third, dedicated assets are created by investments which are specific
to a particular consumer-producer relationship. As indicated, pipelines that
connect a producer with a consumer are good examples.
In the old context these considerations were relatively unimportant. For
instance, stimulating investments was not necessary because of the maturity
of large parts of Europe, while an oversupply of gas rendered dependency
issues relatively unimportant. The market shifts change this picture. Many
new investments are necessary, to a large extent in new pipelines, LNG ter-
minals and storage facilities, all of which are irreversible. As indicated, this
increases regulatory risk and consequently makes regulatory credibility a vital
component for future energy regulation (cf. Guthrie, 2006, p. 31-42). LNG may
reduce asset specificity, especially locational specificity, because LNG creates
the possibility to diversify between suppliers. Also, an LNG terminal does not
need to be constructed for a specific producer or consumer, which makes the
investment less dedicated. However, while these advantages are real, they
must not be overstated because 1) LNG has high storage costs, to an extent
impeding arbitrage and 2)most LNG capacity is committed to a specific project
(in contrast to for instance oil), which means that uncommitted LNG volumes
are quite small (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p. 205).
Furthermore, pipelines remain the mainstay of the gas business. The
increasing import dependence calls for new pipelines from the producers to
Europe, which increases asset specificity. Furthermore, the longer traveling
distances allow a level of flexibility which necessitates additional investments
in European storage. As indicated, storage facilities may aggravate the natural
monopoly problem.
23 See Williamson (1996, p. 59, 60) and Creti and Villeneuve (2003, p. 4).
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2.9.2 Uncertainty
Uncertainty is another vital parameter in regulation aimed at facilitating
investments. Investment under uncertainty is what Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
are concerned with in their real options theory. More recently, Guthrie (2006)
surveys the literature on the implications of different regulatory schemes for
infrastructure industries. Agreeing with Dixit and Pindyck, Guthrie emphasizes
the relevance of modern investment theory to the study of regulation of
infrastructure industries. Intertemporal issues such as investment timing and
irreversibility are stressed.
Under uncertainty, it may be beneficial to delay an investment in order
to wait for more certainty. Uncertainty impacts the investment through the
option value: the higher the uncertainty, the larger the option value, and the
higher the hurdle rate (i.e., the price against which an investor is willing to
immediately invest). Most empirical studies of the impact of uncertainty on
investments take a short-run perspective and find a negative impact (Servén,
1997 and Altug et al., 2000).
In the long-run, uncertainty may increase the capital stock. For example,
Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) argue that the long-run capital stock increases
under uncertainty because uncertainty increases the future marginal revenue
product of capital. Abel and Eberly (1999) take a more nuanced stance by
arguing that the ultimate result of uncertainty of the long-run capital stock
depends on the relative magnitude of the following two effects. They show
that the long-run capital stock might increase due to a hangover effect:
irreversibility makes it impossible for a firm to sell its capital in a low demand
state, resulting in a higher capital stock thanwithout reversibility. On the other
hand, they also argue that uncertainty and irreversibility increase the user cost
of capital, which lowers the long-run capital stock. Neither effect dominates
globally. These authors also show that the presence of uncertainty increases
ambiguity. This ambiguity invites additional empirical research. A recent
survey of the empirical literature on investment under uncertainty concludes
that despite some fundamental difficulties in empirically testing the above
effects, uncertainty generally lowers investment, also in the long-run (Carruth
et al., 2000).
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 18) distinguish two types of uncertainty:
aggregate uncertainty, which affects all firms in an industry, and idiosyncratic
or firm-specific uncertainty, which affects a particular firm. Regarding the
former, if industry-wide demand increases, investing becomes attractive for
every firm in the industry. Depending on the competitive status of the in-
dustry, the associated output expansion – through entry of new firms or
capacity expansion of existing firms – lowers prices somewhat and therefore
also lowers the profit a particular firm can reap. When, on the other hand,
industry demand falls, this again affects all firms.Without irreversible invest-
ments, some firms leave the industry, which somewhat lowers the effect of
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the decreased demand on the remaining firms. However, the lack of exit
possibilities due to the irreversibility of investment precludes this exit and
its resulting cushioning effect. Hence, the response is asymmetric: positive
shocks to industry profitability are scaled down, whereas negative shocks are
not. Profits are therefore truncated, which makes a firm cautious to invest.
Idiosyncratic uncertainty, on the other hand, changes the effect of a positive
shock. A positive shock now affects just one firm and increased profitability
need not be shared with others. There is therefore no risk of profits being
eroded by entry or capacity expansion, mitigating the above asymmetry and
improving investment incentives. However, the investment timing decision
is still influenced because higher risk increases the option value which may
induce the investor to postpone his investment.
One particularly important form of uncertainty is regulatory or political
uncertainty (Altug et al., 2000 and Buckland and Fraser, 2001). An example
is the urge of some governments, prompted by record high gas prices on back
of those of oil, to impose a tax on energy company profits in order to redistri-
bute some of these profits back to consumers. This increases regulatory risk,
which energy companies will incorporate into their calculations. Ultimately,
these higher risk levels will feed through into higher consumer prices, at least
partly counteracting the goal of changing the rent distribution.
The option value of waiting also increases if investors doubt the sustain-
ability of a policy which is beneficial to them (Sérven, 1997, p. 14). The value
of waiting increases and investments are postponed until the return on capital
rises sufficiently to compensate the losses to the investor should a policy
reversal take place (of course, if the necessary hurdle rate is never reached,
this investment pause is perpetual and no investment is undertaken at all).
An example pertains to renewable energy. Nowadays, climate change is amain
concern of energy policy, which makes a reform towards a policy more con-
ducive to renewables likely. If an investor was to doubt this reform’s sustain-
ability, for instance if the emphasis on climate change was to weaken again,
the investment response to the policy reform will be relatively muted.
Hence, uncertainty hampers investments. The source of uncertainty is
important, because the effect on investments of aggregate shocks is larger than
that of an idiosyncratic shock. Regulatory credibility is once again an important
parameter. Rodrik (1990) shows that the option value is quite high even with
high credibility, implying that the hurdle rates to investment are anyway high.
Compared to the old context, the market shifts create additional un-
certainties of which we provide four examples. First, increasing external
dependence creates uncertainty regarding producer behavior and collusion.
This is possible due to the leading role of many producer governments in their
NOCs as well as their growing dominance on the international gas market.
Matters are aggravated because none of the Member States are self-sufficient
in satisfying their domestic gas demand while most – especially those in
Eastern Europe – are heavily import-dependent. For example, CEC (2005b, p. 33)
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indicates that Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
all are completely dependent on gas imports. The Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria and candidate country Turkey all have import dependencies
exceeding 95 percent of domestic demand. As indicated, increasing import
dependence creates uncertainties concerning security of supply that did not
exist in the old context, whether this is justified or not. Second, uncertainty
is increased by the growing share of gas in power generation, because its effect
on gas demand is still very unclear. Third, climate change increases uncertainty
because its future developments are unclear. The unresolved issues are 1) the
precise form that ‘the’ second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will
take, 2) whether there will still be enough political will and commitment to
keep reducing emission levels once the low-cost, easy-to-achieve options are
exhausted and 3) the prospects on nuclear and sustainable energy. Fourth,
gas transit creates uncertainty because it adds a third party to the equation.
If transit countries cannot commit to agreements, the resulting potential for
disputes creates an additional risk to Europe’s gas supplies. Examples are 1)
the postponement of the start of Algerian supply because of internal political
and safety problems as well as difficult relationships with Tunisia and
Morocco, 2) the cut-off of Russian gas via Byelorussia (to Poland andGermany)
after a conflict between the Byelorussian government and Russian Gazprom
in early 2004 and 3) the recent gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine in
early 2006. Hence, as gas transit increases, so does the risk of transit-induced
supply interruptions. This in turn may hamper investments. Box 2.1 below
illustrates some consequences of the risk of transit disputes for investments
in gas pipelines.
Box 2.1: Investment consequences of Russian transit disputes
So far we have assumed that transit disputes may result in hold-up problems which
may result in underinvestments. Notwithstanding this, hold-up caused by transit states
may also result in overinvestments, as argued by Hubert and Ikonnikova (2004) and
Hubert and Suleymanova (2006). Russian gas pipelines heading into Europe are promi-
nent examples. Transit risks have always been an important consideration when
building a Russian pipeline to supply Europe. In the 1990s, Russia constructed the
Yamal pipeline, which runs through Byelorussia and Poland, even though it was clear
that refurbishing and upgrading the existing Ukrainian pipeline system was a much
cheaper option. This choice is attributed to a lack of commitment powers of the Ukrain-
ian government, which rendered the more expensive option the most attractive one,
because it circumvented the Ukraine. Hence, the hold-up problem manifests itself in
overinvestments in this setting.
Another example of overinvestments as a consequence of a lack of commitment
powers is provided by the construction of Nord Stream (formerly known as North
Trans Gas, Baltic Pipeline and North European Gas Pipeline). The story is analogous
to the Yamal story: instead of choosing the cheaper options of upgrading the existing
Ukrainian pipeline systemwhich had around twenty billion cubic meter (bcm) of spare
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capacity, building a new Yamal pipeline or building the Amber Pipeline through
Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States, Russia has opted for the very expensive, partly
underwater, Nord Stream pipeline which circumvents all transit states above by directly
linking Russia and Germany. Building this pipeline creates countervailing power
through the credible threat of diverting supplies through Nord Stream which is sup-
posed to discipline the transit states.
The likelihood of overinvestments is dependent on a number of variables, most
importantly the prospect for a collusive equilibrium between Russia and the transit
states. In fact, Hubert (2007, p. 77, 78) argues that if a collusive equilibrium develops
in which the players are able to make credible long-term commitments, Nord Stream
will not be built at all. Hence, the fact that Nord Stream is under construction, signals
a lack of commitment. The cost of holding excess capacity is another important variable.
If excess capacity is prohibitively expensive, which for examplemay occur if the relative
value of gas is low compared to transport costs, an investor will not invest in a more
expensive pipeline and will consequently not be able to create countervailing power.
Without alternative means to counteract opportunistic behavior, the investor will then
end up in the classical underinvestment situation. In both cases, uncertainty created
by the transit risks increases the hurdle rate for investments. However, the difference
with the underinvestment case is that the higher hurdle rate now manifests itself
through a new, more expensive pipeline.
In sum, the market shifts have created a new context for gas regulation which
fundamentally differs from the context in which existing gas regulation was
developed. For instance, as set out in section 1.3, in the traditional structure,
investment risks were shared between the dominant players, which facilitated
the early development of the European gas market. Liberalization and the
accompanying regulation could consequently focus onmore efficiently deploy-
ing (sweating) existing assets. Furthermore, gas supplies were ample and
therefore supply security not as vital an issue as today. However, in the new
context created by the market shifts, the main issue is how to facilitate new
investments rather than sweat them (cf. WRR, 2008, p. 15).24 Furthermore, this
has to be done in a gas market which is dominated by sellers, where political
considerations are becoming more important and where supply security and
sustainability have become the top priorities of energy policy. This changes
the context for regulation into one where the interplay of regulation with
investments, irreversibility, risks and uncertainty determines whether a regu-
latory regime creates a governance structure that properly facilitates invest-
ments.
CIEP (2006, p. 18, 19) mentions four additional issues that arise in this
context. First, regulatory credibility is greatly enhanced by regulatory stability
in terms of objectives and instruments. However, ex-post adaptations to
regulation are required due to the inherent uncertainties specified above and
24 See section 1.5.2.
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the learning curve of a regulator. This creates a trade-off between regulatory
credibility and flexibility (see chapter four). Second, the roles of the relevant
parties may change along the way. A prominent example pertains to the
producer’s NOCs. If they integrate downwards into the European distribution
sector, their role will change compared to their current role of supplier.
Unbundling integrated incumbents is another example. The role of trading
companies without a network is very different from that of an integrated
incumbent, for example in terms of negotiating power vis-à-vis the producers
(see also section 4.10.3). Third, the demand side deserves more attention.
Consumers can lower import dependence and lessen price spikes by actively
participating in gas markets. Finally, regulation must acknowledge that the
value chain is fragmented over different jurisdictions, each with its own
policies and approaches and consequently that a one-size-fits-all regulatory
approach may not be the optimal solution.
2.10 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides an overview of themarket shifts that are fundamentally
changing international gas markets. These shifts stem from 1) external depend-
ence and long-term vulnerability, 2) producer behavior, 3) an increase in long-
distance gas supply, 4) an increase in gas transit, 5) a loosening link between
energy demand and GDP growth in Europe but a tightening link at the global
scale, 6) a growing awareness of climate change and 7) increasing gas demand
from power generation. These seven shifts can be classified in the following
four main categories: 1) a shift in international relations with the emergence
of a seller’s market, 2) a shift in energy policy objectives where supply security
has become the top priority while sustainability is growing in importance,
3) an increasing influence of politics on energy relations and 4) a need for new
investments along the entire gas value chain. In conjunction, these shifts create
a new context for European gas regulation.
In the old context, in which current gas regulation was developed, the
emphasis lay on asset sweating and, due to the presence of ample gas supplies,
supply security was not considered to be a large threat. In contrast, in the new
context, a regulatory regime must govern the market in such a way that it
properly facilitates investments in a seller’s market where political considera-
tions and anxieties are becoming more important and where supply security
and sustainability have become top priorities for energy policy.
The interplay of regulation with irreversible investments, risks and un-
certainty determines whether a proper governance structure can be devised.
Consequently, the criteria for an adequate regulatory regime in the new context
are investment irreversibility, risks and uncertainties. European gas regulation
needs to adapt to this new context in order to reach the energy policy object-
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ives. This study analyzes whether existing regulation will allow it to do so.
The emphasis is on the theoretical underpinnings of current regulation. The
next two chapters discuss the neoclassical underpinnings of current regulation.

3 The neoclassical perspective towards
reform of the European gas market
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As indicated in the introductory chapter, this study contrasts two economic
perspectives on regulation in order to examine whether existing regulation
can adequately reach the energy policy objectives in the new context for
regulation. This chapter discusses the neoclassical perspective on regulation
and traces its implications for the structure of a liberalized gas market. It sets
the scene for chapter 4, which argues that the existing regulation is firmly
embedded in the neoclassical paradigm.
The neoclassical methodology is based on three basic axioms, which are
discussed in section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses the neoclassical emphasis on
perfect competition that emanates from these axioms. By assuming that the
market can work perfectly, the implication is that any deviation from perfect
competition – that is, any market failure – is a candidate for regulatory inter-
vention (see section 1.5.1). Possible market failures on the European gasmarket
are identified in section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides the neoclassical policy pre-
scriptions for reforming the European gas market. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 THE NEOCLASSICAL METHODOLOGY
Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) state that in the last three decades neo-
classical economics has incorporated models that allow economic actors to
be imperfectly informed and irrational. This invalidates the traditional criticism
on the neoclassical assumption of perfectly informed and perfectly rational
individuals. The authors contend that the hardcore of the neoclassical perspect-
ive towards economics consists of three main axioms: methodological indi-
vidualism,methodological instrumentalismandmethodological equilibration.
3.2.1 Methodological individualism
Methodological individualism states that all actions are performed by indi-
viduals. Consequently methodological individualism implies that all social
phenomena can only be explained in individual terms, which implies that all
analyses must ultimately be couched in terms of the behavior of individuals.
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Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) argue that the analytical method employed
to this end consists of three steps: 1) the socio-economic phenomenon is to
be analyzed by focusing on the goals, plans and actions of the individuals
who have brought about this phenomenon, 2) understanding fully their
working at the individual level and 3) synthesizing the individual-level know-
ledge to explain the phenomenon at hand.
Hodgson (1988, p. 55-62, 2007, p. 211) points out that methodological
individualism requires purposeful individual actionwhich is a sufficient cause
for all social action. By considering individual action as the only determinant
of social phenomena, other, possibly complementary, explanations for human
behavior such as norms, habits or social institutions, are not accepted as an
explanatory variable. Recent advances in neoclassical economics allow a link
between individual behavior and these complementary explanations. However,
according to Arnsperger and Varoufakis, these complementary explanations
are explained rather than being explanatory variables for individual behavior.
3.2.2 Methodological instrumentalism
Methodological instrumentalism assumes that all behavior is preference-driven.
The individual is seen as a bundle of preferences who, given these preferences,
undertakes actions that maximize his expected utility. This requires a number
of assumptions, in particular: perfect and costless information, complete and
transitive preferences and the individual being able to act as a lightning
calculator in order to make all required calculations. The preferences them-
selves are not explained. Preferences are exogenous to the analysis, i.e.,
separate from the structure of interaction in which the individual is involved,
either because they are psychological phenomena that should be explained
by psychologists as opposed to economists, or because individual purposeful-
ness is entirely indeterminate (Hodgson, 1988, p. 60, 66). It is therefore assumed
that people behave as if they possess consistent preferences which guide their
behavior. Hence, the ends are given and the individual chooses the means
to reach his objectives. According to Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006), the
fundamental point with respect tomethodological instrumentalism is that the
preferences fully determine an individual’s actions. Therefore, even the current
emphasis of some neoclassicists towards endogenizing preferences does not
refute methodological instrumentalism as the preferences remain fully deter-
mining.
3.2.3 Methodological equilibration
Methodological equilibration posits that human interactions always tend
towards an equilibrium, which in economic theory refers to a situation where
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price adjustments in the process of competition equalize supply and demand
of a good or service. Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006) refer to Cournot (1838),
who according to them was the first scholar to use methodological
equilibration. They define the concept by specifying the three steps Cournot
took in his analysis: 1) discover the equilibrium, 2) assume that agents will
find themselves at that equilibrium and 3) show that at the equilibrium small
changes will not move self-interested behavior away from the equilibrium.
In effect, the presence of the equilibrium is assumed rather than explained.
3.3 PERFECT COMPETITION
The above axioms imply that individuals will transact on a market when they
consider it to be in their best interest. Therefore, as long as individuals expect
a transaction to generate additional utility or, for a firm, profit, the transaction
will be undertaken. The axioms also imply that these transactions will be
conductedwithout any problems. In equilibrium, the highest possiblewelfare
will be attained, because competition ensures that products are produced at
the lowest possible unit cost (productive efficiency) and correspond with
consumer preferences (allocative efficiency). Hence, competition is perfect.
The axioms explainwhy competition is perfect (Hunt, 2000, p. 7-9). Perfect
competition theory focuses on the interaction between consumers and pro-
ducers. Consumer’s tastes and preferences concerning the producer’s goods
are assumed to be identical and stable. Hence, consumer demand is homo-
geneous. Furthermore, they know all there is to know about the products due
to the perfect and costless information and they buy products in order to
maximize their utility. The firms act in a similar manner. Theymaximize their
profits, or more accurately, the net present value of future profits. They pro-
duce products using capital, labor and land as factors of production. These
resources are assumed to be homogeneous and perfectly mobile: a unit of one
resource is identical to another and can be transferred unrestrictedly between
firms. Furthermore, innovation is exogenous. The latter implies that the firm’s
only role is to respond to changes in the environment by determining the
quantity of goods to produce. In other words, the firm is conceptualized as
a production function in which resources are transformed into outputs. Its
boundaries are determined by technological conditions such as scale economies.
In these settings, competition means that in the short run, firms change
the quantity of products produced in response to for example changes in prices
or resource costs, while in the longer run, they may adjust production capaci-
ties. Hence, the firm’s environment determines its conduct. Profit maximization
implies that in the short run, all firms produce output up to the point where
the marginal revenue of a product equals its marginal cost. This may result
in profits or losses depending on whether the market price exceeds average
production costs. However, any profit is eventually competed away. Long-run
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equilibrium is attained if the firm produces the quantity for which price equals
long-run marginal costs. This corresponds to the point where long-run average
costs are minimal. At this point, price equals average costs, hence equilibrium
profits are zero. Therefore, the environment also determines the firm’s perform-
ance (i.e., its profits).
If all firms act according to this perfect competition logic, then the equili-
brium is characterized by all firms producing at minimum cost, creating
productive efficiency. Every resource receives the value of its marginal product,
which is optimal. Furthermore, the price of each good equals the marginal
benefit (which indicates what a consumer is willing to pay). This in turn equals
marginal cost, which is an indication of the cost of producing an extra unit.
Hence, allocative efficiency is attained too.
3.4 REGULATORY INTERVENTION IN THE NEOCLASSICAL WORLD
In the neoclassical world, utility and profit maximizing actions of individuals
and firms create the optimal equilibrium, rendering regulatory intervention
unnecessary. This provides straightforward guidance for regulatory interven-
tion: any market situation that deviates from the characteristics of perfect
competition is a candidate for regulatory intervention. Hence, in the neo-
classical world, regulators intervene in order to correct a market failure and
restore the perfect competition equilibrium: regulation is consequently
employed from a public, rather than private, interest perspective.Without the
intention of being exhaustive, we discuss below six prime reasons for market
failure on the European gas market, each providing a rationale for regulatory
intervention on European gas markets.
3.4.1 Failure of competition
Without sufficient competition, market players are able to influence the market
price. The most extreme situation in this regard is a monopoly in which one
firm dominates the entiremarket. Another possibility is an oligopoly, in which
a few firms control the market. Competition fails on the European gas market
in several respects. We provide four different arguments that indicate a failure
of competition in the European gas market.
First, as indicated in chapter 2, the international gasmarket is increasingly
becoming dominated by a few producers. Russia is Europe’s main supplier.
North African, Caspian andMiddle-Eastern supplies are alsowithin economic
reach and expected to increase in importance. An oligopolistic market structure
is likely to develop. This will inevitably create anxieties of depressed supply
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and soaring prices.1 Regulatory interventionmight take the form of initiatives
that strengthen Europe’s negotiation position by allowing Europe to speak
with one voice (more on this below).
Second, economies of scale and scope are important since these are often
assumed to create natural monopoly positions on the gas market, especially
with respect to infrastructure. As indicated, pipelines are not the only segment
of the gas market characterized by economies of scale. In descending order
we have gas storage, blending (i.e., quality conversion) and gas import infra-
structure; gas exploration and production; and gas trading and supply to end
users. The Annex shows that, in the single product case, scale economies are
sufficient but not necessary to create a natural monopoly. In the multi-product
case, however, economies of scope enter the picture, which renders scale
economies neither sufficient nor necessary. Therefore, the traditional argument
of scale economies being responsible for the natural monopoly character of
the gas market is incorrect. This is illustrated by a few private initiatives to
construct pipelines in addition to the existing infrastructure, despite the
presence of scale economies. Wingas in Germany (see section 1.4) and the
ZEBRA pipeline in the Netherlands are notable examples. Rather, natural
monopolies arise when costs are sub-additive, i.e., when one firm is able to
produce all products cheaper than two ormore can. Assuming cost sub-additi-
vity, productive efficiency is achieved by having a single operator managing
the pipeline. This creates a (local) monopoly position. Because pipelines are
essential facilities, entrants need access to the natural monopoly to supply
consumers. This creates a possibility for the natural monopolist to abuse his
dominant position and obstruct competition by charging excessively high
access charges or denying access altogether. This failure invites regulatory
intervention in order to achieve allocative and dynamic efficiency, which
explains why the infrastructure usually remains a monopoly either owned
by the government and/or placed under strict regulatory control.
Third, it has been and still is common for governments to create legal
monopolies or oligopolies on their gas markets. For instance, at the upstream
production level, a legal monopoly is created when a producer obtains a
production and exploration license for a particular gas field. The license gives
the operator an exclusive right to undertake exploration and production
activities, which creates a monopoly position. Also, further downstream the
value chain, national incumbent energy companies, such as Gaz de France,
RWE and E.ON, are in a legal monopoly or at best oligopoly position on their
home markets.
1 Upon closer inspection, fears of monopoly abuse by producers are possible but commonly
overstated. For example, in the case of Russia, the dependence is bilateral. Russia depends
in large measure on Europe for revenues. Furthermore, its existing pipeline system is
strongly focused on supplying the European market with few possibilities to diversify
towards for example Asia.
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Fourth and final, long-term contracts have dominated the natural gas
industry andwill continue to do so for a considerable time to come (see section
1.3).2 Long-term contracts guarantee capacity to a particular user for the
contractually agreed period. This limits the capacity available for trade among
other players which impedes the creation of a competitive European gas
market. The gas prices in these contracts are often determined by a linkage
to oil prices. Hence, oil fundamentals determine gas prices rather than the
gas supply and demand balance. The final destination clauses furthermore
impede competition by preventing consumers from reselling gas outside their
ownmarkets. Removing legalmonopolies and long-term contractsmay require
regulatory intervention (see the Distrigas case study in chapter seven regarding
the latter).
Each of these four failures of competition implies that the perfect compe-
tition equilibrium is not attained, and consequently that regulatory intervention
is warranted to restore it.
3.4.2 Public goods
Public goods have twomain properties. First, public goods are non-rivalrous,
meaning that consumption of the good by one person does not obstruct another
person from enjoying the benefits of using the good. Second, public goods
are non-exclusive, which means that nobody can be excluded from enjoying
the good. Ferroni (2002, p. 1, 2) uses less stringent conditions. He identifies
three characteristics of public goods: 1) they generate significant externalities,
2) they are to a considerable degree non-rivalrous and non-excludable (emphasis
added) and 3) they create opportunities for the enhancement of welfare
through collective action.
If the market is to function perfectly, those persons who are not willing
or able to pay for the good must be excluded from its use and benefits. Non-
exclusivity by definition negates or, under the less stringent conditions, dimin-
ishes the possibility of exclusion and by extension the possibility to ask a price.
As a result, a private producer will not have adequate incentive to produce
the good because others can free-ride on his expenses. This leads to the con-
clusion that privatemarkets will not produce public goods. Hence, the govern-
ment may intervene, for instance by producing the public good and spreading
the associated costs over all users via obligatory levies or taxes. This is in
accordance with the strict conditions of non-rivalry and non-exclusivity.
2 See Neumann and Von Hirschhausen (2004, 2006) and Neuhoff and Von Hirschhausen
(2006) for empirical studies that analyze the relationship between liberalization and contract
length. These papers conclude that liberalization initially decreases contract length but that
asset specificity may increase contract length again. We return to these studies in section
5.4.2.
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Security of supply of an energy system and the environment are two
common examples (see also the next section). With respect to security of
supply, if one extra EU-citizen benefits from an enhanced security of supply,
the benefit of other citizens does not deteriorate. Security of supply, moreover,
cannot be split up in parts and sold on a market, so a private entrepreneur
will not be able to ask a price for this good. Supply security is thus both non-
rivalrous and non-excludable. The environment is a textbook example of a
pure public good (see also the next section). No one can be excluded from
clean air, and an extra person enjoying it will not make a difference for the
rest. Therefore, both supply security and environmental issues exhibit market
failures. Thesemay justify regulatory intervention, even government provision,
in the neoclassical perspective. Regarding security of supply one might think
of strategic gas stocks which can be used in case of a supply disruption.
Emissions caps or energy taxes provide examples with respect to the environ-
ment.
3.4.3 Externalities
Externalities arise when the actions of one person or firm affect other persons
or firms, either negatively or positively, without adequate compensation. That
is, externalities arise when certain costs or benefits are not incorporated in
the price of the good in question, i.e., when private and social costs and
benefits diverge. In case of negative externalities (e.g., polluting emissions)
the negative consequences of producing a good are not incorporated in its
price. Social costs outweigh private costs, and as a result, the price is too low
and the output too high from a social point of view. On the other hand,
positive externalities (e.g., security of supply) arisewhen production generates
benefits that are not incorporated in the price. Social benefits outweigh private
benefits, which renders the output too low and the price too high from a social
perspective. All in all, externalities, positive and negative, distort the market
allocation away from the optimum.
Externalities regularly appear in discussions on environmental issues and
impact all aspects of the energy markets. The discussion on nuclear energy
is essentially about externalities: positive externalities, such as the zero carbon
emission of nuclear energy use,3 areweighed against the negative externalities,
such as nuclear waste. Furthermore, gas is the least-polluting fossil fuel and
thus constitutes a positive externality compared to more polluting alternatives
like oil and coal. On the other hand, gas’ carbon emission is considered a
negative externality compared to renewable alternatives like wind or solar
energy. Therefore, gas is considered a bridge towards a non-carbon future
3 Note that the use of nuclear energy results in zero carbon emissions. The upstream ex-
traction of uranium, however, entails substantial emissions.
66 The neoclassical perspective towards reform of the European gas market
(cf. Nakicenovic et al., 2000). Regulatory intervention should aim at internal-
izing the externalities. Internalizing the external effects of energy use (by
putting a price on carbon) is the raison d’être of the Kyoto Protocol and the
resulting Emissions Trading Scheme in Europe. Emissions trading is a market-
based solution. Non market-based approaches, like taxes and subsidies, can
also be used. Energy use is discouraged by taxing its use. The use of green
gas4 is stimulated via fiscal subsidies.
In addition to emission-related concerns, both producer and consumer
behavior on the gas market exhibit externalities (Mulder and Zwart, 2006, p.
19-24). Regarding gas production, the tragedy of the commons comes to the
fore. A gas field can be operated bymultiple developers, each of whomwants
to increase its own production. Part of the costs associated with this behavior
will be external, i.e., borne by the other producers. This results in an
inefficiently high production level that too rapidly depletes the gas field.
Depending on the number of developers and transaction costs, negotiations
might in principle be possible. If these are unfeasible, regulatorsmay intervene
by for instance licensing gas production. Moreover, gas exploration and
production harms ecologically sensitive areas like the Waddenzee in the
Netherlands, Alaska in Canada or Sakhalin in Russia. It is doubtful whether
these environmental externalities are sufficiently internalized. Possible solutions
include prohibition of exploration or issuing licenses which specify a controlled
depletion path.
Consumer behavior also creates externalities because consumers usually
do not take all the external effects of their gas use into account. For example,
a lower gas use lowers gas import dependence and may decrease environ-
mental concerns unless it is being replaced by a more polluting alternative.
Consumers generally do not determine their gas use based on a combination
of all these aspects, which creates higher than optimal gas consumption. This
may call for regulatory intervention in order to discourage gas use somewhat.
Finally, network externalities can be a problem in the gasmarket. Network
externalities are externalities that arise from the total size of consumption or
production. An example pertains to gas networks. As a gas network becomes
more developed and integrated, the distances to be coveredwhen developing
an extension shorten. This makes it cheaper to connect a new consumer and
to transport gas to his or her home, which reduces the producers’ costs of
bringing gas to the market. Network externalities can be negative too. An
example is system imbalance in case of peak demand. A larger number of
consumers raises aggregate demand and system load. Peaking gas demand
(usually during harshwinter conditions)might then create a system imbalance
4 Note the close similarity with green power. There is, however, a big difference between
the two. Green power is generated by for instance wind mills and biomass which lowers
emissions. Green gas, on the other hand, is ordinary gas for which it is guaranteed that
somewhere else emissions have been lowered by generating gas in a durable fashion.
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and result in a black-out. Furthermore, if wellhead gas supply is separated
from transportation, a network externality may arise because the producers
may not have a proper incentives to maintain the system-wide pressure
essential for reliable downstream supply (Lyon, 2000, p. 59).
3.4.4 Incomplete or missing markets
We speak of missing markets if a private market fails to provide a good or
service, even though supply cost is lower than what individuals are willing
to pay. With a complete set of markets, prices are perfectly predictable and
firms are able to insure against every possible contingency. With one or all
of these markets missing, resource owners have to guess future prices. If their
guess turns out to be correct, no problemswill arise. However, without perfect
foresight due to a lack of markets, it is highly doubtful that these guesses will
indeed be correct.5 The market fails because incorrect guesses create a distorted
allocation of resources.
With respect to natural gas, spot-, future-, forward- and risk-markets are
often missing or not sufficiently present (cf. Perman et al., 1999, p. 128, 129
and Stiglitz, 1988, p. 688-690), which creates uncertainty regarding current
and future gas prices. Northwest Europe provides a number of initiatives that
attempt to create suchmarkets. For instance, theAmsterdamPower Exchange
operates gas and power exchanges in the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium.6
All three exchanges offer within-day and day-ahead gas at the UK’s National
Balancing Point, the Dutch Title Transfer Facility and Belgium’s Zeebrugge.
Moreover, since the second quarter of 2006, Endex has started gas trading at
the Title Transfer Facility and Zeebrugge.7 Endex enables market participants
to manage price and settlement risk up to three years ahead (Section 4.10.1
provides amore elaborate overview of Continental European hub initiatives).
These trading exchanges allow for some spot, within-day, and day-ahead
trading, but markets are still incomplete.
3.4.5 Information failures
Insufficient or flawed consumer information about a product impedesmarket
operations. If consumers are unable to correctly ascertain the quality of the
goods or services they are receiving, the supplier could cut back the quality
of these goods in order to cut costs. Furthermore, the consumers might not
5 Of course, this effectively creates an information problem and therefore could also have
been discussed in the section in information failures below.
6 See the homepage for more information, at: www.apx.nl/index.php?id=13.
7 See the homepage for more information, at: www.endex.nl/index.php?a=44.
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be able to determine whether the price they are paying is fair. In other words,
information failures may create inefficiencies in product quality and prices
that lead to market failure.
Information failures abound on the opaque gas markets. In the traditional
monopolistic market structure, a consumer paid an all-in gas price, which made
it impossible to determine howmuchwas being paid for what service. Liberal-
ization is supposed to improve this by for example unbundling trade activities
from network activities. This makes it easier to determine how much is being
paid for the commodity, how much for transport and which part is being
taxed. Unfortunately, liberalization also creates information problems. Network
quality in theNetherlands is a conspicuous example of regulatory intervention
in this regard. Dutch network operators are regulated by Office of Energy
Regulation (DTe, a chamber of the Dutch competition authority, NMa). They
were originally regulated by a price cap system in which network tariffs were
allowed to increase with the consumer price index minus an efficiency para-
meter (CPI-x). This system provided network operators with an incentive to
delay or renounce infrastructure investments in order to lower costs and
artificially increase efficiency. Consumers were unable to observe this before
actual failure. This lack of consumer information has been one of the reasons
for adapting traditional price-cap regulation to also provide adequate incentives
for infrastructure investments. This has resulted in the current CPI-x+q regula-
tion system in which the q parameter allows tariffs to rise if infrastructure
quality is above-average.
Incomplete consumer information may also impede consumer switching.
If consumers cannot properly ascertain the quality of competing suppliers,
they may be disinclined to switch, which creates a barrier to entry and
obstructs themarket fromworking satisfactorily. Transparency initiatives are
usually introduced to mitigate this problem.
Upstream, information failures affect the depletion rate chosen by a pro-
ducer in a fairly obvious manner. According to Perman et al. (1999, p. 162),
optimal depletion requires that ‘each asset or resource earns the same rate
of return, and that this rate of return is the same at all points in time, being
equal to the social rate of discount’.8 To be able to optimally deplete a gas
field, an operator thus needs to possess extensive – perfect – knowledge on
future developments such as prices, reserves and government policy. If this
is not the case, the market will fail to provide optimal depletion levels.
8 Environmental economists will realize that this is Hotelling’s (1931) rule for the extraction
of non-renewable resources.
Chapter 3 69
3.4.6 Uninsurable risks
The uninsurable risk argument is often applied to insurance markets, but it
has some relevance for gas markets too. In fact, uninsurability has been one
of the predominant arguments for implementing long-term take-or-pay con-
tracts to finance infrastructure investments. The scale of investments has been,
and sometimes still is, a reason for national governments to promote or create
national champions. The argument proceeds as follows: gas infrastructure
projects are extremely expensive, require long cost recovery periods, cannot
be implemented in stages and require rapid capacity buildup in order to
become financially viable (Stern, 2002, p. 10). Combined with insecurity of
demand due to the liberalizing gas market, this has prompted the producers
to argue that the risk of such projects is too high to be insured privately
without some guarantees. Proposed remedies are the long-term take-or-pay
commitments and/or exemptions from the third party access regime discussed
in the case studies in chapters 6 and 7.
In sum, the neoclassical perspective towards regulation proposes that a
regulator intervenes in the market in order to correct a market failure. The
previous sections have set out the most common market failures that prevail
on the European gasmarket.We have also indicated some proposed remedies
to these market failures, which in this neoclassical world may result in a
substantial regulatory intervention.
3.5 REFORMING THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET ACCORDING TO THE NEO-
CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE
The above sections have set out the implications of the neoclassical perspective
for regulatory intervention. This section completes the picture by tracing the
implications for the structure of a liberalized gasmarket. It draws from Joskow
(1996) who applies the recommendations of the standard neoclassical pre-
scription to electricity.
The basic elements are quite straightforward. The gas value chain comprises
exploration and production, transmission, distribution and (wholesale and
retail) trade activities. Exploration and production and trade are potentially
competitive, while the infrastructure links, transmission and distribution, are
natural monopolies. For these latter links, monopoly provision is the best, i.e.,
lowest-cost, solution. This market failure should be corrected by permanent
regulation of the infrastructure operator. In the traditional market structure,
vertical integration extended into the potentially competitive links as well.
Horizontal integration within a link resulted in a typically low number of
competitors. Hence, in order for real competition to develop, both the vertical
and horizontal structure of the market requires reform.
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3.5.1 Structural reform
Structural reform can occur between different links of the value chain or within
one specific link. The former is referred to as vertical restructuring, the latter
horizontal. We start with vertical restructuring; horizontal restructuring pre-
dominantly applies to the trading and production segments and is discussed
in the final part of this section.
Competitors need to have access to the infrastructure on fair and non-
discriminatory terms to be able to effectively compete with the incumbent
supplier. Vertical integration creates competitive distortions in this regard.
The fear is that an incumbent infrastructure operator who is also involved
competitive activities, may obstruct competition in the competitive activities
through cross-subsidization and discriminatory access. The neoclassical pre-
sumption regarding vertical integration is that firms integrate vertically in
response to a market failure of some kind, especially market power. Because
in the neoclassical world the costs associated with vertical integration are not
recognized, any market failure is a candidate for vertical integration (Joskow,
2005a, p. 325). Furthermore, as indicated above, the boundaries of a firm are
assumed to be determined by technological considerations. In other words,
there is no technical or physical reason for expanding these boundaries, which
means that vertical integration has no efficiency rationale. This explains the
inhospitable view towards vertical integration in the neoclassical perspective:
vertical integration is seen as a response to existing market power or as an
effort to create market power (Williamson, 1985, p. 26). As an illustration, we
provide three traditional market power explanations for vertical integration.
First, vertical integration can arise as a response to double marginalization.
Consider the situation of a bilateral monopoly in which a monopolistic
supplier/manufacturer supplies a monopolistic intermediary. When acting
independently, both will attempt to maximize their own private profits. Each
firm takes its input price as given and charges a monopoly mark up to it. This
doublemark up (marginalization) disappearswhen themanufacturer and the
intermediary are integrated. Tirole (1988, p. 174, 175) shows that in this setting,
vertical integration yields higher industry profits and lower consumer prices.
A second market power explanation for vertical integration is that it
facilitates price discrimination (Perry, 1978). The simplest example is one in
which a monopolist sells intermediate goods to two firms, one in a high-price
industry, the other in a low-price industry. Tirole (1988, p. 141) shows that
the optimal solution entails different prices for the intermediate firms, because
these prices are determined by their respective demand elasticities which will
likely differ. This optimal solution requires the ability to price-discriminate,
since without it the firm paying the lowest price could resell its product to
the higher priced firm. If this arbitrage cannot be prevented directly, vertical
integration may be a solution. The monopolist would then buy a firm in the
low-price industry, set this firm’s final price at the low price level, and con-
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tinue to charge the higher price to the other industry. The expensive good
will only be bought in the high-price industry, which effectively precludes
arbitrage. Vertical integration can thus be used as a substitute for price dis-
crimination.9
Thirdly, vertical integration could hand the integrated firm the power to
raise the costs of its rivals. The key is that the firm interferes with the input
market in order to raise the costs of competitors. The predatory firm must
have the ability to enter into exclusive contracts with lower-cost suppliers that
prohibit rivals from acquiring the input (or a substitute) at a price as low as
that paid by the predator. Vertically integrating into the input market by taking
over the input supplier is a possibility. In the short run, higher costs to rivals
lessen competitive pressure on the predatory firm. In the long-run, it could
raise entry costs and deter entry by potential rivals (cf. Salop and Scheffman,
1983 and Aghion and Bolton, 1987).
Because the indicated competitive disadvantages cannot (by definition)
be offset by efficiency advantages, the policy prescription is to prevent vertical
integration as much as possible. If vertical integration is already present, public
policy should try to remove it. Mitigating the competitive hazards if vertical
integration is already present requires separation of the competitive from the
non-competitive parts. There are five main options for achieving this goal
(OECD, 2001 and CPB, 2005).10
Structural separation
The transmission and distribution assets are vertically divested from the
competitive activities and organized into different companies. The network
operator is not allowed to have any financial ties to production or trading.
This is supposed to severe any linkwith production and trading activities and
accordingly, no incentive or possibility to distort competition in these segments
is possible.
Operational separation
Operational separation separates network ownership from control. Control
is transferred to an independent entity (an Independent System Operator, or
9 Perry (1978) provides a number of alternative ways in which vertical integration can
facilitate price discrimination.
10 TheOECD study also discusses club ownership and separation of the non-competitive part
into reciprocal parts as potential solutions. These options are unlikely for a market like
gas. Club ownership allows firms to jointly own the network assets. This is unlikely for
gas, because governments are in practice very reluctant to give up their control over energy
networks – due to for instance the economic, political and strategic importance of gas to
an economy (see section 1.3). The overall efficiency of separation of the non-competitive
component into reciprocal parts hinges on network efficiencies offsetting the incentive to
deny interconnection. Because gas possesses some positive but very small network effects
(see section 3.4.3), this option is probably inefficient.
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ISO) while ownership remains with the integrated company. The prime ad-
vantage is that the integrated company will no longer have an incentive to
abuse the non-competitive segment to obstruct competition. The outcome
depends on the composition of the independent entity. For example, if the
ISO consists of representatives of the competitive firms, the situation
corresponds to club ownership; if the regulator takes on the task of the ISO,
the situation resembles regulated access. Another important consideration is
whether the ISO receives a part of the profits of the non-competitive activity.
If not, the ISO might have little incentive to stimulate efficient operation of
the non-competitive segment. The following three approaches have less impact
(Hardt, 1995).
Accounting separation
The weakest form of separation is accounting separation which obliges a firm
to keep separate accounts of regulated and non-regulated activities. The
integrated firm has to charge itself the same internal prices for use of the non-
regulated activities as it does other parties. The activities are conducted within
the same company, which is one reasonwhy accounting separation often fails
to remove fears of anti-competitive conduct on the part of the integrated firm.
Functional separation
Functional separation goes a step further by requiring that different activities
be grouped into different divisions of the firm. In addition to charging identical
prices, the integrated firm should rely on the same information as other firms
do. In addition, the employees of both activities must be physically separated
from each other. Once more, all activities are conducted within the same
integrated company.
Corporate separation
Corporate separation, finally, goes yet another step further and requires that
different activities be grouped into different corporate entities, as opposed
to different divisions. As with operational separation, ownership and control
are separated from each other. The difference is that with corporate separation,
everything remains within the integrated company.
In a neoclassical world the choice between these options is straightforward.
Recall that the neoclassical perspective assumes the absence of efficiencies
related to vertical integration. In that case, the most efficient option is structural
separation because it provides the best assurance of the removal of competitive
distortions.
The neoclassical perspective towards horizontal structural reformmeasures
is essentially similar. Perfect competition hinges on the presence of a large
number of competitors that vehemently compete with each other. This is not
only contingent on the presence of competition between links as above, but
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also on competition within a link. Introducing competition within the infra-
structure link is unwise due to its natural monopoly status (see Annex). Pro-
duction and trading activities, on the other hand, may become more efficient
if more competitors appear. This may require horizontal restructuring. For
example, divesting production or trading assets may increase the number of
competitors and by extension competition. As in the vertical case, the neo-
classical assumption is that firms integrate horizontally in response to or
anticipation of market power. Without efficiency rationale, the straightforward
prescription is to combat horizontal integration as much as possible. If removal
appears unfeasible, regulation may be required.
3.5.2 Access
In addition to structural reform which prepares the sector for competition,
another main requirement is the actual introduction of competition into the
sector. Network access is no issue if competition develops between infra-
structures, where each entrant possesses its own gas network and is able to
compete against the incumbent. However, the natural monopoly character
of gas infrastructure renders this option inefficient and likely nonviable. Hence,
rather than between infrastructures, competition should take place on the
infrastructure. This requires entrants to be granted fair and non-discriminatory
access to a single network. There are two basic ways to grant access: negotiated
and regulated third party access (NTPA and RTPA, respectively). NTPA relies
on negotiations between the parties involved, the entrant seeking access and
the network operator, concerning the conditions on which access should be
granted. If no agreement is reached, the regulator should intervene and settle
the dispute. Without structural separation, the criticism concerning NTPA
usually concentrates on the entrant’s dependence on the incumbent, as there
is a threat of the incumbent abusing its advantageous position. Also, it is
difficult for an entrant to adequately determine whether the incumbent’s tariffs
are fair, i.e., based only on cost considerations. Moreover, the regulator’s
information deficit hampers an appropriate dispute resolution, for instance
because the regulator depends on information provided by the incumbent.
The advantage of NTPA is that if all goes well, no government interference is
required and that the access conditions may be relatively easily adapted to
changing conditions.
TPA can also be provided on a regulated basis. RTPA requires a regulator
to initially set the tariffs or the way the tariffs should be calculated in order
to prevent the incumbent from abusing its advantageous position. The entrant’s
position is important when choosing between these options. If entrants are
in a relatively favorable negotiating position, the market power objection to
NTPA becomes less significant. Then NTPA, with its lower government inter-
ference, may be preferred. In the opposite case, RTPA is preferable. Under
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structural separation, themarket power threat dissipates because the network
operator has no incentive to obstruct entrants from accessing its network.
Hence, the neoclassical prescription is this regard is negotiated TPA (on a
structurally separated gas network).
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides an overview of the neoclassical perspective towards
regulation. After having set out its hardcore assumptions – methodological
individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological
equilibration – the neoclassical view towards competition is discussed. The
neoclassical assumption that competition is eventually always perfect implies
that long-term equilibrium profits to producers are zero, that products are
priced at long-termmarginal costs and, consequently, that welfare is maximal.
This view has far-reaching consequences for regulatory intervention as well
as the preferred structure of a liberalized European gas market.
Starting with the former, in the perfect competition outcome, the market
itself has attained maximum welfare, and consequently no regulation is
necessary at all. Only if the market is in a situation that deviates from perfect
competition is there a rationale for regulatory intervention. In other words,
any market failure provides a reason to argue for regulatory intervention
(whether actual intervention should take place is of course dependent on
whether the costs of market failure outweigh the costs of government or
regulatory failure). Regulators may intervene in case of a market failure in
order to restore the perfect competition equilibrium. The market failures on
the European gas market – failure of competition, public goods, externalities,
incomplete markets, information failures and uninsurable risks – and the
solutions that are commonly proposed on the gas market to correct these
imply, in this neoclassical world, a substantial regulatory intervention.
The neoclassical perspective also provides prescriptions regarding the
structure of the liberalized European gas market. One important observation
in this respect is that in the neoclassical world, any efficiency advantage related
to vertical and horizontal integration is ignored. Rather, integration is always
assumed to be a response to, or anticipation of, market power. Consequently,
the main task when reforming the gas market towards competition is to
prevent any integration. If integration has already taken place, potentially
competitive and non-competitive activities must be separated completely
trough structural separation (ownership unbundling in the next chapter).With
a structurally separated network, negotiated TPA is probably the best solution
as it implies lesser regulatory interference and allows for more flexibility. The
next chapter discusses current European gas regulation and shows that it is
firmly embedded in the neoclassical perspective set out in this chapter.
4 The regulatory framework for European gas
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to show the link between neoclassical economics and current gas
regulation, this chapter discusses the process and contents of European gas
legislation. Section 4.2 discusses the process by setting out the European
institutions and other stakeholders. It shows that European gas regulation
emanates from a process in which a range of stakeholders define, influence
and mould European gas regulation according to their objectives. Section 4.3
illustrates the link between energy and European integration, indicating that
European energy markets are important not only from an economic per-
spective. This section also illustrates the sometimes substantial influence on
regulation of different stakeholders. Section 4.4 provides general insights from
agency theory for regulatory intervention and shows why regulation is in-
herently bound to fail. Sections 4.5 to 4.9 discuss the legislative measures that
have been taken so far, with an emphasis on the Gas Directives which largely
prescribe structural and regulatory reform measures, and the problems that
have arisen in the process. Section 4.10 steps away from the discussion of the
legal provisions. This section defines the Commission’s overarching policy
goal – the internal gas market – and the way in which the Commission and
the regulators want to achieve this goal. Most importantly, this section shows
that the internal market view is consistent with the neoclassical assumptions
and the perfect competition equilibrium in chapter three. Section 4.11 concludes
and provides the link with chapter five.
It is important to note that this study analyzes the issues from an economic,
as opposed to legal, perspective. Because this chapter’s discussion of European
gas legislation is part of an economic study, the emphasis is on the economic
impact of the legal provisions. One consequence is that this chapter does not
intend to provide a comprehensive overview of the legal provisions, but rather
uses themain legal provisions to illustrate the economic argument that current
gas legislation is built on neoclassical guiding principles. In addition, the
emphasis is on the economic literature where possible.
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4.2 EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND STAKEHOLDERS
Understanding how the EuropeanUnion ismoving from a regionally-oriented
gas market towards an internal one, starts with the recognition that there is
not a single European policymakerwith a single objective, but rather that there
are a host of different stakeholders, each acting according to their own object-
ives. This section discusses some of these stakeholders. It sets out the European
institutions which together are responsible for the legislative measures and
a number of stakeholders that exert influence on the design of European gas
regulation and its implementation into national law.
We start with the European institutions. Themain decision-making institu-
tions of the European Union are: The European Commission; The Council of
Ministers; The European Parliament; The European Court of Justice; The
Economic and Social Committee; The Committee of Regions; and The Court
of Auditors (Dinan, 1994, p. 205-329 and Senior Nello, 2005, p. 34-66). The latter
three are often regarded as ancillary institutions.We concisely discuss themain
features of the first four institutions.
The European Commission
The European Commission, or the Commission of the European Communities,
comprises 27 Commissioners, one from eachMember State. They are supposed
to act to the Union’s, rather than aMember State’s, best interest. The Commis-
sion is divided in main policy areas which are represented by Directorate-
Generals (DGs). From an energy perspective, Competition, Energy and Trans-
port, Environment, and Internal Market and Services are the most important
DGs.
Senior Nello (2005, p. 40, 41) provides an overview of the Commission’s
most important functions, of which we discuss six.
1 The Commission is the guardian of the Treaties of Rome. She must ensure
application of the provisions from the Treaties and the measures applied
to that end. If a firm, institution or Member State is found to act against
the Treaties, she may issue a reasoned opinion, impose a fine or refer the
issue to the Court of Justice.1
2 The Commission manages the implementation of rules laid down by the
Council;
3 The Commission has certain autonomy in areas like competition policy,
and negotiates for the Community in areas like foreign trade. She rep-
resents the EU in international organizations such as OECD, UN and theWTO;
1 For instance, if the Commission is not satisfied by a Member State’s reply to its threat of
legal proceedings, it issues a ’reasoned opinion’ in which it sets out in full the grounds
for the legal action and requiring the matter to be sorted out by a specific date. If not
resolved at this stage, and as a last resort, the Commission can then bring an action in the
European Court of Justice.
Chapter 4 77
4 She prepares the annual preliminary draft budget for the Community and
is responsible for implementing the budget;
5 She may publish formal representations (i.e., White and Green Papers) on
specific policy areas in order to disclose her view and invite reactions;
6 She makes recommendations or opinions onmatters related to the Treaties.
A number of these functions are interesting from an energy perspective. For
instance, the function of managing the implementation of rules laid down by
the Council comes to the fore when we discuss the third legislative package
below. The final two functions are also interesting. Aswill be indicated below,
Green Papers in particular exert quite some influence. According to Senior
Nello (ibid., p. 41), the Commission’s right to issue recommendations and
opinions are two EU legislative instrumentswhich have no binding force; others
are Directives, Regulations and Decisions.
A Directive fixes a binding objective but leaves the method of achieving
this objective up to the Member States. Hence, a Directive allows more scope
for national sovereignty, which is an important reason for issuing Directives
with respect to energy as will be pointed out below. Because a Directive must
be transposed into Member State legislation, the Directive approach provides
limited scope for national stakeholders to influence regulation. A Directive
is often the result of a lengthy consultation process involving interest groups,
politicians and other stakeholders, enlarging the scope for stakeholder in-
fluence. Second, the Commission may issue a Regulation which is directly
binding in all Member States of the European Communities. Decisions are
a third legislative measure. They concern specific issues and are binding on
those to whom they are addressed. This may include Member States but also
companies or individuals.
The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is the main decision-making body of the EU. It com-
prises the ministers of the Member States (plus one representative of the
Commission). It directly represents theMember States. The European Council,
comprising heads of state and government, also represents theMember States,
but is strictly speaking no EU institution (Dinan, 1994, p. 237). Therefore, the
Council of Ministers can be seen as the only EU institution that directly re-
presents the Member States (Senior Nello, 2005, p. 41). The Council is a single
body, but meets in different configurations depending on the issue at stake.
It has the power to accept or reject Commission proposals. Decisions are taken
by a vote of Ministers from the Member States, which can take three forms:
majority (for procedural decisions); qualified majority (for many decisions
concerning the internal market, economic affairs and trade); and unanimity
(for foreign policy, defence, judicial and police cooperation, and taxation).
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The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the only European body which is elected directly
(Senior Nello, 2005, p. 47). The Parliament shares legislative power equally
with the Council, implying that it is empowered to agree, reject or amend
European legislation. In addition, the Parliamentmay request that the Commis-
sion issues legislative proposals for laws to the Parliament (Dinan, 1994, p.
281). Another relevant right is that the Parliament may dismiss a single Com-
missioner or even the whole Commission.
The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice is composed of one judge from each Member
State and eight Advocates-General. Its task is to interpret Community law and
to settle disputes arising from the interpretation of Treaties or related legis-
lation. EU law takes precedence over national law, hence the Court of Justice
can overrule national courts and governments. It has the power to impose
fines on countries that do not fulfil the obligations imposed on them by Com-
munity law. In order to speed up procedures, a Court of First Instance was
created in 1989, also comprised of one judge from each Member State. This
court has the power to hear direct actions (Senior Nello, 2005, p. 53).
Other stakeholders
These European-level institutions help us understand how the Gas Directives
and accompanying legislation come about. European legislation is also in-
fluenced by other stakeholders. As indicated, Commission proposals are
usually the result of lengthy consultations with different stakeholders like
industry representatives and interest groups, allowing these stakeholders to
influence the contents of regulation before adoption. Players from all links
of the gas value chain have created associations to influence the European
regulatory process – national regulators (CEER, ERGEG), producers (OGP), the
gas industry (Eurogas, Marcogaz), infrastructure (i.e., transmission, storage,
and LNG) operators (GIE), independent distribution companies (GEODE), in-
dustrial energy users (IFIEC) and energy traders (EFET).
As indicated above, a Directive must be transposed into national law: a
Directive’s provisions must be reflected in national law, inconsistencies of
existing national laws must be eliminated and structures for application and
enforcement must be created (Ministry of Justice, 2002). This process involves
winners and losers. Consequently, various national stakeholders and institu-
tions may want to influence European regulation ex-post through impacting
the implementation of a Gas Directive into national legislation. National
institutions include the relevant ministry, national regulatory authorities,
national competition authorities and the national parliament. The ministry
is responsible for translating a Gas Directive into sector-specific and compe-
tition legislation; the regulatory and competition authorities are responsible
for enforcement. If necessary, these national institutions may adapt some
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provisions to a Member State’s market specifics. Other stakeholders are the
national counterparts of the above European associations. They may try to
influence the national institutions or the Parliament into moulding the provi-
sions into a form more favourable to them.
In sum, the objectives specified in the Gas Directives must be implemented
by everyone, which ensures a significant level of consistency betweenMember
States. Nevertheless, the impact of the Gas Directives likely differs between
Member States according to their interests, endowments and stakeholders.
This implies that the Gas Directives will substantially influence, but not com-
pletely determine the outcome in a particular Member State. This study is
concerned with the liberalization of European gas markets, and consequently
emphasizes the Gas Directives which are the predominant legislative measures
to this end.
4.3 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET
Energy has always been an important economic factor in Europe. Energy was
a subject in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Euratom
Treaties. One goal underlying the development of the ECSCwas to build peace
by linking together the Benelux countries, France, Italy and Germany into a
common program of postwar production and consumption of steel and coal.
The same six countries also looked to nuclear energy as a means to achieve
energy independence. They joined together to form Euratomwith the objective
to contribute to the development of Europe’s nuclear industry by pooling
European atomic resources.2
Oil security had become a political issue at that time, due to the 1956 Suez
Crisis. However, the negotiations on the European Economic Community (EEC)
and Euratom Treaties were so far advanced that incorporation of oil issues
or the development of an integrated energy policy were unfeasible (De Jong,
2008, p. 96). Nonetheless, an integrated European energy policy did not feature
in the 1957 Treaty that established the EEC. According to De Jong (ibid.), in
1962 an integrated European energy policy was proposed. However, due to
diverging national interests of the sixMember States, the results weremeager.
For example, while Belgium andGermany depended in largemeasure on coal,
oil was predominant in the Netherlands and France. The oil crises, by shifting
the emphasis towards reducing energy dependence, changed the picture
somewhat. In 1974, theMember States implemented a crisis mechanismwhich
after the second oil crisis was extended and accompanied by a number of
energy saving proposals. However, this was still a far cry from an integrated
European energy policy.
2 See http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm.
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Around a decade later, a real breakthroughwas provided by the Commis-
sion Working Document ‘The Internal Energy Market’ (CEC, 1988) which
instigated the extension of the internal market to energy, especially so for the
gas and electricity industries.3 The aim was to adjust the existing structures
in such a way that energy would be traded on competitive market conditions
(Correljé et al., 2003, p. 135). This approach implied far-reaching repercussions
for the European energy sectors, because it necessitated the restructuring of
sectors whichwere characterized by exclusive rights or amonopoly – of which
the gas and electricity industries were notable examples.
Extending the internal market into the gas and electricity industries – i.e.,
liberalizing them – proved to be a difficult task.4 Stern (1998, p. 90-92) offers
a number of possible explanations. The industry viewwas that no liberalization
at all was necessary. More influence from Brussels was unwelcome. Protection
of profits was an important argument in industry opposition. Member States
were largely opposed to liberalization because they feared that a large number
of industry and trade union groupswould be antagonized. They also doubted
whether liberalization’s benefits would be worth the effort. Their concerns
were often expressed in terms of security of supply and public service obliga-
tions.
Despite the opposition, two early successes were the Price Transparency
Directive5 and the Electricity6 and Gas Transit Directives7 which entered into
force within three years of the Working Document. Moving on towards real
liberalization would prove much more difficult. Consultative committees set
up to find common ground were inconclusive and only registered the sub-
stantial amount of disagreement between the Commission and the industry
(Stern, 1998, p. 90). The electricity industry proved to bemore willing to accept
that liberalizationmay have advantages for them, allowing electricity liberaliza-
tion to move faster than gas. The consequence was that gas and electricity
could no longer be liberalized in tandem; each required its own approach
(ibid., p. 92).
As indicated, there was considerable opposition to liberalizing national
energy markets – from Member States, but also from powerful incumbent
energy suppliers and other stakeholders. Incumbents – the gas utilities and
gas producing companies – were opposed to the liberalization as this would
create substantial pressure on their profitable national monopolies (Correljé
et al., 2003, p. 137). Another impediment to liberalization was that many
Member States viewed the energy sector as more than just an economic sector
3 COM(88) 238 final.
4 SeeMatlary (1997) for a discussion on the development of European energy policy between
1985 and 1995, and for an analysis of the important roles played in European energy policy
by large Member States and interest groups.
5 90/377/EC, OJ L185 17/07/1990.
6 90/547/EEC, OJ L 313, 13/11/1990.
7 91/296/EEC, OJ L 147, 12/06/1991.
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(see section 1.3). Member States feared theywould lose an instrument enabling
them to influence their economy if they ceded control over their energy mar-
kets. For example, according to Correljé et al. (ibid.), Germany subsidized its
coal mines to maintain jobs while in the Netherlands, energy levies were
introduced to facilitate energy saving aswell as generate government revenues.
Finally, an important reason is that eachMember State had developed its own
market structure which reflected specific national circumstances such as
resource endowment, spatial distribution of activities and production, access
to technology, political preferences, institutions and the stage of market de-
velopment. The result was a divergence of energy policies among Member
States (this situation was one of the reasons for using a Directive-based ap-
Table 4.1: An overview of European liberalization policy initiatives
1987 Single European Act (OJ L 169/1) enters into force and largely
excludes energy
May 1988 Publication Commission’s paper ‘The Internal Energy Market’
(COM(88) 238)
July 1990 Price Transparency Directive (90/377/EEC) enters into force
December 1990 Electricity Transit Directive (90/547/EEC) enters into force
May 1991 Gas Transit Directive (91/296/EEC) enters into force
May 1994 Hydrocarbons Directive (94/22/EC) enters into force
February 1997 First Electricity Directive (96/92/EC) enters into force
August 1998 First Gas Directive (98/30/EC) enters into force
September 1999 First meeting Madrid Forum
August 2000 Gas market opening begins
July 2003 Second (Acceleration) Electricity (2003/54/EC) and Gas (2003/
55/EC) Directives.
November 2003 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)
established.
July 2004 Market opening following the second Directives begins
June 2005 DG COMP Energy Sector Inquiry launched
November 2005 Regulation (1775/2005) on conditions for the access to natural
gas transmission networks enters into force
January 2007 Publication of Energy Package and final report on the energy
Sector Inquiry (SEC(2006 1724)
July 2007 Full gas and electricity market opening
September 2007 Proposal for a third legislative package (COM (2007) 529 final)
Source: adapted from Honoré and Stern (2007, p. 244).
proach for energy). Table 4.1 highlights some landmarks of European energy
liberalization policy. It does not intend to provide a comprehensive overview
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of all legislative measures taken – that would have required a discussion of
competition policy and merger legislation too.
The table illustrates that a large number of legislative, regulatory and policy
initiatives have been proposed to liberalize Europe’s gas and electricity market,
providing an indication of the severe opposition. Another indication is that
the gas and electricity markets are fully opened nearly twenty years after the
first Commission paper on gas and electricity liberalization.
Nonetheless, the adoption of the Electricity andGasDirectives does signal
the dismantling of the managed and integratedmarket structure into one that
ultimately should develop into a genuine internal energy market. So far, we
have emphasized the influence of Member State and stakeholder opposition
as an obstructing factor to energy regulation. In addition, however, we also
need to appreciate that regulatory intervention itself is a very difficult task
for a regulator to undertake, inherently prone to failure. To elaborate on this,
and to determine the circumstances under which regulationwill typically fail,
the next section discusses the economic literature on this regulatory failure.
4.4 REGULATORY FAILURE
The neoclassical perspective towards regulatory intervention set out in the
previous chapter prescribes regulation in response to a market failure. In case
of gas, an important market failure pertains to the natural monopoly character-
istics of the infrastructure. As indicated in chapter three, the regulatory task
is to remove this market failure in order to restore the perfect competition
equilibrium. In consequence, network operators are commonly regulated,
usually regarding their prices or revenues, in order to prevent them from
abusing their dominant position vis-à-vis entrants.
The perfect competition equilibrium is attained only if regulation does not
fail as well. Agency theory, however, illustrates that such failure of regulation
is likely. It poses regulation as an implicit contract between a regulator/govern-
ment and a firm. It focuses on ex-ante incentive alignment. Regulation can
be posed as a game in which a principal – a regulator – tries to design a regu-
latory contract in order to provide the proper incentive to an agent – a regu-
lated firm.8 This section discusses the insights for regulatory intervention that
emanate from agency theory.9 Regulatory intervention is determined by the
objectives of a regulator. These are discussed in section 4.4.1. Regulatory
8 Posing regulation as a principal-agent problem follows the ‘new regulatory economics’
approach that was developed in the early 1990s. Cf. Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Laffont
(1994).
9 This section builds on Joskow (2006, p. 3-15) and Armstrong and Sappington (2006, 2007).
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interventionwill fail predominantly due to information problems and dynamic
interaction with the regulatees, issues which are discussed in sections 4.4.2
and 4.4.3. This section finishes by delineating this study’s scope of regulatory
intervention.
4.4.1 Objectives
A regulator’s objectives determine which kind of regulation will eventually
be imposed. Typically, a regulator is assumed to act in society’s interest and
to maximize social welfare, which is the sum of the rents accruing to con-
sumers and firms. In its simplest form, this amounts to the following formula:
SW = f (S; αR)
Where SW stand for expected social welfare; S is an indication of consumer
surplus; R indicates producer surplus; and α is a parameter denoting the
relative weight attached to producer surplus by the regulator or society. If
producer and consumer rents are weighed equally, α is 1. Most regulatory
models assume a regulator to favor consumer rents over producer rents. There
are two general approaches to this end. First, one might assume an α smaller
than 1 (Baron and Myerson, 1982). This may be due to regulators being more
concerned with the utility of local consumers, instead of that of company
owners, who are not all local residents (Baron, 1989, p. 1362). A second
approach emphasizes the social cost of transfer payments to the firm (Laffont
and Tirole, 1986). In this case, a regulator is able to directly compensate a firm,
in order to reimburse its costs and/or to provide a net transfer, through
payments that draw from the government budget. These transfer payments
carry with them a social cost due to distortions caused by the taxes that are
used to generate these funds. Therefore, one dollar of transfer payment requires
more than one dollar of taxes to raise it. To illustrate this, Laffont and Tirole
(1986) introduce the parameter λ = 0. That is, one dollar of transfer payment
results in one + λ dollar of social costs. Laffont (2005, p. 1, 2) estimates λ to
be around 0.3 for developing countries.
Both approaches are similar in that welfare is increased by transferring
producer rents to consumers. The optimal outcomes differ, however. In the
former case, the optimal, perfect information outcome ismarginal cost pricing
with transfer payments compensating for the firm’s fixed costs. However, in
the latter case, transfer payments to the firm are costly.10 This means that
10 This may be due to distortions created by subsidies or by an insufficient amount of public
funds.
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the optimal outcome is achieved by Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, as opposed to
direct compensation (Ramsey, 1927 and Boiteux, 1956).11
Neven and Röller (2005, p. 830, 831) identify a number of factors that
influence the appraisal of a consumer standard versus a welfare standard
including producer profits, of which the influence of stakeholders is an im-
portant one. Based on a political economy model of merger control, Neven
and Röller argue that without regulatory failure a regulator’s objective must
encompass both consumer and producer benefits. However, regulation may
fail if lobbying is effective, i.e., if a regulator is likely to be captured by the
merging firms or another stakeholder (see the next section). This may imply
that a consumer-oriented standard is preferable as it mitigates the incentive
to capture the regulator (we return to the issue of capture in the next section).
4.4.2 Information
The information at a regulator’s disposal determines its ability to regulate.
Regulation is straightforward under the neoclassical assumption of perfect
information, for if a regulator can simply dictate the optimal regulatory scheme
to themonopolist, no complications arise and allmonopolistswill act efficiently
according to a regulator’s (and society’s) objectives. This would create the
perfect competition behavior outlined above. However, a regulator is generally
unable to perfectly observe neither a firm’s costs nor its managerial efforts
(Agrell and Bogetoft, 2004, p. 6 and Joskow, 2006, p. 4, 5). A firm will in-
trinsically have better information on these issues. This asymmetric information
creates a classical principal-agent problem in regulation (given a divergence
of the interests between the regulator and the regulatee). Unless the regulator
manages to completely dissipate its informational disadvantage, this induces
strategic behavior which complicates regulation.12
Unobservability of costs provides a firmwith an incentive to portray itself
as a higher cost firm than it actually is, because this will generally induce a
regulator to set or allow higher prices. This decreases welfare. It also shifts
rents from consumers to the firm, which as indicated above, further decreases
welfare. A regulator thus faces an adverse selection problem in trying to
distinguish high cost firms from low cost firms (Baron and Myerson, 1982).
11 Ramsey-Boiteux pricing proposes a pricing rule based on the inverse elasticity rule. The
price of the relatively inelastic goodmust be higher than that of its more elastic counterpart.
Intuitively, it is optimal to increase prices to consumers who are unlikely to switch because
this increases profits. In contrast, consumers prone to switching must be charged lower
prices to prevent them from changing to another supplier.
12 The regulator may lessen his information deficit by for instance obtaining information on
the regulated firm’s costs from third parties. Hemay also implement a proper cost account-
ing system, commission industry studies or use competitive benchmarks or yardstick
regulation (Joskow, 2006, p. 14-16).
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Observing a firm’s realized costs and then adjusting the prices accordingly
after a certain period may mitigate the adverse selection problem.
However, this creates a second information problem. Auditing a firm’s
costs lowers the prospect of a firm earning a rent as prices will be adjusted
to costs (with a delay). This might give the managers an incentive to decrease
their efforts because the imperfect observability of managerial effort implies
that high managerial effort will not be rewarded adequately and low effort
not punished sufficiently. Accordingly, by solving the adverse selection prob-
lem, the regulator will have exposed itself to amoral hazard problem (Laffont
and Tirole, 1993, p. 35, 36). Moral hazard results in managers exerting as low
an amount of effort as possible. This managerial slack and accompanying x-
inefficiencies (Leibenstein, 1966) pushes costs up higher than necessary, which
increases consumer prices to above-optimal levels.
These information problems illustrate the fundamental problempertaining
to a regulator. If a regulator wants to transfer rents from the firms to the
consumers by auditing a firm’s costs, he induces the firms to engage in
strategic behaviorwhich increases their costs. Consequently, the regulator faces
a trade-off between rent extraction and cost reduction, which constitutes the
basis for the wide variety of approaches and instruments for regulating net-
work industries that can be observed in practice.
Asymmetric information creates problems in other respects too. We high-
light three examples. First, information asymmetries create scope for regulatees
or interest groups to influence a regulator to undertake actions preferential
to them but not necessarily to society as a whole (Stigler, 1971). Such regulatory
capture significantly afflicts regulatory policies. In consequence, regulatory
design focuses to a large extent on how to overcome capture (Helm, 2006,
p. 174).13 Secondly, asymmetric information rules out the optimal equilibrium.
Crew andKleindorfer (2006) submit that theories which conclude that regula-
tory policymight result in optimal prices, always assume some sort of common
knowledge.14 Hence, asymmetric information renders it unlikely that a regu-
latory policy will result in optimal prices. Finally, a firm’s informational
advantage implies that a firm cannot be motivated to disclose its privileged
information unless it receives a (substantial) rent from doing so. In particular,
Armstrong and Sappington (2006, p. 330, 331) argue that the regulated firm
needs to receive the full surplus of its activities in order to behave efficiently,
that is, to operate at minimum costs and to satisfy consumer demand and
13 See Dal Bó (2006) for a review of empirical and theoretical literature on regulatory capture.
14 In addition, Eggertsson (2005, p. 138) argues that ‘the concept of the optimal regime or
optimal economic system (…) is too elusive to be of practical use’. We get back to
Eggertsson’s views in chapter five.
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needs.15 Granting the full surplus to the producer means transferring the
entire consumer surplus to him. If this situation is considered undesirable,
and accordingly some surplus is transferred to consumers, the producers will
not act efficiently in consequence. Some efficiency therefore may be sacrificed
for distributional purposes.
4.4.3 Dynamic interaction
A regulator and a regulated firmwill often interact with each other repeatedly.
The above considerations apply to a static, one-period setting. At least two
issues arise when dynamic interactions are taken into account.
First, a regulator might learn about the regulated firm(s) when interacting
more than once. As indicated, this might reduce the regulator’s informational
deficit as it could use newly obtained information in the next regulatory period.
It creates a risk to the regulatee if we consider a regulator’s objectives. Because
a regulator typically attaches a higher value to consumer rents than to firm
profits, he has incentive to increase welfare by transferring rents from firms
to the consumers. In regulatory terminology: a regulator has limited commit-
ment powers not to renegotiate the regulatory contract. If the firms realize
this, they will change their behavior accordingly. The regulated firm faces a
trade-off between better performance in a particular period and resulting
higher performance standards in future periods. This could induce the firm
to underproduce, at least at the end of the regulatory period, in order to avoid
more demanding future regulatory schemes – the so-called ratchet effect
(Weitzman, 1980, Freixas et al., 1985 andDalen, 1997). A related consideration
is expropriation. Expropriation arises in the presence of sunk (or irreversible)
investments which are particularly relevant to network industries (Williamson,
1975). Section 2.9.1 indicates that such investments tie the investor to the
market he has invested in, creating scope for ex-post regulatory opportunism.
With limited commitment powers, a regulator will behave opportunistically.
He might choose not to compensate the firm for its investment, but rather to
deliver all benefits to the consumers via for instance imposing low prices or
encouraging entry via free or cheap access to the sunk investment. This
changes an investor’s ex-ante behavior. The investor might, in the extreme
15 This is the Loeb-Magat (1979) mechanism, which has been refined by Finsinger and Vogel-
sang (1982) and Sappington and Sibley (1988). The former allow for imperfect information
of a regulator concerning consumer demand for the regulated product. A regulator will
provide a regulated firm a subsidy equal to its approximation of the increment in surplus
by its activities. In the latter’s incremental surplus subsidy scheme, asymmetric information
need not be a problem if the regulator knows the firm’s demand curve and discount rate.
They propose a dynamic modification of the Loeb-Magat mechanism which achieves the
optimal regulation by granting the regulated firm a subsidy equal to the one-period gain
in consumer surplus resulting from its pricing decision.
Chapter 4 87
case, choose not to make any upfront investments at all. The negative impact
on investments of limited regulatory credibility is referred to as the hold-up
problem. The key issue for any regulatory policy aiming to stimulate invest-
ments in this respect is to remove the threat of opportunistic behavior by
installing a commitment device (VanDijk, 2008, p. 52). Hold-up of investments
is a key parameter in TCE and therefore features prominently in chapter 5.
A second issue that arises in the context of dynamic interactions between
a regulator and regulatee is that the composition of investments may change.
Investors will choose a less capital-intensive production technique tomitigate
the risk of being expropriated (Baumol and Klevorick, 1970, p. 179, 180 and
Gilbert andNewbery, 1994, p. 551). If cost-reducing technologies require sunk
investments, this effect moves themarket equilibrium away from the optimum.
However, dynamic interactions do not necessarily reduce investment in-
centives. According to Salant andWoroch’s (1992)model, inwhich investments
last forever, therefore with a very large danger of expropriation, the desired
level of investment is reached when a firm gradually builds up its asset base.
In this setting, if the regulator displays ex-post opportunism, the firm can
credibly threaten to abandon its investment plan.
In sum, regulation will fail predominantly due to a regulator’s information
deficit which results in moral hazard and adverse selection problems as well
as regulatory capture. Another source of problems is ex-post regulatory oppor-
tunism. Two important implications arise. First, limiting regulatory discretion
has advantages because it lowers both a regulator’s opportunity to behave
opportunistically and the consequences if a regulator is captured. On the other
hand, limited regulatory flexibility also lowers the scope for welfare-enhancing
adaptations to regulation which may arise due to changing market circum-
stances, new forecasts or the learning curve of the parties involved. Hence,
unless opportunistic regulatory behavior can be separated from efficient
adaptations to regulation, there is a fundamental trade-off between discretion
and commitment. Second, a regulator will generally be unable to implement
the optimal regulatory regime. Even if an optimal regulatory scheme would
be possible, the information deficit of a regulator obliges him to allow the firm
some rents to induce it to reveal its superior information. To limit these rents
and increase consumer benefits, some inefficiency must consequently be
allowed.
In consequence, any regulatory policywill be inefficient to a degree. These
inherent inefficiencies will always provide scope for arguing that competition
improves matters. Accordingly, regulatory failure must be weighed against
the market failure it is supposed to correct in order to determine whether
regulatory intervention is the right course of action.16 This has led Martimort
(2006, p. 7) to argue that an important lesson fromoptimal regulation literature
16 This is one of themain arguments of the institutional perspective towards regulationwhich
is discussed in chapter five.
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is that efficiency should not be the sole criterion onwhich to assess regulation.
Rather, the relevant concept here is interim inefficiency, i.e., reaching an
optimal balance between efficiency and limiting a monopolist’s rents from
its privileged information.
In sum, the contents of regulation are determined by a regulator’s object-
ives, its informational deficit and its interactionwith regulatees.We finish this
section by delineating our scope of regulatory intervention. Liberalizing Euro-
pean gas markets requires structural reform, regulatory reform and privati-
zation (Joskow, 1996). The first comprises the vertical and horizontal structure
of the industry as well as related access issues. Regulatory reform refers to
creating new regulations and removing or reforming existing regulations, while
privatization addresses the ownership structure.17 The following sections
discuss existing gas regulation, with an emphasis on the Gas Directives.18
These largely prescribe reform measures.19 Privatization measures are not
included in the Directives and are consequently not considered explicitly in
this study.
The next five sections provide a selected overview of important provisions
emanating from the two Gas Directives issued so far, the Gas Regulation and
the proposed third Gas Directive. Instead of providing an encompassing
overview of all legal provisions, the main provisions are discussed concisely
in order to illustrate how the thinking of European legislators on liberalization
of the European gas market has developed and changed during the course
of time.
4.5 THE FIRST GAS DIRECTIVE
In 1998, the movement towards a liberalized internal European gas market
resulted in the first attempt to lay down a sector-specific regime of common
legal rules.20 As indicated, creating a European internal gas market requires
fundamental restructuring of the traditional market structure. This becomes
clear when we consider that for the internal gas market to develop, at least
17 Regarding the regulation of network industries, Laffont and Tirole (1993) provide a standard
reference work. Armstrong et al. (1994) analyze what economic theory has to say about
reforming utilities (network industries). Aalbers et al. (2002) provide an overview of what
‘one can say based on the economic literature about reform and privatization in network
industries’. A recent and extensive overview of normative regulation theories on utilities
(electricity, gas, telecommunications and water) is provided by Jamison et al. (2005).
18 These sections draw in part from Barents and Slot (2003) and Calster et al. (2007).
19 Note that certain aspects of regulatory reform are not explicitly addressed. For example,
in order to guarantee fair and non-discriminatory access to networks, Member States have
implemented incentive regulationmeasures such as price or revenue caps. Suchmeasures,
however, are not spelled out in the legislationwe discuss, andwill therefore not be explicitly
considered in this study.
20 98/30/EC, OJ L 204, 21/7/1998.
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the following three conditionsmust all be met: 1) free and non-discriminatory
access to the essential facility, 2) free competition among suppliers and 3) the
ability for consumers to choose freely between suppliers. Note the similarity
with the perfect competition equilibrium set out in the previous chapter (see
also section 4.9.1). None of these conditions were fulfilled in the old structure.
The first Directive can be thought of as the first attempt to transform the
old structure into one that satisfies all three conditions. Its main provisions
to this end are a phased market opening, introduction of third party access
(TPA) to the system21 and unbundling of potentially competitive activities
and non-competitive activities. Below we provide the provisions of the first
Gas Directive towards these three criteria.
Market opening
Liberalization requires that Member States open their gas markets to compe-
tition and allow new suppliers to compete with incumbents. According to
Article 18, the gas market should be opened up gradually to enable national
markets to adjust to the new environment in a flexible and ordered manner
and to take account of the different market structures in the Member States.
Consequently, markets were to be opened up in progressive stages. According
to Recital 9, the principle of subsidiarity left implementation, where possible,
to the Member States. Each stage defined a minimum requirement; Member
States were free to increase their speed of market opening.
Access and unbundling
Market opening is necessary but insufficient to create an internal gas market.
One reason is that the incumbents are typically vertically integrated with
vested interests in downstream trade activities (see section 1.3). A problem
in this regard is that the gas infrastructure is an essential facility: the use of
pipelines is essential for delivering gas to consumers and duplication is, as
a consequence of both the natural monopoly status of the network as well as
the high investment sums, generally unfeasible or prohibitively expensive (see
Annex). This renders potential entrants dependent on themonopolistic network
owner, who can distort competition by discouraging or denying access to its
network. Moreover, vertical integration enables the incumbent to extend its
dominant position into trade activities. Because trade activities are potentially
competitive, this situation needs to be averted. The unfeasibility of network
21 According to the definition of system in CEC (2000, p. 9, 10), TPA must be extended to
upstream pipelines from production facilities to landing or processing terminals including
ancillary services; processing and landing terminals; terminals for importing and exporting
liquefied natural gas (LNG); high-pressure transmission pipelines; natural gas storage
facilities; blending, load balancing and other ancillary services; and regional and local
distribution pipelines.
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duplication renders telecom-like competition between infrastructures impossible
(or at best very expensive).
The second-best option is competition on the infrastructure. Consequently,
chapter six of the Directive, comprising Articles 14-23, focuses on introducing
competition on the existing infrastructure through imposing third party access
(TPA) to the system. This is supposed to grant entrants access to the essential
facility. Member States are allowed to grant access based on negotiations
between the relevant parties (NTPA, Article 15) or on regulated terms (RTPA,
Article 16). In addition, in order to take away the possibility and incentive
for an incumbent to treat his own trade company preferentially, unbundling
requirements and independent regulatory oversight must be introduced. The
unbundling requirements (Articles 12 and 13) force integrated undertakings
to unbundle accounts of their gas transmission, distribution and storage
activities, and where appropriate to also keep consolidated accounts for non-
gas activities. Consequently, transport and trade activities of the incumbents
have to be separated from each other. According to Article 21, the transport
activities must be regulated by an independent regulator to ensure non-discrim-
inatory access to the networks of the transmission and distribution system
operators, while the trade segment should engage in competition with other
gas supply companies. This is supposed to grant to consumers a choice of
supplier, keep prices and network charges low and service levels high.
4.6 SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES
Notwithstanding the significance and positive influence of the first Gas Direct-
ive, additional measures were required. This was largely attributable to three
unresolved issues: 1) uneven implementation amongMember States, 2) differ-
ent access regimes and 3) high levels of market power (Cameron, 2005,
p. 9, 10).
First, the subsidiarity principle had allowed Member States considerable
discretion in implementing theDirective (ibid.). The first Directive introduced
a phasedmarket openingwithminimum opening requirements which allowed
Member States to open their market beyond the minimum. A large number
of Member States did so and a few did not, resulting in a patchwork of
national markets with different degrees of market opening. One consequence
was that energy companies that were shielded by a relatively closed market
competed at the European level with energy companies from more open
markets. This created unfair competition because an incumbent from a closed
market was able to enter a liberalized market, while the reverse was imposs-
ible.
Second, the choice of access regime had created differences betweenMem-
ber States which impeded inter-Member State trade. In addition, the national
regulatory agencies which had been established in thoseMember States favor-
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ing RTPA differed in power and competence. For example, the Germanmarket
displayed negotiated access and had not created an energy regulator (issues
were supposed to be resolved through ex-post action of the competition
authorities), which contrasted with the situations in most other Member States
(ibid.). Such circumstances impede unfettered competition between Member
States, because it is more difficult to access another, differently regulated,
market. In addition, differing regulatory and access regimes make it difficult
to build an interconnector pipeline that facilitates inter-Member State trade
(in fact, that has been an important issue in the regulatory process concerning
the construction of the BBL interconnector between Bacton in the UK and
Balgzand in the Netherlands, see chapter six for an elaborate discussion).
A third problemwas created by the consolidation among incumbents that
had taken place in anticipation of the Gas Directive. This increased incumbent
market power as well as national concentration levels. This posed challenges
that extended beyond the scope of the Directive, as Community legislation
did not includemeasures that directly address the concentration inherited from
the traditional market structure (CEC, 2007c, p. 30).
4.7 THE SECOND GAS DIRECTIVE
These problems indicate that further measures are necessary to create a fully
operational internal gas market. The second Gas Directive sets out to overcome
these problems as well as to increase the pace of liberalization.22 The second
Directive is supposed to make it practically impossible for Member States to
allow their own, shielded markets to exist. It tries to create the necessary
regulatory framework to tackle the remaining barriers to the completion of
the internal gas market. The secondDirective proposes changes regarding the
market opening, TPA and unbundling provisions.
Market opening
To quickly solve the problem of unevenmarket opening amongMember States,
Article 23 of the second Directive stipulates that the gas market must be
opened up to competition at an accelerated speed: for non-residential con-
sumers 1 July 2004 at the latest and full market opening for all consumers on
1 July 2007. This is a substantial improvement considering the absence of a
definitive date for full market opening in the first Directive (Albers, 2005,
p. 49).
Another measure to create a more level European playing field is the
reciprocity clause in Article 23(2). This is a temporary clause which allows
a Member State that has opened its market more than required by the Direct-
ives to refuse access to the network of an eligible consumer to a supplier from
22 2003/55/EC, OJ L 176, 15/7/2003.
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aMember State in which the targeted consumer is not yet eligible. This clause
allows Member States to liberalize more quickly than required without ex-
posing them to unfair competition from less liberalized Member States. The
Commission is also allowed to impose measures to ensure external reciprocity
to guarantee an equal opening of downstream and upstream markets.
Access
Another important change in the secondDirective concerns the access regime.
The NTPA regime was considered unsatisfactory. Therefore, the choice between
NTPA and RTPA in the first Directive is replaced by RTPA in Article 18 of the
second one. That is, TPA to transmission and distribution must be granted on
published and regulated tariffs. Gas storage is recognized as a special case
in that on the one hand storage can be seen as an ancillary service providing
flexibility to new entrants, which implies that access should be provided for
when requested. On the other hand, gas storage can be seen as a system-related
service because of its importance for matching supply and demand, optimizing
the system and creating a level playing field. This would call for a more
restrictive access regime. Therefore, Article 19(1) allows access to storage
facilities, including line pack,23 to be granted based on RTPA, NTPA or both.
The access criteria must at the very minimum be objective, transparent and
non-discriminatory.
One exception to this storage rule is that ancillary services and temporary
storage related to LNG facilities, and which are necessary for re-gasification
and subsequent delivery of gas to the transmission system, fall under the RTPA
regime (Article 19(2)). Furthermore, some storage facilities may be exempted
from the TPA provisions. This stems from the Commission’s interpretation laid
down in a non-legally binding Interpretation Note (DG TREN, 2004a): storage
facilities that are exclusively reserved to transmission system operators (TSOs)
for carrying out their functions and storage facilities that are used for pro-
duction operations may also be exempted from the TPA provisions.
Regarding access to upstream pipeline networks,24 Article 20 stipulates
that the access provisions apply to the extent that these pipelines are not used
for local production. This grants Member States considerable discretion.
According to Article 21(1), access may be refused if this results in serious
economic and financial difficulties with take-or-pay contracts (see also Arti-
cle 27 regarding derogations based on take-or-pay contracts). Article 21(2)
23 Linepack refers to the ability of a natural gas pipeline to effectively ‘store’ small quantities
of gas on a short-term basis by increasing the operating pressure of the pipe (ECORYS,
2007, p. 18). Line pack is often used as a resource to help manage the load fluctuations
on their systems, building up line pack during periods of decreased demand and drawing
it down during periods of increased demand.
24 Defined byArticle 2(2) as ‘pipelines or a network of pipelines operated and/or constructed
as part of an oil/gas project, or used to convey natural gas from one or more projects to
a processing plant or terminal or final coastal landing terminal’.
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allows access to be refused due to a lack of capacity. The same Article states
that Member States may take measures to ensure necessary improvements
to the pipeline network insofar as it is economic to do so or when a consumer
iswilling to pay for them. Finally, Article 22 permits granting exemptions from
TPA to major new infrastructure investments like interconnectors, LNG and
storage facilities (see chapter six).
Unbundling
The third main requirement for developing the internal market is unbundling.
The second Directive goes substantially further than the first: rather than
unbundling accounts, the emphasis in Articles 9 and 13 of the secondDirective
is on legal unbundling. This means that TSOs and DSOs (distribution system
operators) that are part of a vertically integrated undertaking must be inde-
pendent at least in terms of their legal form, organization and decision-making
from other activities not related to transmission and distribution.25 No change
of assets is required. Legal unbundling is limited to the naturalmonopoly (the
network business); all other activities, like supply and production, may still
be operated within a single company. According to Article 13 and Recital 11,
Member States may be exempted from legally unbundling DSOs if a dispropor-
tionate financial and administrative burden on small distribution companies
would result. Articles 13 and 33(2) state that for small DSOs serving less than
100,000 consumers the exemption is not time-limited, as opposed to bigger
DSOs for whom unbundling could be postponed until 1 July 2007. In addition
to the above three conditions for creating an internal market, other important
factors include the public service obligations and the status of national regu-
latory agencies. We start with the former.
Public service obligations
A glance at Annex A and Article 3 of the Directive reveals that the provisions
concerning the public service obligations (PSOs) and consumer protection have
been strengthened. The measures to this end can be classified in three groups
(Cameron, 2005, p. 24). First, there are obligations imposed upon the Member
States. These are a) ensure that gas companies respect the Directives’ require-
ments and do not discriminate, b) protect consumers, especially vulnerable
ones, c) notify measures taken to achieve the PSOs, d) publish the PSOs and
e) ensure easy consumer switching between suppliers. The second group of
measures identified by Cameron (ibid.) are objectives to be pursued by the
Member States, like the PSOs. The Directive allows Member States to define
these objectives and impose them on natural gas undertakings, provided these
are clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and verifiable. Article 3(2)
defines the PSOs as ‘security, including security of supply, regularity, quality
25 See DG TREN (2004b) for the Commission’s interpretation.
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and price of supplies and environmental protection, including energy efficiency
and climate protection’. Following Articles 5 and 26, other objectives to be
pursued are protection of final consumers and social and economic cohesion.
Member States are allowed to monitor and intervene based on security of
supply considerations.26 The third group of provisions allows Member States
to establish a supplier of last resort and to protect remote consumers.
Regulatory authorities
Regarding regulatory authorities, two improvements have been implemented.
First, Article 25(1) obliges Member States to set up one or more competent
regulatory authorities which are wholly independent from the industry (but
not from the government). This improves clarity and transparency compared
to the first Directive which only prescribed that appropriate and efficient
mechanisms for regulation, control and transparencymust be created in order
to avoid any abuse of a dominant position. According to Cameron (2005, p.
19, 20), a second improvement is that in order to ensure a level playing field
as much as possible, Recital 13 formulates a number of regulatory competences
in terms of harmonization (subsidiarity notwithstanding). This applies in
particular to network access and setting and approving network tariffs or the
methodology underlying their calculation. Important in this respect is Recital
14’s emphasis on regulatory cooperation and coordination in Europe, which
is considered vital to prevent the patchwork of regulatory strategies (Eberlein,
2005, p. 65). To this end, a number of informal institutions have been set up
with the goal to bring together regulators and stakeholders and allow them
to informally discuss regulatory issues. For gas, the Madrid Forum has been
set up. It was established in 1999 and provides an informal EU-level framework
for discussing issues concerning, and exchange experience of, the establishment
of a competitive internal gas market. Madrid is also the platform to discuss
(mostly technical) issues relating to the creation of an internal gas market
which are not addressed in the Directive.27 In addition, its informal and co-
operative nature provided an alternative to vertically delegating regulatory
powers to the Community (ibid., p. 81). This is why the Madrid Forum was
also regarded as a way around the problem of Member State reluctance to
cede control over their respective energy sectors (ibid., p. 63).
The Madrid Forum has reached an agreement on a few elementary prin-
ciples concerning for example cross-border transactions, cost-reflective tariffs
and non-discrimination procedures. However, as a consequence of the diverg-
ing interests of Member States, incumbents and new entrants as well as its
informal status, the Forum has proved unable to convert these agreements
26 See DG TREN (2004c).
27 TheMadrid Forum comprises officials from the Commission, national regulatory authorities
and EU Energy Ministries, international organizations and associations representing the
gas industry as well as gas and electricity consumers.
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into formal legal, economic and technical rules. As a consequence, and in order
to harmonize the work of different national regulators, the European Regula-
tors Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) was set up in November 2003 to
ensure a consistent application across all Member States of the adopted Direct-
ive.28 While ERGEG diminishes the influence of the Madrid Forum, Madrid
will nevertheless remain an important discussion platform between regulators
and stakeholders. The Gas regulation below highlights the importance of the
Madrid Forum for regulation, its informal status notwithstanding.
Long-term contracts
Finally, the secondGas Directive considers long-term gas contracts. Given the
potential usefulness of long-term contracts for facilitating sunk investments,
Article 18(3) explicitly mentions that these contracts should not be precluded,
insofar as they are compatible with the Directive and the competition rules
of the Community (see chapter seven for a more elaborate discussion).
4.8 THE GAS REGULATION
As indicated, the secondDirective provides a legal framework that is supposed
to facilitate the development of an internal European gas market. However,
it does not provide specific guidelines for transmission systems.29 Therefore,
following the Electricity Regulation, theMadrid Forum concluded that a similar
set of rules was required for gas (Calster et al., 2007, p. 108). This has cul-
minated in the Guidelines for Good Third Party Access Practice which set out
to 1) clarify the role and responsibilities of the main parties in gas transporta-
tion, 2) ensure non-discrimination, 3) facilitate cross-border trade and consumer
choice through competition in the internal market and 4) avoid distortions
to trade (Madrid Forum, 2002b).
In September 2002, at the sixthmeeting of theMadrid Forum, the Commis-
sion issued a compliance report on these guidelines, which concluded that
there was a significant lack of compliance (DG TREN, 2002).30 Accordingly,
the first set of Guidelines were followed by a second set (Madrid Forum, 2003),
adopted at the seventh meeting of the Madrid Forum in September 2003.
However, according to a second compliance report (DG TREN, 2003), theMadrid
28 Lavrijssen (2004) provides a discussion on ERGEG. She (ibid., p. 7) argues that one of the
reasons for the creation of ERGEG was the lack of Member State support for a European
Energy Regulator (see also Geradin and Petit, 2004, p. 13).
29 Transmission is defined in Article 2(1) as ‘the transport of natural gas through a network,
which mainly contains high pressure pipelines, other than an upstream pipeline network
and other than the part of high pressure pipelines primarily used in the context of local
distribution of natural gas, with a view to its delivery to customers, but not including
supply’.
30 At http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas/madrid/6_en.htm.
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Forum’s informal status rendered compliance with the second Guidelines
unsatisfactory too. To better ensure harmonization, the Commission decided
that the principles laid out in the revised Guidelines must form the basis for
a Regulation (1775/2005) on conditions for access to the transmission grid
(Calster et al., 2007, p. 109).31 The Regulation (CEC, 2005e) was adopted on
28 September 2005 and entered into force in November 2005.
The distinction between the Gas Directives and the Regulation can be
illustrated in figure 1.1. The Directive impacts the downstream part of the
European gas market – the LDCs and the small consumers – while the Gas
Regulation focuses on the midstream part that incorporates the transmission
companies and the large industrial consumers. The Regulation’s main provi-
sions are 1) to set harmonized principles for tariffs, or themethodology under-
lying their calculation, for access to the transmission network, 2) the establish-
ment of TPA services, 3) harmonized principles for capacity allocation and
congestion management, 4) the determination of transparency requirements,
5) balancing rules and imbalance charges and 6) facilitating capacity trading.
Compliance with the Regulation as well as the development of market
forces in general have been, and are being, monitored by the relevant author-
ities. Regarding the Gas Regulation, ERGEG launched a public consultation
process in 2007 tomonitor the compliance with the Regulation’s transparency
requirements. ERGEG (2007a, p. 9) indicated a heterogeneous and sometimes
low degree of implementation among Member States, creating a need for a
more comprehensive and complete implementation of the Regulation. ERGEG
also doubtedwhether national regulators had effective powers and enforcement
mechanisms in place to ensure proper compliance and implementation of all
regulatory requirements (ibid.). According to the Commission’s most recent
progress report on the development of the internal gas and electricity market
(CEC, 2008, p. 9), these concerns have been an important reason for the Com-
mission to propose a new legislative package (see below). The compliance
monitoring process included five intermediate documents32 and was con-
cluded in July 2008 with the publication of a conclusions paper (ERGEG, 2008).
In this paper, ERGEG’s view was that the existing requirements in the Gas
Regulation were insufficient to facilitate the development of an efficient and
effective gas market. It proposes three measures that should be included in
the current discussion on the third legislative package (see below): 1) ensuring
complete implementation on the Gas Regulation, 2) strengthening the existing
transparency requirements of the Regulation where necessary and 3) define
and adopt additional transparency requirementswhere necessary (ibid., p. 3).
After the entry into force of the Gas Regulation, the Commission also
closely monitored the implementation and effects of the above legislative
31 OJ L 289, 3/11/2005.
32 All documents are publicly available at http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/
portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS.
Chapter 4 97
measures from a broader perspective, the results of which have been published
in benchmark reports (cf. CEC, 2004a, 2005a). She has also kept in close contact
with stakeholders through themeetings of theMadrid Forum. The Commission
sees the results as generally disappointing because real competition is not
developing as expected and hoped for. This has urged the Hampton Court
European Council in 2005 to call for a true European Energy Policy. The
Commission’s response was a March 2006 Green Paper on the topic of such
a coherent energy policy. These approaches are aimed at improving compliance
with the Directive. To this end, competition law is also used. Following com-
plaints of consumers and new entrants regarding the development of wholesale
markets in Europe and the limited real choice for consumers, the Competition
Directorate launched a sector inquiry into competition in the gas and electricity
markets on 13 June, 2005.33 The final report was presented on 10 January 2007
(CEC, 2007c). The report not only concluded that the second Gas Directive was
implemented incompletely, but also that it failed to address all the structural
problems.
In sum, market development and implementation of legislation were
considered insufficient after the second Gas Directive and the Gas Regulation
had been introduced. Accordingly, a January 2007 CommissionCommunication
to the Council and Parliament entitled ‘Energy for a Changing World’ has
been proposed to develop a general framework for overcoming the problems.
In March 2007, the European Council accepted the ‘new Energy Policy for
Europe’ proposals, which contain measures regarding all three energy policy
goals.34 An important element in a newEuropean energy policy is the develop-
ment of the internalmarket. Completing the internalmarket is themain thrust
of the proposals for a third legislative package, adopted by the Commission
in September 2007, which amends both the second Gas Directive as well as
the Gas Regulation. We discuss the proposals of this third legislative package
(which is currently debated in and possibly amended by both the Council and
Parliament) below.
4.9 THE PROPOSED THIRD LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE
The third package is intended to complete the internal energy market and is
therefore supposed to remove all structural failings.35 In addition, according
to IEA (2008a, p. 27), ‘the rationale of this third package is the integration of
the energy and the environmental objectives of the EU through the use of
market based environmental and other measures’. The package proposes
amendments in six main areas: 1) unbundling, 2) cooperation among national
33 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/energy/inquiry/index.html.
34 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/index_en.htm.
35 COM(2007) 529 final.
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regulators, 3) powers and independence of national regulators, 4) cooperation
between TSOs, 5) improving the functioning of markets and 6) security of
supply. Of these, the main new feature for market liberalization consists in
the structural changes to the industry through ownership unbundling; the other
measures are accelerations of already existing measures (ibid.).
Unbundling
Regarding unbundling, the view is that the existing provisions are insufficient
to facilitate a well-functioningmarket (CEC, 2007h, p. 4-7). Legal and functional
separation of network operations from supply and production 1) allow a
system operator to treat its own affiliates more favorably than others, 2) does
not guarantee non-discriminatory access to information and 3) retains an
integrated company’s distorted investment incentives. The Commission’s
preferred solution is ownership unbundling (structural separation in section
3.5.1). Note that the unbundling requirements only apply to the transmission
grids; for distribution system operators, legal and functional unbundling is
considered sufficient. Member Statesmust ensure that a personwho exercises
control over a supply undertaking cannot at the same time hold any interest
in or exercise any control over a transmission system. While this is the pre-
ferred option, an alternative is provided for those Member States that do not
wish to go down the ownership unbundling path (ibid., p. 5). The requirement
for this alternative is that network independence and investment incentives
are similar to ownership unbundling. The Independent SystemOperator option
(operational separation in section 3.5.1) allows a vertically integrated under-
taking to retain the ownership of its network assets, but requires that it is
managed by an independent system operator which is completely separate
from the vertically integrated undertaking.
The package also considers undertakings from non-European countries.
These companies must demonstrably and unequivocally comply with the
unbundling requirements. The Commission proposes that third country under-
takings can acquire control over a Community transmission system or TSO
only if this is permitted by an agreement between the EU and the third country
(ibid., p. 7).
Cooperation among national regulators
A second legislative change follows from cross-border issues. Cross-border
issues have been one reason for setting up theMadrid Forum and ERGEG.While
both forums have been useful, there has always been a regulatory gap –
differences in regulation betweenMember States. In order to create true supra-
national gas markets, the technical rules need to be harmonized. This is out
of the Commission’s reach as well as the reach of ERGEG orMadrid. According-
ly, a new entity, independent of the Commission, must be devised that bundles
the expertise of all 27 national regulators. An Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators (ACER) is consequently proposed (ibid., p. 9-13). ACER
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complements the actions of national regulators. Its main tasks are: allowing
national regulators to cooperate, providing regulatory oversight of the coopera-
tion between transmission system operators (see below), handling specific
cross-border issues like exemption requests for interconnectors and providing
advise to the Commission.
Powers and independence of national regulators
Following the first two Directives, Member States must establish national
regulators that oversee and ensure the proper functioning of the market. Some
national regulators are well-established, have strong powers and are inde-
pendent. In some Member States such regulators have been established just
recently, are not independent and/or lack the required powers. It is therefore
proposed to strengthen the powers of national regulators by giving them a
clear mandate to cooperate at the European level, in close cooperation with
ACER and the Commission (ibid., p. 7-9).
In addition, their market regulation powers are strengthened by for instance
granting regulators the possibility to review investment plans, monitor compli-
ancewith TPA rules and impose sanctions (ibid., p. 8). Furthermore, regulators
must have access to information on the operational decisions of the firms. The
requirements for regulatory independence are also strengthened. Rather than
being independent from industry interests, a regulator must now be inde-
pendent from any other public or private entity.
Cooperation between TSOs
Market integration requires that national TSOs cooperate effectively. For
instance, network access and operational rules must be compatible for supra-
national markets to develop. The Commission considers voluntary cooperation
initiatives in this regard, like Gas Transmission Europe, to be insufficient.
Cooperation must therefore be strengthened (ibid., p. 13-15). Highlighted areas
of cooperation are the development of market and technical codes, research
and innovation initiatives of common interest, coordination of grid operation
and investment planning (ibid., p. 14).
Improving market functioning
Market functioning needs to be improved according to the Commission. This
relates to TPA, transparency, access rules for storage and LNG, and retail mar-
kets (ibid., p. 15-19).
Regarding TPA, the third package sets out to streamline the procedure for
applying and granting exemptions from the TPA regime, as well as to clarify
some of the conditions. An example is providing general minimum conditions
for capacity allocation and congestion management of an exempted infra-
structure, rather than determining these on a case-by-case basis (ibid., p. 15,
16). The transparency requirements imposed on incumbentsmust be increased
in order to create a level playing field for new entrants. In particular, in
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addition to publishing network capacities, it is proposed that transparency
requirements also cover gas stocks, demand and supply projections and
balancing and trading costs (ibid., p. 16). The strengthened national regulators
must ensure and oversee this process. The Commission still sees access to
storage and LNG facilities as insufficient, because the second Directive leaves
too much discretion to Member States to define their storage regime. As a
solution, the Commission proposes a better implementation of the voluntary
Guidelines for Good Practice for Storage System Operators (agreed upon by
stakeholders in the Madrid Forum). These Guidelines should become legally
binding, storage system operators must be legally and functionally unbundled,
national regulators must have more powers to oversee access to storages and
there must be clarity on which regulatory regime applies to storage facilities
(as opposed to the choice of access regime in the second Directive) (ibid., p. 17).
LNG access also needs to become clearer. The second Directive’s requirement
that access must be regulated is considered too vague. It is also thought to
create room for diverging Member State interpretations. Therefore, legally
binding guidelines which spell out more clearly defined LNG access rules must
be defined (ibid., p. 18). A final initiative to improve market functioning is
aimed at retail markets. The Commission considers setting up a retail forum
(analogous to Madrid and Florence) which would allow all stakeholders
concerned to discuss specific retail problems (ibid., p. 18).
Security of supply
Ensuring security of supply requires sufficient storage and import capacity
to be in place in order to satisfy a peak demand. It is proposed that the indi-
cated network of European TSOs monitors supply security and makes system
adequacy forecasts for summers, winters and the long-term. A European
outlook needs to be construed which takes account of the possibilities to export
and import gas in case of peak demand. Finally, cooperation among Member
States is seen as an important element of supply security (ibid., p. 19). The
current coordination platform is supplemented with additional transparency
requirements on the level of commercial stocks (i.e., a storage operator must
disclose on a daily basis the volume of working gas in its storages) and a
solidarity mechanism between Member States is proposed (ibid., p. 20).
All in all, the third legislative package tries to improve matters by a strict
separation of supply and production from transmission. Furthermore, the
abilities of regulators need to be strengthened, both nationally and at the
European level. Cooperation and coordination must be improved – between
national regulators, TSOs andMember States. Operations along the entire value
chain must be more transparent. Finally, greater solidarity benefits Member
States by improving security of gas supply.
The regulatory framework specified above has been developed in order
to create an internal gas market. At each stage, problems regarding the
competitiveness or the development of the internalmarket have occurred. New
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proposals were suggested that were supposed to remove the impediments.
In consequence, the changes to regulation have been substantial. As set out
in chapter three, there is a trade-off between regulatory flexibility and credibil-
ity.36 To be credible, regulation must be as stable and predictable as possible
while leaving room to implement necessary changes. Therefore, the third
package is supposed to be the final one.
Some recent developments
Recent developments, however, are creating uncertainties. For example, as
indicated, the Commission’s proposal for a third legislative package could
be amended by the Council and Parliament. Both did so, especially regarding
unbundling, the key part of the proposals. On 6 June 2008, the Council agreed
on a general approach to opening gas and electricity networks that prevents
integrated energy incumbents from selling off their networks (European
Council, 2008). This agreement was based on a third option – the third way
proposed by France, Germany and six other Member states – for unbundling
energy incumbents which allows former state monopolies to retain ownership
of their gas and electricity grids. However, they would have to transfer their
management to an independent transmission operator (ITO) with effective
decisionmaking rights over day-to-day operations like network operation and
maintenance.
On 9 July, the Parliament’s vote on two reports37 provided general support
for the liberalization of Europe’s gasmarkets, but nevertheless called for some
changes. The Parliament rejected the ISO option put forward by the Commis-
sion and adopted the third way ITO option. The MEPs (Members of the Euro-
pean Parliament) did install additional safeguards such as an independent
trustee who would closely oversee the internal discussions of the gas trans-
mission operator, as well as consumer protection measures like the right to
withdraw from contracts without charge (European Parliament, 2008).
On 18 June, the Parliament voted on a report relating to electricity mar-
kets,38 in which it rejected the ISO and ITO options, leaving ownership
unbundling as the only option. The gas vote implies that agreement on gas
liberalization is more likely than regarding electricity liberalization, where
there is still considerable disagreement. A separate treatment for gas is not
new; in 1994, the gas and electricity industries were also separated in terms
of liberalization proposals (Stern, 1990, p. 92). At the time of writing (Septem-
ber, 2008), the effect of this split is not clear. For instance, the exceptions to
full unbundling for gas may spill over to electricity. On the other hand, if
successful in electricity, ownership unbundling could eventually also spill over
36 Or, in the terminology of chapter three, between discretion and commitment.
37 One was drafted by Romano La Russa, A6-0275/2008, the other by Atlanas Paparizov, A6-
0253/2008.
38 Drafted by Eluned Morgan, A6-0191/2008.
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to gas. In order to take away the uncertainty as soon as possible, this important
issue needs to be resolved quickly. This is why the Madrid Forum invited the
Council and the Parliament to come to an agreement on the Commission’s
proposals as soon as possible (Madrid Forum, 2008, p. 2).
In addition, the Commission has published a progress report on the devel-
opment of the internal gas and electricity market (CEC, 2008) which reiterates
the need for its third package proposals. The report notes that cross-border
coordination at the regional level has improved (see also section 4.10.1 below).
However, the main conclusion is that the problems identified in amongst others
the Energy Sector Inquiry have not been solved and that major barriers to
efficient functioning of both electricity and gas markets still exist (ibid, p. 2).
Insufficient implementation of European legislation by Member States is
another important problem in this regard (as also observed with respect to
the Gas Regulation).39 Four main areas of improvement are proposed (ibid.
p. 9): 1) national regulators must be empowered with a view to ensuring
proper implementation of legislation by stakeholders, 2) regulatorsmust have
their own responsibility to encourage implementation (for instance through
harmonization of regulatory best practice models), 3) the industry must observe
the legal requirements without compromise and 4) regulated energy prices
remain a concern. In addition, according to the Commission, these problems
cannot all be solvedwithin the existing legislative framework, which explains
its proposal for a third package.
4.10 THE INTERNAL GAS MARKET
As indicated, the overriding goal of the legislative measures discussed above
is to create an internal gas market. In order to be able to assess whether the
above legislative measures will be able to attain their goal, that goal must first
be properly defined. To this end, the next section steps away from, and com-
plements, the legal perspective by examining the Commission’s and the regu-
lator’s definitions of the internal gas market and the way this market is sup-
posed to be achieved. The final section points out the relation to the neo-
classical perspective set out in the previous chapter.
4.10.1 The long-term vision
This section discusses the long-term vision of a single European gas market
shared by the European Commission and the European regulators (ERGEG).
39 In addition to implementation of legislation, other areas of concern includemarket integra-
tion, concentration and consolidation, price trends, independence of network operators,
effective regulation by regulators, the consumer dimension and security of supply.
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The Madrid Forum (see section 4.7) has published a road map towards the
internal European gas market (Madrid Forum, 2002a). It issues a step-by-step
plan to achieve the long-term vision. It contains the following high-level
objectives:
· real supply-side competition;
· contractual flows becoming decoupled from physical flows in many loca-
tions;
· entry-exit tariff arrangements for access to transmission networks;
· liquid hub-based trading;
· a robust and comprehensive regulatory framework; and
· effective mechanisms for investments in cross-border infrastructure.
A second road map builds on the first and identifies the following goals
(ERGEG, 2005, p. 6):
‘effective competition delivering real benefits for gas consumers throughout the
EU; a stable regulatory framework facilitating efficient levels of investment; secure
supplies; choice; and gas suppliers able to market their services to all consumers
across the EU. This vision also now includes the availability of new sources of gas
supply to Europe, notably LNG.’
The ultimate objective is a fully integrated single (internal) energy market,
as also stressed by the Lisbon Council in 2000. The specific characteristics of
Member State gas markets and consequent differing starting-points have been
acknowledged. These have led to an intermediate step of creating effective
regional gas markets based on liquid hub-to-hub trading. The Commission’s
view on the future European gasmarket hinges to a large extent on hub-based
trading. A hub can be seen as an intersection of pipelines creating a central
place where gas can be traded. Hubs are an important precondition for the
development of an internal gas market, because a hub facilitates gas trade via
bilateral contracts and exchanges.40 Hubs also facilitate spot gas markets, like
the UKNational Balancing Point and the Dutch Title Transfer Facility discussed
below, both of which are markets where gas can be traded and delivered
instantly or at short, intra-day, notice. Spot markets allow the market to clear
by enabling producers of surplus energy to locate available buyers for this
energy, negotiate prices and deliver gas to the consumer. This greatly facilitates
a competitive market.41
The regional markets should eventually be integrated to create a single
European gas market. The Gas Regional Initiatives focus on creating a North-
40 Note that a gas hub is not an exchange. It is merely a convenient location for trade and
provides some additional trade facilitating services, see Egenhofer et al. (2004, p. 18).
41 Other elements conducive to market competition include facilitation of price discovery,
organization of trading in a transparent way and prevention of systemic risk.
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west, South and South South East (SSE) regional gas market. Table 4.2 provides
the definition of the regions.
Table 4.2: The Gas Regional Initiatives
Region Countries Lead regulator
Northwest Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, UK, Germany,
Denmark, Sweden, Northern Ireland and Norway (as
an observer)
The Netherlands
SSE Italy, Austria, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia,
Poland, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania
Italy and Austria
South Spain, Portugal and France Spain
Source: ERGEG website42
Hub development is a priority in each of these regions: each region is more
or less classified according to the existence of hubs or alternative trading
mechanisms.
The Northwest region is best endowed both with hub trading and prospects
for further development. We emphasize Continental trading initiatives and
consequently largely exclude UK and Irish initiatives. The most liquid43 Conti-
nental hub is the Zeebrugge hub, located on the Fluxys part of the Intercon-
nector, with a churn rate of around four. Churn rates provide a measure of
liquidity.44 To put the churn rates below into perspective, consider the UK
National Balancing Point which possesses a churn rate of around 10 or the
US Henry hub which averages around 30. Zeebrugge is a physical, rather than
a virtual, hub.45 A second important hub is Eurohub, a physical hub in the
Emden, Oude Statenzijl and Bunde region close to the Dutch-German border.
This hub has good prospects since a great deal of European gas from either
42 At http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_INITIATIVES/
GRI.
43 Liquidity is difficult to define. In fact, according to IEA (2008a, p. 46), ‘Liquidity can be
a somewhat elusive concept, since it is incorporates four distinct characteristics of a market
namely: depth, breadth, immediacy, and resilience. Deep markets are ones in which large
volumes can be bought or sold without moving the price excessively, and wide markets
are ones in which a large number of different bids and offers are present in the market.
Immediacy on the other hand relates to the ability to trade large volumes in a short period
of time, and resilience to the ability of the market to recover towards its actual supply/
demand equilibrium’.
44 Stern (2007, p. 18), defines a churn rate as the ratio of total trades to total demand in the
region served by the hub. The churn rates quoted below are all from Stern (2007, p. 19,
20). The churn rates must be treated with care, however, because the figures relate to a
single month: in other months other, possibly higher, churn rates may apply. They neverthe-
less show that in general liquidity is quite low. See Hernandez and Bahillo (2005) and IEA
(2008a, p. 46-60) for a status reports on Europe’s gas trading hubs.
45 At a physical hub gas is traded at a physical delivery point.
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Norway and/or Russia can pass through this region.46 Northern Germany
also has the BEB virtual hub, offering both transport and storage services and
accommodating approximately 25 bcm yearly. This hub is still in its infancy
and ismainly used for physical balancing. Consequently, no significant churn
rate can be expected. Fourth is the Dutch Title Transfer Facility, a virtual
trading platform operated by Dutch network operator Gastransportservices
(a subsidiary of network operator Gasunie), which is of recent origin and
whose maturity and liquidity are increasing: whereas in 2003, 30 parties traded
1.3 bcm in total, numbers have increased to 40 parties trading 2.5 bcm in 2004.
The churn rate has increased from three in October 2006 to sometimes seven
in early 2007. Scandinavian hub development is starting with the virtual Gas
Transfer Facility in Denmark. Gastra, the Danish gas system operator, considers
developing a virtual gas trading hub in cooperationwith the Nordic electricity
exchange Nord Pool, which could stimulate the development of a Northwest
gas market.
Italy is important in the SSE region. It has a developing trading point, punto
de scambio virtual, which is conceptually located between the entry and exit
points of the national (transmission) network. It is a virtual trading place which
consents bilateral transactions between traders on a daily basis. Currently it
accounts for a little over 2 percent of total supplies, but it has good prospects
of functioning as a regional hub because large volumes of gas from different
sources are expected to flow into Italy (see below). Given its state of infancy,
the low churn rate is unsurprising. This hub appears to be used predominantly
for physical balancing. The Austrian Baumgarten hub near the Slovak border
is an important trading initiative both for the SSE and, due to the Nabucco
pipeline discussed in the next section, also for the European gas market as
a whole. It is a physical hub which already distributes Russian gas to Austria,
Germany, France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia andHungary. To stimulate a regional
market, Baumgarten has been upgraded to the Central European Gas Hub.
Baumgarten is too young and too exclusively used for physical balancing to
possess a significant churn rate.
In the Southern region, France’s Points d’Exchange de Gaz are virtual hubs
where gas can be traded bilaterally.47 Their churn rate is generally below 2
and peaks at 3. In Spain, gas swaps are often conducted at LNG terminals.
The development of these regional initiatives, and market integration in
general, is being monitored by ERGEG. The regional initiatives feature promi-
nently in theMadrid Forums aswell as an the 2008 progress report (CEC, 2008).
46 The Emden region is already vital in Europe’s gas supply from Norway since Europipe
1 and 2 and Norpipe all arrive in Emden.
47 A virtual hub operates in awide geographical area and allows gas trade at any point within
that area. Buyers and sellers are not tied to a specific delivery point – the system operator
balances out all trades – which should facilitate gas trading.
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The conclusions of the two latest Madrid Forum gatherings indicate progress
being made regarding the Regional Initiatives (Madrid Forum, 2007, 2008).
Nevertheless, according to the progress report, market integration has not yet
developed sufficiently. This is indicated by, for example, the existence of price
differences, regional monopolies, legal differences between Member States,
and persistent cross-border congestion betweenMember States (CEC, 2008, p. 3).
4.10.2 The Commission’s investment priorities
In addition to full implementation of the above legislative measures, the
necessary infrastructure must also be developed in order to ensure the free
movement of gas volumes between Member States (cf. IEA, 2008b, p. 31). Gas
networks are therefore at the heart of a well-functioning European internal
gas market. As a result, in order to materialize its internal market vision, the
Commission’s trans-European energy networks program identifies themissing
links in Europe’s energy networks and formulates priority investment projects
which are considered essential to develop the European energy market. With
respect to natural gas, six priority projects have been identified. We discuss
the most important projects below (see DG TREN, 2007, for a comprehensive
evaluation of the priority projects).
The first priority project is the Nord Stream pipeline, which is supposed
to cross Germany and the Netherlands to arrive at Bacton in the UK (through
the BBL which is extensively discussed in chapter six). Its intended yearly
capacity is 55 bcm, equally divided over two parallel pipelines, and con-
struction should commence in 2010. The first pipeline is planned to come on
stream in 2011, the second in 2012.48 An alternative route would involve
constructing a pipeline parallel to the existing Yamal-Europe pipeline
– Yamal 2 – running through Byelorussia and Poland to reach Germany and
from there possibly on to the Netherlands and the UK. Both projects illustrate
the relevance of a Northwest European gas market as envisaged in the road-
map. As a consequence of, for example, problems with Byelorussian and
Ukrainian transit, Gazprom’s emphasis too has shifted towards Nord Stream.
The second priority project focuses on the South region. Two major pipe-
lines delivering Algerian gas to Europe are planned: the Medgaz and Galsi
pipelines. Starting at the second half of 2009, the former is supposed to deliver
8 bcm per year to Spain and from there on to France. The latter should com-
mence operations in 2009/2010 and is supposed to deliver a yearly volume
48 According toGoldman (2008, p. 159, 160), construction ofNord Streamhas been postponed
by at least a year due to, amongst others, concerns regarding the pipeline’s effect on the
ecology of the Baltic Sea, a rejection by Estonia to cross its offshore economic zone and
Swedish concerns that the pipeline may be used by the Russians to install underwater
eavesdropping equipment.
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of 8 to 10 bcm of Algerian and Tunisian gas to Italy. Due to the inclusion of
Italy, this priority project also facilitates the SSE region. Furthermore, Algeria
might develop into an important energy corridor if the planned Trans-Saharan
Gas pipeline, which is supposed to deliver up to 25 bcm of Nigerian gas per
year to Europe, materializes as envisaged in 2015.
The South region is furthermore facilitated by the third priority project
that focuses on bringing gas from Egypt and Libya to Europe. An 8-10 bcm
per year connection between Libya and Italy (Gela) has been in operation since
2004. In addition, Egyptian gas could in the future be channeled to Spain via
Libya. Thirdly, the Arab Gas pipeline, linking Egypt with Turkey via Jordan
and Syria, is planned. From Turkey, the gas could be delivered to Europe via
the Nabucco or Orient Express pipelines (see below).
The fourth priority project predominantly focuses on the SSE region. This
region is growing in importance due to its proximity to the Caspian region.
The goal is to deliver Caspian andMiddle-Eastern gas via Turkey into Europe.
It emphasizes Baumgarten. There are at least three important pipeline projects:
the interconnection between Turkey, Greece and Italy, Nabucco and theOrient
Express pipeline. The first project consists of interconnections between Turkey
and Greece (ITG) and between Greece and Italy (IGI). ITG is currently under
construction with a maximum capacity of 12 bcm per year (of which 8 bcm
is anticipated to flow into Italy by 2012). IGI will transport up to 8-10 bcm per
year and is foreseen to be completed in 2011 (the offshore section of IGI is the
Poseidon pipeline discussed in chapter 6). The second main pipeline in this
region is the Nabucco pipeline. Nabucco is planned to run from the Turkish
border all the way to Baumgarten. Its anticipated maximum capacity is 31
bcm per year. Construction is envisaged to commence in 2010. Around 2010/
2011, 8 bcm per year of Caspian gas is expected to reach Baumgarten. Its
maximum transport capacity should be reached by 2020, with 16 of the 31
bcm reaching Baumgarten. As discussed below, however, Nabucco’s prospects
are quite uncertain. Thirdly, Caspian gas may also reach Austria via the 10
bcm per year Orient Express pipeline which runs from Turkey to northern
Greece, the western Balkans, Slovenia andAustria. Connection of this pipeline
to Italy is also envisaged. This project is still under consideration.
The final two priority projects focus on developing or upgrading LNG
terminals and underground gas storage facilities. LNG initiatives focusmainly
on the south region (predominantly Spain); Wilhelmshaven and Zeebrugge
are the two Northwest candidates. DG TREN (2007, p. 32, 33) lists all proposed
and planned projects, some of which are already operational. The capacities
of many projects are not yet available. As an illustration, the Zeebrugge
upgrade will add 4.5 bcm, Wilhelmshaven’s planned capacity is 10 bcm and
Spain plans to have a total LNG capacity of 65 bcm by 2011. Underground
storage initiatives are more evenly spread across the Continent, with the
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Northwest region possessing the largest volumes: 37.2 bcm in 2005.49 Accord-
ing to DGTREN (ibid, p. 78), the regionwill need to double this volume by 2030.
New initiatives are planned in France, the Netherlands, Belgium andGermany.
Italy also has a substantial amount of storage: 12.8 bcm which is mainly
developed as a strategic reserve.
In sum, gas trading initiatives are developing in Europe, but aside from
the UKNational Balancing Point, none possesses sufficient liquidity (Hernandez
and Bahillo, 2005). The Sector Inquiry (CEC, 2007c, p. 34) confirms this: the
2003-2004 churn rate for Europe as a whole is about 1. The intermediate step
of developing regional markets will require the right steps being taken to
unlock sufficient liquidity at European hubs and a number of outstanding
issues being addressed.50 After liquid and well-functioning regional gas mar-
kets have developed, these should be linked together to create a single Euro-
pean gas market. However, this is still a far cry because according to ERGEG
none of its vision’s high-level objectives have been reached yet.
The interaction with producers causes additional problems. For one, Euro-
pean policies may contradict those of producers and vice versa. The Gas
Directive does not apply to non-European countries. Therefore, simply deman-
ding that producers act according to European standards is unhelpful. For
instance, demanding the break-up of Gazprom is useless because the Russian
government does not need to act according to European legislation. Once
importing pipelines are built, however, European legislation will apply to the
parts crossing European territory.
The planned Nabucco project provides an example of the tensions that
arise. Nabucco, by unlocking resources from Azerbaijan and perhaps Iran,
Iraq, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, is an important initiative towards lowering
Europe’s dependence on Russian imports, because it circumvents Russia.
However, two recent Russian pipeline deals may represent counter-
measures. The first is a December 2007 agreement between the presidents of
Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to build a pipeline carrying 20 bcm
per year of Kazakh and Turkmen gas to Russia (Financial Times, 2007b). The
project consists of the reconstruction and expansion of one branch of the
Central Asia Centre (CAC) pipeline system, comprising five separate pipelines
constructed in the Soviet era, which chiefly carries Turkmen gas to Russia
49 Northwest Europe is defined as the Benelux, Germany, France, UK andDenmark as opposed
to the broader definition used in the Gas Regional Initiatives.
50 According to page three of the roadmap a number of issues are: 1) experience of the
development of existing successful hubs, 2) access to capacity into and out of hubs (inclu-
ding capacity trading), 3) incentives for investment in transportation capacity between hubs
and in storage, 4) transparency, 5) availability of gas sources, 6) communication and
transaction arrangements, 7) cross-border compatibility (i.e., of balancing and flexibility
regimes), 8) cross-border capacity, 9) the arrangements for regulatory oversight and 10)
existence of regulatory gaps relating to cross-border activity.
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(Fredholm, 2005, p. 31).51 This should carry an additional 10 bcm per year.
In addition, a new parallel pipeline will be built to boost overall capacity to
20 bcm per year by 2012. On the European side, there are fears that this deal
will decrease Turkmen and Kazakh gas available to Nabucco. The second
pipeline deal is a proposal of Gazprom and Italian ENI to develop South
Stream, a pipeline crossing the seabed of the Black Sea, which avoids Turkish
transit by directly linking Russia and Bulgaria. Two routes are currently under
consideration for the onshore section into Europe: one running north to Austria
and Slovenia via Serbia and Hungary; the other to southern Italy via Greece.
The pipeline’s throughput capacity will be 30 bcm per year. It is expected to
come on stream in 2012. In early 2008 several agreements have been concluded
that indicate South Stream’s progression. In January 2008, Russia and Bulgaria
signed a deal that created a joint venture to build South Stream on Bulgarian
territory (RIA Novosti, 2008a). That same month, the Serbian government
approved the sale of a controlling majority in NIS, a Serbian state-controlled
oil-refiningmonopoly, to Gazprom. The parties also agreed on the construction
of the Serbian section of South Stream (RIA Novosti, 2008b). The third January
2008 deal comprised an agreement between Gazprom and Austrian OMV –
an important partner in Europe’s Nabucco project – granting the former a 50
percent stake in the Central European Gas Hub at Baumgarten in Austria (RIA
Novosti, 2008c and OMV, 2008). With Hungary joining the project in February
(RIA Novosti, 2008d), the northern branch appears to be advancing well.
Regarding the southern branch, Gazprom is in discussion with Slovenia (RIA
Novosti, 2008e). The line-up of participants in the project is growing fast. Once
the line-up is complete, construction can commence.
Both projects fuel European supply security anxieties. By locking in poten-
tial suppliers through long-term contracts, both projects may render Nabucco
obsolete and consequently increase Russia’s grip on Europe. On the bright
side, Turkey’s recent agreementwith Iran to develop its part of the South-Pars
gas field in the Persian Gulf and to ship the supplies via Turkey to Europe,
improves Nabucco’s outlook. Nabucco’s outlook has deteriorated recently as
a consequence of the August 2008 Georgia crisis. Nabucco is supposed to
deliver Caspian and Iranian gas to Europe. It is supposed to connect to the
South Caucasus pipeline52 (which in turn is supposed to connect to the Trans-
Caspian gas pipeline53) which runs through Georgia (Goldman, 2008, p. 154-
156). Because of the crisis, doubts have been cast as to the reliability of Georgia
51 The five CAC pipelines can be divided into two branches. The main branch consists of
four pipelines (CAC-1, -2, -4 and-5) and runs from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan to
Russia. The second branch comprises the CAC-3 pipeline and reaches Russia via Kazakhstan
(Fredholm, 2005, p. 32). The pipeline project focuses on this branch.
52 Built by a consortium led by BP in order to transport gas from the Shah Deniz field in
Azerbaijan to Turkey.
53 A planned, submarine pipeline crossing the Caspian Sea between Turkmenbasy in Turk-
menistan and Baku in Azerbaijan.
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as a transit state, and by extension, the reliability of the South Caucasus
pipeline supposed to feed Nabucco (ibid., p. 149). Therefore, in addition to
uncertainty regarding gas supplies, the safety of the proposed route is also
being doubted.
Of course, these anxieties may well be a European overreaction – just as
the one following the January 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas row (Stern 2006a). This
is because South Stream links Russia to its main consumer for the foreseeable
future. The consequent interdependence could improve supply security.
Furthermore, as indicated, for the European onshore sections which will fall
under European jurisdiction, Gazpromwill have to act according to European
ownership, access and competition provisions. This should lessen concerns.
This being said, large parts of these projects fall outside the scope of European
regulation. These projects illustrate that the viability of many European infra-
structure projects critically depends on the producer’s reaction.
4.10.3 The link with the neoclassical perspective
The internal market logic is that eventually an atomized gas market with a
large number of suppliers is created. The suppliers vehemently compete with
each other on an equal footing and a short-term basis, creating unfettered
supply competition. This supply competition lowers consumer prices, increases
service levels and facilitates efficient investments. Efficient demand and effi-
cient investments help alleviate supply security anxieties. Furthermore, in this
perfect setting, gas prices internalize the costs of emissions, which mitigates
sustainability issues. This is nothing short of a direct translation of perfect
competition above. Therefore, the neoclassical perspective towards regulation
is the guiding principle of existing gas regulation. This perspective implies
that any impediment to the liberalization process or the development of the
internal gas market is a sign of insufficient competition. This explains why
the Commission’s solution to the currently unsatisfactory development of
competition is to more strongly pursue competition on Member States’ gas
markets (CEC, 2005e, 2007c). This builds on another important assumption,
namely that by changing the structure of the market it is possible to change
market participants’ conduct in the desired direction. This assumption follows
from the neoclassical structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain, 1956),
which states that the market structure (the number and relative sizes of firms
in an industry) determines firm conduct (output decisions and pricing be-
havior), which yields an industry’s overall performance (for example, its
efficiency and profitability). For example, the lack of competition at the trans-
mission level can, according to the third legislative package, be overcome if
we change the market structure through ownership unbundling. Following
ownership unbundling, firm conduct will be more competitive. The main
argument in this regard is that the behavior of a separated transport company
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is more competitive than when the company is integrated (see section 4.9).
An integrated transport companymay have incentive to impede or deny access
to the benefit of the incumbent’s trading company. In contrast, separation
severs the link between the transport and trading companies. The transport
company now will focus only on its own core-business, the argument goes,
which is to grant access. Accordingly, it will have incentive to offer third
parties access to its grid on fair and non-discriminatory terms. This in turn
will yield a more efficient performance. The next chapter provides a critique
on this rather simplistic assumption.
Furthermore, one consequence of the perfect competition assumption is
that by the time the internal market has developed, the invisible hand will
have dissipated all problems. In other words, it is assumed that the market
forces themselves will solve the current problems. The only thing to do for
a regulator in this situation is to create an environment in which these market
forces can flourish as much as possible. This argument is tautological: by
assuming that the internal market will eventually work perfectly, all problems
that may occur are considered temporary by definition and are therefore
effectively assumed away. That is, all current problems on the European gas
market will eventually dissipate once the internal gas market develops. How-
ever, if the current problems are due to a structural discrepancy between full
competition and the specifics of the European gas market, then the current
problems may well become permanent if not addressed explicitly.
Consequently, by not recognizing the possibility of permanent problems, the
perfect competition assumption by definition rules out this option.
4.11 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides an overview of the process and contents of European
gas legislation. The development of European gas regulation involves the
European decision-making institutions and stakeholders that exert influence
both at the development stage as well as concerning the transposition of
European legislation into national law. Stakeholders may capture regulators
which generally induces regulatory failure. Regulation may furthermore fail
due to a regulator’s information deficit or its opportunistic behavior. As a
consequence of these problems, any regulatory policy is inefficient to a certain
degree. These inherent inefficiencies, in turn, always create scope to argue that
competition improves matters by lessening the need for regulation.
This study emphasizes structural and regulatory reform on the European
gas market (and ignores privatization). The emphasis is therefore on the two
Gas Directives issued so far as well as the proposals for a third one. Due to
the importance of gas transmission, the Gas Regulation is discussed too. These
measures are developed to reach the Commission’s long-term vision which
is to create an internal European gas market. The priorities to this end are to
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create regional gas markets as a stepping stone to the internal gas market, and
to stimulate investment to develop a European gas network of sufficient size
and flexibility.
These legislative measures indicate that the existing regulatory framework
for gas is firmly embedded in the neoclassical perspective set out in chapter
three. The internal gas market is a direct translation to the gas market of the
assumptions underlying perfect competition. However, the new context for
gas regulation is a far cry from the anticipated internal gas market. The sub-
stantial need for investments along the value chain and the observations that
the international gas market is being dominated by sellers, that political
considerations are growing in importance and that supply security and sustain-
ability have become the priorities for energy policy, illustrate a departure from
the perfect competition world. The criteria relevant in the new context are
beyond the scope of current regulation which is built on neoclassical founda-
tions, implying that we should consider thinking from a broader perspective
than neoclassical economics.
5 The transaction cost perspective towards
reform of the European gas market
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The transaction cost economics approach has been developed specifically to
deal with the criteria in the new context for regulation. Consequently, this
chapter examines whether the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective
provides better guiding principles for a regulatory scheme that stimulates
investments, and reaches the energy policy objectives, in the structurally
changed European gas market.
This chapter sets out the TCE perspective towards gas regulation. Section
5.2 starts with a number of general criticisms on the neoclassical perspective
that have resulted in the development of alternative economic perspectives
of which TCE is one. Section 5.3 firstly discusses the broader new institutional
economics (NIE) approach. It discusses two waves of early contributions of
the NIE approach towards network industries and their restructuring that
illustrate some fundamental critiques on the neoclassical approach. Thereafter
NIE’s analytical framework is presented in an overview of Williamson’s four
institutional levels which, in conjunction, determine actual market behavior.
This discussion sketches a number of consequences for structural and regu-
latory reform and illustrates the level at which TCE operates. Section 5.4 pro-
vides the analytical framework of TCE. From this discussion a number of
criteria are derived that determine whether regulationwill be appropriate from
the TCE perspective. These criteria are used to develop an encompassing
framework that combines the neoclassical and TCE perspectives. With this
framework in hand, section 5.5 assesses whether TCE provides the proper
theoretical underpinnings for European gas regulation in the new context.
Section 5.5 shows that European gas regulation is vulnerable to ex-post
hazards. Therefore, TCE indeed provides better guiding principles for gas
regulation than neoclassical economics. Section 5.6 traces a number of impor-
tant implications of the TCE perspective for regulatory intervention. Section 5.7
revisits the neoclassical prescriptions for reforming the European gas market
discussed in chapter three. It shows that a liberalized gas market designed
with the TCE perspective in mind differs substantially from one that emanates
from the neoclassical prescriptions. Section 5.8 concludes and sets the scene
for the case studies in chapters 6 and 7.
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5.2 A CRITIQUE ON AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEOCLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE
As indicated in chapter three, the neoclassical axioms result in a perfectly
competitive market in which competition is sufficient to steer firm and con-
sumer behavior in the optimal direction. No government guidance is required.
The firm is considered as a black box or production function that transforms
resources into products, which are subsequently sold on a spot market. In
consequence, firms andmarkets are seen as complementary, while in fact they
are substitute governance structures (Coase, 1937). In consequence, neoclassical
economics provide no explanation for the demarcation between markets and
firms. It also fails to provide insight into the boundaries of the firm. That is,
it does not explain the governance structures that lie between the extreme
solutions of organization through markets or firms that can be observed in
practice, for example long-term contracts. Furthermore, due to the black box
nature of the firm, no consideration is given to its internal organization. In
fact, internal organization of activities within a firm is considered costless.
However, such considerations are vital in the new context set out in chapter
two where devising an appropriate governance structure becomes the main
consideration for regulatory policy. Neoclassical approaches are also criticized
for their neglect of the influence of institutions on economic behavior. By
analyzing matters through a perfect competition lens, neoclassical economics
does not explicitly consider the presence of or need for institutions. However,
even when assuming perfect competition, one also simultaneously assumes
the presence of a set of institutional constraints guiding market exchange.
Hence, institutions matter and must be considered explicitly.
These considerations have spurred a substantial body of research that
amends the neoclassical approach. All approaches essentially argue that
institutions must be incorporated into the analysis in order to adequately
explain economic performance, and that institutions shape and define the
actions of different players (Nelson and Sampat, 2001, p. 39). However, the
proposed amendments to neoclassical theory to this end differ between three
main approaches. Therefore, in order to delineate our own approach, we set
out the main premises of these approaches below.
Closest to the neoclassical fundament is the research program sometimes
labeledNeoinstitutional economics (cf. Alchian andDemsetz, 1972, DeAlessi,
1983 and Eggertsson, 1990).1 It upholds the neoclassical core ofmethodological
individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological equili-
bration, but generalizes neoclassical economics by adding a few extra ingre-
dients – information, the structure of property rights and transaction costs –
1 Several classifications have been made. We use the one found in Eggertsson (1990), which
contrasts Neoinstitutional economics with New Institutional Economics, or NIE. An alternat-
ive classification is to identify old institutional economics – along the lines of Veblen and
Hodgson below – with NIE, as in Hodgson (1989), Langlois (1989) and Rutherford (1989).
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to the mix. Given these additional constraints and with given preferences, an
individual optimizes his welfare. This eventually creates an equilibrium out-
come, possibly characterized by an alternative organizational form.
This approach contrasts with the New Institutional Economics (NIE)
approach which rejects parts of the neoclassical core, notably the rational-choice
model which follows from the methodological instrumentalism postulate.
Important in this regard is Simon’s (1957) work, which has challenged the
rationality assumption. He argues that the human mind has a limited ability
to formulate and solve all the complex problems required for rationality. In
effect, therefore, rationality is bounded. As a consequence, individuals will
display satisficing rather than maximizing behavior: individuals try to attain
acceptable minima rather than optima. Building on this and pulling together
all the theoretical threads into a coherent framework,Williamson´s (1975) work
is widely regarded as a landmark in NIE. NIE is primarily based on Transaction
Cost Economics (TCE). Our discussion below emphasizes the TCE line of reason-
ing. By rejecting the rational choice postulate and replacing it with bounded
rationality, NIE and TCE deviate somewhat fromneoclassicism. They neverthe-
less retain large parts of it – for instance through upholding optimizing be-
havior by way of cost minimization and by following strict methodological
individualism.
Bounded rationality has also given rise to a more forceful rejection of
neoclassical economics. For instance, Hodgson (1988), building on Simon (1957)
but also incorporating contributions by scholars like Veblen (1909), who
questions the conception of economic man central to neoclassical economics,
goes further than Williamson. In fact, in chapter 9 of his work, Hodgson
provides a number of points of criticism on theWilliamson approach, of which
we highlight three. Hodgson (ibid., p. 203) argues thatWilliamson incorrectly
treats information in a positivist sense, i.e., he ignores the fact that information
on (transaction) costs has to be interpreted by the economic actors whose
interpretationswill differ due to differing cognitive frameworks. Furthermore,
Hodgson’s treatment of the market differs from Williamson’s: rather than
viewing the market as a state of nature, as does Williamson, for Hodgson the
market consists of mechanisms which structure, organize and legitimate
exchange (ibid., p. 174). This means that the market is itself a social institution
(ibid., p. 206). In consequence, rather than solely focusing on explaining the
presence of the firm, there is just as much need to explain the presence of
markets. A third departure from the Williamson approach is that according
to Hodgson, the existence of the firm must be explained not merely from the
perspective of cost-minimization and efficiency, but also from the point of view
of the firm as an institution of power (ibid., p. 214).
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5.3 NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
In order to comprehend NIE’s analytical framework, its early developments
are instructive. Therefore, section 5.3.1 sets out some early contributions,
following which section 5.3.2 provides the analytical framework.
5.3.1 Early contributions
According to Glachant (2002), the initial contributions of NIE to network
industries and their reform came in two waves: one instigated by Coase and
Demsetz, the other attributable toWilliamson and Goldberg. Belowwe discuss
the main insights for regulatory intervention that arise from both waves; this
section reproduces the eloquent discussion in Glachant (2002).
Coase’s contributions start with his milestone 1937 paper on the nature
of the firm, in which he questions the neoclassical assertion that prices are
delivered freely to economic agents. In practice, producing and disseminating
market prices result in transaction costs. According to Coase, the market is
not the only institution for coordinating economic activity; rather, both firms
and the market are substitute governance structures. The most efficient mode
of economic organization is determined by comparing the relative efficiency
of market organization and organization within firms. This explains Coase’s
(1946) objections to thewave of nationalizingmonopolies that were conducted
under the assumption that marginal cost pricingwouldmitigate all problems.
As indicated in chapter three, this requires the public authority to possess
complete (and costless) information, which is unlikely. In a related point Coase
(1959) argues that a government is unlikely to be more able than private
negotiations to efficiently distribute scarce resources. He proposes competitive
bidding (for radio frequencies) as an allocationmechanism.His landmark 1960
paper focuses on the neoclassical recommendation for intervention in case
of market failure. While certain private transactions undoubtedly give rise
to transaction costs, so does the alternative of government intervention. Accord-
ingly, the choice between these two options hinges on a comparison of their
transaction costs. An illustration is provided by Coase (1974). He argues that
lighthouses, a classic example of public goods which according to the neo-
classical perspective should be provided by the government, are actually
privately owned and operated. He argues that regulatory intervention is not
necessarily more successful than private ownership in correcting the market
failure due to public goods.
Inspired by Coase’s research, Demsetz (1968) asks why network industries
need to be regulated. His answer is that there is no need for regulatory inter-
vention if a competitive solution is available: a natural monopoly can be
regulated by auctioning the right to operate the natural monopoly to the bidder
that offers to supply at the lowest cost (also referred to as franchise bidding).
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In other words, if competition on the market is not feasible, then competition
for themarket is the next best alternative. Building on these insights, Demsetz
(1969) introduces his famous Nirvana fallacy which implies that an existing
governance structure is considered efficient not when it corresponds with the
theoretical perfect competition optimum but rather when none of the feasible
alternatives is superior.
The second wave builds on and refines these insights. Goldberg (1976)
argues that the merits of franchise bidding are contingent on whether the
duties and services of the franchisee can be specified ex-ante in a contract.
If the only concern is to obtain an adequate price, then ex-ante specification
is straightforward and consequently franchise bidding indeed offers the best
solution. However, for most network industries, other aspects are also import-
ant, some of which cannot so easily be specified beforehand, like service
quality. Under these circumstances, the superiority of franchise bidding is
questionable, because ex-post contracting issues arise. This extends to the
analysis of Williamson (1985, p. 34, 35) who argues that the relative position
of the bidders and the incumbent may change over time. That is, while there
may be large-numbers competitive bidding for an initial contract, at the con-
tract renewal stage competition may be hampered due to a small-numbers
bargaining. This is because the incumbent is proceeding in a learning-by-doing
manner, which grants him a non-trivial information advantage over compe-
titors, putting them at a disadvantage. Williamson (1976) provides a practical
empirical illustration of this effect.2
5.3.2 Analytical framework
As indicated, a fundamental criticism on neoclassical economics is that it
ignores important institutional determinants that explain alternative forms
of economic organization. To solve this problem, the neoclassical perspective
must be enriched both to enable it to account for the costs of internal organiza-
tion, as well as to recognize that there is a wide array of governance structures
in real life through which transactions can be mediated (see Estache and
Martimort, 1999, Berg, 2001, CIEP, 2006 and Dassler, 2006 for recent contri-
butions). To this end, research has focused on theories of organization, also
referred to as the economics of institutions, consisting of property rights theory,
agency theory and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Menard, 2005, p. 281).
New Institutional Economics (NIE) has developed primarily out of TCE and
is based on three pillars: transaction costs, contracts and property rights (see
Klein, 2000, for a survey of the very broad NIE literature). These pillars have
created two distinct lines alongside which NIE has developed, both of which
2 More on the Williamson framework below when we discuss Transaction Cost Economics.
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originate from Coase’s research referred to above. Williamson (1998, p. 24)
puts it in the following way:
‘The New Institutional Economics comes in two parts. Part one deals with the
institutional environment – the rules of the game – and traces its origins to Ronald
Coase’s 1960 paper on “The Problem of Social Cost”. Part two deals with the
institutions of governance – the play of the game – and originates from Coase’s
1937 paper on “The Nature of the Firm”.’
The first part was further developed by North (1981, 1990), the second part
by Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985, 1996). Figure 5.1 provides an overview of
the different levels of institutional analysis.
Figure 5.1: New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost Economics and European gas policy
Source: adapted from Williamson (1998), Groenewegen (2005) and CIEP (2006)
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This figure was originally developed to illustrate the position of NIE among
different levels of social analysis. The dotted arrows illustrate the relationship
between NIE, TCE and the traditional neoclassical theories of economics. Recent-
ly, this framework has been deployed to explain differences in governance
structures in infrastructure industries (cf. Groenewegen, 2005, Groenewegen
and Künneke, 2005, and Midttun, 2005) and gas markets specifically (cf.
Correljé, 2005 and CIEP, 2006). The right-hand side of the figure illustrates the
impact of the different institutional levels on the European gas market. This
framework has been discussed concisely in section 1.7 in order to motivate
this study’s focus. The following description is more comprehensive.
Level one comprises the informal institutions where the basic societal values
and beliefs are located. One might, in this context, think of values, norms and
traditions that create a level of social embeddedness for individuals. These
informal institutions are the underlying determinants of a society’s basic view
on market reform and energy policy. For gas, the relevant issues include the
energy policy objectives, perceptions about sovereignty over energy resources,
beliefs about state versus markets and the emphasis on consumer interests
(CIEP, 2006, p. 22). Changing the institutions at this level may take centuries
or evenmillennia, giving them a pervasive influence on the long-run behavior
of economies (North, 1991, p. 111).
The informal institutions determine the formal institutions at level two,
where the polity, judiciary and bureaucracy are located. This is the property
rights part of NIE which determines the rules of the game. One might at this
level think of (inter)national treaties and laws laying down the ground rules
for the behavior of market actors. This is the level at which market design
takes place. It is also the level at which we find the Gas Directive and the
national Gas Acts, which arise from the transposition of the Directives into
national law aswell as competition policy provisions. According toWilliamson
(1998, p. 27), first-order economizing – getting the institutional environment
right – takes place at this level. Formal institutions also change very sluggishly:
changes in the institutional environmental can take up to decades or centuries
tomaterialize. Levels one and two comprisewhat Davis andNorth (1971) refer
to as the institutional environment.
Getting the institutional environment right is not an easy task, because
the traditional structure of the European gas market was not conducive to
market competition. The vertical and horizontal integration as well as the
shielded national gas markets prevented competitive forces from spreading
across Europe. Consequently, liberalization requires significant restructuring
of the European gas market as a consequence of which there will be winners
(presumably the consumers) and losers (the incumbents). Chapter four points
out the important role of interest groups and stakeholders in shaping and
moulding gas regulation. Regulationwith the aim of implementing liberaliza-
tion can only be properly devised and implemented if there is sufficient
support for it among stakeholders. Glachant and Perez (2007) provide interest-
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ing insights into the consequences for network industry regulation. They argue
that if the pro-reform coalition is not sufficiently strong, the practical effects
of the restructuring efforts may be much less than anticipated. For instance,
vested interests may be exempted from the provisions in order to launch the
reforms. This implies that it is difficult in practice to promptly restructure the
European gas market into one governed by competitive forces. The result is
that initially, liberalization initiatives are scaled down in order to limit opposi-
tion. Examples in this regard pertain to the TPA and unbundling provisions,
both of which have become more strict after the first Directive. Accordingly,
the liberalization process is spread out over many years and implemented in
different successive stages. This approach is reflected in gas regulation with
both Gas Directives proposing to open the market in progressive stages and
leaving implementation to the Member States. Glachant and Perez raise the
point that splitting up of the process may impact the course of liberalization:
if a certain stage of liberalization has been reached, it may be hard to progress
from there on because of the opposition of (new) stakeholders. Eggertsson
(2005, p. 138) points out another drawback: this modulation of institutional
reforms is risky because it may create interim periods of severelymalfunction-
ing economic systems.
In addition, restructuring alone is insufficient. For instance, vertical separa-
tionmay improvematters by removing anti-competitive incentives. However,
its effect will be severely limited if it is copied onto the traditional market
structure without additional measures. Hence, removing vertical integration
may be necessary but is not sufficient. Rather, the institutional environment
should be changed by rearranging existing property rights in order to create
an institutional structure that better aligns with the separated entities.
However, changing institutions create their own problems. This can be
seen by considering North’s (1990) analysis of the process of institutional
change. According to North, institutional changes always become necessary
in the course of time, because no one really knows what will happen in the
longer term. Since some outcomes or events are unobservable, they cannot
be specified in a contract, inviting ex-post changes. He argues that existing
institutions do not change overnight, and will accordingly impact the present
structure as well as the possibilities for structural change. Therefore, institu-
tional changes will not consist of radical adaptations to the existing structure,
but rather incremental ones at the margin (ibid., p. 101). In other words,
changes are marginal and build on the existing institutional structure. Hence,
when the formal institutions are changed, for instance through issuing a new
Gas Directive, a disequilibrium may be created because the more tenacious
informal institutions do not change accordingly.Without adequate adjustment
to the new situation, this disequilibrium can create problems and tensions
which may, for instance, increase opposition to, and lower the feasibility of,
the reforms. In North’s (1994, p. 367) own words: ‘It is adaptive rather than
allocative efficiency which is the key to long-run growth’.
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From a slightly different perspective, Aoki (2001) points out that new or
changed institutions need to be implemented in aworldwhere numerous other
institutions already exist. These existing institutions (like long-term take-or-pay
contracts) partly lock-in the current situation.3 Thiswill impact, either positive-
ly or negatively, the development and prospects of new institutions. As above,
the consequence is that a discrepancy may arise between the inert existing
institutional environment and the institutional changes implemented in order
to realize the competitive reforms. In consequence, the new, adjusted institu-
tional structure may well be less far-reaching than originally intended by the
new Directive.
The rules of the game determine the way the game is played, which is
located at the third level. This is the level at which the institutional arrange-
ments are designed. Here the laws, treaties and property rights developed
at the second level are transposed by Member States into actual regulation
such as contracts, guidelines or tariff methodologies. This is where the govern-
ance structure (cf. Williamson, 1985, 1996) – addressing issues like spot market
trading, the level of unbundling or state ownership – is determined.4 Getting
the governance structure right is referred to as second-order economizing.
Changes in governance can take up to a decade to materialize. These institu-
tional arrangements are the focus of transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE takes
the institutional environment as given. That is, TCE determines themost appro-
priate mode of governance given the prevailing property rights, rule of law
and regulations. This study analyzes existing European gas regulation, and
consequently emphasizes this third institutional level. The next section more
elaborately discusses the TCE framework which is central to this study’s ana-
lysis.
At the fourth and final level, the institutional arrangements drive the
behavior of market actors who try to achieve their specific objectives. This
is what neoclassical economics is concerned with. The issue here is to get the
marginal conditions right, which is third-order economizing. Changes at this
3 Different reasons have been put forward. Couwenberg andWoerdman (2006) analyze lock-in
on the Dutch natural gas market and argue that the old transactions create a lock-in that
makes implementation of full competition impossible. Without explicitly analyzing path
dependence, Polo and Scarpa (2007) corroborate this by arguing that the presence of take-or-
pay commitments might negate the pro-competitive effects of stimulating entry. They claim
that take-or-pay commitments might create a segmented market, i.e., a market in which
each supplier targets a different segment of themarket. The resulting entrywithout compe-
tition would harm liberalization’s efficacy. From a different perspective, Mañé Estrada (2006,
p. 3784) ‘can think only of two possible answers’ to the observation that the EU appears
to be locked-in to its current competition approach: 1) the current policies are the only viable
ones in today’s EU or 2) statesman of the EU have ceased to observe the actual world
around them. The first answer corresponds with lock-in being caused by the ongoing
integration movement (see section 4.3), while the second one implies that the market shifts
from chapter two may not be adequately recognized by European policy makers.
4 See Groenewegen (2005, p. 10) for a number of options.
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level concern prices and quantities, and these changes occur more or less
continuously in response to changing market conditions. As indicated in
chapter three, the neoclassical emphasis on regulation is neatly illustrated by
the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm (Bain, 1956). In this
paradigm, the market structure (the number and relative sizes of firms in an
industry) determines a firm’s conduct (output decisions and pricing behavior),
which yields an industry’s overall performance (for example, its efficiency
and profitability). From this perspective, a firm’s only function is to transform
inputs into outputs. In contrast, NIE and TCE regard the firm as an organization
which must itself be subjected to economic analysis (Klein, 2000, p. 463, 464).
Hence, the value of the neoclassical approach notwithstanding, figure 5.1
indicates that this viewpoint towards regulation is no longer appropriate.
Accordingly, a main message of this study is that the neoclassical approach
must be complemented with the NIE framework in order to explicitly recognize
the important role of transaction costs, contracts and property rights in Euro-
pean gas regulation. Note that while the above description of the four levels
implies a one-way, top-down, causality, the arrows indicate otherwise.William-
son’s (1998, p. 26) assumption is that while causality also runs from the bottom
up, this causality is less strong than the top-down causality. Therefore, the
main causality is top-down. However, recent research seems to indicate that
the bottom-up causality may be stronger than Williamson assumes, as il-
lustrated in the next section.
5.3.3 Criticism on and adaptations of the Williamson framework
Causality also runs from bottom to top due to the presence of several bottom-
up feedback loops. For example, as indicated in chapter four, the actions of
market players and stakeholders influence the design of European regulation
that is being imposed on amarket. Theymay lobby the regulatory institutions
to induce institutional changes at a higher level. Firms and investors may also
influence the higher-level institutions by changing themarket structure through
mergers, take-overs and joint-ventures (Correljé and De Vries, 2008, p. 76).
In addition, all players learn during the process, for instance as a result of
new insights into the developing institutions. This learning curvemay change
their behavior and may in turn also change the institutions. Other examples
that induce bottom-up pressure include technological change and broad societal
change (CIEP, 2006, p. 23). In addition, undesirable market outcomes at the
fourth level may indicate that the institutional environment and/or arrange-
ments are working unsatisfactorily, which may prompt institutional changes.
For example, insufficient investments may signal the need for amendments
to regulation in order to better facilitate investments. This may explain some
of the amendments to regulation we have discussed in the previous chapter,
for instance the enlarged scope for exemptions from the TPA provisions and
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the acceptance of some degree of long-term contracting. These feedback loops
indicate 1) that the bottom-up causality may be stronger than assumed by
Williamson and 2) that regulation is a dynamic process.
However, using insights from North (1990), Correljé and De Vries (2008,
p. 76, 77) highlight two informational reasons that may weaken the feedback
loops. First, information may be insufficient to determine whether a specific
choice is superior to the current one. They provide the example that the
experience with liberalized markets is too limited to provide clear evidence
that a market design without a capacity mechanism provides sufficient invest-
ment incentives. Without a superior option, or consensus on it, the easiest
solution is to stick with the existing option. This is one of the causes for the
lock-in (or path dependence) indicated above (ibid., p. 12). Second, the models
– both formal and mental – with which information is processed may be
inadequate. Any model is inherently a simplification of the real world and
will therefore always highlight only part of the real world. Different national
policy and political traditions to some extent result in different reference
models of policymakers, and these in turn result in different policy guidelines.
If feedback is sufficient and adequate, these models can improve over time
and converge towards an optimal model. However, in complex systems like
electricity and gas, feedback is likely to be inadequate. In their conclusion,
Correljé and De Vries (2008, p. 89) identify time lags (due to investment lead
times) and the fact that much of the feedback represents the perspective of
lobbyists as additional impediments to the feedback loop.
In addition to the more prominent presence of feedback loops indicated
above, several other amendments to the Williamson framework have been
proposed recently (cf. Haase, 2008). First, De Vries andCorreljé (2006) disagree
with Williamson’s indications regarding the time periods of institutional
changes. Specifically, they argue that the time periods might be too long and
static. The periods also appear to be based more on aesthetic considerations
than on empirical observations. Second, Correljé and De Vries (2008, p. 68)
argue that the governance structure is also determined by a set of exogenous
factors, comprisingmacroeconomic characteristics (e.g., level of development
and economic growth), the institutional and socio-political constitution of a
country (e.g., rule of law and institutional centralization) and the physical
situation (e.g., resource endowment and physical size of the market). A third
amendment follows from De Vries and Correljé (2006), who argue that the
distinction between the formal institutions at level 2 and the institutional
arrangements at level 3 are not as clear-cut as implied in figure 5.1. They
distinguish between general formal institutionswhich correspond to the rules
of the game in the Williamson model on the one hand, and sector-specific
formal institutions which are determined by the scope of the Gas Directives
and Regulations on the other. They argue that the difference between the two
is ambiguous. Recall from chapter four that the basic legislative principles are
determined at the European level (in consultationwith stakeholders), following
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which Member States must transpose the legislation into their national law.
According to Haase (2008, p. 11) this multi-level and multi-actor regulatory
process explains the ambiguity. She provides the following example which
illustrates that unbundling can be classified both as a formal institution and
an institutional arrangement. European gas legislation determines that legal
unbundling must be implemented. This qualifies as a formal institution at
level 2. On the other hand, national regulators determine which form of
unbundling is actually introduced in a Member State, which constitutes an
institutional arrangement at level 3. Fourth and final, she (ibid., p. 12) contends
that energy policy objectives may change at relatively short notice (see the
first amendment above), whichwould imply changes at the lower institutional
levels. As an example, she mentions the energy paradigm shift put forward
by Helm (2005a, 2007a). According to Haase, this new paradigm implies a
shift from the competition, liberalization and privatization emphasis prevailing
during the 1980s and 1990s to one governed by supply security and climate
change. This changed paradigmwill impact the lower institutional levels, and
consequently probably require a different governance structure. Note that this
relates to our discussion of the market shifts in chapter two (althoughwe argue
there is more to this issue than just a shift in policy objectives). We argue that
these market shifts create a gas market that is fundamentally different from
the one from which existing gas regulation emanates. This begs the question
whether gas regulation is able to adapt in order to secure the energy policy
goals in this new context in which gas regulation operates.
5.4 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS
TCE is concerned with institutional arrangements such as contracts and
guidelines. The transaction is the basic unit of analysis. In short, TCE argues
that many transactions create contractual hazards which must be mitigated
through an appropriate governance structure. It studies comparative con-
tractual arrangements and examines which of the feasible alternatives is best
suited given the transactions at hand. As pointed out below, this makes TCE
the ideal basis for designing regulation in the new context set out in section 2.9.
5.4.1 Analytical framework
The ease of contracting is an important difference between neoclassical eco-
nomics (NCE) and TCE. NCE, with its perfect competition postulate, assumes
that contracts are complete, i.e., that every possible contingency can be fore-
seen, specified and agreed upon in a contract. This does not imply the absence
of uncertainty. The future is not known but the probability distributions of
all possible future events are (Klein, 2000, p. 466). In Knight’s (1921) terminol-
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ogy, NCE assumes the presence of risks rather than uncertainties, which allows
for contracts that foresee and anticipate all possible contingencies. Under these
assumptions, there is no efficiency argument for coordinating transactions
outside the market. Hence, market exchange is the best option. TCE takes a
different perspective. Figure 5.2 illustrates TCE’s analytical framework.
Figure 5.2: The analytical framework of TCE
Own elaborations
TCE allows for the presence of uncertainties. That is, the available contracting
options are limited because nobody knows exactly what will happen in the
future. This translates into contractual incompleteness, because a contract
cannot take account of ex-post adaptations that cannot be foreseen ex-ante.
Even if we assume the possibility of contractual completeness, writing, moni-
toring, verifying and enforcing a complete contract will likely be prohibitively
expensive. If we consider a very simple transaction like buying an off-the-shelf
component, the uncertainty is very small and spot transactions are likely to
be the preferred solution. However, more complicated, specialized transactions
which are common on gas markets, require more sophisticated modes of
governance. According to Williamson (1975, p. 4), an important cause for
contractual incompleteness, in addition to uncertainty and complexity of
transaction, is bounded rationality. That is, an agent intends to behave in a
rational manner but will do so only to a limited degree, for instance because
human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill and time. This explains
the left-hand column of figure 5.2: the inherent presence of uncertainty, com-
bined with the complexity of transactions and the bounded rationality of
individuals, renders most contracts unavoidably incomplete.
Contractual incompleteness invites opportunism, also known as moral
hazard, which is defined by Williamson (1996, p. 6) as ‘self-interest seeking
with guile’. The gaps present in any contract can be used by an agent to
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achieve his own personal goals which do not necessarily coincide with those
of society as a whole – think of sub-goal pursuit, shirking, etc.5
In addition to contractual incompleteness, asset specificity is an important
cornerstone of TCE. It can take one of several forms.6 For European gas, com-
mon forms are locational and physical asset specificity and especially dedicated
assets, as indicated in section 2.9.1. Locational specificity relates to the spread
of gas reserves; physical specificity relates to the network-bound character
of gas; and dedicated assets refer to investments in assets that are specific to
a particular consumer or relationship. Arguably the most important form of
specificity in the case of gas is dedicated assets. Dedicated assets sink invest-
ments into a market and create a bilateral relationship between the parties
involved. These then have an incentive to bargain about the rents that arise
from the sunk investment. This can have negative effects both on ex-ante
investment and ex-post efficiency, aswell as increase transaction costs. In fact,
transaction costs are determined to a large extent by the degree of asset speci-
ficity (Williamson, 1985, chapter 4). Asset specificity is closely related to low
numbers relations, the final element in the second column of figure 5.2. This
is due to the fact that asset specificity creates a condition of bilateral depend-
ency, which implies that what may have been a large number supply situation
at the outset is transformed into a small number exchange relation thereafter.
In the third column, the interplay of the transactional characteristics –
contractual incompleteness, opportunism, asset specificity and low numbers
bargaining – induce ex-post contractual hazards which increase the costs of
transacting. Therefore, the cost of handling a particular transaction does not
only consist of the direct contracting costs of writing, monitoring, verifying
and enforcing contracts, but also of the costs of ex-post contractual hazards.
These hazards render market exchange costly too, which opens the door for
a comparative analysis of alternative governance forms in order to assess their
respective advantages in terms of transaction costs.
The ex-post contractual hazards warrant further attention. According to
Klein (2000, p. 467), the investment hold-up problem is the best-known example
of an ex-post contractual hazard. Section 2.9.1 discusses this problem and
defines it as the negative impact on investments of limited credibility. If an
investor undertakes a specific investment, he is tied to the trading relation
he has invested in. Hazards arise if circumstances change. Without any safe-
guards, the opportunism of the trading partners may result in their changing
their behavior in order to capture the quasi-rent associated with the specific
5 Hodgson (1998, p. 205) objects to the central role thatWilliamson apportions to opportunism.
According toHodgson, the fundamental issue regarding contract compliance is not oppor-
tunism or self-interest, but rather uncertainty (which may or may not be due to opportun-
ism).
6 These include 1) site or location specificity, 2) physical asset specificity, 3) human-capital
specificity, 4) dedicated assets, 5) brand name capital and 6) temporal specificity. See
Williamson (1996, p. 59, 60) and Creti and Villeneuve (2003, p. 4).
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investment. This lowers the investor’s ex-post profits which changes his ex-ante
behavior. As long as the trading partner fails to credibly promise ex-ante not
to behave opportunistically ex-post, the investor might in the extreme case
choose not to make any investments at all. Accordingly, a governance structure
must be created which can eliminate this investment hold-up problem given
the particulars of the relationship. The essence in this regard is to install
safeguards that improve the ex-post credibility of the trading relationship.
In other words, the key of any regulatory policy aiming to facilitate invest-
ments is for the regulator to find some sort of commitment device; TCE allows
us to analyze which commitment device best suits the transaction at hand.
5.4.2 Empirical evidence and outstanding issues
TCE’s predictions have been quite extensively tested. This section discusses
some landmarks and highlights a few remaining issues. We emphasize vertical
integration and long-term contracts (Klein, 2000, p. 470-478 provides an over-
view).
A number of difficulties arise when empirically testing the TCE predictions.
According to Klein (ibid., p. 477, 478), two of these are related tomeasurement
and confusion about the definitions of key variables, especially uncertainty.
In addition, Hubbard and Weiner (1991) and Joskow (1991) argue that alter-
native hypotheses that might also fit the data – in their papers, these consist
of (neoclassical) market power explanations – are rarely mentioned or com-
pared. A final problem is that most empirical studies do not establish causal
relations, but instead focus on observing correlations.
TCE is usually tested by analyzing to what extent asset specificity facilitates
integration. The common denominator is that there is a positive relationship
between asset specificity and vertical integration (see the survey articles of
Joskow, 1988a, 2005a, Shelanski and Klein, 1995, Crocker and Masten, 1996
and Lyons, 1996). This corroborates the general view that TCE performs well
empirically. According toWilliamson (1996, p. 55), ‘TCE is an empirical success
story’.
Nevertheless, the role of asset specificity has created – and still creates –
considerable controversy within TCE. Klein et al. (1978) have argued that asset
specificity creates hold-up problems which in turn provide a rationale for
vertical integration. This has been challenged by Coase. Coase agrees that high
levels of asset specificity may indeed create hold-up problems, but he objects
to the assertion that this is likely to result in vertical integration rather than
the intermediate solution of concluding long-term contracts. Menard (2005,
p. 310) argues that this controversy – which, as illustrated by Coase (2006)
and Klein (2007), is far from resolved – indicates the need for additional
empirical research. Menard argues that uncertainty and the role of human
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assets must be studied more thoroughly and that tests must be conducted at
the firm or the inter-firm, rather than sector, level.
Regarding the solution of long-term contracts to which Coase refers, Joskow
(1985, 1987, 1988b, 1990) argues that in coal markets, contract duration tends
to increase when relation-specific investments are at stake. Considering gas
markets, Crocker and Masten (1988) corroborate this result and add the ob-
servation that adaptation to changes in economic conditions is vital when
concluding long-term contracts. They furthermore argue that agents are sensit-
ive to relatively small adaptations in contract terms. Crocker andMasten (1991)
provide insights into the actual process of long-term contracting. They argue
that the relational view towards long-term contracts may be a better perspect-
ive than the mechanistic contracts often assumed in economic literature.7
According to the relational view, contracts should not attempt to specify all
possible contingencies; instead, due for instance to their unavoidable incom-
pleteness, contracts should try to establish procedures for adapting change
and resolving disputes. Crocker andMasten apply this relational perspective
to the price adjustment process in long-term contracts between gas producers
and pipelines in the US. Their main conclusion is that relational contracts
become more likely with longer contract durations. Note that the mechanistic
contracts are similar to the complete contracts that arise from the neoclassical
perspective, while the relational contracts follow from the TCE perspective.
Liberalization has induced several recent studies on the relationship
between liberalization and contract length which have a TCE flavor. As referred
to in section 3.4.1, Neumann and VonHirschhausen (2004, 2006) andNeuhoff
and Von Hirschhausen (2006) all submit that liberalization initially decreases
contract length but that asset specificity may increase contract length again.
In conclusion, themajority of empirical research is consistentwith the insights
from TCE.
5.4.3 An encompassing framework
Chapter two points out that the market shifts that are currently taking place
on the international gas market have created a new context for regulation in
which the predominant issue has become how to stimulate investments in a
gas market which is dominated by producers, where political considerations
are gaining importance and where supply security and sustainability have
moved to the top of the energy policy agenda. According to section 2.9, in
such an environment, regulatory policymust focus on irreversible investments,
risk and uncertainty in order to devise an appropriate governance structure.
The traditional neoclassical perspective incorporates risk, but ignores all other
7 Often referred to as contingent claims contracts.
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criteria. Accordingly, one of the main messages of this study is that due to
its neoclassical guiding principles, current European gas regulation cannot
lead to the market behavior that is required in the new context. In order to
better steer themarket, therefore, we need to combine the neoclassical perspect-
ive with the transaction cost view because the latter explicitly considers the
criteria for regulation in the new context spelled out in chapter two.
However, this study does not refute the neoclassical perspective but rather
argues that its applicability is limited. A theoretical framework that covers
both the neoclassical and transaction costs perspectives must specify when
to use which theory. The main criteria in this regard are contractual incom-
pleteness, opportunism and asset specificity, whose interplay determines how
a transaction should be governed in practice (Newbery, 1999, p. 54). These
criteria allow us to determine whether the neoclassical perspective provides
a proper perspective.
If the contracts are incomplete and players behave opportunistically but
the assets are not specific, the market is contestable and the solution is market
exchange (see Annex). The neoclassical perspective is applicable in this setting.
If we have specific assets and opportunism without incomplete contracts, all
contingencies can be foreseen and specified in a complete contract. Hence,
in this situation, we have risks but no uncertainties, which renders the neo-
classical perspective appropriate (see section 5.4.1). Without opportunism,
promises are always kept and simple (incomplete) contracts suffice to govern
transactions without the need for monitoring, verification or enforcement
expenses.
In all three situations, the solutions are straightforward and unproblematic
since either market exchange or ex-ante contracting is sufficient. Consequently,
the neoclassical perspective is appropriate in each of these situations. No
institution is required (Williamson, 1996, p. 56). Only if all three characteristics
are simultaneously present, will there be ex-post contractual hazards which
require costly safeguards. In this setting, institutions become important and
the TCE perspective is the proper theoretical perspective.
5.5 IS THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET VULNERABLE TO EX-POST HAZARDS?
One of TCE’s mainmessages is that the required governance structure depends
on the transactions on amarket, which in turn are determined by themarket’s
structural characteristics. This section examines the structural and transactional
characteristics of the European gas market in order to determine to what extent
ex-post contractual hazards can be expected.
Figure 5.2 above spells out the relevant criteria. The presence of most of
these on the European gasmarket is already discussed elsewhere. Section 2.9.1
indicates the sunk and specific nature of gas market investments, while sec-
tion 2.9.2 points towards the increasing uncertainty on European gas markets.
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In conjunction with the assumption of bounded rationality, we have contractual
incompleteness on European gas markets. Furthermore, according to section
5.4, the specific assets create a low-number bargaining situation. Hence, the
only criterion that requires further elaboration if we are to determine the
likelihood of ex-post contractual hazards is opportunism, which is determined
by regulatory credibility or commitment (see section 2.9.2). To this end, section
5.5.1 provides a non-exhaustive overview of the criteria that determine regu-
latory commitment that arise from the literature. These criteria allow us to
determine under what circumstances regulatory policy can be considered to
be credible. Section 5.5.2 then examines the credibility of European gas regu-
lation.
5.5.1 Criteria of regulatory commitment
Newbery (1999, chapter 2) models the problem of regulatory commitment.
He provides a simple infinite horizon model that illustrates under which
circumstances regulation may be credible without additional institutional
arrangements. A two-player dynamic regulation game between a regulator
and a regulatee is defined. The following sequence of actions is undertaken.
First, the rules of the game are set by a government or the community at large.
This determines the applicable regulatory rules. Based on these rules and on
its predictions of the level of revenue that the regulator will allow over the
lifetime of an investment as well as its predictions of future demand, the
regulated firm chooses the level of capacity it will install. Uncertainty is
introduced by not being sure in advance whether future demand will be high
or low. High demand is 1 with known probability 1-P; low demand is 1-σ
with known probability P. After the firm’s investment, both players observe
the actual level of demand, following which the regulator determines the
amount of revenue allowed to the regulated firm. At this point, renegotiation
or expropriation may occur. This forms the basis on which the regulated firm
sets its price and output and pay-offs are generated. Playing this game pro-
vides the following solution for (rate of return) regulation to be credible (see
Newbery, 1999, p. 73-77 for the derivation):
(1-σP)*(c-b) > r*[1+(1-θ)*i],
where (1-σP) is next period’s expected output; (c-b) is the extra variable cost
of not having the regulated firm’s investment; r is the fixed or capital cost of
investing in capacity; θ < 1 is the weight placed on investor profits; and i is
the rate of return used by the regulator to discount future benefits. This model
allows the regulator and regulatee to create a cooperative, or reputational,
equilibrium in which the investment is undertaken and the regulator allows
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for a price that recovers the sunk investments. In this equilibrium, a lack of
regulatory commitment poses no problem and no contractual hazard arises.
Levine et al. (2005, p. 461, 462) cast some doubts on the prospect of such
reputational equilibria. They argue that a cooperative equilibrium without
hazards, as Newbery’s, depends in largemeasure on the presence of complete
information.8 They (ibid. p. 456) introduce incomplete information by assuming
uncertainty regarding the type of regulator. A regulator may be a strong type
who likes to commit and accordingly has high costs of reneging, or in contrast,
a regulator may be weak and prone to opportunism and short-term optimiza-
tion. Their analysis indicates that a cooperative equilibrium is only one of a
range of possible equilibria, amongwhich the no-investment/no-cooperation
outcome. Another contrast withNewbery is that they explicitly recognize both
the increasing consumer demand and the capital depreciation rate.
These models provide six main criteria that determine the likelihood of
a regulator reneging on his promises. We discuss these criteria below, following
which section 5.5.2 applies them to the European gas market.
Gas demand and technological development
First, (1-σP) indicates that an increasing expected output in the next period
improves regulatory credibility, since the larger the output of the regulated
firm that is foregone by behaving opportunistically, the less likely a regulator
is to renege. Levine at al. (2005) explicitly consider growing demand: rapid
demand growth increases the benefits in subsequent periods which makes
reneging less likely. Technological development has a similar effect in that
it also increases future pay-offs from complying with the regulatory contract.
Private/public ownership
Second, (c-b) indicates that increasing costs of alternative supply eases compli-
ance with the regulatory contract. This implies that a large comparative ad-
vantage of private over alternative (possibly public) supply improves regu-
latory credibility. This adds ownership of a regulated firm to the criteria.
Schmidt (2000) shows that the incentive for regulatory opportunism in case
of sunk investments can bemitigated via a privatization policy that distributes
a large part of the shares to the general population (in contrast to insider
privatization, where the shares are allocated to the workers of the company).
According to Vickers (1993) and Biais and Perotti (2002), this widespread
distribution can be achieved by allocating shares cheaply or freely, by restrict-
ing the number of shares an individual can own or by discouraging people
to sell their shares for cash. The intuition is straightforward.With widespread
distribution of shares, breaking the regulatory contract harms a large part of
the population, which increases its political costs. Two additional issues
8 Note that this argument is similar to the one brought forward by Crew and Kleindorfer
(2006), discussed in section 4.4.2.
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warrant attention. First, the scope for lowering the number of shares allowed
per individual is restricted, since investors need to receive a sufficient number
of shares to be able to exert some control. That is, the more shares are trans-
ferred away from the investors to the public, the less incentive they will have
to invest in the first place. Second, giving away shares for free or at a discount
lowers the government revenues associated with privatization. Nevertheless,
the Schmidt (ibid, p. 412) model shows that despite these objections, ‘giving
away a substantial part of the shares to the general population may not only
reduce expropriation but also increase the restructuring efforts and revenues
from privatization’ (emphasis added).
Capital depreciation
The fixed or capital cost of investing in capacity, r, will at low levels increase
credibility. To see why this is the case, note that r depends on the capital
intensity of production and the rate of capital depreciation. The former directs
us towards sunk investments, which have already been extensively discussed.
Levine et al. (2005) provide an explicit treatment of capital depreciation, as
opposed to the implicit treatment above, and they show that higher capital
depreciation shortens the period over which capital needs to be replaced. The
benefits of reneging are then short-lived, whichmakes it relatively expensive.
Investor/consumer benefits
The higher the weight on investor profits – that is, the higher θ is – the less
likely it is that reneging will occur. In the same vein, Teulings and Bovenberg
(2006) show that the potential hold-up problem in investments (in R&D)
depends on the share of profits in the consumer surplus. That is, the less
surplus a potential investor is able to extract, the lower is his incentive to
invest. If a regulator places relatively high emphasis on consumer rents, he
will have an incentive to expropriate investor rents and distribute these to
consumers as doing so will increase welfare (see section 4.4.1). This incentive
becomes lower as θ increases, which lowers expropriation hazards for the
investor.
Discount factor
A regulator’s discount factor, i, signals his view of the future. If the discount
factor is low, a regulator values future pay-offs highly and will consequently
be less inclined to renege. A related concept is the short-sightedness of a
regulator (a regulator that values future benefits highly can by definition not
be short-sighted or myopic). A myopic regulator is more likely to act
opportunistically and maximize welfare over a relatively short-term horizon,
a situation which may occur if a regulator is in office for a short period of
time (Lewis and Sappington, 1990).
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5.5.2 Regulatory commitment on the European gas market
These criteria allow us to determine whether regulation is credible. We deter-
mine whether the European gas market is susceptible to opportunistic regu-
latory behavior (and consequently hold-up) by tracing how the criteria identi-
fied impact a regulator’s ability and incentive to ex-post commit to its ex-ante
regulatory promises.
Gas demand
Substantial effort is currently being exerted to reduce gas demand – for
instance as a consequence of import dependency anxieties and the emphasis
on both energy efficiency and lowering gas demand.Nevertheless, gas demand
will grow, for instance due to increasing gas demand from power generation
(see section 2.8). This increases the benefits in future periods which improves
commitment by lowering the incentive to renege on a regulatory contract.
Technological development
The rate of technological development has the potential to significantly in-
fluence a market and its regulation (as has happened in the telecommunications
market when mobile telephony was introduced). However, gas markets are
generally characterized by a relatively low level of technological development,
which results in the benefits from reneging lasting relatively long, which in
turn lowers commitment.
Ownership
Gas does not (yet) score too well on the issue of ownership. A recent European
Court of Justice ruling that golden shares are incompatible with the free
movement of capital9 indicates a desire to decrease government involvement
in this sector. However, the current trend is one of increasing rather than
decreasing government control. Most European energy companies have been
and still are controlled or influenced by their governments through majority
stakes (like the Norwegian government’s 62.5 percent stake in StatoilHydro)
or golden shares (in the case of Belgium’s Distrigas and GDFSUEZ, the French
company that was created by the merger between Gaz de France (GdF) and
SUEZ).10 The GDF/SUEZ merger is furthermore a bad omen, because it may
indicate a movement towards creating national energy champions. Commit-
ment would be higher in case of privatized companies not controlled or
influenced by their government andwith their shares spread over a large part
of the general population. However, this seems unlikely for the foreseeable
future.
9 CoJ EC September 28 2006 C-282/04.
10 See sections 6.3.2 and 7.3.1 for more elaborate discussions of this merger.
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Capital depreciation
Capital depreciates which means that at some point in time, investments will
be worn out and should be replaced by new investments. Gas capital stock
has a low level of depreciation, as it generally lasts up to decades. This
lengthens the period after which capital needs to be replaced, which makes
the benefits of reneging last for a relatively long period of time and
consequently lowers commitment.
Consumer/Investor rents
The picture on investor’s profits is not very positive, because the emphasis
of existing gas regulation is on consumer interests. Existing gas regulation
has been instigated and developed during the 1980s and 1990s and it is there-
fore firmly embedded in the competition, liberalization and privatization
emphasis that prevailed during that period. From this a regulatory structure
has evolved that aims to reduce costs to the benefit of consumers. The current
emphasis on consumer interests is also clear from the observation that most
of the regulation theories which have led to the existing gas regulation assume
a regulator who attaches a higher weight to consumer interests than to pro-
ducer interests (see section 4.4.1). A typical European gas regulator will have
incentive to redistribute investor rents to consumers. This once more lowers
regulatory commitment.
Discount factor
The discount factor of a typical gas regulator is generally quite high. One
reason for this is electoral pressure to obtain short-term gains. Gas is a highly
politicized subject due to for instance the importance of energy to a national
economy and the soaring energy prices. One consequence is that regulatory
bodies generally have a low degree of political autonomy. For instance, Arent-
sen (2004, p. 88) observes that
‘Only Italy, TheNetherlands (to some extent) and theUnited Kingdom have legally
independent and autonomous gas market regulators with autonomous ex-ante
regulatory mandates. All other countries in one way or another share regulatory
mandates with governmental bodies, in almost all cases the ministry of economic
affairs or energy.’
Hence, the threat of regulation being exposed to political considerations, and
in turn a low discount factor and myopic behavior, is conceivable for gas.
Again, commitment is low.
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Table 5.1: Gas market specifics and regulatory commitment
Variable Gas market Regulatory commitment
Demand Increasing +
Technological develop-
ment
Low -/-
Private ownership Predominantly public -/-
Capital depreciation Low -/-
Investor’s profits Emphasis on consumer interests -/-
Discount factor High -/-
Table 5.1 summarizes the analysis and illustrates that regulatory commitment
is typically low. Of the six main factors identified, five definitely indicate low
regulatory commitment. Only the projected increase in gas demand increases
policy credibility. However, import dependency anxieties render it unlikely
that European gas demand will be stimulated to increase regulatory commit-
ment. Note that this section does not explicitly consider the nature of the
investments. Their impact on regulatory commitment has already been dis-
cussed in the section on asset specificity. Their sunk nature creates the possibil-
ity for ex-post opportunism. On the other hand, the need for substantial new
investments increases the future pay-offs of a cooperative solution. Hence,
regarding investments, the picture is inconclusive.
The predominant picture that can be distilled from this section is that the
specifics of the European gas market make it relatively easy (that is, cheap)
for a regulator to renege on his regulatory promises. In conjunction with asset
specificity and contractual incompleteness, this lack of regulatory commitment
creates ex-post contractual hazards and investment hold-up problems. The
TCE perspective is therefore applicable to the European gas market. The next
two sections trace the implications of the TCE perspective for regulatory inter-
vention and the structure of a liberalized European gas market, as compared
to the neoclassical recommendations in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
5.6 REGULATORY INTERVENTION IN THE TRANSACTION COST WORLD
TCE provides a different perspective on regulatory intervention than the neo-
classical approach. Without the intention of being exhaustive, this section
provides some important implications of viewing regulation through a TCE
rather than neoclassical lens.
Recall that the neoclassical perspective argues that a market failure is
sufficient ground to think about regulatory intervention, but that actual inter-
vention should only materialize in practice if the costs of the market failure
outweigh the costs of the government or regulatory failure that accompanies
the intervention (see section 1.5.1). The TCE perspective corresponds to the
neoclassical perspective by arguing that regulatory intervention is required
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only if it is more efficient than private ordering (if not, then the best solution
is to refrain from regulatory intervention, market failure notwithstanding).
However, compared to the neoclassical perspective, TCE throws the rational
choice axiom overboard but retains optimizing behavior. The fundamental
difference with neoclassical economics is that that due to, amongst others,
bounded rationality and uncertainty, the choice does not necessarily fall on
the first-best optimum. Rather, TCE advocates a comparative institutional
analysis in which the governance structure which entails the lowest transaction
costs – comprising the direct contracting costs and the costs related to ex-post
contractual hazards – is chosen from a set of feasible alternatives. This observa-
tion has consequences for the scope for regulatory intervention.
The difference resides in the costs of regulatory intervention. In economic
jargon, regulatory intervention may be warranted only in case of complex
externalities, i.e., if the transaction costs of private internalization become
prohibitively expensive because, for instance, many actors are involved, the
sources of externalities are diffuse, information is asymmetric or players behave
opportunistically. A first main implication is therefore that the neoclassical
perspective provides toomuch scope for regulatory intervention (cf. Robinson,
2000), for instance by not recognizing the costs of opportunism. Another
implication is that from a TCE perspective, no governance structure should
be ruled out beforehand (see the next section).
Second, a regulator’s behavior is different in the TCE framework. TCE
deviates from the neoclassical perspective 1) by assuming a regulator to be
non-benevolent and generally unable to implement an optimal regulatory
scheme, while 2) allowing him to behave opportunistically. The latter explains
TCE’s emphasis on ex-post governance issues (Williamson, 2005, p. 44).11
Third, TCE rejects the neoclassical notion that state ownership and state
regulation are substitutes. According toMenard and Shirley (2005, p. 13), they
are different, polar modes of governance, each with its own characteristics,
efficiency properties and transaction costs. Their feasibility depends on the
characteristics of the transaction at hand.
5.7 REFORMING THE EUROPEAN GAS MARKET ACCORDING TO THE TRANSACTION
COST PERSPECTIVE
This section revisits the neoclassical prescriptions for designing a liberalized
gas market in section 3.5 in order to illustrate the differences between the
11 TCE also detracts from the capture and agency theorieswhichwe used to discuss regulatory
failure section 4.4. According to the capture theories, regulation is supplied in response
to private interests, which assumes a passive regulator. In contrast, TCE sees regulators
as active, for instance by behaving opportunistically. Regarding the agency theories, TCE’s
emphasis on ex-post governance detracts from the emphasis in agency theories on principal-
agent contracting schemes that are required to provide the proper ex-ante incentives.
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neoclassical and the transaction cost perspective for restructuring and liberal-
izing the European gas market.
Structural reform
Regarding vertical restructuring, the neoclassical recommendation is clear:
integrated firms must be structurally separated because vertical integration
has no efficiency rationale while being likely to stifle competition. The TCE
framework is less inhospitable to vertical integration.We follow Joskow (2005)
who applies the TCE framework to vertical integration. TCE criticizes the neo-
classical perspective for 1) ignoring both the costs of internal organization and
the availability of more complicated hybrid governance forms and 2) assuming
that vertical integration is without efficiency rationale. In case of ex-post
hazards, market transactions cannot remove the investment hold-up problem
which implies that the costs of market exchange are high. This means that
it is beneficent to devise alternative governance structures that mitigate hold-
up. Vertical integration can be regarded as the most far-reaching alternative
to market exchange.
As indicated, ex-post contractual hazards are likely to occur on the Euro-
pean gas market due to its transactional characteristics, which implies that
vertical integration entails benefits because it lowers these hazards and the
resulting investment hold-up. This efficiency rationale is countered by the costs
of internal organization. An additional cost results from the fact that vertical
integration may distort competition in competitive segments like wholesale
trading. In choosing the appropriate governance structure, therefore, the net
benefits of market exchange need to be compared to those of vertical integra-
tion as well as other feasible alternatives like long-term contracts or one of
the alternative separation options set out in section 3.5.
These recommendations for restructuring a liberalized European gasmarket
are in stark contrast to those that emanate from the neoclassical perspective.
First, note that we dispute neither the costs of vertical integration nor the
benefits of structural separation. However, since TCE recognizes the efficiency
advantages of vertical integration, pointing out its costs is insufficient to rule
it out as an option. Only if the transaction costs of market exchange are lower
than those of vertical integration as well as those of the alternative separation
options should structural separation be pursued. If, on the other hand, vertical
integration entails the lowest transaction costs of all feasible options, then
vertical integration with accompanying behavioral regulation is the way to
go.
We can be concise regarding horizontal restructuring, since once again
the issues are similar to those involved in vertical restructuring. TCE departs
from the neoclassical perspective by 1) recognizing that horizontal integration
may have an efficiency rationale through economizing on transaction costs
and 2) explicitly acknowledging the costs of internal organization and hybrid
governance forms. Accordingly, a decision to horizontally break up production
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or trading firms must be based on a comparative assessment between the
benefits of enhanced competition and the costs of, for example, diminished
coordination.
Access
This has repercussions for the access regime. With a structurally separated
network, the competitive anxieties are relatively minor and negotiated access
is preferred. However, if a less far-reaching separation option proves to have
the lowest inefficiencies (i.e., transaction costs), then the increased fears of
competitive abuse may be best mitigated through a regulated access regime.
In sum, the specific characteristics of amarket and its transactions critically
determine the preferred type of structural arrangements. This illustrates the
departure of TCE from the neoclassical emphasis: rather than simply being a
response to market power or an effort to create market power, vertical and
horizontal integration can also occur because they mitigate contractual and
transaction-specific hazards which might lower transaction costs compared
to market exchange or an intermediate contracting solution.
5.8 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter sets out the TCE perspective, which has been proposed as an
alternative to the neoclassical guiding principles of existing gas regulation.
One important advantage of the TCE perspective is that it incorporates into
the analysis the institutional determinants that explain alternative modes of
economic organization. It puts the transaction center stage and determines
the most appropriate governance form given the prevailing property rights,
rule of law and regulations. It proposes a comparative institutional analysis
of viable governance forms in order to find the governance form that entails
the lowest transaction costs which consist of the direct contracting costs and
the cost due to ex-post contractual hazards. TCE builds on three main criteria:
contractual incompleteness, opportunism and asset specificity. In conjunction,
these three characteristics create ex-post contractual hazards, and in turn the
investment hold-up problem,which requires costly safeguards. Consequently,
a governance structure must be devised that eliminates the ex-post hazards
at the lowest possible transaction costs.
The transactional characteristics on a particular market determine whether
the TCE criteria are present and in turn whether the TCE perspective is appro-
priate. This chapter develops an encompassing framework comprising the
neoclassical and TCE perspective, based on which it argues that the TCE per-
spective is appropriate only if all three criteria are simultaneously present.
If not, then either market exchange or ex-ante contracts will remove ex-post
contractual hazards and the neoclassical perspective suffices.
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The new context for gas regulation discussed in chapter two creates con-
tractual incompleteness and asset specificity on the European gasmarket. The
applicability to the European gas market of the TCE perspective is determined
by examiningwhether opportunism is a threat in the new context. To this end,
we must determine the level of regulatory commitment on European gas
markets. The lower the regulatory commitment, the more vulnerable an
investor is to regulatory opportunism. Six criteria, derived from the academic
literature on regulation, determine the level of regulatory commitment: 1) the
growth in gas demand, 2) the rate of technological development, 3) the owner-
ship of a regulated firm, 4) the rate of capital depreciation, 5) the emphasis
of a typical regulator on either consumer or investor rents and 6) the discount
rate. It is shown that the transactional characteristics of the European gas
market imply a low level of regulatory commitment. Accordingly, the Euro-
pean gas market is vulnerable to regulatory opportunism.
Because the European gas market exhibits all three TCE criteria, TCE is the
proper lens through which to analyze European gas regulation. Hence, this
study predicts that the TCE perspective would result in a better outcome in
terms of market behavior in the new context for regulation, as compared to
the current, neoclassically-oriented regulation.
According to this perspective, there is less scope for regulatory intervention
on the European gasmarket, because the costs of opportunism are recognized
as transaction costs of regulatory intervention. These higher costs of interven-
tion compared to the neoclassical perspective, imply a lower need for interven-
tion. On the other hand, a regulator does not possess all information and is
prone to opportunistic behavior.
The policy prescriptions for reform also differ from the neoclassical ones.
TCE argues that the competition distorting effects of vertical integration are
insufficient to argue for ownership unbundling. It does not dispute the draw-
backs of vertical integration. It acknowledges that integrationmay arise because
it mitigates ex-post contractual hazards. Hence, in contrast to the neoclassical
perspective, vertical integration may have efficiency benefits. In addition, the
presence of ex-post hazards also makes market exchange costly. Therefore,
in contrast to the neoclassical perspective, gas regulation must consider 1) that
vertical integration may well have efficiency properties by mitigating ex-post
hazards and 2) that there is an array of intermediate governance forms, like
long-term contracts, which must also be considered. The net benefits in terms
of transaction costs of market exchange must be compared to those of vertical
integration as well as feasible intermediate contracting solutions; no governance
structure should be ruled out beforehand.
This chapter completes the theoretical critique on current gas regulation.
However, the effect of regulation on market behavior, and by extension on
securing the PSOs, is an empirical issue. Therefore, the following two chapters
empirically examine this theoretical critique. The discussion of theGasDirect-
ives in chapter four illustrates that existing gas regulation has implemented
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some changes that implicitly follow the TCE perspective. The twomost promi-
nent examples are the enlarged scope in the second Gas Directive for exempt-
ing certain investments from the third party access provisions, and the accept-
ance of long-term supply contracts. The case studies in the next two chapters
examine these amendments.
6 TPA exemptions – The BBL case
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter and the next empirically examine the previous chapter’s theore-
tical critique by analyzing the actual behavior of market players. The goal is
to assess whether the theoretical conclusion that TCE is superior to the neo-
classical perspective also holds in practice. This would only be the case if the
TCE perspective better predicts and explains regulatory behavior. Chapters
six and seven provide case studies that examine this issue by describing the
regulatory process in order to trace the arguments that were voiced by the
different stakeholders, and to infer which specific changes to regulation have
been implemented and why these changes were made. This in turn leads to
an indication of whether current regulation has already implemented provi-
sions that deviate from the neoclassical perspective in actual practice, and if
so, whether the neoclassical perspective is able to explain these amendments.
If the amendments can be explained using the neoclassical perspective,
then current regulation is appropriate in the new context, and possible adapta-
tions to gas regulation would be marginal (i.e., building on the neoclassical
guiding principles). If not, however, gas regulation’s guiding principles should
be changed, with consequently more fundamental adaptations. The issue then
becomes whether the TCE perspective better explains the amendments. If so,
this study’s theoretical critique is corroborated. The final step would then be
to infer whether the current amendments sufficiently incorporate the TCE
perspective into European gas regulation.
This chapter analyzes one prominent adaptation to gas regulation: the
enlarged scope for TPA exemptions. It conducts a case study of the first pipeline
investment project to receive an exemption: the interconnector between Balg-
zand in the Netherlands and Bacton in the UK (the BBL pipeline). Section 6.2
provides the background to the case study. It sets out the TPA exemptions
regime as specified in the second Gas Directive and explains our choice of
the BBL pipeline. Section 6.3 then discusses the BBL project. It provides themain
technical and economic features of the project and a discussion on the holding
companies. Section 6.4 sets out a short timeline of BBL’s exemptions process,
from which we deduce three phases. Section 6.5 discusses phase 1 which
comprises the informal guidance process which has been developed because
the second Gas Directive was not yet implemented at the time BBL was
planned. After having received informal comfort, the final investment decision
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was made, and a formal application for an exemption could be made. This
is phase 2, which is discussed in section 6.6. In phase 3, which is the subject
of section 6.7, the European Commission assesses the views of both regulators
towards the BBL exemption. Based on this overview of the regulatory process,
section 6.8 draws some lessons. It examines whether the granting of exemptions
can be considered an adaptation of the neoclassical underpinnings of gas
regulation, whether the neoclassical perspective is able to explain the presence
of exemptions, and if not, whether the TCE perspective can provide a satis-
factory explanation. It is argued that the TCE perspective is indeed a better
perspective. In addition, some of the problems encountered in practice are
identified and recommendations are provided for solving them. Section 6.9
concludes that the Commission is currently stuck between the neoclassical
and TCE perspectives.
6.2 BACKGROUND
This section provides the background to our case study. It sets out the TPA
exemptions regime that emanates from the secondGas Directive and explains
our choice for BBL.
6.2.1 The TPA exemptions regime
Before considering the specific application of the TPA exemptions regime, this
section first sets out the reasons why the exemptions regime is considered
necessary and the conditions under which an infrastructure investment may
be exempted.
We start by restating that due to the structural market shifts discussed in
chapter two, facilitating new investments has become vital. At the early stages
of liberalization, costs could quite easily be decreased by more efficiently
deploying the existing infrastructure (sweating the assets). The presence of
awell-developed infrastructure disguised the inherent tension between stimu-
lating investments and promoting competitive forces (Newbery, 2001). Reduced
spare capacity following liberalization more visibly brings this tension to the
fore. Nowadays, asset sweating is likely to result in underinvestment and
consequent disruptions, which shifts the emphasis of European gas policy from
sweating existing assets to stimulating investments in new assets. In the old
days, investments were guaranteed throughmeasures including 1) long-term
take-or-pay contracts, 2) vertical integration, 3) regulating the pipeline as a
monopoly or 4) have the government build and operate pipelines (Makholm,
2007, p. 4). Liberalization, especially through the unbundling and third party
access (TPA) provisions, puts pressure on the viability of each of thesemeasures
and impedes investments.
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This tension between liberalization and investments has been recognized
in European legislation. TPA to the infrastructure is and will remain one of
the core elements of the European reform initiatives. It determines that every
infrastructure owner must grant third parties access to the infrastructure on
fair and non-discriminatory terms (which are determined by tariff regulation
by Member States). This corresponds to the neoclassical perspective set out
in chapter three. However, in order to facilitate sufficient investments, Article
22 of the second Gas Directive deviates from this perspective by allowing
certain investments to be exempted from the TPA provisions. TPA exemptions
allow an investor freedom from this regime for a specified period if certain
conditions are met. With an exemption, an investor may conclude long-term
(capacity) contracts based on negotiated TPA, rather than regulated TPAwithout
an exemption, in order to obtain the required financing for a project.
More specifically, according to the Commission’s interpretation laid down
in a non-binding Interpretation Note (DG TREN, 2004d), investments in new
infrastructures as well as in significant increases in capacity of existing infra-
structures and investments in modifications to such infrastructures which
enable the development of new sources of gas supply can be dispensed from
TPA requirements if the following six conditions are met:
1 The investmentmust concern amajor new infrastructure – interconnectors,
LNG and storage facilities;
2 The new infrastructure must enhance competition in gas supply and
security of supply;
3 The level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the invest-
ment would not commence without an exemption;
4 The infrastructure must be legally separate from the system operator;
5 Charges must be levied on users; and
6 The exemption must not be detrimental to the efficient functioning of the
internal gas market.
Regarding the first condition, a major, or high-cost, infrastructure is defined
as a project with costs so high that they substantially increase the final con-
sumers’ bills if remunerated through regulated tariffs. The second condition
is supposed to ensure that a new infrastructure will not establish or reinforce
the market power of a specific supplier. However, as indicated in Spanjer
(2007b), it is difficult to envisage an investment bringing additional gas to
Europe from failing the above criterion, even if this gas is coming from an
existing supplier, since additional gas volumes by definition improve security
of supply compared to the situation without the additional gas. Third, a low-
risk project will not receive an exemption. Project risk is based on the following
five criteria (DGTREN, 2004d, p. 2): 1) the extent to which an investment is sunk,
2) the presence of uncertainty due to events that might occur after the invest-
ment has occurred, for instance concerning consumption projections, 3) other
competing investments, 4) changes in world market conditions or 5) an above
144 TPA exemptions – The BBL case
average amortization period.We get back to these criteria in section 6.8.1. The
fourth condition requires a legal separation between the network activities
(of transmission system operators) and infrastructure activities in order to
ensure that the interests of the transmission system operator in whose system
the infrastructure is built do not conflict with the interests of the infrastructure
operator. Fifth, only infrastructure users should be charged in order to prevent
a cross-subsidization of merchant activities with regulated revenues. Finally,
the sixth condition aims to defend a competitive market, rather than enhance
it, as does the first condition. This condition implies that the operator of an
exempted infrastructure must act in a transparent manner, notably through
publishing relevant data concerning the operation of the concerned infra-
structure. Furthermore, additional requirements may be implemented for
example regarding capacity hoarding or use-it-or-lose-it mechanisms.
Three additional considerations are relevant. First, exemptions must be
regarded as an exception to the general rule of TPA. Therefore, TPA exemptions
should be granted only exceptionally. Second, Member States already have
some scope to stimulate investments without using exemptions, for instance
by allowing higher than normal rates of return to specific investments. Third,
when granted, an exemption does not have to be granted to the full extent.
The proportionality principle stipulates that the size and duration are deter-
mined by the riskiness of the investment in question. Under a full exemption,
there is no need for any TPA. Under a partial exemption, TPA must be allowed,
but need not be based on published tariffs. Examples are open seasons in
which potential users of the infrastructure commit themselves to a certain part
of the capacity prior to construction. Capacity may also be allocated after
construction through individual negotiations (which corresponds to NTPA) or
auctions.
As indicated, by granting certain investment projects derogations from
the TPA provisions, the exemptions regime indicates a move away from the
neoclassical perspective in chapter three. The extent to which an exemption
is granted – and the extent to which regulation deviates from its neoclassical
guiding principles in actual practice – is determined by the specifics of a
particular investment project. Hence, to assess whether the exemptions regime
can be considered an appropriate amendment in line with TCE, we need to
study specific investment projects. By looking closely at the regulatory process
leading up to the granting of an exemption, we can trace the arguments that
have been voiced by the relevant stakeholders and determine which of these
have fed through into actual regulation. This provides a picture of the amend-
ments to the neoclassical paradigm which are implemented in practice. With
this picture in mind, we can determine whether these amendments can be
explained by the neoclassical perspective. If not, we can determine whether
the TCE perspective provides a better explanation of regulatory behavior, i.e.,
whether the TCE perspective is also superior to the neoclassical perspective
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concerning actual regulatory behavior. The next section explains our choice
of investment project.
6.2.2 Exempted infrastructure investments
Section 4.10.2 indicates that the Commission’s investment priorities focus to
a large extent on investments in pipelines with four out of six priority projects
concerning pipeline projects. These projects emphasize new pipelines that
provide additional gas volumes and interconnector pipelines that connect the
national transmission systems of Member States in order to facilitate regional
gas trading. This emphasis on pipeline projects has urged us to choose a
pipeline project for our case study. Three pipeline projects have been exempted
so far.1
The most recent exemption has been granted to the Austrian part of the
Nabucco pipeline, discussed in section 4.10.2, which is supposed to unlock
Caspian and Middle Eastern gas resources for the European market, which
should lower Europe’s dependence on Russian imports. Construction has not
yet commenced. Nabucco is planned to be fully operational by 2020. However,
for reasons specified in section 4.10.2, the prospects for Nabucco actually
materializing are somewhat doubtful due to Russian counter measures. A
second exemption applies to the pipeline project between Greece and Italy,
IGI in section 4.10.2, which is supposed to bring Caspian and Iranian gas to
Western Europe. The exemption has been granted for the Poseidon pipeline,
which is the offshore section of IGI. It is planned to become operational in 2011.
The third exempted pipeline project is the pipeline between Bacton in the UK
and Balgzand in the Netherlands (henceforth the BBL pipeline). It links the
British to the Dutch gas market, and has started supplying gas to the UK on
1 December 2006.
As long as a pipeline is not actually completed, considerable uncertainty
exists regarding the specifics of the project, because important project para-
meters maywell change between now and 2011 or even 2020. This uncertainty
hampers our analysis of the exemption process. Therefore, we choose the BBL
project for our case study because it is the only exempted pipeline that has
actually been constructed.
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas/infrastructure/exemptions_en.htm for an overview
of the granted exemptions.
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6.3 THE BBL PROJECT2
The UK gas supply deficit following declining production rates at the UK
Continental Shelf (UKCS) has been a main justification for building BBL. Due
to this deficit, a long-term gas supply contract has been concluded in 2002
in which Dutch Gasunie Trade & Supply (GUTS) agreed to supply 80 bcm of
gas to British gas supplier Centrica over a 10-year period (Gasunie, 2002). Gas
had to be flowing in 2006. To honor this contract, additional transport capacity
had to be made available. Gas Transport Services (the Dutch Transmission
System Operator, a division of NV Nederlandse Gasunie) was asked to build
BBL. BBL is a risky project. One reason for this is that it competes with a number
of other projects, such as the existing Interconnector between Bacton and
Zeebrugge, LNG regasification terminals (Zeebrugge on the Continent, and
Isle of Grain and Milford Haven in the UK) and Norwegian supply routes.
Accordingly, the economic viability of BBL depends on the developments
regarding these competing projects. This section sets out the rationale for
building BBL and its technical and organizational features, and it specifies the
relevant stakeholders.
6.3.1 Project description
The BBL project comprises six elements:
· Compression facilities in Noord-Holland;
· A 5-kilometer onshore pipeline section to the designated pipeline dune
crossing location near Julianadorp;
· A dune crossing/landfall from behind the dunes to a location offshore from
the coast, preferably constructed using the horizontal directional drilling
technique;
· A 230 kilometer offshore pipeline crossing the North Sea from The Nether-
lands to the UK;
· A pipeline section crossing the beach at Bacton;
· An onshore pipeline section to the gas terminal in Bacton.
The total connection length is 235 kilometers with a 36 inch pipeline diameter.
The project’s investment costs amount to around 500 million euros. Gas started
flowing on 1 December, 2006, with a capacity of around 15 bcm per year. In
order to remunerate the investment costs, a 2003 open season3 allowed
potential users to conclude 15-year contracts with an indicative tariff of 65
2 This section draws on De Joode (2006).
3 Open seasons are procedures in which potential users of the infrastructure commit them-
selves to a certain part of the capacity prior to construction. Open seasons provide demand
security to the investor before committing himself to the investment.
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euros per normal m3 per year (this tariff was based on the assumption that
the pipeline would have a 30 inch diameter; the 36 inch diameter results in
other indicative tariffs).4 All current capacity has been contracted to the initial
shippers, Gasterra, E.ON Ruhrgas AG and Wingas AG, for periods of 10 and
15 years. Following the terms of Gasterra’s supply contract with Centrica (see
next section), gas flows unidirectionally into the UK. Technical modifications
can make the flow bidirectional. However, due to a lack of shipper interest
for transporting gas from the UK to the Netherlands emanating from the 2003
open season procedure, such reverse flow is not yet included.
There have been considerable competitive improvements along the way.
BBL Company (see next section) has recently started another open season
procedure to investigate market interest for an expansion of transmission
capacity. In case of sufficient interest, expansion possibilities will be investi-
gated, and provided there is a positive business case based on commitments
from shippers, BBL capacity could be increased (BBL Company, 2007a). In
addition, BBL also started to offer short-term services to shippers through daily
transmission contracts (BBL Company, 2007b). Furthermore, as of 1 December,
2007, BBL Company offers forward capacity (i.e., gas flowing into the UK) on
an interruptible basis (BBL Company, 2007c).5
BBLwill after construction interact with other, existing or planned, projects
and pipelines. Two of these deserve special attention: the Interconnector and
Nord Stream. BBL is the second pipeline that connects the UK to the Continent:
the Interconnector between Zeebrugge in Belgium and Bacton has been in
operation since 1998. It is currently capable of transporting 25.5 bcm of gas
per year from Zeebrugge to Bacton and 20.0 bcm per year in the opposite
direction.6 The Interconnector is a competitor to BBL because both are able
to carry gas from the Continent to the UK. Second is Nord Stream, see section
4.10.2. Rather than competitors, these pipelines will most likely be comple-
mentary, because BBL can be regarded as an extension of Nord Stream which
opens up the UK market to Russian gas.
4 The indicative tariff required for the project go-aheadwas based among others on analyses
of several scenarios regarding competing projects, among which an upgrade of the Inter-
connector, expansion of the Norwegian Langeled pipeline into the UK and LNG terminals
for the Netherlands.
5 Interruptible capacity must be distinguished from firm capacity. Firm capacity is capacity
that is expected to be available at all times other than exceptional circumstances (like
maintenance). Interruptible capacity, on the other hand, is additional capacity in excess
of firm capacity. This extra capacity may be interrupted at times and is therefore described
as ‘interruptible capacity’. Interruptible capacity is usually allocated to shippers in pro-
portion to their firm capacity rights. See http://www.interconnector.com/Commercial/
FirmIntreruptibleandUIOLICapacity2.htm.
6 See http://www.interconnector.com/index.html.
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6.3.2 Holding companies
BBL was undertaken on a partnership basis which necessitated the setting up
of a separate company, BBL Company BV, in July 2004. BBL Company constructs
the pipeline with its own capital and at its own risk. GTS is the main operator
and currently holds a 60 percent majority of the shares through its subsidiary
Gasunie BBL BV (GTS’ share will reduce to 51 percent if it transfers 9 percent
to Gazprom, see below). Two other parties, Fluxys BBL BV and E.ON Ruhrgas
BBL BV, have been present since the setting up of the joint venture, each pos-
sessing a 20 percent share. These three subsidiaries provided the capital
required for construction and remunerated these costs through the above-
mentioned long-term contracts with shippers. Gazprom became involved in
the project recently, after the construction of BBL, with an option to buy 9
percent of the shares. We discuss the subsidiaries below.
As indicated, a gas supply contract between GUTS and Centrica has led
GUTS to request the Dutch transmission system operator to build BBL. In anti-
cipation of the legal unbundling requirements of the second Gas Directive,
the integrated national champion Gasunie7 was unbundled in GTS and GUTS
in January 2002. GUTS retains Gasunie’s shareholders. The Dutch government
became a forerunner by deciding to push through towards ownership
unbundling. This penultimate step in the restructuring of the Dutch Gasbuild-
ing created an infrastructure company (NVNederlandse Gasunie) and a trading
company (GUTS, renamed into Gasterra) from 1 September, 2006 on. Gasterra’s
ownership structure is similar to GUTS’s. The final restructuring step was to
privatize Gasterra and split it between ExxonMobil and Shell, but this has been
postponed until further notice. The NV Nederlandse Gasunie is completely
owned by the Dutch State and comprises three main divisions: GTS, Gasunie
Construction andMaintenance and Gasunie Participations & Business Develop-
ment. The Dutch Gas Act precludes GTS from directly participating in a mer-
chant project like BBL. Therefore, the BBL shareholding is a part of the Participa-
tions and Business Development division. BBL Company stresses the legal
separation between GTS and Gasunie BBL which is supposed to ensure BBL’s
independence from the system operator.
On 6 November, 2007, NV Nederlandse Gasunie and Gazprom signed an
Umbrella Agreement on the joint participation of both companies in the Nord
Stream and BBL gas pipeline projects (Gazprom, 2007). The agreement stipulates
that Gasunie receives a 9 percent share in Nord Stream, coming from Win-
tershall and E.ON Ruhrgas, which will each cede 4.5 percent of the shares, in
exchange for which Gazprom receives an option to acquire 9 percent in BBL
Company. Accordingly, GTS’ share would decrease to a 51 percent majority.
This reciprocal shareholdingmay open up the UK gas market to Gazprom (for
7 TheDutch State held 50 percent of its shares; the remaining 50 percent were equally divided
between Shell and ExxonMobil.
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instance by linking Nord Stream to BBL in the future). If Gazprom exercises
its option, a state-owned – the Russian state holds a controlling portion of
Gazprom’s shares8 – and integrated gas supplier satisfying around one third
of European gas imports9 will become involved in BBL.
Fluxys BBL is a subsidiary of the Belgian TSO Fluxys. Fluxys originated in
the November 2001 legal unbundling of the integrated Distrigas into an inde-
pendent transport company and a trading company (Distrigas). As of Septem-
ber 2006, SUEZ (through its subsidiary SUEZ-Tractebel) owns 51 percent of the
Fluxys shares; Publigas (a group of public Belgian communalities) owns 37.5
percent (SUEZ, 2006). Private shareholders own 11.5 percent and the Belgian
State holds one golden share.
The merger between the French companies Gaz de France (GDF) and SUEZ,
creating GDF SUEZ, has repercussions for both the Belgian gas market and
Fluxys. Following an in-depth investigation, the Commission concluded that
GDF SUEZ would have anticompetitive effects for the Belgian and French gas
markets (CEC, 2006b, c). Regarding the Belgian gas market, the Commission
was concerned with the high market share of GDF SUEZ. Furthermore, the
merger would remove GDF as a direct competitor to Distrigas (of which there
are very few, see section 7.3.1), following which GDF SUEZ would dominate
the Belgian market. GDF SUEZ would also have access to most of the gas
imported into Belgium andwould hold almost all long-term import contracts.
Competition would furthermore be impeded by GDF SUEZ controlling Fluxys,
the Belgian TSO, which would grant them privileged access to supply infra-
structure and storage. GDF and SUEZ proposed structural remedies to remove
these concerns. The merger was officially concluded on 22 July, 2008.
Some of the structural remedies, which should become applicable as a
consequence of the merger, affect Fluxys (section 7.3.1 discusses the effects
on Distrigas). The restructuring of the Fluxys activities entails the creation of
two entities: Fluxys and Fluxys International. Fluxys owns the entire Belgian
gas transmission/transit system as well as the complete Belgian gas storage
infrastructure and operates all the infrastructures regulated under Belgian law
(the transmission and transit system, storages and LNG terminals). GDF and
SUEZ have promised not to control Fluxys through their shareholdings. Speci-
fically, they have agreed not to hold more than 45 percent of Fluxys’ capital
(SUEZ currently holds over 57 percent of the shares, while Publigas holds
around 33 percent of the shares). At 3 September, 2008, GDF SUEZ and Publigas
reached an agreement followingwhich GDF SUEZ commits to sell, on 31Decem-
ber 2009, a number of its Fluxys shares to Publigas, allowing Publigas to
become Fluxys’ majority shareholder (GDF SUEZ and Publigaz, 2008).
The other entity, Fluxys International, will own the Zeebrugge LNG terminal
and the non-regulated Belgian and international assets (amongwhich BBL and
8 See http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article21713.shtml.
9 See http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article20160.shtml.
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Huberator, the Fluxys subsidiary that operates the Zeebrugge gas hub). Fluxys
BBL therefore becomes a subsidiary of Fluxys International. The 3 September
agreement also includes Fluxys International. In exchange for ceding control
over Fluxys to Publigas, GDF SUEZ is allowed to hold 60 percent of Fluxys
International’s capital (with the remaining 40 percent being shared equally
between Fluxys and Publigas). To prevent GDF SUEZ from controlling the
Zeebrugge LNG terminal, which is of strategic importance to the Belgian as
well as the European gas market, Fluxys will, in addition to its 20 percent
share, also take care of the management of Fluxys International and have the
right to appoint the Board of Directors.
E.ON Ruhrgas is one of the main European gas companies. Its upstream
activities are undertaken by E.ON Ruhrgas Exploration and Production. The
downstream activities, the selling of gas to distribution companies, industrial
consumers and electricity producers, are conducted by E.ON Ruhrgas Inter-
national and Thüga, a German communality. E.ON Ruhrgas Gastransport has
leased E.ON Ruhrgas’ transmission grid and is responsible for its operation,
maintenance and expansion. It also markets storage capacities on behalf and
account of E.ON Ruhrgas. From 1 January 2004 on, E.ON Ruhrgas Transport
has been legally separated from the trading activities (this was one of the
conditions for ministerial approval of E.ON’s takeover of Ruhrgas). Regarding
this separation, a recent statement by E.ON in which it proposes to sell off –
that is, structurally (ownership) unbundle – its electricity transmission network
to an operator with no interests in electricity generation or supply (E.ON, 2008)
may be a prelude to significant changes. The voluntary10 decision to unbundle
of E.ON, one of themost vehement opponents of the Commission’s unbundling
proposals, may signal the crumbling of the opposition. If so, then in due time
the gas networks may be unbundled too, and Gastransport will become com-
pletely independent from E.ON Ruhrgas.
6.4 THE EXEMPTION PROCESS
A particular problem for GTS was that in order to guarantee supplies to the
UK in 2006, the project was being planned while the second Gas Directive was
drafted but not yet implemented in UK and Dutch legislation. The relevant
national authorities have the power to formally grant an exemption only after
the Directive has been implemented in national law. In consequence, it was
not yet possible for GTS to submit a formal exemption request. Accordingly,
10 The press release notes that E.ON unbundled as part of a deal with the Commission to
settle ongoing antitrust inquiries, which places doubts on the voluntary nature of the
unbundling. It provides an illustration of the process in which the Commission uses
competition policy to ensure compliancewith theDirectives (see section 4.8). The case study
in chapter seven provides a more elaborate treatment of such a combined approach.
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before undertaking any commitments, GTS sought clarity on the applicable
regulatory regime. Since BBL is an interconnector pipeline, GTS requested advise
of the applicable regulatory regime from the British Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI)11 and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), as
well as the DutchMinistry of Economic Affairs and the DutchOffice of Energy
Regulation (DTe).
DTI and OFGEM set out their views regarding the implementation of the
secondDirective concerning LNG terminals and interconnectors in a June 2003
joint consultation document (DTI/OFGEM, 2003a) which confirmed that the RTPA
requirements with the possibility for exemption will apply, subject to a Euro-
pean Commission veto. The consultation and corresponding stakeholder
responses resulted in a final views paper in November (DTI/OFGEM, 2003b)
that confirmed the initial views. Because at the time several projects were
coming to financial close before transposition of the second Gas Directive into
UK legislation, OFGEM indicated its willingness to provide early guidance. This
had to be provided on a case-by-case basis, through a consultation on the basis
of draft exemption applications for specific projects. GTS was the first to issue
a draft application (GTS, 2003).12 The UK consultation was carried out in
parallel with a consultation by DTe.
The preliminary guidance phase in the UK concerned four stages. It started
with GTS’ draft application for an exemption in which GTS set out why it
thought BBL satisfied all criteria for awarding an exemption. On the basis of
this draft application, OFGEM issued its initial views (OFGEM, 2003a). In the third
stage, other stakeholders were also allowed to offer their thoughts. Finally,
based on its initial views, stakeholder responses and possibly additional
information by GTS, OFGEM provided its final views (OFGEM, 2003b) on which
its informal comfort letter is based. The Dutch preliminary guidance differed
from the UK process because DTe did not issue a separate initial views docu-
ment prior to stakeholder consultation (but rather referred to DTI/OFGEM, 2003a
above). Hence, the Dutch approach consisted of three stages, in which the
stakeholder views and DTe’s final views were integrated into DTe’s informal
comfort letter to the Minister of Economic Affairs in November 2003 (DTe,
2003). This is what we refer to as phase one of the exemption process.
The second phase commenced when, after having obtained informal
security, the investment decision was made in May 2004 and BBL Company
was set up in July of the same year. BBL Company formally requested an
exemption in December, 2004 (BBL Company, 2004), following which an official
11 DTI was disbanded when the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform
(BERR) was created on 28 June 2007.
12 The two other draft applications concernedQatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil’s South Hook
LNG import terminal (which we will refer to below) and Dragon’s LNG import terminal,
both at Milford Haven in Wales.
152 TPA exemptions – The BBL case
consultation process was initiated. Approval documents were published in
March (DTe, 2005) and April (OFGEM, 2005).
All regulatory decisions were sent to the European Commission, who also
provided initial and final views. However, this case study focuses on the
interaction between the UK and the Dutch sides in shaping the exemption for
BBL. We therefore do not explicitly consider the Commission’s guidance pro-
cess. We will only consider the Commission’s final views towards the UK and
Dutch exemption decisions in order to tracewhich arguments eventually found
their way into regulatory practice. We refer to the Commission’s assessment
as phase three of the exemptions process.
6.5 PHASE 1: GTS’ DRAFT EXEMPTION APPLICATION AND STAKEHOLDER
RESPONSES
6.5.1 GTS’ draft exemption application
In its draft exemption application, GTS’ main rationale for requesting an ex-
emption is that building BBL requires a significant investment sum with
corresponding risks. According to GTS, BBL can be constructed only if there
is long-term clarity on the applicable regulatory regime and contracted capaci-
ties. The former is uncertain because by connecting the Netherlands to the
UK, BBL will operate in two different jurisdictions. Regarding the latter, GTS
plans to grant access to BBL on the basis of long-term capacity contracts through
an open season procedure which allows interested parties to commit them-
selves to a part of the capacity prior to construction. These initial contracts
determine BBL’s capacity. GTS’ exemption request applies to this contractual
structure which it considers necessary for the project to commence. Further-
more, GTS requests that the conditions of the initial contracts are not subject
to regulatory or governmental approval. The draft application provides GTS’
views regarding the conditions for an exemption. Section 6.2 mentions these
conditions:
1 The investmentmust concern amajor new infrastructure – interconnectors,
LNG and storage facilities;
2 The new infrastructure must enhance competition in gas supply and
security of supply;
3 The level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the invest-
ment would not commence without an exemption;
4 The infrastructure must be legally separate from the system operator;
5 Charges must be levied on users;
6 The exemption must not be detrimental to the efficient functioning of the
internal gas market.
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BBL is an interconnector, hence the first condition is fulfilled. We specify GTS’
view regarding the latter five conditions below.
The new infrastructure must enhance competition in gas supply and security of supply
Regarding competition in the UK gas market, GTS argues that it cannot be
responsible for a competition analysis of BBL. Since BBL operates separately
from the parties concluding the contracts, GTS has no information on the source
or destination of the gas that is transported through BBL. GTS has nevertheless
commissioned an independent study by Arthur D. Little (ADL, 2003), which
shows that upstream concentration of the UK gas market would decrease if
BBLwas connected to the UK grid. The report also provides a view to the future.
It identifies three possible scenarios. The first assumes that BBLwill not be built
and that the 8 bcm per year in the GUTS contract with Centrica will be supplied
by an alternative route, for instance reverse flow capacity in the Interconnector.
The second scenario assumes BBL to be operational by 2006 with a capacity
of 8 bcm per year; the third assumes an initial capacity of 8 bcm per year in
2006, rising to 17 bcm per year in 2008. In each case, the report calculates the
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (HHI, see table 2.2) for 2006 and 2008 to measure
concentration. The results are that cases 1 and 2 have slightly higher and
similar HHI values in 2008 compared to 2006. Hence, concentration increases
slightly regardless of BBL. The increase in HHI in case 3 is lower that in the
other two cases. All 2008 HHI values still indicate a competitive market. The
report consequently argues that market concentrationmay increase a bit from
2008 on, but not to levels that give rise to regulatory concern. It concludes
that the UK upstream gas supply market will remain very competitive after
BBL. The report’s overall conclusion is that in the worst case BBL will have no
impact on concentration, but that under realistic assumptions competition will
increase as compared to the situation without BBL.
Regarding security of supply, ADL concludes that BBL will add to security
of supply both in the UK and the Netherlands. UK security of supply will
improve because BBL can supplement UKCS gas supply andNorwegian imports
with suppliers linked to the Continental gas market. UK security of supply
will furthermore improve because BBL allows UK consumers to access Dutch
and other storage facilities. Finally, ADL argues that if in the future, reverse
flow capacity will be included, BBL will allow Continental or Dutch gas
supplies to be supplemented with UKCS or Norwegian gas.
GTS envisages a few additional advantages related to competition. First,
access of Continental suppliers to the most liquid market in Europe will
improve the working of the internal European gas market, and increase the
scope for arbitrage between the two markets. Second, BBL will also increase
competition in gas transport (as opposed to competition at the commodity
level), because it is a direct competitor to the existing Interconnector. Third,
GTS argues that if BBL is connected to Nord Stream, the UK market will have
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at its disposal the vast Russian reserves. In addition, BBL may even facilitate
the inclusion of the Netherlands in the Nord Stream project.
The level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the investment would
not commence without an exemption
The riskiness of the project has already been mentioned in the introduction
to this section. GTS adds that any insecurity concerning its initial long-term
contracts – if for example tariffs were to be revised, extra conditions imposed
or the contract length shortened – might increase investment risk to such an
extent that the investment will not materialize. Another additional argument
is that the initial long-term contracts with shippers which range from 10 to
15 years are necessary but not sufficient. There will still be risks with respect
to the sale of transport capacity after the initial contracts have expired. Finally,
GTS illustrates the size of the investment, which ranges, depending on the
chosen pipeline diameter, between 375 and 500 million Euro, by comparing
this sum with the average GTS investments of 70 million Euro per year prior
to BBL. BBL therefore increases average investments to 150-250 million Euro
per year. Hence, BBL doubles and maybe even quadruples average yearly GTS
investments up to the year 2006.
The infrastructure must be legally separate from the system operator
BBL Company is owned by GTS. GTS indicates that it is considering including
one or two other transmission companies into a joint venture.13 GTS explains
that BBL Company will be legally separate from GTS. It will also be financially
independent. BBL Company will subcontract exploitation and operation to NV
Nederlandse Gasunie (see section 6.3.2) on the basis of a service contract. All
transport contracts relating to BBL facilities and ancillary services will be
conducted between BBL Company and its customers. In addition, GTS points
out that it is already internally separated fromGUTS (as it was still called then).
Legal separation should be completed by July 2004.
Charges must be levied on users
Since BBL is an independent transmission company, GTS argues, it has an
incentive to pass through its costs to users. Costs are remunerated by the long-
term capacity contracts on the basis of the 2003 open season. GTS will publish
the open season’s indicative tariffs and the conditions for interruptible con-
tracts.
Regarding capacity allocation, GTS promises to implement a use-it-or-lose-it
system, inwhich unused capacitywill bemade available on a short-term basis
to prevent capacity hoarding. If a user chooses not to use its contractually
agreed capacity or a part thereof, there will be a possibility to trade this
13 These are, as indicated in section 6.4, Fluxys, the Belgian TSO, and E.ON Ruhrgas.
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capacity on the secondarymarket. A thirdmeasure to prevent capacity hoard-
ing proposed by GTS relates to interruptible capacity: BBL is allowed to take
back capacity which has not been used by the contracted party for a long
period but for which there is demand. GTS furthermore points out that it is
considering setting up a bulletin board which facilitates secondary capacity
trading by bringing (potential) shippers in contact with each other. Finally,
information will be provided on historical capacity use, prices and real time
flows, insofar as confidentiality requirements are not violated.
The exemption must not be detrimental to the efficient functioning of the internal
gas market
According to GTS, the contractual and technical specifications of transmission
through BBL are in accordance with both the Dutch and UK network require-
ments. At the time of submitting its draft application, GTS was discussing
network issues with National Grid Transco, the UK TSO. On the Dutch side,
GTS expects that additional transport capacity will be required on the GTS
network. Especially the missing link between Oude Statenzijl and Balgzand
needs to be expanded to accommodate the increased gas volumes due to BBL.
GTS explicitly notes that these investments are a necessary condition for a
number of potential shippers to reserve transmission capacity in BBL. The GTS
view is therefore that these additional investments are a vital element in the
BBL investment decision (in fact, the investment decision on this missing link
will be taken at the same as BBL’s investment decision).
In sum, GTS argues that BBL lives up to all the requirements above and is
hence eligible for an exemption. GTS requests an exemption for the entire length
of the initial long-term contracts. Furthermore, the date at which gas starts
flowing does not run parallel with the starting dates of the initial contracts.
Accordingly, when gas starts flowing, some extra capacity may be available
because not all initial contracts will have started yet. Since GTS plans to make
these capacities available to the market in order to remain in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the initial contracts, GTS requests the exemption
to also apply to this overcapacity.
6.5.2 British responses
The stakeholders we consider are the regulators and those parties that have
submitted an official response to GTS’ draft application. We start with the
British side, where we discuss OFGEM’s initial views, the relevant stakeholder
responses and OFGEM’s final views which consider the stakeholder responses
and additional information provided by GTS.
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OFGEM’s initial views
In September 2003, OFGEM set out its initial views on GTS’ draft exemption
application (OFGEM, 2003a). Regarding the first criterion, that the investment
must enhance competition in gas supply and supply security, OFGEM indicates
that it will be undertaking its own competition analysis. Regarding information
provision, it indicates that details need to be filled in. This particularly concerns
the issue whether BBL’s information provision to themarket is, andwill remain,
consistent with UK information disclosure requirements. Finally, OFGEM attaches
high value to the views of other interested stakeholders (discussed below).
Second, OFGEM agrees with GTS that the level of risk is such that it merits an
exemption. Because OFGEM assumes that in due time BBLwill be separate from
GTS and that GTS will be effectively unbundled from the trading activities (see
also section 6.4.2), it also considers the third criterion to be met. The fourth
criterion, which states that charges must be levied on users, is not considered
a problem. The connection of BBL to the UK system is also not considered an
issue, because entry capacity to the National Grid Transco (NGT) system will
be booked in a similar fashion to other entry capacity. Furthermore, OFGEM
trusts that any technical complication will be resolved by GTS and NGT. Finally,
while considering the circumstances in which the exemption may be with-
drawn, OFGEM sees no reason not to grant GTS an exemption for the capacity
and duration of the initial long-term contracts. All in all, OFGEM’s initial view
is that BBL can expect to receive an exemption.
Respondent’s views
Five parties responded to the draft application: BP Gas, Power & Renewables,
Total Gas & Power, Centrica, Interconnector (UK) and NGT. The first three are
gas suppliers in the UK, Interconnector is a competing infrastructure to BBL
and NGT is the British transmission system operator.
BP (2003) supports BBL in principle. It offers five additional suggestions
in order to guarantee that BBL is operated on appropriate terms. First, BP
envisages the possibility that there will be commercial drivers for UK exports
to the Continent. Accordingly, in order to also allow exports from the UK, BBL
should be bi-directional. Second, BP argues that physical flow information
should be made available to the UK and Dutch authorities in order to prevent
capacity hoarding. Pipeline operators must ensure that contractual arrange-
ments permit capacity to be traded efficiently (for instance through offering
capacity on an interruptible basis) on the secondary market. Furthermore, a
bulletin board would be welcome. Third, BP is concerned that TSOs may exer-
cise too much discretion in accepting or rejecting gas qualities that are mar-
ginally out of the specification range. In order to prevent discriminatory
behavior of shippers by the BBL operators, gas quality requirements should
be made explicit. Fourth, BP argues that the advantages of BBL, especially if
it becomes a bi-directional link, hinge on the capacity of related pipelines to
and from Bacton and Balgzand (note that GTS already mentioned the missing
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link between Oude Statenzijl and Balgzand in its draft application). These
additional TSO investments should not result in problems. Finally, BP argues
that BBL may enhance overall efficiency of the entire North Sea infrastructure.
BP recommends that the operators have a ’good faith obligation’ to negotiate
with third parties wishing to connect to BBL.
The second respondent is Total Gas, Power & Renewables. Total (2003)
puts forward one main concern. While not opposing GTS’ exemption applica-
tion, Total emphasizes that the decision should not lead to any differences
in regulatory requirements between BBL and existing infrastructures (in parti-
cular interconnectors) built before the second Gas Directive came into force.
Centrica (2003) welcomes BBL. It considers the information provision
requirements imposed on Interconnector UK to also be appropriate for BBL.
Centrica wants the option to withdraw the exemption after it has been granted
to be based on clear criteria. Furthermore, withdrawal should be conducted
only after consultation with Centrica and other market parties.
Interconnector (2003), the operator of Interconnector between Zeebrugge
and Bacton, has no specific comments because some key elements, such as
the use-it-or-lose-it (UIOLI) provisions, are treated confidentially. Interconnector
does provide some generic concerns predominantly regarding competitive
distortions resulting from the exemption. Interconnector’s first concern
corresponds to Total’s concern that there should be no competitive differences
between new and existing investments. In addition, Interconnector wants to
knowhow the relevant regulators intend to ensure commercial neutralitywhen
exemptions are granted. Interconnector furthermore argues that as an exem-
ption seeks to make an uneconomic investment project economic, it is similar
to a direct financial subsidy. This hampers the principle of a level playing field.
Furthermore, Interconnector notes that since third party access rules are always
a hindrance to an investment, all parties should be granted an exemption.
Finally, NGT has no principled objections either. NGT (2003) judges the
application according to each of the five criteria for granting an exemption.
Regarding the first criterion, NGT agreeswith GTS’ assessment of BBL’s competi-
tive effects on the UK upstream market. NGT furthermore considers BBL an
important contribution to UK supply security. Similar to Interconnector above,
NGT refrains from taking a firm view on the capacity allocation mechanisms
due to a lack of information on for instance UIOLI. NGT confirms OFGEM’s initial
view regarding the remaining exemption criteria. In addition, NGT explicitly
sets out its relation with BBL and its shippers and explains that the regulated
system will not be affected by BBL. In particular, BBL needs to be connected
to NGT’s system, which requires an agreement between both parties on a
network entry agreement. Furthermore, if gas is to flow from BBL into NGT’s
system, shippers must purchase entry capacity to the NGT grid. NGT uses this
information to assess future network enhancements. This approach is consistent
with all other NGT entry points. Hence, BBL will not hamper the efficient
functioning of the regulated system.
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OFGEM’s final views
After having conducted its own competition analysis in addition to GTS’, OFGEM
(2003b) upholds its view that BBL should in principle enhance competition on
UK gas supply. Nevertheless, OFGEM considers ExxonMobil’s role as a share-
holder of the trading part of Gasunie (which is only legally separated from
GTS, as opposed to the originally anticipated ownership unbundling) as a
potential problem because of ExxonMobil’s proposal to build an LNG terminal
with Qatar Petroleum, which is seen as a competitor to BBL (see section 6.3).
OFGEM fears that ExxonMobil’s reciprocal shareholdingmay distort competition
between both projects. If this was to result in competitive problems, however,
these problems would be addressed when ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum
apply for an exemption for their South Hook LNG terminal. OFGEM takes over
some the respondent’s comments. OFGEM agrees with BP, Centrica, Inter-
connector and NGT that further detail is required on the level of transparency
and the UIOLI provisions. Because of the preliminary status of the guidance
process, OFGEM is satisfied with GTS’ current provisions for the moment.
However, OFGEM reserves the option to amend the exemption should the UIOLI
provisions prove inadequate. OFGEM rejects BP’s argument for reverse flow
capacity, because the GTS open season does not signal a need for it.
Regarding the second condition, the risk being sufficiently high to make
an exemption necessary, GTS has provided additional, largely confidential,
financial information on the economics of the project. Specifically, GTS argues
that return on equity is not expected for 20 years. Furthermore, GTS demon-
strates that if it had to reserve 25 percent of BBL’s capacity for short-term access,
access tariffs would rise to uncompetitive levels. GTS’ financial advisors, KPMG,
argue that without an exemption, the project’s long-term finance is unsustain-
able due to the risks associated with regulated TPA. OFGEM concludes that the
level of risk merits an exemption.
Regarding the separation of GTS from BBL Company, the third condition
for granting an exemption, OFGEM notes that its initial view is based on the
assumption of an ownership separation between GTS and the rest of Gasunie
(Gasterra). OFGEM now includes the decision to implement a less far-reaching
legal unbundling and the inclusion of Fluxys into the BBL joint-venture. OFGEM’s
concern regarding the latter is that competition between BBL (connected to the
Dutch system) and Interconnector UK (connected to the Belgian system) could
diminish. Accordingly, OFGEM requests clarity regarding the relationship
between ExxonMobil, Shell and Fluxys if a formal application is to be sub-
mitted.
The fourth criterion, that charges should be levied on users, poses no
problem. Moreover, none of the respondents raised any issue in this regard.
Hence, this criterion is met. The fifth condition concerns the effective function-
ing of the internal gas market. NGT has voiced concerns to OFGEM regarding
the quality of the Dutch gas imported into the UK. While acknowledging the
issue of gas quality, OFGEM expects that these concerns will be mitigated.
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Finally, regarding exemption length, GTS has confirmed to OFGEM that possible
overcapacity will be made available to the market. In consequence, OFGEM
upholds its initial views and therefore allows an exemption for the entire
capacity including possible overcapacity. Due to the differing starting dates
of the contracts, a 15 year exemption is considered appropriate. OFGEM rejects
Centrica’s suggestion to specify the conditions for withdrawal of an exemption,
because conditions for withdrawal are not specific to BBL.
In conclusion, based on GTS’ draft application, the additional confidential
information provided by GTS and the views of respondents, OFGEM envisages
that BBL will be applicable for an exemption. Its comfort letter was sent to GTS
on 24 November, 2003.
However, OFGEM also indicates a number of caveats to its positive assess-
ment. First, OFGEM notes five unknown factors in GTS’ draft application. These
concern the size of the pipe, the capacity of the owners, the duration of the
initial contracts, the ownership of BBL and the separation agreements between
GTS and the rest of the former Gasunie. In consequence, in considering GTS’
application, OFGEM has assumed that:
· BBL will have the capacity required to deliver GUTS’s (Gasterra’s) gas sold
to Centrica. That is, the pipeline capacity is assumed to be 8 bcm per year;
· GUTS will be the capacity owner;
· The initial contracts will last 10 years;
· BBL will be legally separated from GTS; and
· GTS will be separated from the rest of the former Gasunie according to the
provisions of the second Gas Directive.
Any deviation from these assumptions may require a revised vision to the
one above. Second, GTS’ formal application will be subject to a formal con-
sultation process. The responses from that consultation may be reason for
OFGEM to deviate from the above views. Furthermore, if market conditions
change by the time of the formal application, so may OFGEM’s formal view.
The UK preliminary guidance process is rounded up by two recommenda-
tions offered by OFGEM in order to improve GTS’ prospect of receiving a formal
exemption. First, as indicated in ADL (2003), further capacity sales in addition
to the GUTS contract would improve BBL’s effect on UK competition. Second,
structural unbundling of GTS from the rest of former Gasunie would also
enhance the effect on UK competition.
OFGEM’s preliminary exemption decisionwas sent to the European Commis-
sion. In two confidential letters (dated 30 January and 12 May 2004) the Com-
mission stated that the exemption would likely be accepted if 1) exemption
length would not exceed the period of the initial contracts, 2) reverse flow
nominations were not covered and 3) the UK retail market was kept under
close review.
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6.5.3 Dutch responses
This section considers the Dutch side. As indicated in section 6.4, one difference
between the UK and the Dutch preliminary consultation processes was that
the Dutch regulator, DTe, did not issue a separate initial views document, but
rather referred to DTI/OFGEM’s (2003b) joint consultation paper. DTe did consult
the relevant stakeholders concerning GTS’ draft application to arrive at its
comfort letter to the Minister of Economic Affairs. We follow the structure
of DTe’s advice on GTS’ draft application, which means that we set out the
respondent’s views regarding the exemption criteria, immediately followed
by DTe’s (2003) assessment.
Respondent’s views and DTe’s assessment
DTe received responses from ten stakeholders: Gasunie Trade& Supply (GUTS);
Centrica; Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM); RWE Gas Netherlands;
DSM Agro; Nuon; Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX); the Association for
Energy, Environment andWater (VEMW according to its Dutch acronym); the
Vrijhandels Organisatie voor Electriciteit en Gas (the Free Trade Organization
for Electricity and Gas, or VOEG according to its Dutch acronym) and the
European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET).
Some of these may need some clarification. NAM is the biggest oil and gas
producer in the Netherlands. DSM Agro is a Dutch producer of fertilizer and
industrial products, and consequently a large consumer of gas. Nuon is a
Dutch gas and electricity supplier. The APX Group provides gas and power
exchanges for the UK, Dutch and Belgianmarkets (see section 3.4.4). The latter
three respondents are examples of the stakeholder associations we referred
to in section 4.2. VEMW is a Dutch organization established to further the
interests of industrial gas users. VOEG is a Dutch platform designed to stimulate
energy trade and includes producers, transporters and traders. Finally, EFET
is a European stakeholder group comprising over 80 energy-trading companies.
The new infrastructure must enhance competition in gas supply and security of supply
The respondents’ views are somewhat mixed regarding BBL’s effects on compe-
tition and supply security. GUTS and NAM emphasize BBL’s positive effects on
1) UK supply security, 2) Dutch security if BBL is connected to Nord Stream
and 3) competition in Europe because BBL is an alternative pipeline that com-
petes with the Interconnector. However, DSM, NUON, VEMW, VOEG and EFET
are concerned that increased gas flows on GTS’ grid due to BBL will result in
insufficient transport capacity to supply Dutch consumers. Additional GTS
investments to upgrade the grid should not be remunerated on Dutch users
(which would be the case if GTS undertakes the investments and spreads the
costs over Dutch users).
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APX and NUON want BBL to provide reverse flow capacity. VOEG even
proposes that the exemption be contingent on reserve flow capacity being
installed. Attention is also given to UIOLI and capacity allocation. NUON argues
that 20 percent of the capacity should be available for short-term contracts.
Regarding UIOLI, APX argues, as does OFGEM above, that the UIOLI rules are
not yet clear enough. VOEG opposes that an exemption also applies to UIOLI
provisions.
DTe’s assessment follows some of these arguments. DTe argues that an
exemption may be granted only if sufficient measures are taken to prevent
negative effects on Dutch supply security. DTe is predominantly concerned
with the effects of gas flows that transit through the Dutch system to BBL (i.e.,
Balgzand). In this regard, DTe highlights three points. First, GTS should prevent
that these transit flows result in insufficient transport capacity to supplyDutch
consumers. Second, Dutch competition must not be impeded by the transit
flows creating scarcity on Dutch entry points.14 The concern in this regard
follows particularly from congestion at the entry point at Oude Statenzijl.
Scarcity at this point would impede third party entry into, and in turn compe-
tition in, the Dutch gas market. Additional investments required to prevent
such scarcity should be undertaken by GTS in a timelymanner. Third, the costs
of these investments in the GTS grid should be remunerated on BBL users, for
instance by including these in the exit tariffs at Balgzand. Only if GTS proves
that Dutch consumers benefit from these investments may a part be re-
munerated at other entry- and exit tariffs. Furthermore, DTe wants to make
the exemption contingent on timely information provision to DTe and/or the
Minister of Economic Affairs.
DTe deviates from some respondents (APX, Nuon, VOEG) in not obliging
BBL to install reverse flow, because the open season indicated a lack of interest.
This is similar to OFGEM’s view. However, DTe adds that GTS may be obliged
to provide backhaul, i.e., non-physical transport, to the Netherlands. For
example, backhaul imports into the Netherlandsmay take the form of reduced
exports from the UK. To this end, GTS should recognize Balgzand as a non-
physical entry point in its system as well as ensure that BBL contracts provide
adequate and timely information on expected forward flows (into the UK) in
order to facilitate backhaul. Finally, regarding UIOLI, DTe follows OFGEM in
mentioning that there are no principle problems at the moment, but that
additional clarity on the specifics is required. In sum, DTe’s conclusion is
similar to OFGEM’s: she provides comfort concerning the first exemption cri-
terion under the condition that theMinister of Economic Affairs, after delibera-
14 According to DTe (2006), an entry point is a point where gas enters GTS’ national transport
grid. Gas can enter a national grid from for example a production site, another national
grid or a storage facility. An exit point refers to a point where the gas leaves the national
grid, for instance into a regional transport grid, a large industrial consumer or an export
point like Balgzand in the case of BBL.
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tion with BBL and UK authorities, maintains the right to change the UIOLI
provisions if they prove unsatisfactory.
The level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the investment would
not commence without an exemption
NAM and GUTS argue that BBL’s risk is high enough to make the project
nonviable without exemption. GUTS indicates that the exemption is a crucial
condition for concluding the transport contract with BBL Company. VOEG and
NUON argue that the investment risk should be compensated for by long-term
contracts. According to VEMW, on the other hand, BBL fits into the core activities
of GUTS and Centrica, and its risk should therefore be considered a normal
business risk which does not justify an exemption.
DTe has received additional information from GTS that identifies risks
related to financing, permits, technical operation, maintenance, planning delays,
price and volumes. DTe’s view is that financing risks are the prime considera-
tions for determining whether investment risk justifies an exemption. DTe
considers that an exemptionmay impact GTS’ expected tariffs becausewithout
an exemption, tariffs will be determined by regulation, while with an exem-
ption BBL can set these tariffs itself. There is also an impact on expected trans-
ported volumes, because if regulation induces tariffs and conditions which
are unattractive compared to alternative routes, BBL volumes will decrease.
Hence, DTe considers that its risk assessment should also take into account
price and volume risk. Its risk assessment analyzes the effects on the three
risks it considers relevant of the following three alternatives: no exemption,
a partial exemption and a full exemption. We discuss here a number of
elements that were considered important in this regard.
The first main element has been discussed above: since BBL will at first
have few competitive advantages for the Dutch market, its costs should not
be remunerated on Dutch consumers. A second element is the extent to which
BBL Company is able to force BBL users into concluding long-term contracts
with high tariffs and unreasonable conditions. This possibility hinges on the
presence of viable alternatives to BBL. DTe identifies the Interconnector, and
its increase in capacity, as such an alternative. DTe has received GTS calculations
which, based on BBL’s indicative tariffs and those of the Interconnector’s reverse
flow expansion, compare the prices of both projects for transport from the
Dutch Title Transfer Facility (a virtual trading platform operated by GTS, see
section 4.10.1) or Gersheim to the UK. These calculations show a very small
price differential, based on which DTe concludes that BBL is experiencing
competition from the Interconnector (more on this in section 6.6.1). Competitive
pressure may be increased further if plans to construct a pipeline from Den-
mark to the UK or additional LNG terminals in the UKwere tomaterialize. These
competitive forces imply that an RTPA regime should be careful not to impose
too low tariffs, as this might make the project nonviable. Too high tariffs would
result in shippers choosing an alternative option.
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Concerning the possibility of a partial exemption, DTe reckons it has insuffi-
cient information regarding the GTS assumptions that underlie its argument
that the project is nonviable without a 15 year exemption (the duration of the
longest initial contracts) rather than 10 year (the duration of the shortest initial
contracts). It is not clear that the initial contracts will not be concluded if after
10 years a part of their capacity was to fall under an RTPA regime.15
DTe nevertheless acknowledges that regulating the tariffs of a pipeline that
operates in the presence of alternative competing routes may entail high risks
to the investor. However, these risks may also be mitigated by implementing
RTPA with tariffs that are based on existing alternatives on the market. In this
situation, RTPAwould prescribe a tariff which is in accordancewith themarket.
Interestingly, DTe notes that such a market-oriented tariff would also arise with
an exemption if there is real competition between alternatives and if an open
season procedure has been installed to allocate capacity in a competitive
fashion. Under these circumstances, granting an exemption would have no
impact at all on tariffs.
In sum, DTe considers that there is sufficient evidence that the investment
risks are high enough for an exemption. An important additional consideration
is that tariff regulation is less necessary due to the competitive pressure from
alternative projects. This statement may imply that DTe is less restrictive if
there is competitive pressure, for instance through allowing longer exemptions.
If so, then we must note that this is in direct contrast to the Commission’s
goal of granting exemptions restrictively. That is, taking the presence of
competition as an argument to introduce competition less vehemently (through
a longer exemption) runs counter to the Commission’s main goals to introduce
competition as much as possible.
As for GTS’ calculations which indicate that its access tariffs would rise
to uncompetitive levels if BBL had to reserve 25 percent for short-term access,
DTe again emphasizes that it has insufficient information to properly assess
the realism of the GTS projections, especially its scenarios regarding short-term
contracts.With this explicit reservation, DTe differs fromOFGEM. DTe also differs
from the OFGEM view regarding the duration of the exemption, because it is
not convinced that a 15-year exemption is proportional. Based on the informa-
tion received, DTe concludes that a 10-year exemption, equal to the minimum
length of the initial contracts, would not prevent the investment from being
undertaken. In sum, DTe provides comfort to GTS regarding the risk criterion
under explicit reference to the above reservations.
The infrastructure must be legally separate from the system operator
The original expectation was that BBL would be separate from GTS and that
GTS would be structurally separated from GUTS after the Dutch Gasbuilding
15 Recall GTS’ argument that without an exemption, the project’s long-term finance is unsus-
tainable due to the risks associated with regulated TPA.
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had been fully restructured. However, at the time of its draft application, GTS
was internally separated from GUTS, while the envisaged legal separation was
postponed. Without structural unbundling, however, NUON, DSM and VEMW
have expressed their concerns regarding the independence of GTS from GUTS.
DTe points out that ownership unbundling is not mandated by European
legislation. It notes that when GTS formally applies for exemption, its
unbundling should be carefully assessed in light of the Gas Directive’s provi-
sions. For the moment, however, DTe expects that BBL will satisfy this criterion.
Tariffs are levied on users
No reactions from respondentswere received. GTS has indicated that BBL users
will pay for booked capacities based on the indicative tariff specified in the
open season procedure, which is sufficient for DTe to provide comfort.
The exemption must not be detrimental to the efficient functioning of the internal
gas market
The responses regarding this criterion have already been discussed in the
context of the first criterion. DTe adds the criterion that BBL must not be detri-
mental to the efficient operation of the system it is connected to. In this regard,
DTe mentions that no problems are expected because no gas will be flowing
into the Netherlands. If reverse flow capacity is installed, DTe considers con-
sultationwith BBL and OFGEM to be necessary. Hence, DTe also provides comfort
regarding this criterion.
In conclusion, following OFGEM, DTe provides informal comfort regarding
all criteria for awarding an exemption. Based on its current information, DTe
advises the Minister of Economic Affairs to provide comfort for a full exem-
ption over a period of 10 years. One additional advice to the Minister is to
look into the initial contracts if GTS formally applies, in order to ensure that
the information on which comfort has been granted has not changed.
We close this section with the observation that while both regulators were
positive towards BBL, some differences in opinion came to the fore. An impor-
tant reason for these is the fact that BBL entails clear advantages for the UK
by supplying it with additional gas volumes, as opposed to the Netherlands.
Due to these additional volumes, OFGEM is understandably focused on increas-
ing BBL’s competitive advantages as much as possible, hence its emphasis on
gas quality and the role of ExxonMobil as a shareholder of GUTS. The Dutch
perspective is different because without reverse flow capacity, BBL’s effects
on Dutch supply security will be minimal. There is a lack of consensus among
respondents regarding BBL’s effect on Dutch competition, because this depends
on uncertain future developments like the installment of reverse flow capacity
and connection toNord Stream. The Dutch competition assessment is therefore
more strongly focused on preventing obstructions to competition, as evidenced
in DTe’s concern with additional transit flows created by BBL on GTS’ grid.
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DTe is somewhat less forthcoming towards BBL than OFGEM. DTe is less
lenient regarding GTS’ information provision because it has some explicit
reservations regarding the information it has received on GTS’ risk projections.
This contrasts with OFGEM, who explicitly states that it agrees with GTS’ risk
assessment. DTe is also stricter regarding the exemption period: whereas OFGEM
considers the proposed 15-year exemption appropriate, DTe advises a 10-year
exemption.
We can only speculate regarding the reasons for this difference. As indi-
cated, one possible explanation may be that the lack of direct competitive
advantages to the Dutch market has resulted in DTe taking a less positive
stance towards the project. Without many direct competitive benefits, it is
understandable that DTe’s emphasis should lie on preventing anti-competitive
effects on the Dutch market. In contrast, OFGEM would then have a stronger
incentive for promoting BBL’s development due to the competitive benefits
for the UK market, which might explain its more lenient stance.
6.6 PHASE 2: BBL COMPANY’S FORMAL EXEMPTION APPLICATION AND STAKE-
HOLDER RESPONSES
Phase one of GTS’ exemption process resulted in comfort letters from both sides
of the North Sea. These, together with the Commission’s reaction on OFGEM’s
preliminary exemption decision, created the security to take the final invest-
ment decision on BBL inMay 2004 and to create the joint venture BBL Company
in July. BBL Company officially requested an exemption in December 2004 (BBL
Company, 2004), after which a formal consultation process was initiated.
6.6.1 BBL Company’s formal exemption application
BBL Company submitted its formal exemption application to OFGEM and DTe
on 10 December 2004. The application is based on Article 22 of the second
Gas Directive as implemented in the Dutch and UK legislation. This implies
for theNetherlands that the application ismade under Article 18h of the Dutch
GasAct. BBL Company applies for an exemption fromparagraphs 2.2 (Articles
12, 13), 2.3 (Articles 14, 15, 16, 17, 17a, 17b) and 2.5 (Articles 19, 20). In the
UK, the application is based on sections 149 and 150 of the Energy Act 2004.
Specifically, BBL Company applies for an exemption from Conditions 10 and
11 of the Interconnector License.
Section 6.5.1 provides a detailed account of GTS’ draft application. The early
guidance procedure provided comfort from both regulators. Consequently,
the basic arguments remained unchanged. BBL Company’s formal application
can therefore be considered to be an updated version of the draft application.
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This section discusses the arguments that differ from those in the draft applica-
tion.
The new infrastructure must enhance competition in gas supply and security of supply
A few additional arguments are voiced in this regard. First, BBL Company
refers to the European Commission’s Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E)
Programme which identifies missing links in Europe’s infrastructure. TEN-E
prioritizes specific investment projects which according to the Commission
facilitate the operation of the internal gas market. An interconnector between
the Netherlands and the UK is such a priority project. Hence, BBL Company’s
referral to the TEN-E Programme is supposed to emphasize BBL’s positive effects
on the development of a European internal gas market. Second, the ADL study,
which was an important part of the draft exemption, has been updated. The
study confirms its 2003 conclusions. Finally, it is indicated that as BBL will not
be able to completely fill the UK’s supply deficit, it will not obstruct other
projects from being developed.16
Mitigating this supply deficit extends to supply security. One additional
argument is that BBL increases the possibilities for third parties to enter the
UK gas market. In addition, BBL Company includes a discussion of aMay 2004
energy securitymonitoring report by OFGEM and DTI through their Joint Energy
Security of Supply Working Group (JESS, 2004) to illustrate BBL’s positive
addition to UK supply security. The report identifies a UK supply gap which
will increase UK import dependence in the coming 20 years. The report iden-
tifies five potential solutions: 1) additional imports from Norway, 2) LNG
terminals to import gas from around the globe, 3) more interconnection, 4)
pipeline upgrades and 5) gas storage. BBL corresponds to the third solution
and improves supply security by mitigating the supply gap. BBL Company
adds that BBL furthermore improves supply security because its transmission
contracts neither specify a minimum load factor nor impose other limiting
conditions regarding the use of transmission capacity (besides of course the
UIOLI provisions). In consequence, according to BBL Company, BBL increases
the availability of capacity and flexibility in UK and Continental gas markets.
Finally, the transmission contracts explicitly include reverse flow possibilities
(not physically, but either through swaps or interruptible contracts) which
facilitates arbitrage.
The level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the investment would
not commence without an exemption
Regarding investment size, no new arguments are voiced. Another component
of investment risk is an investment’s competitive position. BBL Company
elaborates quite extensively on BBL’s competitive position in comparison to
16 The report states that BBL will provide an additional 16 bcm of import capacity to the UK
which equals around 18 percent of UK gas consumption.
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competing projects, most notably the Interconnector. The Interconnector’s
reverse flow capacity enables it to supply gas to the UK, and consequently
compete directly with BBL. BBL Company provides the tariff comparison with
Interconnector we have referred to in section 6.5.3. Based on its indicated tariff
of 65 euros per normal m3 per year, BBL requires 87 euros per m3 per hour
per year to transport gas from TTF to the National Balancing Point in the UK.
The corresponding figure for transport through the Interconnector is 84 euros.
Hence, according to BBL Company, there is no room for tariff increases. A
related point emerges from the ADL study referred to above. Based on ADL’s
conclusions that that the UK market can be considered competitive, BBL Com-
pany argues that this competitive pressure precludes it from setting high access
tariffs.
BBL Company adds regulatory opportunism to the specific risks indicated
in its draft application (which predominantly emphasized the risk due to the
applicability of two different legal regimes). This has been discussed extensive-
ly in chapter five and needs no additional clarification at this point. BBL Com-
pany stresses that the exemption must be legally binding in order to make
ex-post reneging as difficult as possible. BBL Company has provided additional
information in support of its claim that the exemption should cover the entire
length of the initial contracts. Specifically, it has provided a calculation indi-
cating that the project’s break-even point extends beyond the initial contract
length.
The infrastructure must be legally separate from the system operator
In providing informal comfort, both OFGEM and DTe had voiced concerns
regarding the separation of BBL from GTS. OFGEM based its informal comfort
on the assumption of a legal separation between BBL and GTS as well as
between GTS and the rest of Gasunie. DTe noted that BBL’s unbundling should
be assessed in light of the Gas Directive’s provisions.
BBL Company reacts to these concerns by emphasizing the establishment
of GTS in July 2004. According to BBL Company, this takes away the concerns,
because GTS is legally separate from Gasunie. In addition, BBL Company
explains, in a December 2004 update of its application, that there is agreement
to go a step further and to implement structural (ownership) separation, which
according to BBL Company further enhances BBL’s independence from GTS.17
BBL Company elaborates on the role of GTS after separation. According to
BBL Company, one result of the separation is that GTS is responsible for the
national transmission activities (in other words, GTS will be the transmission
17 At the time of BBL Company’s application, this ownership unbundlingwas being planned;
it has been implemented on 1 July 2005. GTS, Gasunie Technology & Assets and the BBL
shareholding are structurally separated from the trading activities, GUTS (now Gasterra),
and brought into the hands of the government. Gasterra has retained the same shareholders:
Shell, ExxonMobil and the Dutch State.
168 TPA exemptions – The BBL case
system operator). Because the Dutch Gas Act permits GTS to be involved only
in regulated national transmission activities, and therefore not in BBL, the BBL
shareholding is the responsibility of Gasunie Technology & Assets.
Consequently, BBL Company stresses the legal separation between Gasunie
Technology & Assets and Gasunie BBL which is supposed to ensure BBL’s
independence from the system operator.
BBL Company furthermore indicates that the other holding companies,
Fluxys and E.ON Ruhrgas, also live up to the unbundling requirements, see
section 6.3.2. Finally, BBL Company reacts to OFGEM’s concern in its final views
that the incorporation of Fluxys into the joint venture may decrease compe-
tition between BBL and the Interconnector. OFGEM’s informal comfort requested
clarity on this point, which BBL Company provides by stating that Fluxys does
not participate in the Interconnector.
Charges must be levied on users
No additional arguments are voiced in this regard. BBL Company proposes
the same capacity allocation mechanisms as in its draft application. BBL Com-
pany updates its information by providing the following overview of the open
season process. Initial shipper interest was substantial, with 18 interested
parties. Following a number of exploratory meetings, six were left. Finally,
after further discussions regarding the parties’ commitments to capacity, E.ON
Ruhrgas, Wingas and GUTS signed the initial contracts. As indicated, these
contracts determined BBL’s initial capacity which justified a 36 inch pipeline.
The exemption must not be detrimental to the efficient functioning of the internal
gas market
The only additional remark in this regard is that BBL Company sent a letter
to DTe on 30 August 2004 pointing out that Gasunie Technology &Assets will
carry out a substantial investment program in the GTS grid in order to prevent
a scarcity of transport capacity due to the transit flows on behalf of BBL. This
alleviates one of DTe’s concerns in its final views. BBL Company indicated that
the investment costs will be recouped on BBL users through long-term capacity
contracts.
Because its initial contracts must start before December 2007, with a dura-
tion of 10 to 15 years, BBL Company applies for a 15-year exemption up to
December 2022. They argue that this would guarantee a level playing field
between shippers. The request concerns a full exemption, including the capacity
of the initial contracts, reverse flow services and any spare capacity over and
above the initial contracts. BBL Company adds that if the exemption would
not cover the initial contract period, non-exempted capacity sold on an RTPA
basis would impact the initial contracts. Specifically, BBL Company argues that
regulated tariffs could also change the tariffs in the initial contracts. Finally,
BBL Company explicitly considers the possibility of reverse flows in case of
sufficient interest. BBL Company argues that these future contracts must be
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consistent with the initial contracts, hence that an exemption should also apply
to future reverse flow contracts.
BBL Company considers that its formal application is acceptable to the
European Commission. BBL Company responds to many of the concerns of
the regulators. The additional information provided to this end is often an
update of the information in the draft application. The only significant change
is the restructuring of Gasunie. For our purpose, a very interesting point raised
by BBL Company is that of regulatory opportunism. We get back to this at the
end of this chapter.
6.6.2 British responses
The formal procedure is similar to the one following GTS’ draft application:
OFGEM provided its initial views in December 2004 (OFGEM, 2004), inviting
stakeholders to express their opinions and synthesizing both into its final views
document, published in May 2005 (OFGEM, 2005). We discuss this process
below. We only consider changes to OFGEM’s final views concerning the pre-
vious consultation.
OFGEM’s initial views
OFGEM’s initial views arose from its final views on the draft application and
the updated information provided by BBL Company (most of which is discussed
in the previous section).
OFGEM upholds its view that BBL will improve competition in UK gas supply
as well as its security. Its own competition analysis concludes that 1) there
is no evidence that current market participants and new entrants will not be
able to compete within the retail market due to a lack of future gas supplies,
2) the GB (Great-Britain) market is dynamic enough to respond to changes in
supply and demand and 3) OFGEM has sufficient power to prevent future abuse
within the GB market. By removing any connection between ExxonMobil and
BBL Company, the intended restructuring of Gasunie alleviates OFGEM’s con-
cerns regarding ExxonMobil’s role in both BBL and the South Hook LNG ter-
minal. Finally, OFGEM welcomes BBL Company’s intention to provide con-
tractual (i.e., firm) reverse flow on the secondary market as well as an
interruptible reverse flow (i.e., backhaul) service in the primary market.18
OFGEM considers that the first exemption condition is likely to be met. BBL
Company’s updated information on its contractual provisions is considered
sufficient by OFGEM to honor its request for clarification on the UIOLI provisions.
18 See section 6.3.1 for the differences between firm and interruptible flows and between
forward and reverse flows. The primarymarket refers to capacities that are acquired directly
from BBL Company, while secondary capacity may be acquired from shippers that do not
make use of their contracted capacity.
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Regarding project risk, OFGEM sees no reason to change its position that the
level of risk is sufficient for an exemption. Interestingly, OFGEM makes no
reference to BBL Company’s concern regarding regulatory opportunism. A new
situation had arisen with respect to the third criterion, because BBL Company
had been set up.19 OFGEM considers BBL Company to be sufficiently separated
from the British and Dutch system operators. The restructuring of the Dutch
Gasbuilding indicated above facilitates OFGEM’s positive view. The fourth
criterion concerns chargers to users. OFGEM’s positive final view on the draft
application has remained unchanged. Regarding the fifth criterion, that the
infrastructure should not have detrimental effects on competition or the inter-
nal market, OFGEM provides formal comfort on the condition that any gas
quality issue is removed by GTS and National Grid Transco (NGT). OFGEM
considers this condition to be met by referring to Condition 3 of the draft
Interconnector Licensewhich is required to access the UK system. Condition 3
specifies that BBL Companymust have a transmission operator to transmission
operator agreement. Based on this agreement, GTS and NGT are expected to
be able to cooperate to remove gas quality issues.
OFGEM’s initial view regarding the duration of the exemption is that an
exemption for the initial capacity and any contractual reverse flow iswarranted
until December 2022 (i.e., based on the duration of the longest underlying
contract). OFGEM retains the option to amend or revoke the exemption for the
capacity of the contract that expires in 2016, for instance if this capacity is sold
after 2016 in a way that is detrimental to competition. However, OFGEM refuses
to comply with BBL Company’s request to also exempt future reverse flow
capacity. OFGEM considers that this issue must be addressed when it arises.
Condition 12 of the Interconnector License (which applies to BBL) allows BBL
to apply for an exemption of any investment in additional future capacity.
OFGEM has the ability to assess whether such an investment meets the risk
criterion. Since it is impossible at this point to determine whether this criterion
will also be met by future capacities, OFGEM considers that its view cannot
be extended to future capacities. This applies to both forward capacity to the
UK and reverse capacity from the UK.
Finally, OFGEM’s approval of BBL Company’s exemption is contingent on
three factors. First, BBL must comply with the Competition Act 1998 and the
Enterprise Act 2002, implying that the exemption may be revoked if BBL
Company breaches competition law. Second, the approval applies to a specific
situation, which if changed, may result in a review of the decision. Finally,
the European Commission may veto or amend OFGEM’s decision.
19 At the time of the draft application, the BBL project was owned by GTS and GTS considered
including one or two other transmission companies into a joint venture. At this point, legally
separate subsidiaries of E.ON Ruhrgas and Fluxys have been included in the partnership,
each with a 20 percent share.
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Respondent’s views
OFGEM received responses from two parties: Centrica, who also responded
to the draft application, and GUTS, the party who requested GTS to build BBL.
Centrica (2005) welcomes BBL and supports OFGEM’s initial views. It offers
three specific comments. First, Centrica notes that since Great-Britain’s licensing
regime has not yet been finalized by DTI, OFGEM’s decision should be subject
to further review, based on another consultationwith themarket parties, once
the licensing regime has been finalized. Second, Centrica requests more clari-
fication regarding BBL Company’s proposals on UIOLI. Third, Centrica would
like to receive additional information as to any additional investments in GTS’
grid as a consequence of BBL.
GUTS (2005) obviously supports BBL, but nevertheless expresses two con-
cerns. First, GUTS voices the same argument as BBL Company concerning the
fact that discrimination should be prevented between possible future regulated
tariffs (if not exempted) and non-regulated tariffs of the initial contracts. GUTS
notes that the proposed Interconnector License includes elements to this end.
Second, GUTS notes that NGT’s quality requirements should be in line with the
recommended EASEE-gas20 values for high calorific gas at cross border points,
because this would allow maximum utilization of the BBL and connected
infrastructure.
OFGEM’s final views
OFGEM’ s final views include no material changes with respect to its initial
views. Concerning BBL’s effect on competition and supply security, OFGEM aims
to closelymonitor the retail gasmarket to detect any anti-competitive behavior.
Since it received no responses on the risk criterion and ownership structure,
OFGEM’s final views on both are similar to its initial views. Regarding charges,
OFGEM acknowledges GUTS’ view that discrimination between regulated and
non-regulated activities should be prevented. OFGEM considers that the require-
ment that charges and the methodologies underlying these charges should
be objective, transparent and non-discriminatory suffices. Hence, also on the
charges criterion, OFGEM’s final view corresponds to its initial view. The
respondents also issued some comments in light of the criterion that BBL should
not harm competition or the internal market. OFGEM responds to Centrica’s
information request by indicating that the only investment in NGT’s system
is the connection of BBL to the grid. As to GUTS’ gas quality concerns, OFGEM
refers to its initial views in which it argued that gas quality issues must be
resolved bilaterally by GTS and NGT. Once more, OFGEM’s view remains
unchanged.
20 This acronym stands for the EuropeanAssociation for the Streamlining of Energy Exchange.
EASEE-gas was set up in 2002 to develop and promote the simplification and streamlining
of both the physical transfer and the trading of gas across Europe. It comprises members
from every link of the gas value chain.
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No responses were received regarding the length of the exemption. Never-
theless, OFGEM’s final view is more lenient than its initial view: the exemption
not only applies to contractual reverse flow, but also includes any non-physical
reverse flow. This new and expanded provision comprises both contractual
reverse flow capacity offered by shippers on the secondary market as well
as interruptible reverse flow capacity offered by BBL Company on the primary
market. Finally, since no responses or additional information were received
on the grounds for amending or revoking the exemption, OFGEM’s final views
in this regard mirror its initials views.
6.6.3 Dutch responses
On the Dutch side, DTe did not organize a consultation process based on its
informal comfort advice, but chose instead to base its formal advice (DTe, 2005)
on the additional information it received after having sent its comfort letter.
This additional information arose from BBL Company’s formal application or
the reactions from GTS and Gasunie Technology and Assets to questions from
the director of DTe.
DTe’s formal advice to the Minister of Economic Affairs
DTe splits the issue of competition and supply security into three parts: 1)
competition and supply security in the Netherlands, 2) the direction of gas
flows and 3) UIOLI provisions. Regarding the first part, in order to alleviate
DTe’s concerns regarding a potential scarcity of transport and entry capacity,
GTS indicated that its investment plan will add 500.000 m3 of entry capacity
in the Northeastern part of the Netherlands. Based on confidential capacity
figures, DTe concludes that the additional entry capacity is sufficient to cover
expected transit flows. Furthermore, the costs of these investments will be
remunerated on BBL users through long-term capacity contracts, which removes
another of DTe’s concerns voiced in response to GTS’ draft application. DTe notes
an additional competitive advantage of BBL: it creates the possibility to export
high calorific gas from the Dutch small fields to the UK. This export frees up
scarce conversion capacity in the Netherlands, because the exported gas need
not be converted into gas of Groningen quality suitable for the Dutch market.
The additional conversion capacity in turn increases the possibilities for
suppliers to supply Dutch consumers, which improves the prospects for
competition. A final advice of DTe regarding competition and supply security
is that the Minister should force GTS/BBL Company to provide information
not only in its compulsory two-yearly capacity plan (according to Article 8
of the Dutch Gas Act) but also at interim intervals in case of a substantial
deviation from its investment plan.
DTe proposes no changes to its comfort advice concerning the direction
of gas flows. The same applies to the UIOLI proposals, with the additional
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advice to evaluate BBL Company’s UIOLI mechanism and if necessary to adapt
it after consultation with DTe.
Regarding investment risk, DTe received additional information from ABN
AMRO and KPMG as well as a copy of the initial contracts, which acknowledges
the need for an exemption. DTe makes the interesting observation that if one
takes BBL Company’s actual behavior as a guiding principle, it can be argued
that the exemption need not cover the entire duration of the longest initial
contracts (i.e., 15 years). This is because the investmentwas given the go-ahead
despite the Commission’s reaction to OFGEM’s informal comfort letter, inwhich
the Commission provides comfort for a 10-year exemption.21 Apparently,
this 10-year exemption was sufficient for the project to commence. DTe never-
theless grants the full-length exemption for the entire capacity of the initial
contracts because 1) it considers it too difficult to determine the exemption
length at which the investment would cease to be attractive, 2) there is no real
need to shorten the exemption because the competition from alternative
projects takes away the risk of BBL Company abusing a dominant position and
3) the open season, which is a form of TPA, justifies leniency.
These three reasons are also used by DTe to argue against the Commission’s
advice not to exempt reverse flows. An additional reason for doing so is that
contractual counter flows are derived from physical forward flows. Treating
the two differently, DTe argues, would result in regulatory problems, for
instance in determining the appropriate cost basis, as well as impede a level
playing field between shippers. Regarding the final three exemption criteria,
the ownership structure, the tariffs for BBL use and BBL’s effect on competition
and the internal market, DTe’s formal advice is similar to the advice in its
comfort letter.
In sum, DTe considers BBL eligible for a full exemption with the option to
amend or revoke the exemption for the capacity of the contract that expires
in 2016 if this capacity is sold after 2016 in a way that impedes competition.
Hence, DTe’s assessment appears to have moved closer to OFGEM’s. Whereas
DTe’s final views on GTS’ draft application provided comfort for a 10-year
exemption, its final views on BBL Company’s formal application in principle
allow an exemption for the entire length of the initial contracts (up to 15 years),
which is similar to OFGEM’s stance. Both regulators include reverse flow
capacity in the exemption. The additional conditions are that 1) GTS/BBL
Company provides interim information if it deviates from its investment plan,
2) BBL Company’s UIOLI system is evaluated and 3) BBL Company owns the
complete infrastructure when building commences. Following DTe’s advice,
the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs formally approved BBL’s exemption.
21 As indicated in section 6.5.2, the Commission accepted the exemption if 1) its length would
not exceed the period of the initial contracts (i.e., 10 years), 2) reverse flow nominations
were not covered and 3) the UK retail market was kept under close review.
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6.7 PHASE 3: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S ASSESSMENT
The European Commission was required to assess the regulator’s decisions
on BBL’s exemption. It has the power to veto the exemption or demand amend-
ments. The Commission received the UK andDutch decisions on 12 April 2005.
It published its formal notification of receipt on its website and invited third
parties to respond.22 However, no responses were received. The Commission
then requested further information from the UK and Dutch authorities, which
extended the deadline for the Commission’s response to 12 July 2005. Its
evaluation (CEC, 2005d) proposes a number of amendments to the exemption
decisions which are in line with the letters sent earlier in response to OFGEM’s
informal comfort.
A first amendment relates to competition in the Dutch market. The Com-
mission argues that Dutch competition will only be enhanced in case of fair
and non-discriminatory access to reverse flow from the UK. Hence, reverse
flow must not be exempted from third party access provisions. Another con-
cern regarding reverse flow is that the Commission is not convinced that BBL
Company would provide reverse flow capacity on reasonable terms without
regulation. It underpins this opinion by arguing that the transmission contracts
between BBL Company and shippers specify that 85 percent of the payments
for reverse flow services would flow back to the main shippers. Consequently,
the Commission considers the incentive of BBL Company for developing reverse
flow capacity to be rather low. Second, the Commission considers that exem-
ption length should not extend beyond what is needed for the project to go
ahead. As indicated above, the project commenced after having received
comfort from the Commission for an exemption covering the initial contracts
(10 years). Furthermore, in contrast to both regulators above, the Commission
considers the presence of competing pipelines or the open season procedure
insufficient to justify a longer exemption. Adopting a more lenient stance
towards the project – that is, allowing longer exemptions than strictly necessary
for the project to commence – based on such arguments runs counter to the
essence of the Gas Directive, the Commission argues. Third, the Commission
also refutes the argument that having RTPA in the years 2016-2022 would
impact the initial contracts, because regulators are supposed to take this into
account in approving their tariff methodologies for this period. Fourth, the
option to amend or revoke the exemption during the period 2016-2022 for the
capacity of the contract that expires in 2016 if this capacity is sold after 2016
in an uncompetitive fashion is considered insufficient. The reason is that this
approach grants the exemption unless uncompetitive behavior is identified,
which directly contrasts with the condition that exemptions must be granted
exceptionally.
22 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas/infrastructure/exemptions_en.htm.
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In sum, the Commission is considerably more strict with respect to BBL’s
eligibility for an exemption than the Dutch and UK regulators. It considers
that BBL will meet the Article 22 criteria only if the exemption decision by the
UK and Dutch regulators is amended so that its length is 10 years (2006-2016)
for the initial contracts and 15 years (2007-2022) for the remaining capacity.
Furthermore, reverse flow should not be exempted.
6.8 LESSONS FROM THE BBL EXEMPTION PROCESS
6.8.1 Actual regulation and the TCE perspective
As a result of assuming that vertical integration brings no increase in efficiency,
neoclassical regulatory intervention is forced as much as possible to remove
vertical integration, which it can do relatively easily through simple access
rules or tariffs. Following the neoclassical perspective, European gas regulation
emphasizes fair and non-discriminatory TPA as the basis for a competitive
internal gas market.
If one strictly follows the neoclassical perspective, then introducing TPA
creates the perfect competition equilibrium where investments are being
undertaken efficiently. Accordingly, in the neoclassical world, the tension
between liberalization and investment which is the foundation for the exem-
ptions regime (see section 6.2.1) is non-existent. Hence, no exemptions should
be granted at all. Consequently, the neoclassical perspective fails to explain
the granting of an exemption to BBL.
Chapter 5 argues that the TCE perspective provides better guiding principles
for gas regulation. Recall that the implication of the TCE perspective is that
if an investment project faces ex-post hazards, applying the current TPA regime
may not be the optimal (i.e., lowest transaction cost) solution. The discussion
of investment hold-up in sections 2.9.1 and 5.4.1 illustrates the argument. It
is argued that if an investor undertakes a specific investment, he is tied to the
trading relation he has invested in. Ex-post hazards arise if circumstances
change. Without any safeguards, the opportunism of the trading partners may
change their behavior in order to capture the quasi-rent associated with the
specific investment. This lowers the investor’s ex-post profits which in turn
changes his ex-ante behavior. As long as the trading partner cannot guarantee
ex-ante not to behave opportunistically ex-post, the investor might in the
extreme case choose not to undertake the investment. The essence in this regard
is to install safeguards that improve the ex-post credibility of the trading
relationship.
The BBL project fits this description. As indicated, the Commission sees
BBL as a vital infrastructure that improves security of supply. Amain argument
of BBL Company is that the risk of the project is such that it would not com-
mencewithout an exemption from TPA. BBL’s TPA exemption can be considered
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as a safeguard which is supposed to remove ex-post hazards concerning the
BBL investment. It does so by allowing BBL Company to provide access not
on regulatory terms, but rather through open seasons for capacity rights with
consequent long-term transmission capacity contracts with shippers based on
negotiated tariffs. During BBL’s exemption process, the UK andDutch regulators
have allowed quite substantial adaptations to the TPA regime. The Commission
for its part amended the regulator’s exemption decisions, but it has granted
an exemption to the project in order to ensure its development. BBL Company
has indicated that this exemption was material in the project’s go-ahead,
implying that the exemption sufficiently mitigated ex-post hazards. This
decision can only be explained using the TCE perspective, corroborating our
theoretical critique in the previous chapters. Accordingly, the decision that
BBL qualifies for an exemption is a step back in gas regulation from its neo-
classical guiding principles towards the TCE perspective.
However, nowhere in the exemption process has this influence been recog-
nized explicitly. Therefore, the BBL exemption may well coincidentally fit the
TCE framework or only certain parts of it. The remainder of this section
analyzes whether the step back from the strict application of TPA as a result
of the exemptions regime can be considered sufficient to guarantee a credible
European gas regulation which removes the ex-post contractual hazards. In
other words, we consider whether it corresponds to the TCE perspective. For
this assessment, we use the TCE criteria: contractual incompleteness, opportun-
ism and asset specificity. Their interplay determines how a transaction should
be governed in practice. Ex-post contractual hazards and required costly
safeguards only play a role if these criteria appear in conjunction.
Ex-post contractual hazards are an element of investment risk. To assess
the appropriateness of the BBL exemption regime in light of the TCE perspective,
we must consider both the arguments that were voiced in the BBL process as
well as the general risk criterion for awarding an exemption that has been
applied to BBL. As indicated in section 6.2.1, DG TREN (2004d, p. 2) provides
the following general criteria that determine an investment’s riskiness:
· the extent to which an investment is sunk;
· the presence of uncertainty due to events that might occur after the invest-
ment has occurred, for instance concerning consumption projections; other
competing investments; changes in world market conditions for primary
fuels; or an above-average amortization period.
BBL’s exemption process has brought to the fore numerous arguments, some
of which have been acknowledged by the Commission. In order to determine
whether the current exemptions regime has properly incorporated the TCE
criteria, and consequentlywill be able tomitigate ex-post contractual hazards,
we must look at actual regulation. Therefore, we trace below the extent to
which the TCE criteria have found their way into BBL’s exemption decision.
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Asset specificity
Nowhere in the BBL exemption process is explicit reference made to BBL’s
specificity or sunk nature. This does not point towards ignorance of asset
specificity, however, because asset specificity is explicitly mentioned in the
exemption criteria. Amore likely explanation is that BBL’s specificity is undis-
puted, for instance because it has been built to honor GUTS’s supply contract
with Centrica and is therefore specific to that trading relationship. The open
season procedure and capacity allocationmechanisms referred to above lower
BBL’s specificity by allowing other parties besides GUTS, Centrica or the initial
shippers to use the pipeline. Nevertheless, specificity remains considerable,
because BBL’s only function is to provide transmission of gas from the Nether-
lands to the UK. Reverse flows or backhaul services further lower but do not
remove BBL’s specificity. In terms of the previous chapter, BBL creates a quasi-
rent, which may be lowered but not removed. Section 5.4.1 also indicates that
asset specificity is closely related to low numbers relations, because asset
specificity creates a condition of bilateral dependency, implying that what may
have been a large number supply situation at the outset is transformed into
a small number exchange relation thereafter.
Contractual incompleteness
There is no explicit reference to contractual incompleteness in the exemption
process. However, the fact that ex-post uncertainty is an explicit criterion of
investment risk implies that contractual incompleteness is a parameter in the
exemption process. Nobody knows exactly what will happen in the future.
Consequently, since a contract cannot take account of ex-post adaptations that
cannot be foreseen ex-ante, contracts are inherently incomplete. Ex-post un-
certainty has been an important consideration at several stages of the exem-
ption process. We provide a few notable examples that arise from the regula-
tory process.
GTS notes in its draft application that there will still be risks regarding the
sale of transport capacity after the initial contracts have expired. Competing
infrastructure projects have played an important role since the start of the BBL
project. As indicated, the competitive position of BBL compared to the Inter-
connector has been an important parameter in the investment decision. DTe
followed BBL Company’s calculations concerning its indicative tariff and
thereby acknowledged that the presence of competing infrastructures creates
a substantial risk to BBL. In its formal exemption decision, DTe noted that the
presence of competing infrastructures is sufficient to warrant a longer than
minimum exemption. OFGEM adhered to this. In addition, financing uncertainty
is also considered relevant by the national regulators. This is illustrated by
DTe’s final views regarding GTS’ draft application. By granting longer than
minimal exemptions (i.e., extending beyond 10 years), both regulators appear
to acknowledge GTS’ statement that return on equity is not expected after the
initial contracts have expired. The Commission’s final assessment, however,
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amends this view by arguing that the presence of competing projects and/or
open seasons does not provide sufficient ground for longer exemptions than
required for the investment to commence. Nevertheless, the ex-ante risks are
considered sufficient for a minimum-length exemption.
Regulatory opportunism/risk
As indicated, although the risk criteria do not explicitly refer to regulatory
opportunism, there is nevertheless clearly room to incorporate opportunism.
It has surfaced at a few points during the exemption process. According to
GTS’ draft application, regulatory uncertainty is the main justification for an
exemption. The uncertainty in this regard emanates from the fact that BBL will
operate in two different jurisdictions and hence will have to deal with two
different regulators, creating uncertainty regarding the applicable regulatory
regime. Regulators, respondents and the Commission acknowledge this risk.
Another regulatory risk pertains to the observation that the second Gas Direct-
ive will not yet have been transposed into UK andDutch legislation at the time
of BBL’s financial close. The latter risk has been the reason for the early guid-
ance process.
Furthermore, the draft application argued that any insecurity concerning
the initial long-term contracts might increase investment risk to such an extent
that the investment will not materialize. Examples of such uncertainty given
by GTS were that tariffs could be revised, extra conditions imposed or contract
length shortened. These examples point towards regulatory opportunism. BBL
Company makes this point explicitly in its formal application. It specifically
argues that ‘even if a favourable regulatory regime were offered at the outset
(…) there is no certainty that this would last’. GTS argues that regulatory policy
may be influenced by political pressure. This has urged BBL Company to stress
that a positive aspect of including exemptions in the second Gas Directive is
that it makes ex-post reneging of a regulator more difficult than a regulation
which can more easily be amended ex-post. None of the actors make any
reference to the possibility of regulatory opportunism, however. The Commis-
sion considered in its final assessment (CEC, 2005d, p. 4) that ‘since exemptions
from third party access are an exception from the general rules in the Directive,
these should not go beyondwhat is necessary for the project to proceed, which
in this case, was related to the time periods of the underlying contracts’. No
reference is made to costs due to regulatory opportunism. Hence, regulatory
opportunism is ignored in the BBL exemption process.
The omission of regulatory opportunism is also evident from a broader
perspective if we consider the Commission’s interpretation note on exemptions
(DG TREN, 2004d, p. 5) which assumes the following cost elements to be relevant
for a risk assessment: the revenues over time, the expected return on invest-
ment, the foreseen amortization period and the cost of capital assumptions.
Accordingly, the current regime emphasizes the costs related to economic risks
and does not consider regulatory opportunism as a risk element. This ob-
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servation is confirmed by the interim results of a survey on regulator’s ex-
perience with Article 22 exemptions which notes that ‘The only relevant risks
with respect to Art. 22 are economic risks (for example risk of investment with
sunk costs or large investments in combination with low market demand)’
(ERGEG, 2007b, p. 13). Remunerating these economic costs is obviously a good
thing, but it excludes regulatory opportunism and therefore fails to properly
remove ex-post hazards.
In sum, the Commission considers that exemptions must be used to make
previously unprofitable but desirable investment projects profitable – both
in the BBL case as well as concerning exemptions in general. This is perfectly
understandable. However, the Commission does not take into consideration
the presence, and costs, of regulatory opportunism. This contrasts with the
TCE perspectivewhich states that in order to remove the ex-post hazardswhich
arise after the construction of BBL, the Commission should explicitly allow
remuneration of the costs of regulatory opportunism, which it currently fails
to do. The next section identifies the problems that arise from this omission
and proposes a number of policy recommendations in order for the exemptions
regime to become more credible.
6.8.2 Problems and policy options
This section discusses two problems of the current exemptions regime. The
first is a direct consequence of the omission of regulatory opportunism. The
Commission acknowledges that the exemptions regime is currently notworking
satisfactorily. For instance, in its impact assessment accompanying the propo-
sals for the third legislative package (CEC, 2007d, p. 57, 78), the Commission
notes that the current approach towards exemptions
‘would lead to increasing national differences in the application of the exemption
requests for new infrastructure projects. (…) Specifying and clarifying the legislative
framework for these exemptions through specific guidelineswould reduce the risk
and would be favourable for the treatment of cross-border exemption requests’.
This section argues that providing more clarity on the conditions that deter-
mine an investment’s eligibility for exemption is necessary but not sufficient.
Following our encompassing framework in section 5.4.2, with asset specific-
ity and incomplete contracts, the presence of opportunism determines whether
simple contracts suffice without the need for exemptions or whether there will
be ex-post contractual hazards. In the latter case, costly safeguards (e.g.,
exemptions) are required. In this situation, in order to compensate for the costs
to the investor of regulatory opportunism, hurdle rates and required pay-offs
to the investor should increase beyond economic cost remuneration.
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The omission of regulatory opportunism in the Commission’s risk assess-
ment highlights an interesting contradiction in existing regulatory policy. If
the Commission really was to adhere to its neoclassical assumption of the
absence of regulatory opportunism, she should grant no exemption at all. By
allowing exemptions based just on economic risks, the Commission’s current
policy lies somewhere between the neoclassical and TCE perspective.
One solution for adequately incorporating the TCE perspective, and in
consequence improving regulatory credibility, which facilitates investments,
is to allow BBL Company to earn higher profits during the exemption period,
which would include the costs of regulatory opportunism. This is unlikely
because any company will be subject to EC competition rules regardless of
the kind of exemption that has been granted (the inclusion of competition
policy follows from the criterion that an exemption may not be detrimental
to competition or the effective functioning of the internal market). In particular,
Article 81 EC ensures that the competition rules concerning agreements, de-
cisions of associations of undertakings and restrictive practices are applied,
while Article 82 EC prevents abuses of a dominant position. Allowing for
higher profits during the exemption, profits which would be higher than
necessary for economic cost remuneration, particularly runs counter to Article
82, because it appears to benefit the investor with his dominant position at
the expense of the infrastructure users. Hence, awarding higher profits during
an exemption will likely run into competition policy objections.
An interesting option in this regard is to grant a US-style exemption.
According to Larouche (2007, p. 25, 26), in the US, competition law is no longer
required if a sector-specific regulation has been implemented which deters
and remedies anticompetitive harm. As the case study indicates, potential
anticompetitive issues are extensively analyzed in the current exemptions
regime. If in this case an investor receives an exemption, and the costs of
regulatory opportunism are included in the regulator’s risk assessment, then
ex-post hazards are substantially mitigated. However, this option is unlikely
due to the place of competition law in primary EC law.
Another solution to this problem is to leave profits intact per period, but
instead to increase overall profitability by extending the length of the exem-
ption beyond the length required for economic cost remuneration. The Com-
mission is unresponsive to this, as indicated by its final assessment regarding
BBL. According to the Commission, the scope and duration of an exemption
should be proportional to the objective being pursued, which is to allow an
investor to make up for his economic costs (see above). Hence, there is also
no incentive for increasing the exemption length beyond the minimum.
In sum, the existing Article 22 criteria live up to the TCE perspective regard-
ing asset specificity and uncertainty, but fail to include regulatory opportunism.
The consequence is that allowed profits during an exemption will be too low.
If we assume that competition policy will prevent the Commission from
allowing higher profits during an exemption, the implication is that DTe and
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OFGEMwere right to allow longer thanminimum exemption lengths. However,
none of them explicitly referred to regulatory opportunism as the basis for
their leniency. DTe, for instance, explained its leniency by noting that it is hard
to determine the required exemption length, that competition from alternative
projectsmitigates abuse of dominance, that BBL’s open season justifies leniency
and that reverse and physical flows should not be treated differently.
A second problem regarding the existing exemptions regime, in addition
to the omission of regulatory opportunism, relates to the number of approved
exemptions. Note that this problem is not caused by an ignorance of the TCE
criteria, but rather is a general problem of the current regime. It nevertheless
deserves attention because it enables us to provide a balanced assessment of
the current exemptions regime. In its response to GTS’ draft application, Inter-
connector (2003) argued that because the application of the TPA rules to an
investment project is always a hindrance to an investment, all investments
should be eligible for exemption. This corresponds to the view that exemptions
are difficult to deny in practice. For example, Stern and Honoré (2004, p. 3)
argue that virtually all new import projects – at their time of writing the LNG
projects at Isle of Grain and Milford Haven and BBL – have received exemp-
tions. According to Hernandez and Gandolfi (2005, p. 3), the exemption of
major new infrastructures has been the rule since the inception of the second
Directive. They argue that all six applications for an exemption have been
approved by the Commission without any objection (emphasis added). BBL is
one of these; the other 5 concern the North Adriatic and Brindisi LNG terminals
in Italy, and the Isle of Grain, South Hook and Dragon terminals in the UK.
However, our case study shows that the Commission actually has implemented
quite substantial amendments to OFGEM’s and DTe’s exemption decisions,
implying that the actual picture is more nuanced than Hernandez and Gan-
dolfi’s. Nevertheless, all requested exemptions have been granted so far. Of
these, only two – BBL and the Poseidon pipeline – were amended by the
Commission.23 Therefore, Hernandez and Gandolfi do have a point by imply-
ing that the current exemptions regime is very lenient towards granting
exemptions (in contrast to the conditions for exemptions which we have
discussed above). This observation urged ERGEG in its presentation to the
Madrid Forum Joint Working Group on 17 July, 2007 to state that exemptions
are the rule rather than the exception. This contrasts with DG TREN’s (2004d)
explicit goal to restrictively grant exemptions.
According to this study, this situation is due to a misunderstanding con-
cerning the impact of RTPA on investment behavior. The risks related to an
RTPA regime are an important reason for applying for an exemption. This is
understandable, because access regulation will always lower a project’s profit-
ability compared to a situation without RTPA requirements. The emphasis on
23 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas/infrastructure/exemptions_en.htm for an overview
of all approved exemptions.
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the risks associated with RTPA is also clear from the BBL case, as GTS’ draft
application (based on confidential financial information provided by its
financial advisor) explicitly argues that without an exemption the project’s
long-term finance is unsustainable due to the risks associated with RTPA. This
statement is accepted by OFGEM, DTe and the Commission in the remainder
of the exemption process. Spanjer (2008) argues that the effect of TPA invest-
ment incentives is not as negative as is often assumed. The argument runs
as follows. The existing exemptions regime is an application to the gasmarket
of the access holiday (AH) theory which builds on the assumption that access
regulation truncates profits. According to AH theory, a lack of credibility to
leave access regulation unaltered ex-post negatively impacts sunk investments
(note the close similarity with the TCE reasoning). In such a situation, an
exemption is very useful because it removes the hazard of ex-post regulation
for a period of time which improves project profitability. Spanjer argues that
this argument has limited practical applicability. Only in case of excessive
access regulation – i.e., access regulation that makes the investment project
unprofitable overall – will investment behavior be impacted. In contrast, if
access regulation lowers profits but retains a project’s overall profitability, it
will not impede the investment and no exemption is necessary. Overestimating
the effect of RTPA on investments creates a situation in which any investment
project can show that its profitability will deteriorate when regulated, and
hence that it is eligible for an exemption. Consequently, denying an exemption
becomes impossible. According to this study, this is an important reason for
the observation that all exemptions are approved despite clear intentions of
granting them exceptionally.
If we combine both our arguments, the omission of regulatory opportunism
in an investment’s risk assessment and the overestimation of RTPA’s impact
on investment behavior, we need an exemptions regime that grants exemptions
more restrictively than does the current regime, but when doing so is more
lenient to the investor. The Commission does not follow these recommenda-
tions regarding BBL. First, the exemption is granted and the GTS/BBL Company
arguments that the RTPA regime is an important impediment to investment
are acknowledgedwithout explicitly considering the relation between invest-
ment behavior and RTPA. Hence, the approval of BBL’s exemption is not based
on a proper analysis of the interaction between the access regime and invest-
ment incentives.24 Second, if the Commission considers an exemption to be
necessary, as is the case with BBL, the costs resulting from regulatory opportun-
ism justify leniency regarding the conditions of the exemption. As indicated
above, extending the exemption length may be an appropriate solution (as
opposed to scaling down the exemption to a minimum).
24 Note that we have not had insights into KPMG’s andABNAMRO’s calculations regarding
their conclusion that the risks related to the RTPA regime justify an exemption.
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6.9 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter empirically examines the conclusion of chapter five that the TCE
perspective provides a better basis for European gas regulation than the
neoclassical perspective. It analyzes the actual behavior of market players
regarding one prominent adaptation to gas regulation that signals a move away
form the neoclassical perspective: the enlarged scope for TPA exemptions in
the second Gas Directive. This is conducted through a case study of the first
pipeline investment project that has received an exemption: the interconnector
between Balgzand in the Netherlands and Bacton in the UK (the BBL pipeline).
The analysis of the regulatory process in this case results in the following
conclusions.
First, granting an exemption cannot be explained using the neoclassical
perspective, because in the neoclassical world the tension between liberalization
and investments, which is the foundation for the exemptions regime, is non-
existent. The TCE perspective provides a proper explanation for the presence
of exemptions by considering BBL’s TPA exemption as a safeguard thatmitigates
ex-post hazards concerning the BBL investment project. Accordingly, by grant-
ing exemptions, European gas regulation hasmoved away from its neoclassical
guiding principles towards the TCE perspective.
Second, the assessment of BBL’s exemption incorporates the TCE criteria
of asset specificity and the presence of incomplete contracts, but ignores
regulatory opportunism. A similar picture arises with respect to the general
risk criteria of the exemptions regime. Even though BBL Company explicitly
refers to it in its formal application, neither the national regulators nor the
Commission have incorporated it into their assessments. The encompassing
framework in chapter five points out that when regulatory opportunism is
omitted, all promises are kept and ex-ante contracting removes all ex-post
hazards, as a consequence of which the neoclassical perspective still suffices.
This illustrates that European gas regulation appears to be moving towards
the TCE perspective but nevertheless retains its neoclassical perspective. The
conclusion is that European gas regulation is currently stuck between the
neoclassical and TCE perspectives. This is undesirable, because chapter five
illustrates that the structural and transactional characteristics of the European
gas market call for a full incorporation of the TCE perspective.
Third, a consequence of the omission of regulatory opportunism is that
the inherent costs resulting from regulatory opportunism are not recognized
in an investment’s risk assessment. Accordingly, the allowed profits during
an exemption are too low. One solution is to allow higher profits to reflect
the higher hurdle rates, but this is not likely due to the applicability of compe-
tition policy. An alternative solution might be to grant US-style exemptions,
whereby competition law does not apply if competitive harm has been miti-
gated by sector-specific regulation. However, the place of competition policy
in primary EC law makes this option unlikely. Another solution may be to
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grant exemptions which are longer than minimum (i.e., longer than required
for the remuneration of economic costs).
Fourth, amore general problem regarding TPA exemptions is that it appears
very hard in practice to deny an exemption (despite the clear intention to grant
them exceptionally). According to this chapter, one reason for this is an
overestimation of the impact of RTPA on investment profitability. The traditional
argument is that RTPA truncates profits because a regulator cannot credibly
promise ex-ante to leave access regulation unaltered ex-post. A TPA exemption
is then very useful since it removes the ex-post hazard of regulation for a
specified period of time, which increases profitability. This chapter submits
that this argument has limited applicability in practice. Any project can show
that RTPA diminishes profitability compared to a situationwithout RTPA,which
makes is impossible to deny an exemption. The issue regarding investments
is not so much whether project profitability diminishes as a result of access
regulation, but rather whether it diminishes to the extent that the project
becomes unprofitable. As long as profitability remains positive, the investment
will commence and no exemption is required. In conjunction, the third and
fourth conclusion argue that a TPA exemptions regime which is based on TCE
guiding principles should grant fewer exemptions than is currently the case,
but display more leniency towards granted exemptions.
7 Long-term supply contracts – The Distrigas
antitrust case
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the second amendment in gas regulation: the treatment
of long-term downstream gas supply contracts. To this end, a case study is
carried out on the Commission’s antitrust case against Distrigas’ downstream
long-term gas supply contracts in Belgium. The goal is similar to that of the
previous chapter, namely examining whether the theoretical critique is valid
in practice. The choice fell on this antitrust case because it provides the Com-
mission’s view towards future long-term contracts.
Section 7.2 provides the background to the case study. It sets out the
Commission’s view towards long-term supply contracts. It is indicated that
the Commission’s view arises from an antitrust case against Distrigas, a Belgian
trading company. Section 7.2 also provides the required background informa-
tion on Distrigas. Section 7.3 studies the Commission’s antitrust case against
Distrigas’ long-term supply contracts in Belgium. This section describes the
regulatory process in order to trace the arguments that were voiced by the
different stakeholders in order to infer which specific changes to regulation
have been implemented and the reason for these changes. Section 7.4 explores
the broader implications of the case study. It argues that the acceptance of
long-term contracts by the Commission cannot be explained within the neo-
classical perspective. It can be explained, however, within the TCE perspective.
Section 7.5 examines whether the Commission’s view properly incorporates
the TCE criteria. We show that it does not and that the Commission is once
again stuck between the neoclassical and TCE perspectives. Section 7.6 con-
cludes. Chapter four’s disclaimer also applies here. Because this study analyzes
the issues from an economic perspective, the emphasis is on economic argu-
ments and literature where possible.
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7.2 BACKGROUND: LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND COMPETITION
7.2.1 Stakeholder views
This section sets out the views of different stakeholders in the European arena
regarding long-term contracts and competition. Section 4.10.1 has discussed
two ERGEG papers that set out a road map towards a competitive single gas
market in Europe. ERGEG (2005) is a discussion paper for public consultation.
It poses several questions onwhich it invites stakeholder responses. One cluster
of questions relates directly to long-term contracts and competition (ERGEG,
2005, p. 34):
‘Long contracts give security to investors, but may frustrate the development of
effective competition. Under the regulated approach, what steps are needed to
provide the necessary degree of security to investors (for example, the existence
of a regulated asset base)? If the two approaches co-exist (for example, where non-
regulated infrastructure outside the EU meets regulated infrastructure inside the
EU at the border), what issues are raised by the interaction? Finally, how do legacy
contracts fit into this picture?’
The answers to these questions should provide the stakeholder’s views on
the existence of long-term contracts while moving towards competitive gas
markets. Twenty-two responses to the consultation were received, of which
five directly addressed the questions posed above.1 This section provides an
overview of these responses in order to provide a general view of the opinions
on long-term contracts and competition. Two of these stakeholders – EFET and
GIE – have been mentioned in section 4.2. The remaining three stakeholders
comprise the already referred to energy companies E.ON and Centrica as well
as Eurelectric, the sector association representing the common interests of the
European electricity industry and its worldwide affiliates and associates. These
responses, in combination with those of Shell (which do not directly address
the above question), provide a complete range of views on long-term contracts
and competition.
GIE (2006), Gas Infrastructure Europe, representing the European infra-
structure operators, posits that while short-term tradingwill increase, long-term
contracting will remain the cornerstone for the European gas market. These
contracts need to be balanced against the drive to develop competitivemarkets.
According to GIE, one key aspect of this is for the regulatory framework to
not prescribe a particular form of remuneration, but to allow flexibility to how
investments are funded. Regarding legacy contracts, contracts that existed prior
1 Seehttp://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_CONSULT/
ARCHIVE/GAS/ Roadmap%20to%20competitive%20markets/RR for the overview of all
responses.
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to the liberalization coming into force, GIE points out that thesewill not impede
competition provided that adequate congestion management principles and
secondary trading markets are present.
EFET (2006), the European Federation of Energy Traders, recognizes the
important role of long-term contracts in facilitating infrastructure investments.
However, these contracts must be consistent with competitive markets, imply-
ing that new users of an infrastructure should not be disadvantaged compared
to existing users. In this regard, EFET mentions that long-term contracts, as
well as the legacy contracts, are of no concern if a TSO has been fully (i.e.,
ownership) unbundled, if non-discriminatory TPA services to all parties is
provided and if unused capacity is made available on the secondary market
or through use-it-or-lose-it principles.
Centrica (2006), a UK-based supplier of gas and electricity on both sides
of the Atlantic Ocean, argues that the two approaches identified by ERGEG –
a fully regulated approach where investors remunerate their costs based on
tariffs set by the regulator, and a commercial approach where investments
are secured on the back of long-term contracts – have facilitated investments
in the UK. Regarding the long-term contracts approach, Centrica argues that
the traded gasmarket itself provides a significant element of investor security
in a competitive environment. In contrast to the two approaches identified
by ERGEG, Centrica identifies four different investment approaches: the regu-
lated approach, a liberalized commercial model within parts of the EU, the
legacy, pre-liberalization model in parts of the EU and the commercial model
that applies to non-EU infrastructure projects such as Nord Stream. The co-
existence of these fundamentally different approaches is themain impediment
to competitive trading markets in Europe. As above, the issue is to integrate
these contracts as much as possible into the liberalizing gas market without
impeding investment incentives.
Eurelectric (2006) puts forward a similar argument by identifying two
pressing problems: 1) most EU cross-border capacity is booked for incumbents’
existing (legacy) long-term contracts and 2) investment in new cross-border
capacity is inadequate. Regarding the first issue, no suggestions for a solution
are proposed. Regarding the second issue, Eurelectric fears that TSOs may not
have sufficient incentive to invest in cross-border capacity, creating a need
for Member States and regulators to step in to ensure that investments are
undertaken.
E.ON (2006) emphasizes the investment security properties of long-term
contracts. In fact, in order for companies like E.ON to efficiently deliver
adequate investment in an appropriately diverse portfolio of assets requires
among others that ‘regulators/governments support long-term contractual
supply and transportation agreements as well as protect investments’.
Finally, Shell (2006) also emphasizes that long-term contracts are a risk
management tool. Shell goes a step further bywarning for toomuch emphasis
on short-term considerations due to liberalization. Shell is concerned by the
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renewed debate about the viability and desirability of long-term contracts.
While she acknowledges that there is clearly a role on the European gas market
for short-term business, according to Shell, ERGEG’s discussion paper puts too
much emphasis on ‘short-term-ism’, with possibly detrimental consequences
to investments.
These responses illustrate the different perspectives and views of different
stakeholders regarding long-term contracts and competition. The common
denominator appears to be that there is a tension between the short-term focus
that follows liberalization and the long-term contracts required to facilitate
investments. This is in accordance with one of the main messages from the
transaction cost perspective, namely that there is a fundamental tension
between competition and coordination. The upshot is that devising a regulatory
regime that introduces competition in the European gasmarketwhilst ensuring
sufficient investments, will need to carefully balance both conflicting objectives.
The next section sets out the balance currently chosen by the Commission.
7.2.2 The Commission’s view
The Commission’s assessment of long-term contracts and competition is based
predominantly on the extent to which consumers are able to switch between
suppliers. This can be explained as follows. As indicated in chapter one, the
European gas market is mature, which means that a relatively low number
of new connections to the grid is required. This in turn means that new con-
sumersmust be recruited from existing suppliers by for instance offeringmore
attractive contract terms. Consequently, the ability of consumers to switch is
vital to facilitate competition among suppliers.
The Commission’s current view on long-term contracts on a liberalized
European gas market has come to the fore in two recent publications. Firstly,
the final report of the Energy Sector Inquiry (CEC, 2007c, p. 7-10) identifies
at least two main impediments to competition of long-term contracts. An
important precondition for competition to develop is the possibility for new
entrants and existing competitors to procure additional gas in order to gain
a foothold on the market or increase their market share. Such entry is fore-
closed if themajority of available gas volumes are tied up in long-term supply
contracts. A second, and related, competition-distorting effect is that long-term
downstream supply contracts prevent consumers from switching to another
supplier. This implies that dispensingwith long-term contracts would improve
the level of competition, whichwould in turn improve operational and alloca-
tive efficiency.
A second publication that reflects the Commission’s assessment is its
proposal for a third legislative package (see section 4.9). The accompanying
impact assessment builds on the Sector Inquiry and argues that a higher level
of competition, and by extension a lower level of long-term contracting, implies
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a shift of welfare from current gas suppliers and transporters to consumers
(CEC, 2007d, p. 55). This ‘will mean an increase in efficient use of the transport
system. The cost of regulation and the cost of compliance are expected to be
less than economic benefits’ (ibid.). Hence, the emphasis is on competition
rather than coordination. In the explanatorymemorandum to the third package
proposals, the Commission notes that ‘downstream bilateral supply agreements
provide an opportunity to energy intensive industries to obtain more predict-
able prices. However, such agreements risk foreclosing the downstreammarket
(…)’ (CEC, 2007e, p. 18). Hence, long-term contracts entail benefits by reducing
uncertainty to users. This may indicate a step back from the neoclassical
perspective, which does not consider such efficiency rationales, towards amore
explicit recognition of the TCE perspective in gas regulation. On the same page,
the Commission furthermore notes that ‘To reduce uncertainty on themarket,
the Commission will, in the coming months, provide guidance in an appro-
priate form on the compliance of downstream bilateral long-term supply
agreements with EC competition law’.
The Commission has recently closed its antitrust case against Distrigas,
a Belgian trading company (see also section 6.3.2), which focused on the long-
term contracts that Distrigas had concluded with its consumers. These down-
stream supply contracts contrast with upstream supply contracts which are
usually concludedwith gas producing companies like Gazprom to import gas
supplies. This chapter focuses on the downstream contracts, because these are
fully within the Commission’s jurisdiction (upstream supply contracts are,
with the notable exception of Norway, predominantly concludedwith parties
that are not subjected to European gas legislation). The outcome of the Dis-
trigas case is exemplary of the Commission’s treatment of other companies
that have concluded or wish to conclude such contracts with consumers,
because the Commission has indicated that it will take account of the reasoning
developed in the Distrigas competition case when assessing future cases (CEC,
2007g). Hence, the Distrigas case provides the Commission’s current and future
view on long-term downstream supply contracts on European gas markets.
7.3 THE DISTRIGAS ANTITRUST CASE
7.3.1 Distrigas
Founded in 1929, Distrigas has been the integrated gas incumbent on the
Belgian gas market until 2001. In 1998 Distrigas went public but remained
integrated. This ended in November 2001 when Distrigas was legally
unbundled into Fluxys (the transport part, see section 6.3.2) and Distrigas
which was from then on responsible for the trading activities. Table 7.1 pro-
vides Distrigas’ shareholder structure.
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Table 7.1: Distrigas shareholders
Shareholder Percentage
SUEZ (through SUEZ-Tractebel) 57.25
Publigas (Belgian communalities) 31.25
Private shareholders 11.50
Belgian State 1 golden share
Source: Distrigas website, at: www.distrigas.be
Distrigas is the largest gas supplier and importer in Belgium.Distrigas is active
in six countries in the Northwest region – Belgium, Luxemburg, France,
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – and Spain. Table 7.2 indicates that
around 80 percent of its gas sales are on the Belgian market.
Table 7.2: Distrigas gas sales
Gas sales in TWha to: 2006 2007
Resellers/distribution 67.9 62.5
Direct industrial consumers 49.1 49.5
Electricity generators 44.8 28.5
Sales in Belgium 161.8 140.5
Sales outside Belgium 31.7 31.6
Arbitrage 8.2 4.6
Total sales 201.7 176.7
Total sales in bcmb 17.3 15.2
a) TWh stands for Terawatt hour which amounts to 1012 watt*hour.
b) bcm stands for billion cubic meter. 1 bcm equals 11,630 MWh or 11.63 TWh.
Source: Distrigas website, at: www.distrigas.be.
Distrigas facilitates both east-west and north-south gas flows. For example,
Distrigas holds a 16.41 percent share in the UK Interconnector and has facili-
tated Interconnector’s investment in reverse flow capacities to Belgium. Dis-
trigas is also active in the LNGmarket. It has been importing LNG fromAlgeria
since 1982 and from Qatar since 2007.
Section 6.3.2 indicates that the merger between SUEZ and Gaz de France
(GDF) has far-reaching consequences for the Belgian gas market and Fluxys.
This merger, and the related structural remedies, also have an effect on Dis-
trigas.
We highlight the most notable remedies that affect Distrigas. The most
important remedy is the divestiture of SUEZ’s holding in Distrigas. Until the
merger was finalized, Distrigas was managed independently from SUEZ under
the supervision of a trustee. After the merger, Distrigas will be sold in its
entirety (including its French activities) to a third party that must have relevant
expertise in the energy sector, particularly in the downstream supply to final
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consumers. In order to cover Electrabel’s (Belgian’s biggest electricity company,
solely owned by SUEZ) needs for its gas-fired power plants as well as to serve
its consumers (mainly residential), GDF SUEZ will conclude a supply contract
with Distrigas prior to divesting its stake. This supply contract amounts to
maximally 70 TWh,2 and must after five years have decreased to 20 TWh.
Furthermore, to facilitate market entry and competition, the operation of the
Zeebrugge hub is transferred from SUEZ to Fluxys, the network operator. In
addition, several investment projects will be carried out which increase infra-
structure capacities. The most prominent example pertains to improvements
in the functioning of the Zeebrugge gas hub through the creation of a single
entry point which links all networks together.
As indicated in section 6.3.2, the Commission accepted the remedies and
approved the merger on 14 November 2006 (CEC, 2006b). The deal with the
Commission includes the obligation to make public a shortlist of potential
candidates for the take-over of Distrigas before the end of March 2008. On
March 26, SUEZ published its shortlist which announced that negotiations
would start with Electricité de France, Italy’s ENI and Germany’s E.ON (SUEZ,
2008). On May 29, ENI announced that it had signed an agreement to buy
SUEZ’s share in Distrigas (ENI, 2008).3
7.3.2 The regulatory process
We start out by noting that the regulatory process differs from that of BBL’s
exemption process. First, this case does not involve national regulators. Second,
there is less publicly available information in the present case. The Commis-
sion’s antitrust website contains the Commission’s assessments and decisions,
but not the stakeholder responses in the consultation process and Distrigas’
submitted documents.4 Nevertheless, the information at our disposal is suffi-
cient for the task at hand which is to trace and assess the Commission’s view
towards Distrigas’ long-term contracts (see CEC, 2007j for an overview of the
process).
2 Terawatt hour (TWh) is a unit of energy used for expressing the amount of produced
energy, electricity and heat. 1 TWh = 1,000 Gigawatt hour (GWh) = 1 million Megawatt
hour (MWh) = 1 billion kilowatt hour (kWh).
3 At the time the shortlist was published, themerger had not yetmaterialized. Consequently,
the agreement was conditional on themerger betweenGdF and SUEZ actuallymaterializing,
approval by the Commission of the agreement and the right of first refusal of Publigas
not being exercised. Due to this uncertainty, three possible scenarios were being considered:
1) the situation in which Distrigas is managed as a separate company, 2) the reintegration
of Distrigas in the SUEZ group if the merger should fail and 3) the divestment of Distrigas
to ENI if the merger actually materialized. These scenarios influenced the Commission’s
assessment in the Distrigas case, as we discuss below.
4 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/index/by_nr_75.html#i37_966.
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The regulatory process commenced on 26 February 2004 when the Commis-
sion opened proceedings by adopting a Statement of Objections5 concerning
long-term supply contracts between Distrigas and an unspecified industrial
consumer. On 30 June 2005, the Commission adopted a preliminary assessment.
This concerned supply contracts with a number of different consumers –
industrial users, electricity producers and resellers. The preliminary assess-
ments were concluded by a supplementary Statement of Objections on 8 May
2006 concerning Distrigas’ long-term contracts with industrial users in Belgium
(CEC, 2006a). The Commission’s objections predominantly focused on market
foreclosure issues as we show below.
On 1March 2007 Distrigas submitted a proposal which specified a number
of amendments aimed at allaying these objections. These proposals were
followed on 5 April 2007 by a market test notice in which the Commission
invited interested third parties to respond (CEC, 2007f).6 Based on the responses
received, Distrigas submitted an amended proposal on 12 June 2007. The
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions7 was
consulted on 17 September 2007, following which the Hearing Officer8 issued
her final report on 25 September.9 The regulatory process was completed on
11 October 2007 through a formal Commission decision that made Distrigas’
amendments legally binding (see CEC, 2007k).
5 A Statement of Objections is a written communication which the Commission addresses
to persons or undertakings before adopting a decision that affects their rights negatively.
This ensures the addressee’s rights of defense by giving them the opportunity to make
their point of view known on any objection the Commission may wish to make in a
decision. The Statement of Objections must contain all objections which the Commission
intends to rely upon in its final decision. It is an important procedural step foreseen in
all competition procedures in which the Commission has the right to adopt negative
decisions. See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/s_en.html.
6 OJ C 77, 05/04/2007.
7 An Advisory Committee comprises representatives of the Member States and is consulted
by the Commission in antitrust and merger cases where such a consultation is foreseen.
A preliminary draft decision by the Commission is submitted to and discussed with the
Committee. The Advisory Committee issues an opinion which is taken into account in the
final Commission decision.
8 The Hearing Officer is an independent senior official charged with organizing hearings
and with ensuring that they are properly conducted. Its tasks include resolving disputes
between the Commission services and the parties concerned about the confidentiality of
documents and access to the file which one or more of the parties claim in order to prepare
their defense. The Hearing Officer reports to the Commissioner with special responsibility
for competition. Its final report on a competition case is attached to the decision and
published in the Official Journal. The terms of reference of the Hearing Officer are laid
down in a Commission decision.
9 OJ C 9, 15/1/2008.
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7.3.3 The Commission’s preliminary assessment
An important element in the Commission’s objections concerned Distrigas’
dominant market position. Hence, its preliminary assessment started with
determining the relevant product and geographic markets for Distrigas. The
market for supplying high-calorific gas to consumers with an annual gas
consumption that exceeds 1 million m3 was seen as the relevant product
market. Due to the specific legal and regulatory regime in Belgium as well
as price differences between Belgium and its neighbors, the Belgian market
was considered to be the relevant geographic market. Three elements were
especially relevant in the Commission’s conclusion of market dominance (see
the Commission’s commitments decision (CEC, 2007l) for an overview).
The first element was the highmarket share enjoyed byDistrigas five years
after liberalization. The Commission provided confidential information specify-
ing that Distrigas’ market share on the relevant market for industrial con-
sumers was 55 to 65 percent. When taking account of Electrabel’s share on
the same market, the total market share of SUEZ-related undertakings rose to
70-80 percent, compared to 5-15 percent for the next largest supplier. Second,
the Commission identified barriers to entry due to 1) the balancing regime
of the transport network, 2) the difficulty in using gas in transit to supply
Belgian consumers, 3) congestion on entry points into the Belgian transport
network, 4) a lack of liquidity on the Zeebrugge hub and 5) a lack of effective
competition on the low-calorific gas market. The problem regarding the latter
point was that the lack of competition could spill over to the high-calorific
market. This was due to the fact that some consumers with multiple sites
wanted a single supplier for all their Belgian sites. The spill-over occurred
because some of these sites were connected to the high-calorific network and
others to the low-calorific grid. Thirdly, being a member of the SUEZ group
strengthened Distrigas’ position on the relevant markets. The SUEZ group
comprises consumers like Electrabel and many local distribution companies.
Accordingly, Distrigas was assured of supply to large consumers fromwithin
the group, providing an advantage to competitors who lack such access and
guaranteed supply. This preferential position will disappear once Distrigas
is divested as a consequence of the GDF/SUEZ merger. According to the Com-
mission, however, Distrigas will remain dominant in the divested situation.
Based on these considerations, the Commission concluded that Distrigas has
a dominant position on the relevant markets. Of course, simply indicating a
dominant position is insufficient; there has to be abuse of dominance.
In its original Statement of Objections, the Commission expressed concerns
regardingmarket foreclosure and the use and resale restrictions in a Distrigas
contract with a large energy consumer. Since Distrigas decided to remove the
sales restrictions from its contracts before the Statement was sent, the Com-
mission’s latter concern was no longer relevant. Accordingly, the Commission
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emphasized market foreclosure issues, which in this case were due to the
volumes tied by the contracts and the duration of the contracts.
The contracted volumes were considered problematic because most Dis-
trigas contracts specified mandatory minimum off-takes with the possibility
for consumers to procure their entire demand fromDistrigas even though their
exact annual consumption was unknown beforehand. In addition, some con-
sumers had signed contracts that explicitly obliged them to buy all their gas
from Distrigas. Furthermore, most consumers only had one supplier – only
very large consumers with an annual consumption exceeding 500 GWh were
able to obtain gas from multiple suppliers. Below this threshold, consumers
were considered to be tied to their supplier, and therefore able to switch only
at the contract renewal stage.
Regarding contract duration, the first step was to determine the normal
length of a supply contract. To this end, the Commission considered the
average duration of the transport contracts which are required in conjunction
with supply contracts. The normal duration of a gas transport contract in
Belgiumwas one year. Consequently, a normal supply contract was considered
to be of the same duration. The Commission noted that some contracts con-
tained tacit renewal clauses that automatically renew a contract unless one
of the parties explicitly terminates it, and observed that some contracts had
no explicit termination date. The Commission did not consider this harmful,
however, because it assumed that the professional buyers on the relevant
product market were able to terminate their contracts if they considered this
to be in their best interest. Accordingly, consumers were considered tied by
a contract until the first possibility to terminate the contract. With this defini-
tion in hand, the Commission calculated which part of the relevant market
would be tied by Distrigas’ contracts. These calculations showed that Distrigas’
supply contracts on 1 January 2005 tied 50-60 percent of the relevant market
on 1 July 2005, 30-40 percent a year later and 20-30 percent three years later.
These calculations confirmed the Commission’s foreclosure suspicions and
in conjunction with Distrigas’ market dominance led the Commission to
conclude in its preliminary assessment that Distrigas’ long-term gas supply
contracts foreclosed the relevant markets in a way that might constitute an
abuse of its dominant position.10
7.3.4 Amendments proposed by Distrigas
The Commission has published in the Official Journal a notice to market test
the commitments proposed to meet its concerns raised in its Statement of
Objections of May 2006 for prohibition on abuse of dominant position under
10 In addition, CEC (2007k, p. 7) seems to suggest that this situation could impede inter-
Member State gas trade.
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Article 82 EC.11 The notice mentions that despite both oral and written ob-
jections to the Commission’s concerns, Distrigas nevertheless proposed the
following amendments:12
· Distrigas promised to return to the market a portion of the gas it or its
related undertakings supply to the consumers on the relevant market
(industrial users, electricity generators and resellers). Specifically, each
calendar year a minimum of 65 percent, and on average for all calendar
years a minimum of 70 percent, of supplied volumes will be available to
alternative suppliers, providing a choice of supplier to the related con-
sumers. These volumes will be calculated based on Distrigas’ annual
contract volumes with Distrigas retaining some flexibility to account for
fluctuations over the years.
· One reservation was made. In order to protect Distrigas from having to
reopen its long-term contracts if its sales decrease from their 2007 level,
Distrigas was allowed to tie a fixed volume of gas sales under long-term
contracts which may not exceed 20 percent of the market concerned. The
fixed volume depends on whether or not the GDF/SUEZ merger goes
through. These first two amendments allowed Distrigas to conclude long-
term contracts that tie at most 30 percent of its existing supply volumes
or 20 percent of the market, whichever is highest.
· The duration of new contracts with industrial users and electricity genera-
tors will not exceed five years. Existing consumerswith contract durations
extending beyond the five year threshold will be allowed to unilaterally
terminate these with prior notice and without indemnity. Furthermore,
Distrigas’ supply contracts with resellers may not exceed two years.
· Distrigas will not include any use, resale or destination clauses in new
contracts. Nor will these contain tacit renewal clauses. These restrictions
will be removed from or not enforced regarding existing supply contracts.
· Distrigas excluded the following five classes of sales from its amendments:
1) gas supplies to industrial consumers whose consumption is less than
12 GWh, 2) gas supplies to electricity generators with installations below
10 MW, 3) intra-group sales and the sales to Electrabel to cover its needs
11 CEC (2007f) provides additional information on this market test notice and the following
steps to be taken. By publishing the market test, the Commission invites interested parties
to present their comments on the commitments offered by Distrigas within one month of
the publication in the Official Journal. If the market test indicates that interested parties
consider the proposed commitments to remove the Commission’s concerns about the
foreclosure of the Belgian gasmarket, the Commissionwill adopt a so-called commitments
decision (CEC, 2007l) under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Such anArticle 9 decision finds
that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission, without concludingwhether
or not there has been or still is an infringement. However, if commitments given in the
context of such a decision are broken, the Commission may impose on the party in question
a fine amounting to ten percent of total worldwide turnover without having to prove that
there has been an infringement of the antitrust rules.
12 OJ C 77, 5/4/2007.
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for its gas-fired power plants and to serve its mainly residential consumers
(see section 7.2), 4) Distrigas’ trading activities and 5) sales outside the
relevant geographic market, i.e., outside Belgium.
· The amendments were proposed for a period of four years, taking effect
from 2007. They apply to Distrigas as long as its market share exceeds 40
percent and surpasses that of its nearest competitor by at least 20 percent.
· If Distrigas is divested, the sales of the buyer on the relevant market will
be included. After a transitional period of one year the buyer’s existing
contracts will be included unless its existing contracts are less than five
percent of Distrigas’ sales in 2007.
7.3.5 Stakeholder responses
This section provides an overview of the stakeholder responses that were
received. The Commission received eight confidential responses. Consequently,
we only have access to the Commission’s synthesis of these comments. The
Commission notes that Distrigas’ amendments were generally welcomed. The
respondents believe that the Commission’s concernswould be covered. A few
additional proposals were made. Some were outside the scope of the investiga-
tion, such as the proposals relating to ownership unbundling or improved
access to storage and gas volumes.
Three main concerns were put forward. First, one respondent feared that
consumers who prefer long-term contracts, for instance to invest in new
production capacity or to obtain certainty if gas takes up a large chunk of
production costs, might get into trouble once the proposed amendments, which
substantially shorten contract duration, are implemented. A second concern
relates to contracts with resellers. The duration of contracts between Distrigas
and the resellers is restricted to a maximum of two years. Some respondents
worry that this in turn prevents gas resellers from concluding contracts that
exceed two years. Finally, some respondents were concerned with the exclusion
of Distrigas’ sales contracts to Electrabel if the GDF/SUEZ merger went ahead.
According to the Commission, such fears are not relevant because the contracts
with Electrabel are specific to themerger, rendering it natural to exclude them
from the Distrigas case.
In response, Distrigas adapted its amendments by clarifying issues concern-
ing resale restrictions and sales outside Belgium. Distrigas furthermore stated
that it will not remove clauses from the contracts that only designate a point
of delivery. In conjunctionwith the proposed amendments indicated in section
7.3.3, these additional considerations provide Distrigas’ final amendments.
The final stage in the regulatory process is the Commission’s evaluation of
these amendments.
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7.3.6 The Commission’s final assessment
The Commission classified the amendments using the following five categories:
1) adequate volumes being returned to themarket every year, 2) themaximum
contract duration for industrial consumers and power generators (new installa-
tions excluded) being five years, 3) the maximum contract duration with
resellers being two years, 4) no supply contract containing resale or use re-
strictions and 5) the commitments being binding until the end of 2010. In its
commitment decision, the Commission assessed each of these on their
proportionality (CEC, 2007l, p. 9-13).
The obligation on Distrigas to make available each year to the market 30
percent of its own portfolio or 20 percent of the total market is supposed to
lowermarket foreclosure and accordingly enable alternative suppliers to build
up their own portfolio to compete with Distrigas. This obligation was con-
sidered proportional, because it merely enhances the contestability of the
market. Distrigas still has flexibility in contracting with consumers. In addition,
Distrigas is not in any way precluded from competing with new entrants for
consumers after contacts have expired. Finally, there would still be some
flexibility if Distrigas was unable to meet the threshold in a particular year.
The second category concerned contract duration. The goal here was to
alleviate the foreclosure problems by precluding Distrigas from tying con-
sumers for long periods of time. The main impetus for this obligation was
the observation that most Belgian consumers procured their entire gas demand
from Distrigas. Shortening the duration of long-term contracts ensured that
these consumers would be returned to the market at shorter notice, which
would enable new parties to compete for them (as above). Distrigas appeared
to live up to this amendment quite well, because the Commission noted that
at the start of 2005, the amendments would only affect one Distrigas contract.
Hence, the effect of this amendment was to ensure that Distrigas keeps up
this behavior. Therefore, this measure was considered proportionate. The
Commission reserved the right to reopen proceedings if it received signals
from industrial users of misbehavior by Distrigas.
An important point was that the limitation in contract duration did not
apply to gas supply for new investment in gas-fired power generation capacity
exceeding 10 MW. The argument bears some resemblance to the exemptions
case in the previous chapter: the investment might not go ahead without
predictability of prices and security of gas supplies. In addition, Distrigas was
also allowed to sell gas without time limitations to power plants owned by
affiliated companies. These secured suppliesmay give affiliated power gener-
ators a competitive advantage over non-affiliated generators. Allowing non-
affiliated power generators to also conclude such unrestricted contracts would
guarantee a level playing field between affiliated and unaffiliated power
generators. However, thismeasurewas not considered to be necessary, because
the Commission did not expect that industrial users would be building new
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production capacity before 2010. Therefore, industrial users were not allowed
to conclude supply contracts that extended beyond the amendments. The
Commission may reopen the proceedings if its expectations turn out to be
wrong.
Regarding the third category, limiting themaximum contract durationwith
resellers to two years, the Commission restated that the most important effect
of the amendment is precludingDistrigas from cherry picking – tying themost
attractive consumers through long-term contracts and leaving the less attractive
ones to the competitors – while not significantly altering Distrigas’ existing
contracts. This ensured the proportionality of this amendment in the same
fashion as with the contracts for power generators and industrial consumers.
The proportionality of the removal of all use, resale or destination clauses
from contracts is explained by noting that these amendments are consistent
with EC competition law.
Regarding the length of the amendments, the fifth category, the Com-
mission noted that competition is gradually developing in Belgium. To facilitate
and speed-up this process, barriers to entry have to be removed as soon as
possible. The period up to 2010 is crucial for the development of further
competition in Belgium. If the amendments would bind for a shorter period
of time, the Commission argued, alternative suppliers would not have sufficient
time to build up a proper consumer base to compete with Distrigas. Therefore,
the period up to 2010 was considered proportional.
Finally, it was noted that the remaining amendments by Distrigas are
conditional on the GDF/SUEZ merger. Consequently, the above five categories
of amendments were applicable to Distrigas in any case, whether the merger
materializes or not, and therefore apply today. The Commission noted that
in the situation in 2007, with Distrigas being managed as a separate under-
taking, the amendments only apply to Distrigas. If the merger is called off
and Distrigas is subsequently reintegrated into the SUEZ group, the amend-
ments will still need to be respected. If Distrigas is divested and sold off, then
the purchaser – ENI – will have to comply with the amendments provided that
it has significant activities on the relevant market (CEC, 2007k). The Commis-
sion’s overall assessment was that all amendments are proportional. There
was no longer ground for action and consequently all proceedings were
brought to an end.
7.4 WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE DISTRIGAS CASE
Two implications of this case study stand out. First, the Commission uses the
Distrigas case as a benchmark case to provide guidance to other dominant
suppliers concerning their concluded or proposed downstream long-term
supply contracts. This is illustrated by the proceedings that were recently
opened against Electrabel and Electricité de France (EdF) for suspected fore-
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closure of the Belgian and French markets (CEC, 2007g). The Commission
declared that it will take account of the reasoning developed in the Distrigas
case (ibid.).
The second implication is that the case study indicates reluctance on the
part of the Commission to allow dominant companies to conclude long-term
gas supply contracts due to their foreclosing properties. The Commission
appears willing and able to force adaptations to existing long-term contracts
through antitrust proceedings in order to facilitate competition. If we consider
the January 2007 conclusions of the Energy Sector Inquiry (CEC, 2007c), the
July 2007 proceedings against Electrabel and EdF and a 2006 case of the
German competition authority against E.ON Ruhrgas in conjunction, a rather
inhospitable view on long-term contracts comes to the fore. The sector inquiry
identifies foreclosure by long-termdownstream contracts as a key impediment
to the development of competition in European gas markets. Second, as indi-
cated, the suspected objections that underlie the Commission’s proceedings
against Electrabel and EdF are similar to those used in the Distrigas case, and
consequently need no further elaboration. The E.ON Ruhrgas case is concisely
discussed in Bellantuono (2008), see also box 7.1.
Box 7.1: E.ON Ruhrgas vs. the Bundeskartellamt
Early in 2006, the Bundeskartellamt, the German competition authority, decided that
certain long-term contracts concluded by E.ON Ruhrgas with resellers should be pro-
hibited (Bundeskartellamt, 2006a). The argument was that tying resellers (i.e., regional
and local gas distributors) through long-term contracts had a foreclosure and therefore
price-raising effect by impeding the competition from potential newcomers. This was
a breach of German and European competition law. The decision, which was immediate-
ly enforceable, obliged E.ON Ruhrgas to limit the duration of new and existing contracts
covering over 80 percent of resellers’ requirements to a maximum of 2 years. Contracts
tying between 50 and 80 percent of requirements were allowed to run up to 4 years.
Furthermore, supplying additional volumes under short-term contracts to make up
for the remainder of consumer demand was prohibited. These provisions concerned
downstream contracts; long-term import contracts between E.ON Ruhrgas and gas
producers were excluded.
E.ON appealed the immediate enforceability before the Düsseldorf Higher Regional
Court (Bundeskartellamt, 2006b). The appealwas rejected. This decision is very similar
to the Commission’s objections and decisions in the Distrigas case, which is why this
German case is often considered a forerunner of the Commission’s current behavior
towards long-term contracts.
According to Bellantuono (2008, p. 2), the Commission’s view emphasizes
fostering competition. Bellantuono (ibid.) also argues that the argument that
any interference with long-term contracts could decrease investments and
dampen security of supply is dismissed. The Commission’s view above violates
most of the TCE arguments that were put forward in chapter five. Adapting
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existing long-term contracts is an example of ex-post regulatory opportunism
that lessens regulatory credibility which in turn hampers investments. Further-
more, recall that chapter five has pointed out that a long-term contract may
mitigate ex-post contractual hazards, which provides an efficiency rationale
that must be weighed against its foreclosure effects.
However, the Commission’s actual stance is more nuanced than implied
above, because she explicitly mentions that long-term downstream supply
contracts are not incompatible with the EU competition rules per se (CEC, 2007j,
p. 4, 5). In fact, she appears to argue along TCE lines by noting that the likely
positive and negative effects of long-term contracts on competition must be
assessed in the overall context in which they occur. The Commission uses the
Distrigas case to provide the following five criteria for assessing long-term
contracts: 1) the market position of the supplier, 2) the share of consumer
demand tied under the contracts, 3) the duration of the contracts, 4) the overall
share of the market covered by the contracts and 5) efficiencies. Especially
the fifth criterion implies a TCE perspective.
This fifth criterion cannot be explained using the neoclassical perspective,
due to its disregard for the presence of an efficiency rationale for long-term
contracts. Since any long-term contract will by definition foreclose a part of
the market, the neoclassical perspective prescribes a complete removal of all
these contracts. Therefore, as in the exemptions case study, the TCE perspective
once more provides a better explanation of actual regulatory behavior than
the neoclassical perspective. In conclusion, the Distrigas case also empirically
confirms our theoretical critique on the neoclassical perspective.
The final issue is to determine whether the Commission’s criteria take
proper account of the TCE criteria or whether existing regulation is stuck
somewhere between the neoclassical and the TCE perspective – as in the exemp-
tions case. To this end, the next section discusses these criteria and assesses
whether they indeed signify a proper incorporation of the TCE perspective.
7.5 DO THE COMMISSION’S CRITERIA FOLLOW THE TCE PERSPECTIVE?
As indicated, the Commission’s view towards long-term contracts in a compe-
titive environment can be derived from the Energy Sector Inquiry (CEC, 2007c).
The Sector Inquiry sets out to provide a preliminary indication on whether
or not existing downstream long-term contracts impede competition by creating
barriers to entry. To this end, it provides insights on three of the above criteria
(ibid., p. 236-241). The data provided in the Sector Inquiry, a part of which
will be referred to below, provides information on downstream supply con-
tracts in Europe and illustrates some indicators that are being used to evaluate
these contracts in light of the goal to facilitate competition. A supplier’smarket
position is not elaborated upon. Also, because efficiencies arising from the
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contracts must be considered on a case-by-case basis, these are also left out
of the general analysis.
A supplier’smarket position is the starting point of the analysis, see section
7.3.2. If a single supplier dominates the market, this supplier’s portfolio of
contracts will be the subject of an examination (as was the case with Distrigas).
Long-term contracts concluded by fringe suppliers, however, will generally
not give rise to foreclosure concerns. The Commission notes that in some cases,
especially those involving no single dominant supplier, it may be necessary
to consider the cumulative effect of the long-term contracts of several suppliers.
The second criterion, the share of consumer demand tied by the long-term
contracts, is important because if a contract ties most or all of a particular
consumer’s demand, this consumer is effectively removed from the market.
The Sector Inquiry refers to this as exclusivity (ibid., p. 236). Exclusivity
forecloses the market and may assist a dominant supplier in retaining or
extending its dominance. The Sector Inquiry provides interesting insights by
specifying three indicators of the level of exclusivity. The first is the number
of contracts that contain rebate clauses. A rebate clause is a clause that provides
lower prices when certain targets, like procured volumes as a share of overall
requirements, have beenmet. The Inquiry provides a table that illustrates that
the percentage of contracts containing these rebate clauses ranges from 13
percent in Germany to 28 percent in Italy. The second indicator, take-or-pay
clauses (see section 1.3), increases overall exclusivity according to the Commis-
sion. If a take-or-pay clause is close to a consumer’s overall demand, then we
can effectively speak of a predominantly exclusive supply situation. A third
and final indicator put forward in the Inquiry is the presence of technical
obstacles or obstacles in the network codes that prevent dual-supplier agree-
ments. The requirement of two metering stations that may be required for a
dual-supplier agreement is put forward as an example. At page 236, the Sector
Inquiry states that:
‘Taking the data from customers and suppliers together, the Sector Inquiry has
found that dual supplier relationships at the final customer level are certainly not
the norm and very rare in some Member States [AS: it is noted that this is with
the exception of multi-site customers who can choose different suppliers for each
of their sites]. Evenmost local distribution and supply companies, which consume
very large volumes of gas, generally appear to have a single wholesale supplier.’
In addition, contract duration, the third criterion, may aggravate the foreclosure
effects. Contracts that tie consumers for a long period of time impede compe-
tition by preventing the consumers concerned to switch and become available
to the market. Shorter contracts allow a consumer to become available to the
market sooner, in which case alternative suppliers can compete with the
incumbent supplier. Contract length is an obvious indicator. The Sector Inquiry
provides evidence on contract duration for a selection of Member States –
France, Germany, Italy, theNetherlands and Poland. Especially Germany and
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Poland appear to have very high shares of such contracts (over 80 percent
in both countries). It is also indicated that in these five countries very few
contracts last less than one year while many exceed five years. Finally, the
Sector Inquiry provides data that indicates that the volume weighted average
contract duration in these five countries has declined since the start of liberal-
ization, but that the duration still exceeds 3.5 years (with the exception of Italy).
Another indicator of contract duration is the presence of tacit renewal clauses.
These clauses automatically renew a supply agreement for a specified duration
at the contract termination date unless one of the parties gives prior notice
of termination to the other. According to the Sector Inquiry, these clauses have
a similar effect to indefinite contract periods and consequently impede switch-
ing. The Sector Inquiry indicates that these clauses are used quite extensively
(ibid., p. 239). Once again, Germany and Poland have the largest shares of
contracts with these clauses (60 and almost 75 percent respectively, when
measured by the number of contracts). Italy followswith 30 percent. A second
contractual clause, notice periods, provides the final indicator. One consequence
of a notice period is that it takes some time before a switch of supplier becomes
effective, delaying the benefits to the consumer of the switch. This postpone-
ment of the benefits of switching makes switching less attractive to the con-
sumer. The Sector Inquiry consequently interprets notice periods as an indi-
cator of the ability of consumers to switch supplier. It provides data that
indicates that notice periods are not a significant obstacle to switching in
France, Italy and theNetherlands. They are, however, in Germany and Poland,
where 72 and 95 percent of contracts have notice periods that exceed three
months.
The fourth criterion concerns the ratio of the long-term contracts to the
total market. Long-term contracts concluded by a dominant supplier need not
result in foreclosure problems if the contracted volumes are small relative to
the total market volumes. In the Distrigas case, the amendments accepted by
the Commission imply that there would be no competition concerns if Distri-
gas’ long-term contracts lasting more than one year would cover less than 20
percent of the relevant market. The Sector Inquiry (ibid., p. 241) argues in this
regard that the combination of high exclusivity of suppliers, long contract
duration, tacit renewal clauses and long termination periods implies that there
are significant barriers to consumer switching.
The final criterion relates to efficiencies. These have to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis and therefore are not explicitly elaborated upon in the Sector
Inquiry (though it mentions the recuperation of sunk investments as a possible
example). The Commission notes in this regard that even if a long-term con-
tract results in foreclosure, the Commission will assess whether the contract
generates efficiencies that outweigh its negative effects. Accordingly, long-term
contracts are undesirable only if their costs outweigh their efficiency benefits.
As an illustration, the Commission mentions its exclusion of gas-fired power
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plants from the scope of the amendments imposed on Distrigas. Facilitating
new gas-fired power generation is considered beneficial to the Belgian elec-
tricity market by adding electricity production capacity. These investments
may require the certainty of a gas supply contract that lasts longer than five
years to become economically viable and are therefore excluded. Another
example emanates from the Sector Inquiry when it notes that long-term con-
tracts may allow consumers to better manage the risks associatedwith adverse
price movements. However, these ‘may not outweigh the negative foreclosure
effects of long-term retail (i.e., downstream) contracts on competition and
overall consumer welfare’ (ibid., p. 237).
There are a number of similarities with the Commission’s treatment of
exemptions in the previous chapter. The first similarity is that the Commis-
sion’s assessment implies a step back from the neoclassical perspective. One
illustration is the fourth criterion which specifies that long-term contracts may
not be considered harmful if they foreclose only a small part of the total
market. A second andmore fundamental illustration is the fifth criterion which
explicitly allows for the efficiencies of long-term contracts. This efficiency
criterion brings us to the second similarity. As with the exemptions regime,
there is a clear scope to incorporate the TCE perspective into existing regulation,
because all TCE criteria can potentially be included in the assessment of long-
term supply contracts.
However, the guidance provided so far is insufficient. A promise to con-
sider the efficiency properties of long-term supply contracts is clearly positive,
but it is far from an assurance that the relevant TCE criteria will be explicitly
incorporated in the assessment. The argument runs along lines similar to the
BBL case. Ensuring certainty of gas supplies is the justification put forward
by the Commission for excluding new power plants from the amendments
to Distrigas’ long-term supply contracts. In its explanation regarding the
efficiencies of downstream long-term supply contracts in general, the Commis-
sion notes that (CEC, 2007j, p. 5):
‘It follows that long-term contracts are only incompatible with EC competition rules
when they are likely to have negative effects on competition due to their significant
foreclosure effects and these negative effects are not outweighed by efficiency
benefits’.
Note the omission of the costs of the Commission’s intervention (which is
consistent with the neoclassical perspective towards regulatory intervention).
One effect of the Commission’s antitrust case is that Distrigas’ ability to con-
clude long-term contracts is being amended. This renegotiation is an act of
regulatory opportunism which decreases regulatory credibility. From a TCE
perspective, this is an additional cost of reducingmarket foreclosure. Further-
more, chapter five has pointed out that long-term contracts serve a purpose
on European gas markets by mitigating ex-post hazards. Shorter contract
durations may well increase ex-post hazards, and consequently impede invest-
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ment or increase hurdle rates. Therefore, the problem is once again the dis-
regard of the effects of regulatory opportunism. By not taking into account
all the costs of its interventions, the Commissionwill amend downstream long-
term gas supply contracts more often than is efficient. This indicates the third
similarity with the exemptions case: in both cases, the Commission is stuck
between the neoclassical and TCE perspectives.
7.6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter analyzes the second notable amendment to gas regulation’s
neoclassical guiding principles, namely accepting long-term downstream gas
supply contracts. We study the Commission’s antitrust case against Distrigas,
because the Commission has explicitly stated that the outcome of this case
is exemplary of its treatment of other companies that have concluded or wish
to conclude long-term supply contracts with consumers. Hence, the Distrigas
case provides the Commission’s current view towards long-term downstream
supply contracts on European gas markets. This chapter examines whether
this view can be considered to be an adaptation to gas regulation’s neoclassical
underpinnings, and if so, whether it is appropriate in light of the TCE perspect-
ive.
Regarding Distrigas’ supply contracts on the Belgian gas market, the
Commission was notably concerned with their duration and the volumes of
gas tied toDistrigas. In order to prevent these contracts from impeding compe-
tition by foreclosing a substantial part of the market, the Commission started
an antitrust case against Distrigas. The result was that Distrigas proposed to
limit the duration of new contracts with gas resellers to two years at most.
New contracts with other large consumers (industrial consumers and power
generators) would last up to five years, excluding newgas-fired power plants.
In addition, Distrigas promised to return to the market an average of 70
percent of the gas it contracts each year.
To some, these amendmentsmay reflect a general hostility of the Commis-
sion towards long-term downstream gas supply contracts. However, the
Commission takes a nuanced stance towards long-term supply contracts by
noting that their likely positive and negative effects on competition must be
assessed in the overall context in which they occur. Based on the Distrigas
case, the Commission formulated the following five criteria for assessing long-
term contracts: 1) themarket position of the supplier, 2) the share of consumer
demand tied under the contracts, 3) the duration of the contracts, 4) the overall
share of the market covered by the contracts and 5) efficiencies. Especially
the fifth criterion implies a TCE perspective. This leads to twomain conclusions
regarding the Commission’s stance towards long-term downstream gas supply
contracts.
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The first conclusion mirrors the first conclusion in the exemptions case:
the neoclassical perspective cannot explain why long-term supply contracts
are accepted. The reason is that by not ascribing an efficiency rationale to long-
term contracts, the assessment of any long-term contract will always be nega-
tive due to its inherent foreclosure effects. Therefore, the neoclassical per-
spective prescribes a complete ban on all contracts of this type. In the TCE
perspective, long-term contracts have an efficiency rationale throughmitigating
ex-post hazards. Therefore, as in the exemptions case study, the TCE perspective
once again provides a better explanation of actual regulatory behavior than
the neoclassical perspective, which confirms the theoretical critique on the
neoclassical guiding principles of current gas regulation. Accepting long-term
supply contracts and their related efficiencies therefore signals a step back
in European gas regulation from its neoclassical guiding principles towards
a TCE perspective.
Second, the Commission’s view is once again stuck between the neoclassical
and TCE perspectives. The foreclosure effects of long-term supply contracts
are not disputed. Instead, we argue that the Commission’s assessment fails
to take into account the costs of regulatory opportunism, which is consistent
with the neoclassical view towards regulatory intervention. The guidance
provided so far is insufficient due to the omission of regulatory opportunism.
By understating the costs of its own interventions, the Commission is likely
to amend downstream long-term gas supply contracts more often thanwould
be the case if all costs would be taken into account. By extension, ex-post
hazards will be higher and regulatory credibility will be lower than necessary
as a consequence of which investment will be impeded.

8 Summary and conclusions
8.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
The European gas market is currently undergoing substantial structural and
regulatory reform. These reform initiatives are supposed to liberalize the
European gas market in order to reach the energy policy objectives: supply
security, competitiveness and sustainability. The introductory chapter discusses
these objectives. The study leads to three main conclusions regarding the
energy policy objectives and liberalization of the European gas market. First,
liberalization is not principally at odds with reaching the policy objectives.
In fact, liberalizationmay result in all policy objectives being reached, provided
it is accompanied by a proper regulatory regime. The challenge is to create
the circumstances – i.e., the appropriate regulatory regime – under which
liberalization improves availability, efficiency and sustainability. Second, all
policy objectives display market failures. Since current regulation is guided
by neoclassical economics, anymarket failure becomes a candidate for regula-
tory intervention. Therefore, according to the current regulatory settings, all
energy policy objectives are candidates for regulatory intervention.1 Conse-
quently, the energy policy objectives are considered public service obligations.
Third and final, the discussion on the policy objectives also indicates that
facilitating investments takes center stage in securing each of the policy object-
ives.
This study is motivated by the currently unsatisfactorily state of European
gas liberalization, as reflected in the benchmarking reports published by the
European Commission. An additional reason for this study is that the inter-
national gas market is experiencing a number of shifts which are together
fundamentally reshaping the European gas market.
Chapter two elaborates on these shifts, which stem from 1) external de-
pendence and long-term vulnerability, 2) producer behavior, 3) an increase
in long-distance gas supply, 4) an increase in gas transit, 5) a loosening link
between energy demand and GDP growth in Europe but a tightening link at
the global scale, 6) a growing awareness of climate change and 7) increasing
1 While a market failure is sufficient ground to think about regulatory intervention, actual
intervention should only materialize in practice if the costs of the market failure outweigh
the costs of the government or regulatory failure that accompanies the intervention, see
section 1.5.1.
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gas demand from power generation. These can be classified in the following
four broad categories:
· A shift in international relations – the emergence of a seller’s market rather
than a buyer’s market;
· A shift in energy policy objectives with security of supply having become
the top priority, while climate change has also increased in importance;
· An increasing need for investments along the entire value chain. Total EU-
27 investment requirements amount to roughly 1800 billion Euro of which
around 12 percent – 216 billion Euro – is required for gas (CEC, 2007a,
p. 17);
· An increasing influence of politics on energy relations.
These shifts create an environment that differs from the environment at the
end of the 1980s, when European gas liberalizationwas instigated. For instance,
the context in which current gas regulation has been developed emphasized
asset sweating due to the presence of a mature infrastructure. In addition, the
availability of ample gas supplies resulted in a relatively low emphasis on
supply security. In contrast, in the new context, new investments are required
and supply security is a big issue. Nowadays, a regulatory regimemust govern
the market in such a way that it properly facilitates investments in a seller’s
marketwhere political considerations and anxieties are becomingmore impor-
tant andwhere supply security and sustainability have become the top priori-
ties for energy policy. The interplay of regulationwith irreversible investments,
risks and uncertainty determines whether a proper governance structure is
devised. Consequently, the criteria for an adequate regulatory regime in the
new context are irreversibility of investments, risks and uncertainties.
This study’s main concern is whether the current approach towards struc-
tural and regulatory reform of the European gas market will be able to secure
the public service obligations. This is tantamount to examiningwhether current
regulation is still adequate in the changed context set out above. We therefore
examine whether current regulation has incorporated the above criteria, and
if not, whether it will be able to do so under its current guiding principles.
8.2 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We use two economic perspectives to analyze the above issues: the neoclassical
and the transaction cost perspective. We use the neoclassical perspective
because it provides the guiding principles for the existing gas regulation.
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8.2.1 The neoclassical perspective
Chapter three discusses the neoclassical perspective, notably its main assump-
tions, its implications for regulation and its prescriptions for structural reform
to liberalize the European gasmarket. It builds on three hardcore assumptions:
methodological individualism,methodological instrumentalism andmethod-
ological equilibration. The goal is to reach the perfect competition outcome
where long-run equilibrium producer profits are zero, products are priced
at long-run marginal costs and consequently welfare is maximal. This view
has far-reaching consequences for regulatory intervention. In a perfect compe-
tition world, the market will have attained maximum welfare on its own,
which implies that no regulation is necessary at all. There is consequently only
a rationale for regulatory intervention if the market is in a situation that
deviates from perfect competition. In that case, regulators must intervene in
case of a market failure in order to restore the perfect competition equilibrium.
As indicated above, in the neoclassical perspective, any market failure is a
candidate for regulatory intervention. This study identifies several market
failures on the European gas market: failure of competition, public goods,
externalities, incomplete markets, information failures and uninsurable risks.
These imply that the neoclassical perspective results in a substantial level of
regulatory intervention in the European gas market.
The neoclassical perspective also provides guidelines regarding the struct-
ure of the liberalized European gas market. The neoclassical line of reasoning
argues that thewidespread vertical and horizontal integration in the traditional
market structure has no efficiency advantage. This is due to the fact that
integration is always assumed to occur in response to or anticipation ofmarket
power. Consequently, the main task when reforming the gas market towards
competition is to prevent any integration. If integration is already present,
then competitive and non-competitive activities must be separated completely
trough structural separation (or ownership unbundling). On a structurally
separated network, negotiated TPA is probably the best solution as it implies
lesser regulatory interference and allows for more flexibility.
8.2.2 Current European gas regulation
European gas regulation is developed on the basis of European gas legislation,
which is formulated by the European decision-making institutions in interplay
with the relevant stakeholders. Chapter four provides an overview of the
process and contents of European gas legislation. The stakeholders exert
influence both at the development stage as well as concerning the transposition
of the European legislative measures into national law.
Stakeholders may induce regulatory failure by capturing regulators, in
which case the regulator undertakes actions in the best interest of the stake-
210 Summary and conclusions
holders but not necessarily in society’s interest. A regulator’s information
deficit and its opportunism provide additional grounds for regulatory failure.
Due to these problems, any regulatory policywill be inefficient to some extent,
which implies that regulatory intervention will not lead to the perfect compe-
tition equilibrium. There will consequently always be scope to argue that
competition will improvematters by reducing the inherently inefficient regula-
tion.
Since this study emphasizes structural and regulatory reform of the Euro-
pean gas market (and leaves out privatization), it emphasizes both Gas Direct-
ives issued so far and the proposal for a third one. Due to the importance of
the regulation of gas transmission networks, the Gas Regulation is also dis-
cussed. Taken together, these legislative measures indicate that the existing
regulatory framework for European gas is firmly embedded in the neoclassical
perspective towards economics and regulation set out in chapter three.
Liberalization and the restructuring of the European gas market should
eventually create an internal European gasmarket. On this internal gas market,
all policy goals are supposed to be satisfied as efficiently as possible. This
anticipated internal European gas market is similar to the neoclassical perfect
competition equilibrium. The underlying assumption is that an atomized gas
market should materialize eventually in which a large number of suppliers
vehemently compete with each other on an equal footing and a short-term
basis. This would induce unfettered supply competition which would lower
consumer prices, increase service levels and facilitate efficient investments.
Efficient demand and efficient investments would alleviate supply security
anxieties. Furthermore, in this perfect setting, gas prices would internalize
the costs of emissions, which would mitigate sustainability issues. This is
nothing short of a direct translation to the gas market of the perfect compe-
tition equilibrium, which is why the neoclassical perspective towards regulation
is the guiding principle of existing gas regulation.
These neoclassical guiding principles imply that any impediment to the
liberalization process or the development of the internal gas market is a sign
of insufficient competition. This explains why the Commission’s solution to
the currently unsatisfactory development of competition is a stronger push
towards competition on Member State gas markets. One consequence of the
perfect competition assumption is that once the internal market has developed,
the invisible hand will have dissipated all problems. This argument is tauto-
logical: by assuming that the internal market will eventually work perfectly,
all problems that may occur are considered temporary by definition and are
effectively assumed away in the equilibrium. This in turn by definition rules
out the option that the current state of affairs may be due to a discrepancy
between full competition and gas market specifics (because this would point
towards a fundamental problem). In other words, the neoclassical arguments
underpinning the current gas regulation by definition rule out one of the main
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arguments from TCE, namely that the current institutional structure of the
European gas market may not be conducive to competition.
This vision contrasts with the new context for gas regulation. As indicated,
in this new context the issue is to facilitate substantial new investments along
the value chain of a gas market dominated by sellers, in a world where
political considerations are growing in importance andwhere supply security
and sustainability have become the priorities for energy policy. This is a far
cry from the anticipated internal gas market. The relevant criteria in the new
context are not acknowledged by the neoclassical perspective and are
consequently beyond the scope of current regulation which is built on neo-
classical foundations. The transaction cost economics (TCE) approach has been
developed specifically to deal with the criteria that come to the fore in the
new context. Consequently, TCE is the alternative economic perspective we
consider.
8.2.3 The transaction cost perspective
Chapter five discusses the TCE perspective towards regulatory intervention
and restructuring. TCE places the transaction center stage and determines the
most appropriate governance form given the prevailing policy objectives,
property rights, rule of law and regulations. TCE incorporates into the analysis
the institutional determinants that explain alternative modes of economic
organization and proposes a comparative institutional analysis of viable
governance forms in order to find the governance form that entails the lowest
transaction costs which consist of the direct contracting costs and the cost due
to ex-post contractual hazards.
Its analytical framework builds on threemain criteria – contractual incom-
pleteness, opportunism and asset specificity – which in conjunction induce
ex-post contractual hazards. Regarding opportunism, we note that an important
contrast with the neoclassical perspective is that TCE explicitly recognizes
regulatory opportunism. Costly safeguards are required to mitigate the ex-post
hazards and the investment hold-up problem theymay create. Consequently,
a governance structure must be devised that eliminates these hazards at the
lowest possible transaction costs. The transactional characteristics of a particular
market determine whether these criteria are present and in turn whether the
TCE perspective is appropriate. This study uses the TCE criteria to develop an
encompassing framework, comprising the neoclassical and TCE perspectives,
which determines when to use which perspective. This framework specifies
that the TCE perspective is appropriate only if all three criteria are simul-
taneously met. If not, then either market exchange or ex-ante contracts remove
ex-post contractual hazards. In both these settings, the neoclassical perspective
is appropriate. Therefore, the issue is to determine whether contractual in-
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completeness, asset specificity and opportunism are simultaneously present
on the European gas market in its new context.
The increasing need for new, irreversible investments increases asset
specificity. The new context also leads to substantial uncertainty, which induces
contractual incompleteness. Hence, the new context for gas regulation creates
contractual incompleteness and asset specificity on the European gas market.
In order to determine whether the TCE perspective is the proper lens through
which to view the European gas market, it must be determined whether
regulatory opportunism is a threat in the new context. This is done by de-
termining the level of regulatory commitment on European gas markets. The
lower the level of regulatory commitment, the more vulnerable an investor
will be to regulatory opportunism. Six criteria are derived from the academic
literature on regulation to determine the level of regulatory commitment. These
are: 1) the growth in gas demand, 2) the rate of technological development,
3) the ownership of a regulated firm, 4) the rate of capital depreciation, 5) the
emphasis of a typical regulator on either consumer or investor rents and 6)
the discount rate. The level of commitment is determined by the costs of
reneging (i.e., breaking the regulatory contract). If future benefits of adhering
to the regulatory contract are high, the costs of reneging, and therefore also
the level of commitment, will be high because of the benefits foregone by
discontinuing the relationship. Only the increasing gas demand will increase
future benefits and therefore have a positive effect on commitment. Of course,
due to for instance supply security issues in the new context, gas demandwill
not be explicitly stimulated to improve commitment. All of the remaining five
criteria lower regulatory credibility. The nature of investments is not explicitly
mentioned, because investments have been treated when considering asset
specificity.We nevertheless note that the effect of investments on commitment
is mixed. The sunk nature of many investments in the gas market creates the
ex-post hazards. However, the fact these investments will increase in future
improves commitment. Therefore, the transactional characteristics of the
European gas market imply a low level of regulatory commitment. By ex-
tension, the European gas market is vulnerable to regulatory opportunism.
In sum, the European gas market exhibits all three TCE criteria.
Consequently, the TCE perspective provides the proper lens through which
to view European gas regulation. This leads to the conclusion that the TCE
perspective results in better outcomes in terms of market behavior in the new
context for regulation compared to the current, neoclassically-oriented regula-
tion. TCE implies significant differences in regulatory intervention compared
to current regulation. For example, with a TCE view, there is less scope for
regulatory intervention in European gas, because the TCE perspective takes
into account more costs of intervention, especially the costs related to
opportunistic behavior. An additional difference is the TCE assumption that
a regulator does not possess all information.
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Concerning the policy prescriptions for reform, TCE submits that the compe-
tition distorting effects of vertical integration are insufficient to justify owner-
ship unbundling. Note that the drawbacks of vertical integration are not
disputed. However, TCE allows integration to arise in order to mitigate ex-post
contractual hazards, rather than only in response to, or as an effort to create,
market power. Hence, vertical integrationmay have efficiency benefits, while
the presence of ex-post hazards makes market exchange also costly on Euro-
pean gas markets. Therefore, in contrast to the neoclassical perspective, gas
reform initiatives must recognize that 1) vertical integration may well have
efficiency advantages by mitigating ex-post hazards and 2) intermediate
governance forms, such as long-term contracts, may also be appropriate. In
sum, the net benefits in terms of transaction costs of market exchange must
be compared to those of vertical integration as well as to feasible intermediate
contracting solutions. Consequently, no governance structure should be ruled
out beforehand based on its anti-competitive properties.
This completes the theoretical critique on current gas regulation. However,
the effect of regulation on market behavior, and by extension on the securing
of the PSOs, is an empirical issue. The TCE perspective is superior to the neo-
classical perspective only if it is shown to better explain and predict actual
regulatory behavior. In this light it is important to observe that several amend-
ments have been made to European gas regulation that appear to follow the
TCE line of reasoning. Two notable examples are the possibility to exempt
certain investments from the obligation to provide third party access, and the
enlarged scope for concluding downstream long-term gas supply contracts.
8.3 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS
This study conducts case studies on both amendments. The goal is to assess
whether the theoretical critique is also valid in actual practice. This is done
by describing the regulatory process in order to trace the arguments that were
voiced by the different stakeholders, the specific changes to regulation that
have been implemented and the reasons why these changes were made. This
indicates whether current regulation has already implemented provisions that
deviate from the neoclassical perspective in actual practice, and if so, whether
the neoclassical perspective is able to explain these amendments.
If the amendments can be explained by the neoclassical perspective, then
current regulation is appropriate in the new context, and possible adaptations
would be marginal (i.e., building on the neoclassical guiding principles). If
not, however, regulation’s guiding principles should be changed, which implies
more fundamental adaptations. The issue then becomes whether the TCE
perspective provides a better explanation. If so, this study’s theoretical critique
would be corroborated. The final step would then be to infer whether the
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current amendments sufficiently incorporate the TCE perspective into European
gas regulation.
8.3.1 TPA exemptions – The Balgzand-Bacton pipeline
Chapter six analyzes the first amendment: the enlarged scope for TPA exemp-
tions in the second Gas Directive. The TPA exemptions regime allows certain
investments that are considered important to the European gas market to be
exempted from the obligations to provide access to third parties. A case study
is undertaken of the interconnector between Balgzand in the Netherlands and
Bacton in the UK (the BBL pipeline), which is the first pipeline investment
project that has received an exemption. From the analysis of the regulatory
process in this case, the following four conclusions are drawn.
First, the fact that BBL received an exemption cannot be explained by the
neoclassical perspective. This is due to the fact that in the neoclassical world
the tension between liberalization and investments, which is the foundation
for the exemptions regime, is non-existent. The TCE perspective, on the other
hand, provides a proper explanation by considering BBL’s exemption as a
safeguard that mitigates ex-post hazards regarding the BBL investment project.
Accordingly, by granting exemptions, European gas regulation has moved
away from its neoclassical guiding principles towards the TCE perspective.
Second, the assessment of BBL’s exemption application incorporates the
TCE criteria of asset specificity and the presence of incomplete contracts, but
ignores regulatory opportunism. A similar picture arises with respect to the
general risk criteria of the exemptions regime. Even though BBL Company
explicitly refers to regulatory opportunism in its formal application, neither
the national regulators – the British Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(OFGEM) and theDutchOffice of Energy Regulation (DTe) – nor the Commission
have incorporated it into their assessments. The encompassing framework in
chapter five points out that when opportunism is omitted, all promises are
kept and consequently that the neoclassical perspective suffices because simple
ex-ante contracts remove all ex-post hazards. This illustrates that European
gas regulation is moving towards the TCE perspective but nevertheless retains
its neoclassical perspective. The conclusion is therefore that European gas
regulation is currently stuck between the neoclassical and TCE perspectives.
This is undesirable, because chapter five illustrates that the structural and
transactional characteristics of the European gas market call for a full incor-
poration of the TCE perspective.
Third, the omission of regulatory opportunism implies that its costs in
terms of ex-post hazards are also not explicitly considered in an investment’s
risk assessment. The consequence is that the profits allowed to an investor
during an exemption will be too low, whichmay impede investments. Allow-
ing higher profits to reflect the higher hurdle rates may be a solution, but is
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not likely due to the applicability of competition policy. This problem could
be solved by granting US-style exemptions, whereby competition lawdoes not
apply if competitive harm has been mitigated by sector-specific regulation.
However, the place of competition policy in primary EC lawmakes this option
unlikely. Another solution may be to grant exemptions that exceed the mini-
mum length (i.e., which are longer than required for the remuneration of
economic costs). The willingness to grant longer exemptions was visible in
DTe’s and OFGEM’s BBL exemption decisions (subsequently undone by the
Commission), but none of them based their decision on the presence of regu-
latory opportunism.
The fourth and final conclusion addresses a general problem regarding
TPA exemptions which does not directly arise from the BBL case. The problem
is that it appears to be very hard in practice to deny an exemption for a given
project, despite the clear intention to only grant them exceptionally. According
to this study, one reason for this observation is that the impact of RTPA on
investment profitability is overestimated.
The traditional argument is that RTPA truncates profits because a regulator
cannot credibly promise ex-ante to leave access regulation unaltered ex-post.
This renders a TPA exemption very useful because it increases profitability
by removing the ex-post hazard of regulation for a specified period of time.
This study argues that this argument has limited applicability in practice. Any
project can show that RTPA diminishes its profitability compared to a situation
without RTPA, which makes it impossible to deny an exemption. In fact, the
issue regarding investments is not so much whether project profitability will
diminish due to access regulation, but rather whether it will diminish to the
extent that the project becomes unprofitable. After all, as long as a project’s
profitability remains positive under RTPA, the investment will commence and
there is no need for an exemption. Due to this overestimation of the negative
effect of RTPA on project profitability, exemptions are grantedmore often than
necessary.
In conjunction, the third and fourth conclusions argue that a TPA exemp-
tions regime which is based on TCE guiding principles should grant fewer
exemptions than currently, but display more leniency once an exemption has
been granted.
8.3.2 Long-term contracts – The Distrigas antitrust case
The second amendment to the neoclassical perspective is the acceptance of
long-term downstream gas supply contracts in Europe (consequently excluding
long-term import contracts). The case study in chapter seven examines the
Commission’s antitrust case against Distrigas, because the Commission has
explicitly stated that the outcome of this case is exemplary of its treatment
of other companies that have concluded or want to conclude long-term supply
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contracts with consumers. The Distrigas case therefore provides the Commis-
sion’s current view towards long-termdownstream supply contracts on Euro-
pean gas markets.
Chapter seven examineswhether this view can be considered an adaptation
to the neoclassical guiding principles of gas regulation and whether the neo-
classical perspective is able to explain the implemented changes. If not, the
question is whether the TCE perspective can provide a proper explanation. If
it does, the final step is to assess whether the amendments are appropriate
in light of the TCE perspective.
The antitrust case was occasioned by Commission concerns regarding
Distrigas’ contracts on the Belgian gas market, notably their duration and the
gas volumes tied to Distrigas. The antitrust case resulted in Distrigas proposing
to limit the duration of new contracts with gas resellers to two years at most.
New contracts with other large consumers (industrial consumers and power
generators) will last up to five years, excluding new gas-fired power plants.
In addition, Distrigas promised to return to the market an average of 70
percent of the gas it contracts each year.
The effect is therefore that the Commission has forced Distrigas to shorten
its contracts and tie lower volumes. While some may argue that this reflects
a general hostility of the Commission towards long-term downstream gas
supply contracts, the Commission actually adopts a rather nuanced stance
towards these contracts. It notes that their likely positive and negative effects
must be assessed in the overall context in which they occur. Based on the
Distrigas case, the Commission comes upwith five criteria for assessing long-
term contracts: 1) themarket position of the supplier, 2) the share of consumer
demand tied under the contracts, 3) the duration of the contracts, 4) the overall
share of the market covered by the contracts and 5) efficiencies. The fifth
criterion especially implies a TCE perspective. This leads to two main con-
clusions regarding the Commission’s stance towards long-term downstream
gas supply contracts.
The first is similar to the first conclusion in the exemptions case, namely
that the neoclassical perspective cannot explain allowing for long-term down-
stream supply contracts. The reason is that since the neoclassical perspective
fails to ascribe an efficiency rationale to long-term contracts, the foreclosure
effects inherent in any long-term supply contract render a neoclassical assess-
ment of long-term contracts always negative. Therefore, the neoclassical
perspective prescribes a complete ban on all long-term contracts. In the TCE
perspective, on the other hand, long-term contracts have an efficiency rationale
because they mitigate ex-post contractual hazards. Therefore, as in the exemp-
tions case study, the TCE perspective provides a better explanation of actual
regulatory behavior than the neoclassical perspective, which confirms the
theoretical critique on the neoclassical guiding principles of current gas regula-
tion. The acceptance of long-term supply contracts, and the recognition of their
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efficiencies, therefore signals a step back in European gas regulation from its
neoclassical guiding principles towards the TCE perspective.
Second, the Commission’s view is once again stuck between the neoclassical
and TCE perspectives. The incorporation of efficiencies in its assessment is
positive, but it does not consider regulatory opportunism. The foreclosure
effects of long-term supply contracts are not disputed. Rather, it is argued that
the Commission’s assessment fails to incorporate the costs of regulatory
opportunism, which is consistent with the neoclassical view towards regulatory
intervention. The guidance provided so far is insufficient due to the omission
of regulatory opportunism. By understating the costs of its own interventions,
the Commission is likely to amend downstream long-term gas supply contracts
more often than would be the case if all costs are taken into account. By
extension, this more extensive intervention implies that ex-post hazards may
be higher, and regulatory credibility lower, than necessary, as a consequence
of which impediments to investments are higher than necessary.
Finally, the answer to this study’s main research question – Is existing gas
regulation able to secure the PSOs given the new context it must operate in? – is no.
This is not to say that this study opposes liberalization per se. It provides
insights into how to adapt the current approach towards liberalization in order
to reach the energy policy objectives as completely as possible. It opposes the
neoclassical guiding principles underlying the current liberalization regime,
most notably its perfect competition postulate which is visible in the internal
gas market vision. This study argues that the new context for gas regulation
requires a change in its guiding principles with consequent fundamental
adaptations, rather than a continuation of the neoclassical emphasis which
implies adaptations at the margin.
8.4 LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS – HOW TO CREATE SUSTAINABLE COMPETITION
ON EUROPEAN GAS MARKETS
This study’s analysis inherently invites speculation about lessons that can be
learned. It is therefore worthwhile to explore some broader implications of
this study’s conclusions. Although general policy recommendations cannot
be drawn because, as will be argued below, any regulatory policy is context-
specific, the conclusions do allow us to derive some lessons policymakers could
draw from the analysis when pondering the future of European gas regulation
– especially how to create sustainable competition, i.e., competition without
impeding investments, on European gas markets. We provide five lessons for
policymakers.
1) This study shows that regulation is not a one-size-fits-all exercise – even
when considering one particular market. Chapter two indicates that different
market environments require different regulatory regimes. Consequently,
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structural and regulatory reformmeasures that work adequately in a particular
countrymay not work to the same extent (or at all) in another country, because
the preconditions for reform, such as the institutional setting, the market
environment or the development stage of the market, may differ between
countries. For example, the preconditions at the time of the US and UK gas
liberalizations differ greatly from those in the rest of Europe. While both the
US and UKwere largely self-sufficient at the time liberalizationwas instigated,
the European continent currently increasingly depends on an oligopoly of
external suppliers for its gas supplies. The same argument also applies to the
experiences of different Member States. A successful reform in a particular
Member State, or region, may not work similarly in another Member State
or region with different preconditions. Consequently, policymakers, at the
European as well as the Member State level, must recognize these differences
and consequently must be careful when prescribing structural and regulatory
reform measures based on experiences of forerunners.
2) Another conclusion of this study is that a broader perspective towards gas
regulation is required than the neoclassical perspective in order to take proper
account of the changing market fundamentals. One implication of adhering
to the broader TCE perspective is that uncompromisingly pursuing competition
– through for example ownership unbundled networks and liquid, hub-based
spot trading –may impede long-termmarket performance by not sending the
appropriate investment signals to potential investors. Following the case
studies, in order to properly facilitate investments, short-term, competitive
gas markets need to be complemented with alternative coordinationmechan-
isms such as TPA exemptions and long-term supply contracts.
Both case studies indicate that this second lesson appears to be recognized
in current regulation. Nevertheless, this study argues that the adaptations
implemented so far are still too firmly embedded in the neoclassical perspect-
ive. In order to properly implement the alternative coordination measures,
policymakers must take account of the following two lessons.
3) The third lesson emanates from the observation that it is inappropriate
to base a regulatory scheme on the market failure paradigm only. Regulatory
intervention should try to set the preconditions for the competitive process
as good as possible instead of trying to correct a failed market in order to
create the perfect competition outcome. Consequently, a regulatory regime
should aim to remove the institutional impediments to competition through
for example measures that increase market and price transparency, improve
coordination between regulatory regimes along the value chain or lower the
possibility for regulatory capture.
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4) Removing the institutional impediments to competition entails transaction
costs. When thinking about facilitating investments while liberalizing European
gas markets in order to create a sustainable regulatory regime, therefore,
policymakers should not anymore think in terms of more or less competition
but rather should base their views on an assessment of the transaction costs
of government failure versus the transaction costs of the market failure they
try to correct. The transaction costs of both failures are determined by criteria
such as asymmetric information, uncertainty, interest group behavior and the
institutional setting. These are the real criteria on which regulatory decisions
should be based, and not, as is currently the case, the prospects for the devel-
opment of full competition. Such an assessment may result in less intervention,
or even non-intervention, being less expensive in terms of transaction costs
than removing the market failure as much as possible. This would create a
situation of less than perfect competition.
5) Finally, this study argues that regulatory opportunism is not adequately
recognized in current regulation. One consequence of not recognizing the costs
of regulatory opportunism is that a regulator underestimates the costs of its
interventions. Consequently, a regulator is likely to intervenemore often than
would be the case if all costs are taken into account. Consequently, policy-
makers should display more restraint in prescribing interventionist measures
in European gas markets than they do currently.
All in all, the most important advantage of the TCE perspective over the neo-
classical perspective is that by analyzing how institutions govern economic
behavior, it proposes a less rigid way of thinking about regulation. This results
in a regulatory framework that better deals with the fundamental problem
on European gas markets, the trade-off between competition and coordination,
which in turn enhances the prospect of a sustainable regulatory regime for
the European gas market.

Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
HERVORMINGEN IN DE STRUCTUUR EN REGULERING VANDE EUROPESE GASMARKT
– STELT DE HUIDIGE BENADERING DE PUBLIEKE BELANGEN VEILIG?
Aanleiding
Deze studie is geïnspireerd door het feit dat de liberalisering van de Europese
gasmarkt moeilijker lijkt te verlopen dan voorzien was. Een tweede aanleiding
is dat er op dit moment een aantal verschuivingen optreedt op de internatio-
nale gasmarkt, welke gezamenlijk de Europese gasmarkt fundamenteel ver-
anderen. Deze zijn: de ontwikke-ling van een verkopersmarkt, een verschuiving
in de beleidsdoelen, een groeiende behoefte aan nieuwe investeringen en een
toenemende politisering van de energie-relaties.
Door deze verschuivingen ontstaat er een nieuwe context voor de gasregu-
lering, waarin een beheersstructuur moet worden gecreëerd die ervoor zorgt
dat er voldoende geïnvesteerd wordt in een verkopersmarkt waarop de politiek
een grotere rol speelt en waar voorzieningszekerheid enmilieu de speerpunten
van het energiebeleid zijn.
Om de Europese gasmarkt te liberaliseren, dient zowel de structuur als
de regulering te worden hervormd. De huidige hervormingsmaatregelen
worden verondersteld te leiden tot een zekere, competitieve en schone gas-
markt. Dit onderzoek laat zien dat het erom gaat de voorwaarden te creëren
(zoals het juiste reguleringssysteem) waarbinnen liberalisering bijdraagt aan
het veiligstellen van de genoemde publieke belangen.
Probleemstelling en onderzoeksvragen
De centrale vraag in deze studie is of de huidige gasregulering in staat is de
publieke belangen veilig te stellen in de nieuwe reguleringscontext. Het stimu-
leren van voldoende investeringen is hierbij essentieel. Hierdoor leidt deze
studie een aantal criteria af waaraan een reguleringssysteem moet voldoen
dat tot voldoende investeringen leidt in deze nieuwe context. Deze zijn on-
omkeerbare investeringen, risico’s en onzekerheden.
Ter beantwoording van de onderzoeksvraag wordt tevens een tweetal
economische perspectieven onderscheiden: het neoklassieke en het transactie-
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kostenperspectief. Het neoklassieke perspectief wordt gebruikt omdat de
huidige gasregulering gestoeld is op neoklassieke beginselen. Erwordt getoetst
of dit perspectief voldoet aan de bovenstaande criteria, hetgeen niet het geval
blijkt te zijn. Het transactiekosten-perspectief wordt als alternatief geïntrodu-
ceerd, omdat deze wel voldoet aan alle bovenstaande criteria. De analyse wordt
uitgevoerd in een aantal stappen, welke zijn onderverdeeld in de volgende
zes subvragen.
1 Wat is de theoretische onderbouwing van de huidige gasregulering enwelk
doel tracht deze te bereiken?
2 Welke twijfels ontstaan er ten aanzien van het huidige reguleringssysteem
gegeven de criteria in de nieuwe reguleringscontext?
3 Hoe ziet het transactiekostenperspectief eruit, en is dit perspectief superieur
aan het neoklassieke perspectief in het licht van de nieuwe context?
4 Welke criteria ter beoordeling van de huidige regulering volgen uit dit
transactie-kostenperspectief?
5 Waar schiet de huidige regulering tekort in haar nieuwe context?
6 Welke aanpassingen aan de provisies uit de tweede Gasrichtlijn zijn vereist?
De studie is opgebouwd aan de hand van deze subvragen. Bij de onderstaande
bespreking van de resterende hoofdstukken wordt aangegeven hoe deze
subvragen beantwoordworden. Deze studie bevat een theoretisch deel en een
empirisch deel waarin de theoretische kritiek aan de hand van twee case
studies onderbouwd wordt.
Er dient te worden opgemerkt dat het hier een economische studie betreft.
De huidige gasreguleringwordt beoordeeld op haar economischemerites. De
studie bespreekt een aantal juridische provisies, welke voornamelijk gebruikt
worden om inzicht te verschaffen in de economische problemen.
Theoretische analyse
Neoklassiek perspectief
Het neoklassieke perspectief wordt gebruikt, omdat het de leidraad voor de
huidige gasregulering vormt. Hoofdstuk drie behandelt dit perspectief. Het
bespreekt de belangrijkste aannames, de implicaties voor regulering en de
voorgeschreven structuur van de geliberaliseerde Europese gasmarkt. In de
neoklassieke wereld wordt uiteindelijk het evenwicht bereikt waarin de compe-
titie perfect is. Als perfecte competitie zich heeft ontwikkeld, zorgt de markt
op eigen kracht voor de maximale welvaart, en is er geen regulering meer
nodig. Alleen wanneer het evenwicht afwijkt van perfecte competitie, is er
reden voor het instellen van regulering teneinde de perfecte competitie te
herstellen. Met andere woorden, regulering is louter vereist ingeval van
marktfalen. Deze studie stelt vast dat er op de Europese gasmarkt verscheidene
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vormen van marktfalen optreden welke een aanzienlijke regulering op de
Europese gasmarkt zouden rechtvaardigen.
Het neoklassieke perspectief verschaft heldere richtlijnen betreffende de
structuur van de geliberaliseerde gasmarkt. Vanuit neoklassiek oogpunt wordt
aangenomen dat bedrijven integreren, omdat ze reageren op marktmacht of
omdat ze marktmacht willen creëren. Als gevolg hiervan moet elke vorm van
integratie vermeden worden als men een competitieve markt tot stand wil
brengen. In het geval dat al integratie aanwezig is, moeten de competitieve
en non-competitieve activiteiten zoveelmogelijk van elkaar gescheidenworden
door middel van eigendomssplitsing. Als het netwerk volledig gesplitst is van
de handelsactiviteiten, kan toegang verleendworden op basis van onderhande-
lingen tussen de netwerkeigenaar en de toetreder, aangezien dit in minder
regulering en meer flexibiliteit resulteert dan gereguleerde toegang.
Europese gasregulering
Het vierde hoofdstuk behandelt de totstandkoming en inhoud van de huidige
Europese gaswetgeving. Belanghebbenden spelen een belangrijke rol in het
proces, omdat zij zowel de totstandkoming van dewetgeving op het Europese
niveau alsook de transpositie in nationale wetgeving beïnvloeden. Belang-
hebbenden kunnen een reguleerder zondanig beïnvloeden dat deze regulering
zal implementeren in het belang van de belanghebbenden, maar niet noodzake-
lijkerwijs in het maatschappelijk belang. Andere oorzaken voor reguleringsfalen
zijn gebrekkige informatie en opportunistisch gedrag. Regulering zal hierdoor
altijd deels falen, hetgeen grond is om te argumenteren dat (verdere) intro-
ductie van competitie de welvaart verhoogt door de noodzaak voor inefficiënte
regulering te verminderen. Het huidige reguleringsraamwerk blijkt stevig
verankerd te zijn in het neoklassieke perspectief. Het streven naar een interne
Europese gasmarkt kan bijvoorbeeld gezien worden als een toepassing van
het neoklassieke perspectief op de gasmarkt.
Een implicatie van de gekozen neoklassieke uitgangspunten is dat in het
huidige reguleringssysteem het optreden vanmarktfalen een teken is van nog
niet voldoende ontwikkelde competitie. Dit verklaart waarom de Commissie
de huidige onbevre-digende staat van het liberaliseringsproces wil oplossen
door middel van een sterkere nadruk op het faciliteren van competitie in de
lidstaten. Een tweede implicatie volgt uit de aanname van perfecte competitie.
Door aan te nemen dat de markt zich uiteindelijk perfect ontwikkelt, wordt
tegelijkertijd ook aangenomen dat alle tussenliggende problemen uiteindelijk
zullen zijn opgelost. Deze aanname heeft dus tot gevolg dat de huidige tegen-
vallende voortgang van de liberalisering per definitie niet kan zijn veroorzaakt
door een fundamenteel probleem.Dit komt doordat fundamentele problemen,
zoals een discrepantie tussen het Europese streven naar perfecte competitie
en de karakteristieken van de Europese gasmarkt, niet altijd zullen worden
opgelost en dus het uiteindelijke evenwicht kunnen beïnvloeden. Hiermee
wordt een hoofd-boodschap uit de institutionele economie, namelijk dat de
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institutionele vormgeving van de Europese gasmarkt zich misschien niet leent
voor perfecte competitie, over het hoofd gezien.
De bovenstaande visie is tevens niet in overeenstemming met de nieuwe
context voor gasregulering, welke ver verwijderd is van een interne gasmarkt.
De in hoofdstuk twee geïdentificeerde criteria die van belang zijn in deze
context, worden niet meegenomen in het neoklassieke perspectief, waardoor
deze buiten de reikwijdte van de huidige regulering dreigen te vallen. De
transactiekostenbenadering houdt specifiek rekening met deze criteria. Hier-
door vormt deze het alternatieve economische perspectief.
Het transactiekostenperspectief
Hoofdstuk vijf bespreekt het perspectief dat voortvloeit uit de transactiekosten-
economie (TCE). Dit TCE-perspectief stelt de transactie centraal en bepaalt de
optimale beheersstructuur gegeven de geldende eigendomsrechten, wetgeving
en regulering. TCE stelt een comparatieve institutionele analyse voor, waarin
uit verschillende haalbare beheersvormen die met de laagste transactiekosten
gekozen wordt. De transactiekosten bestaan uit de directe kosten van een
transactie, en uit de kosten die voortvloeien uit de ex-post risico’s die kunnen
ontstaan nadat een transactie is overeengekomen.
Deze ex-post risico’s ontstaan als een markt gekarakteriseerd wordt door
de drie TCE-criteria: incomplete contracten, opportunistisch gedrag en specifieke
investeringen. Ex-post risico’s kunnen tot gevolg hebben dat investeringen
alleenworden ondernomen tegen relatief hoge rendementen of zelfs helemaal
niet worden ondernomen. Ter voorkoming hiervan dienen kostbare (in termen
van transactiekosten) waarborgen gecreëerd te worden. Uiteindelijk dient er
een beheersstructuur gevonden te worden, waarin deze waarborgen tegen
de laagst mogelijke transactiekosten ingevoerd worden.
De karakteristieken van de transacties op een markt bepalen of er ex-post
risico’s zullen optreden en daarmee of het TCE-perspectief de juiste is. Deze
studie ontwikkelt een theoretisch raamwerk waarin kan worden bepaald
wanneer het neoklassieke dan wel het TCE-perspectief toepasbaar is. Dit raam-
werk geeft aan dat als een van de bovenstaande criteria afwezig is, de proble-
men kunnenworden opgelost door marktwerking of door het vooraf afsluiten
van contracten. In beide gevallen is het neoklassieke perspectief afdoende.
Om de toepasbaarheid van het TCE-perspectief op de Europese gasmarkt te
beoordelen, moet dus bepaald worden in hoeverre alle drie de criteria gelijktij-
dig aanwezig zijn in de nieuwe reguleringscontext.
De aanwezigheid van specifieke investeringen en incomplete contracten
volgt rechtstreeks uit de karakteristieken van de nieuwe reguleringscontext.
De toepasbaar-heid van het TCE-perspectief op de Europese gasmarkt wordt
hierdoor bepaald door de aanwezigheid van (reguleerders)opportunisme.
Deze studie onderzoekt of reguleerdersopportunisme een gevaar is op de
Europese gasmarkt, door te kijken naar de mogelijkheden en prikkels voor
een reguleerder om zich te committeren aan een ingesteld reguleringssysteem.
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Er zijn zes criteria afgeleid uit de reguleringsliteratuur die het niveau van
committering bepalen: de groei in de gasvraag, technologische vooruitgang,
de eigendomsstructuur van gereguleerde bedrijven, de afschrijvingen op
kapitaal, de nadruk van een reguleerder op het consumenten- of het producen-
tenbelang en de discontovoet. Het totaalbeeld is dat de karakteristieken van
de transacties op de Europese gasmarkt leiden tot een laag niveau van com-
mittering, als gevolg waarvan deze markt kwetsbaar is voor reguleerders-
opportunisme.
Doordat alle drie TCE-criteria gelijktijdig voorkomen op de Europese
gasmarkt in haar nieuwe context, is de conclusie dat het TCE-perspectief zal
leiden tot betere uitkomsten in termen vanmarktgedrag in de nieuwe context.
Dit heeft gevolgen voor de regulering. Er is vanuit het TCE-perspectief bijvoor-
beeld een verminderde noodzaak voor regulering, omdat het TCE-perspectief
meer kosten van ingrijpen meeweegt dan het neoklassieke perspectief (met
name de kosten van opportunistisch gedrag).
Hervormingen van de Europese gasmarkt moeten rekening houden met
tenminste de volgende twee overwegingen. Ten eerste, verticale integratie heeft
ook efficiëntie-voordelen, omdat het de ex-post risico’s van een transactie kan
verlagen. TCE stelt tevens dat een volledig competitief evenwicht op de Euro-
pese gasmarkt, zoals voorgestaan in het neoklassieke perspectief, tot ex-post
risico’s zal leiden met de bijbehorende transactiekosten. Hierdoor moeten de
nettovoordelen in termen van transactiekosten van het organiseren van trans-
acties opmarkten vergelekenwordenmet die van andere haalbare opties, zoals
bijvoorbeeld verticale integratie of langetermijncontracten. Geen enkele optie
zou op voorhand, alleen op basis van negatieve effecten op competitie, moeten
worden uitgesloten (zoals het geval lijkt te zijn in de huidige splitsingsdiscus-
sie).
Case study analyse
Het eerste deel van deze studie levert een theoretische kritiek op de huidige
gasregulering. Het effect van regulering op marktgedrag en -uitkomsten, en
daardoor op het behalen van de beleidsdoelen, is echter een empirische vraag.
Het TCE-perspectief is superieur aan het neoklassieke perspectief wanneer het
een betere verklaring en voorspelling geeft voor regulering in de praktijk. In
dit licht is het belangrijk te beseffen dat de huidige gasregulering niet in beton
gegoten is. Verschillende aanpassingen die een beweging richting het TCE-
perspectief impliceren, hebben reeds plaatsgevonden. Twee in het oog sprin-
gende voorbeelden zijn de toegenomen ruimte voor het uitzonderen van
bepaalde investeringen tot het verlenen van toegang aan derden (third party
access ofwel TPA exempties), en het toestaan van langetermijncontracten voor
downstream gaslevering. Het tweede, empirische deel van deze studie analyseert
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beide aanpassingen in twee case studies, met als doel om na te gaan of de
theoretische kritiek ook geldig is met betrekking tot regulering in de praktijk.
TPA exempties – De Balgzand-Bacton pijpleiding
Hoofdstuk zes bevat een case study van de eerste aanpassing aan het neoklas-
sieke kader. De case study behandelt het eerste pijpleidingproject dat een
exemptie heeft ontvangen, namelijk de interconnector tussen Balgzand in
Nederland en Bacton in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, ofwel BBL. De analyse van
het reguleringproces in deze case leidt tot vier conclusies.
Ten eerste, het neoklassieke perspectief kan niet verklaren waarom BBL
een exemptie heeft ontvangen, omdat in de neoklassieke wereld de spanning
tussen liberalisering en investeringen, welke de reden vormt voor het toestaan
van exempties, niet aanwezig is. Het TCE-perspectief biedtwel een bevredigen-
de verklaring, namelijk dat BBL’s exemptie gezien moet worden als een waar-
borg tegen de ex-post risico’s die optreden in het BBL investeringsproject. De
conclusie is dat het toekennen van exempties een beweging impliceert van
het neoklassieke perspectief naar het TCE-perspectief.
Een tweede conclusie is dat reguleerdersopportunisme niet wordtmeegeno-
men in de behandeling van de BBL-exemptie. Dit beeld komt ook naar voren
uit de generieke criteria voor het beoordelen van investeringsrisico’s in het
huidige exemptieregime. Dit geeft aan dat de huidige gasregulering een
beweging heeft gemaakt in de richting van het TCE-perspectief, maar dat
desondanks de neoklassieke uitgangspunten behouden blijven. De conclusie
is dat de Europese gasregulering zich op dit moment bevindt tussen beide
economische perspectieven. Dit is onwenselijk gegeven de conclusie uit hoofd-
stuk vijf dat de karakteristieken van de transacties op de Europese gasmarkt
pleiten voor een invoering van het TCE-perspectief.
Een derde en verwante conclusie is dat door het negeren van reguleerders-
opportunisme, de kosten van ex-post problemen onvoldoendewordenmeege-
nomen in de beoordeling van het risicoprofiel van een investering. Het gevolg
is dat de toegestane winsten tijdens een exemptie te laag zullen zijn, hetgeen
een investering belemmert. Een oplossing is om langere exempties toe te
kennen dan vereist voor het terugverdienen van economische kosten. Dit
hebben de Britse en Nederlandse reguleerders ook gedaan (waarna ze werden
teruggefloten door de Commissie). Hun beslissingen waren echter niet geba-
seerd op de aanwezigheid van reguleerdersopportunisme.
De vierde en laatste conclusie is van algemene aard. Exempties blijken in
de praktijk zeermoeilijk te weigeren, ondanks het expliciete doel om ze alleen
in exceptionele gevallen toe te kennen. Volgens deze studie is een reden
hiervoor dat het negatieve effect van het verlenen van gereguleerde derdentoe-
gang (RTPA) op de winstgevendheid van een investering overschat wordt.
Momenteel kan een project een exemptie krijgen door aan te tonen dat RTPA
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dewinstgevendheid verlaagt ten opzichte van een situatie zonder RTPA. Aange-
zien dit altijd het geval is, wordt het zeer moeilijk om een exemptie te weige-
ren. Een beter criterium voor het toekennen van een exemptie zou zijn om
na te gaan of RTPA de winstgevendheid zodanig verlaagt dat deze negatief
wordt, waardoor de investering niet ondernomen zal worden. Zolang dit niet
gebeurt, worden er in de huidige praktijkmeer exempties toegekend dan strikt
noodzakelijk.
Gezamenlijk schrijven de derde en vierde conclusie voor dat een regime
voor het toekennen van TPA exempties gebaseerd op TCE uitgangspunten,
minder exempties zou moeten toekennen dan het huidige regime, maar ook
minder strikt zou moeten zijn als een exemptie wordt toegekend.
Langetermijncontracten – De antitrust zaak tegen Distrigas
De tweede aanpassing aan het neoklassieke kader die behandeld wordt in deze
studie is het toestaan van langetermijncontracten voor downstream gaslevering
aan industriële verbruikers en elektriciteitsopwekkers. Hoofdstuk zeven bevat
een case study van de antitrust zaak die is aangespannen door de Commissie
tegen de Belgische gasleverancier Distrigas, omdat deze zaak expliciet door
de Commissiewordt aangehaald als exemplarisch voor de toekomstige behan-
deling van soortgelijke langetermijncontracten.
De bezwaren van de Commissie tegen Distrigas betroffen voornamelijk
de contractduur en het feit dat de contracten grote delen van de gasvraag aan
Distrigas bonden. Als gevolg hiervan voerde Distrigas een aantal aanpassingen
door, met een verkorting van de contractduur enminder gebonden gasvolumes
tot gevolg. Deze aanpassingen kunnen worden uitgelegd als tekenen van een
algemene afkerigheid van de Commissie jegens langetermijncontracten voor
gaslevering. De Commissie lijkt echter een vrij genuanceerd standpunt te
hebben ingenomen. Op basis van de Distrigas zaak specificeert de Commissie
namelijk vijf criteria ter beoordeling van deze contracten: demarktpositie van
de desbetreffende aanbieder, het aandeel van de vraag dat gebonden wordt
door de contracten, de contractduur, het aandeel van de totale markt dat
gebonden wordt door de contracten en de efficiëntie-effecten van de contracten.
Dit laatste criterium impliceert een TCE-perspectief. Deze visie van de Commis-
sie ten aanzien van langetermijncontracten voor downstream gaslevering leidt
tot twee conclusies.
De eerste conclusie is dat de geïmplementeerde aanpassingen wederom
niet verklaard kunnen worden door het neoklassieke perspectief. De reden
is dat het neoklassieke perspectief geen efficiëntievoordelen toelaat voor
langetermijncontracten. Hierdoor schrijft het neoklassieke perspectief een
complete verwijdering voor van alle langetermijncontracten. Volgens het TCE-
perspectief hebben langetermijncontracten een efficiëntievoordeel als ze de
ex-post risico’s van een transactie verkleinen. Als gevolg hiervan verschaft
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het TCE-perspectief wederom een betere verklaring voor de regulering in de
praktijk dan het neoklassieke perspectief. Ook de Distrigas case study bevestigt
hierdoor de theoretische kritiek op de neoklassieke leidraad van de huidige
gasregulering.
De tweede conclusie is dat de Europese regulering ten aanzien van de
bovenstaande langetermijncontracten zich op dit moment bevindt tussen beide
economische perspectieven. Het erkennen van efficiënties is zonder meer
positief, maar neemtwederomhet bestaan van reguleerdersopportunisme niet
mee, waardoor de richt-snoeren van de Commissie onvoldoende zijn. Door
het onderschatten van de kosten van haar eigen interventies, zal de Commissie
te vaak interveniëren met betrekking tot het afsluiten langetermijncontracten
voor gaslevering in Europa (waardoor ook de ex-post risico’s die samenhangen
met dit ingrijpen hoger worden dan nodig).
Deze studie geeft een negatief antwoord op de centrale onderzoeksvraag:
Is de huidige gasregulering in staat om de publieke belangen te borgen gegeven
de nieuwe context waarin zij moet opereren?
Dit betekent echter niet dat deze studie de liberalisering van de Europese
gasmarkt in twijfel trekt. Het doel is om inzicht te verschaffen in hoe het
huidige liberaliseringsproces moet worden aangepast aan de nieuwe context
teneinde de beleidsdoelen op een zo goed mogelijke manier veilig te stellen.
De nieuwe context waarin gasreguleringmoet opereren, vereist een aanpassing
in de fundamentele onderbouwing van het bestaande reguleringsregime, in
plaats van een voortzetting van de neoklassieke uitgangspunten met eventuele
marginale aanpassingen.
Lessen voor beleidsmakers: houdbare competitie op Europese gasmarkten
De analyse in deze studie leidt onherroepelijk tot de vraag hoe het nu verder
moet. Deze sectie geeft vijf beleidsaanbevelingen voor beleidsmakers die zich
bezighoudenmet de vraag hoe houdbare competitie – dat wil zeggen, compe-
titie zonder negatieve effecten op investeringen – gecreëerd kan worden op
de Europese gasmarkt.
1) De regulering van een markt wordt mede bepaald door de omgeving
waarin de markt opereert. Een gevolg van deze constatering is dat als hervor-
mingen in de marktstructuur en regulering positief werken in een bepaalde
markt, dit niet automatisch geldt voor een andere markt, omdat de randvoor-
waarden, zoals de institutionele vormgeving, de marktomgeving of het ontwik-
kelingsstadium van demarkt, kunnen verschillen tussen landen. Bijvoorbeeld,
waar de Amerikaanse en Britse gasmarkten zelfvoorzienend waren toen ze
werden geliberaliseerd, daar zijn de continentale Europese gasmarkten afhanke-
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lijk van een oligopolie van niet-Europese gasproducenten. Dit argument doet
ook opgeld als er wordt gekeken naar lidstaten onderling. Als gevolg hiervan
moeten beleidsmakers, op zowel Europees als op lidstaat niveau, rekening
houden met deze verschillen en voorzichtig zijn wanneer men bepaalde
hervormingsmaatregelenwil voorschrijven die gebaseerd zijn op de ervaringen
van voorlopers.
2) De gasregulering zou gebouwdmoeten worden op het TCE-perspectief als
men adequaat wil inspelen op de veranderende marktomstandigheden. Een
manier om de aanbevelingen van het bredere TCE-perspectief te incorporeren
in de huidige gasregulering is om, zoals beide case studies laten zien, korte-
termijnmarkten te comple-menteren met alternatieve coördinatiemechanismen
zoals TPA exempties en langetermijncontracten.
De case studies geven aan dat deze laatste les ter harte is genomen in de
huidige regulering. De case studies geven echter ook aan dat de aanpassingen
die tot dusver zijn ingevoerd, nog te sterk bepaald zijn door het neoklassieke
perspectief. Teneinde de alternatieve coördinatiemechanismen op een goede
manier in te voeren, zouden beleidsmakers de volgende drie lessen ter harte
moeten nemen.
3) Een derde aanbeveling vloeit voort uit de conclusie dat het onverstandig
is om een reguleringssysteem te baseren op alleen het paradigma dat uitgaat
van marktfalen. Regulering zou zich tot doel moeten stellen om de randvoor-
waarden te creëren voor het ontwikkelen van competitie in plaats van de
onhaalbare perfecte competitie na te streven.Met anderewoorden, regulering
moet zich richten op het verwijderen van de institutionele belemmeringen voor
het ontwikkelen van competitie, bijvoorbeeld door zich te richten opmaatrege-
len die de transparantie vergroten, de coördinatie tussen verschillende regule-
ringsregimes bevorderen of die de kans op beïnvloeding van de reguleerder
verkleinen.
4) Het verwijderen van bovenstaande institutionele belemmeringen leidt tot
transactie-kosten. Beleidsmakers zouden hun zienswijze moeten baseren op
een beoordeling van de transactiekosten van het overheids- of reguleringsfalen
tegenover de kosten van het marktfalen dat zij trachten te corrigeren. Deze
transactiekosten worden bepaald door criteria als asymmetrische informatie,
onzekerheid, het gedrag van belangen-groeperingen en de institutionele
omgeving. Reguleringsbeslissingen zoudenmoetenworden gebaseerd op deze
criteria en niet, zoals nu het geval lijkt te zijn, op de vooruitzichten voor
competitie. Een afweging in termen van transactiekosten kan tot gevolg hebben
dat een situatie met minder interventie, of zelfs helemaal geen interventie,
de laagste transactiekostenmet zich meebrengt. Dit zou een situatie tot gevolg
hebben met minder dan volledige competitie.
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5) Beide case studies geven aan dat reguleerdersopportunisme niet adequaat
wordt meegenomen in de huidige gasregulering, met als gevolg dat een
reguleerder de kosten van zijn interventies onderschat. Hierdoor zal een
reguleerder vaker ingrijpen dan wenselijk zou zijn geweest indien hij alle
kosten had meegewogen. Beleidsmakers doen er dus goed aan om terughou-
dender te zijn dan nu in het voorschrijven van ingrijpende maatregelen.
Het grootste voordeel van het transactiekostenperspectief ten opzichte van
het neoklassieke perspectief is dat het een minder rigide manier van denken
over regulering voorschrijft door te analyseren hoe instituties het economisch
gedrag beïnvloeden en vormgeven. Dit resulteert in een reguleringsregime
dat beter omgaat met het fundamentele probleem op de Europese gasmarkt,
namelijk de afruil tussen competitie en coördinatie. Dit vergroot de kans op
houdbare competitie op de Europese gasmarkt.
Annex
The economics of natural monopoly
Chapter 2 indicates that the concept of natural monopoly is important with respect
to network industries becausemost network industries can at least partly be considered
a natural monopoly due to, e.g., the gas network or the electricity grid. Section 5.2.1
shows that a natural monopoly can result in market failure. Natural monopolies are
one of the main arguments for regulating a network industry. This Annex discusses
the basics of natural monopoly theory and illustrates why regulation is generally
deemed necessary.1 A natural monopoly arises because in some industries a single
firm supplying the entire market demand may entail lower costs than two or more
competing firms. This makes competition through entry undesirable and regulation
necessary. Figure A.1 illustrates the properties of a natural monopoly, where D stands
for market demand and AC for the average costs of a single firm.
Figure A.1: Natural monopoly
At the intersection of AC and D, at production level Q and price P, average costs are
at their minimum. Upon entry of new suppliers, each will produce less than Q which
raises average costs. Hence, one company producingQ and supplying the entiremarket
produces at the lowest possible average costs. Therefore, this monopoly is the lowest-
cost solution. The AC curve is drawn in such a way that average costs decrease all the
way up to Q. This illustrates the traditional emphasis in natural monopoly theory on
1 This section is based on Tirole (1998), Depoorter (1999) and Viscusi et al. (2000). See Joskow
(2007) for a recent overview.
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economies of scale (since economies of scale result in the AC curve sloping downward).2
Baumol (1977, p. 809) changed this emphasis by arguing that:
‘Perhaps themost unexpected finding of this paper is that scale economies are neither
necessary nor sufficient for monopoly to be the least costly form of productive organization.
Rather, the critical concept is (by definition) strict subadditivity of the cost function,
meaning that the cost of the sum of any m output vectors is less than the sum of
the costs of producing them separately.’
Costs are subadditive when one firm is able to produce at lower cost than two or more
are. Note that this is basically the same conclusion as regards scale economies above.
Figure A.2 illustrates the difference between the two concepts.
Figure A.2: Scale economies and subadditivity
We have added to figure A.1 a second AC curve, AC2, indicating average costs when
two firms are present. Note that still only one product is being produced. Production
will be at Q (as in figure A.1) if one firm operates. When two firms are present, pro-
duction doubles to 2Q. There are, as above, economies of scale up to Q and diseco-
nomies of scale afterwards. The two-firm case illustrates the difference with subaddi-
tivity. At a production level between Q and Q*, production by a single company is
still the lowest-cost option available since AC is lower than AC2.Nevertheless, AC slopes
upward, which indicates diseconomies of scale. Whereas economies of scale prevail
only up to Q, subadditivity prevails up to Q*. This illustrates the first part of Baumol’s
claim that economies of scale are not a necessary condition for natural monopoly and
that the right definition of a natural monopoly is rather subadditivity of the cost
function. The numerical example below shows that economies of scale do not even
have to be a sufficient condition for cost subadditivity (we apply Baumol’s first claim
above and define a natural monopoly as a situation in which costs are subadditive).
2 See Viner (1932) for a seminal paper.
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To this end, the analysis is extended to amulti-product setting. Consider the following
cost function:3
C (Q1, Q2) = Q1 + Q2 + (Q1Q2)
α (A.1)
Total cost after increasing each output by β percent becomes
C ((1+β)Q1, (1+β)Q2) = (1+β)Q1 + (1+β)Q2 + (1+β)(1-α)(Q1Q2)α (A.2)
Compare this to the situation where total cost is increased by β percent
(1+ β)C (Q1, Q2) = (1+β)Q1 + (1+β)Q2 + (1+β)(Q1Q2)α (A.3)
Where β>1. For α>0, A.2 is smaller than A.3, indicating economies of scale. Cost is
nowhere subadditive, however. Expression A.1 shows the costs of a single firm which
produces both outputs. Compare this to the costs of two firms who each produce one
of the outputs. Costs would then be Q1 for producing output 1 and Q2 for producing
output 2. Total cost would thus be Q1 +Q2. Hence, production by two specialized firms
is cheaper than production in a single firm, which means that costs are not subadditive.
This holds for any level of α.
This example illustrates Baumol’s second claim: economies of scale are not even
a sufficient condition for natural monopoly. Economies of scope (Panzar and Willig,
1981) explain this. Figure A.1 shows that economies of scale are represented by decreas-
ing average costs at rising production levels. Economies of scope arise when it is
cheaper to produce a number of products in one firm than within different firms. The
numerical example thus provides for diseconomies of scope, since producing in a single
company is more expensive. The distinction between the two concepts is important,
because in our example diseconomies of scope are the reason that costs are not sub-
additive despite the presence of scale economies. The reason is simply that diseconomies
of scope outweigh economies of scale.
In sum, in the single-product case, economies of scale are sufficient (but not
necessary), while in the multi-product case, economies of scale are neither sufficient
nor necessary. Furthermore, economies of scope are essential in defining a natural
monopoly, i.e., in identifying subadditivity of the cost function.
Two additional insights from the literature must be noted. First, even economies
of scale and scope combined are not necessarily sufficient for cost subadditivity (Panzar,
1989, p. 26).4 Second, with multilateral rivalry – i.e., rivalry from diverse firms, which
in the energy case amounts to energy utilities facing rivalry from non-energy com-
panies – even the concept of cost subadditivity is not sufficient anymore (Jamison, 1997).
This study considers both ‘normal’ and natural monopolies. Both are similar in
that they will generally result in risks of anti-competitive behavior and fears of ex-
cessively high prices. This is explained in figure A.3, where MC stands for marginal
cost; D for demand; and MR for marginal revenue.
3 Adapted from Viscusi et al. (2000, p. 342), who have derived this example from Sharkey
(1982).
4 See Proposition 10 of Panzar’s paper and the accompanying mathematical proof.
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Figure A.3: Monopoly and welfare
Any introductory micro-economics textbook shows the workings of a (natural) mono-
poly and its welfare-reducing properties (e.g., Eijgelshoven et al., 2004, chapter 6). With
a large number of suppliers, consumers and unfettered competition, market equilibrium
eventually ends up at the point where themarginal costs of production equal the market
price. This is the intersection of the D curve and the MC curve in figure A.3, where
output is Q1. Total welfare, defined as the sum of consumer and producer surplus,
is maximized. When, instead, a monopolist is present, things change radically. A
monopolist maximizes his own profits, regardless of the interests of other parties in
the economy. A monopolist’s profit is maximized at the point where his marginal
revenue equals his marginal costs, which occurs when an extra unit’s benefits equals
that unit’s costs. Hence, we move to the point where the MR and MC curves intersect
and where output has diminishes to Q2. Output is much lower and price much higher
thanwith unfettered competition.Welfare has been decreased. Therefore, amonopolist’s
incentive results in a price and output level which are not welfare maximizing. If left
unregulated, he will also have the ability to impose this scheme.5
This brings us to regulating a natural monopoly. As the welfare optimum ultimately
entails prices equal to marginal costs, a simple solution to any pricing problem asso-
ciatedwith a (natural) monopolist is for the regulator to oblige themonopolist to charge
prices equal to its marginal costs. However, for a natural monopolist, this option is
problematic. Figure A.1 illustrates this point. The optimal production level is Q and
this should best be produced by a monopolist. Introducing marginal cost pricing to
5 This ability vanishes with perfect contestability. We argue below that contestability is of
limited practical relevance.
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prevent monopolistic price setting will result in losses to the monopolist. Declining
average costs imply that marginal costs are below average costs, because an extra unit
costs less (i.e., the marginal costs) than all the previous units on average (i.e., the
average costs), which lowers total average costs. Equating price to marginal costs will
therefore result in losses to the monopolist.
As indicated, the fear of excessive prices pertains to natural as well as ‘normal’
monopolies. It is interesting to see exactly what the difference between the two is. The
concept of subadditivity helps to explain the difference. For a natural monopoly, total
costs are minimal when output is produced by a single company, which implies that
welfare is increased compared to multiple firms producing the output. A normal
monopoly is different, however, in that it has a societal cost – there is no subadditivity.
Therefore, welfare is lower under a normal monopoly than in an alternative market
with more producers. This explains why in gas trading markets, normal monopolies
are heavily contested by regulators and/or antitrust authorities, whereas with respect
to a natural monopoly like gas pipelines, entry is usually forbidden and regulation
and/or government ownership is the preferred solution.
The distinction between subadditivity and scale economies leads us to another
observation related to the welfare implications of a natural monopoly. A firm operating
under decreasing average costs possesses a strong natural monopoly, as opposed to
a weak natural monopoly for which average costs are increasing even though the cost
function is subadditive. In figure A.2, this weak natural monopolist produces between
Q and Q* (Gegax and Nowotny, 1993, p. 67). A weak natural monopolist might face
entry without being able to prevent it, which makes its monopoly unsustainable (ibid.,
1993, p. 76).6 Its costs are, however, subadditive, which implies that for society as a
whole it is preferable to have one firm producing the relevant output. This renders
any entry inefficient. There are counterarguments too. The increasing costs associated
with entry into a weak natural monopoly can be offset by improved efficiency due
to the competitive forces associated with entry. For instance, competition might lead
to a larger emphasis on cost reduction. If this incentive outweighs the rising costs
associated with entry, overall costs might decline (Aalbers et al., 2002, p. 132). A second
argument is that if a regulator possesses incomplete information about cost or demand
characteristics, he might want to trade off returns to scale to the extraction of the
relevant information through competition among firms (Tirole, 1988, p. 20). With a
weak natural monopoly, nevertheless, one should be careful when considering entry
(MacAvoy et al., 1989, p. 247).
A strong natural monopoly, on the other hand, will not face problems of entry,
as its costs are lower than those of any possible entrant. Hence, the scope for entry
is very limited at best. The rationale for regulation in this case is to prevent the mono-
polist from abusing his market power.
Aweak natural monopoly calls for ownership regulation – privatization or national-
ization – when entry is prohibited. If entry is allowed, it is more prudent to implement
regulation which is focused on efficiency improvements and information disclosure
to overcome the higher costs due to entry, and possibly some protection of the mono-
6 This happens if a potential entrant is able to enter and generate some profits by focusing
on themost profitable activities. This ‘cream-skimming’ would leave only the less profitable
activities for the natural monopolist, whichmightmake the natural monopoly unsustainable.
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polist. Regulation of a strong natural monopoly, on the other hand, could take one
of the forms discussed in section 4.4 and requires stringent regulatory overview to
prevent monopolistic abuse.
An exception to the rule that a natural monopolywill inevitably require regulation
is the presence of a contestablemarket, as contestabilitymakes regulation superfluous.
Contestability has been introduced in seminal studies by Baumol, Panzar and Willig
(1982) and Baumol (1982) who extended Demsetz’s (1968) work on regulating utilities.
They show that in an industry without sunk costs, potential competition can be suffi-
cient to discipline a monopolist. When a monopolist charges a price above average
cost in a contestable market, a potential entrant enters the market at the same pro-
duction scale, charges a price slightly lower than the monopolist’s, and captures the
entire market for as long as it is profitable. When the market becomes unprofitable,
the entrant can just leave the market. This is often referred to as ‘hit-and-run’ entry.
In a contestable market, regulation is pure waste because the contestability induces
a monopolist to price its products at average costs. Criticism often focuses on the
assumptions underlying contestability theory. Contentious assumptions are 1) that prices
adjust more slowly than decisions about entry (the incumbent cannot adjust prices
immediately after being faced with an entry threat) and 2) that entry and exit are
costless (no costs are incurred when entering the market that are not also incurred by
the incumbent, and all costs can be recouped when exiting the market). First, Tirole
(1988, p. 310, 311) shows that prices do not necessarily adjust more slowly than entry
decisions. In fact, the opposite is quite plausible. This would result in a price which
is considerably higher than average costs (Schwartz and Reynolds, 1983, p. 488-489).
The assumption that entrants can leave the market at no cost appears to be unrealistic
in practice (ibid., p. 490). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the presence of sunk
costs might deter entry (Dixit, 1980, p. 106 and Braeutigam, 1989, p. 1305).7 This makes
contestability highly unlikely in gas markets.
Though completely contestable markets are hardly ever seen in practice (Spence,
1983 and Shepherd, 1984), the approach nevertheless has somemerit.Most importantly,
it has resulted in antitrust analyses taking more account of potential competition than
had been the case prior to contestability, when emphasis was being placed on concentra-
tion (Viscusi et al., 2000, p. 161). However, contestability theory does not change our
conclusions above, namely, that a natural monopoly, weak and strong, requires regula-
tion to allow the market to operate smoothly.
7 Sunk costs are also a barrier to exit, since exiting the market and recovering all costs is
by definition impossible. See Gilbert (1989, p. 491).
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Conversion factors
This study’s prime subject is natural gas – liquid and gaseous. While the main unit
of measurement is billion cubic meters (bcm), several other units are available, some
of which also appear in this study. We therefore provide a table with approximate
conversion factors below.
Approximate conversion factors – natural gas (NG) and LNG
To
(multiply by)
Bcm
NG
Bcf
NG
MTOE MT
LNG
Trillion
BTU
Million
BOE
From
1 billion cubic meters NG 1.0 35.3 0.90 0.73 36.0 6.29
1 billion cubic feet NG 0.028 1.0 0.026 0.021 1.03 0.18
1 million tonnes oil
equivalent
1.111 39.2 1.0 0.805 40.4 7.33
1 million tonnes LNG 1.38 48.7 1.23 1.0 52.0 8.68
1 trillion British thermal
units
0.028 0.98 0.025 0.02 1.0 0.17
1 million barrels oil
equivalent
0.16 5.61 0.14 0.12 5.8 1.0
Source: BP (2007)

Author index
A
Aalbers, R.F.T. 88, 235
Abel, A.B. 52
Adelman, M.A. 37
ADL (Arthur D. Little) 153, 159, 166,
167
Aghion, P. 55
Agrell, P. 84
Albers, M. 91
Alchian, A. 114, 127
Al-Moneef, M.A. 40
Altug, S. 52, 53
Aoki, M. 121
Arentsen, M.J. 134
Armstrong, M. 82, 88, 85
Arnsperger, C. 59-61
B
Bahillo, I. 104, 108
Bain, J. 110, 122
Barents, R. 88
Baron, D.P. 50, 83, 84
Baumol, W.J. 87, 232, 233, 236
BBL Company 147, 151, 165-169
Beard, T.R. 26
Beckers, T. 13
Bellantuono, G. 199
Berg, S.V. 88, 117
Bergesen, H.O. 2, 4
Biais, B. 131
Bindemann, K. 40
Bogetoft, P. 84
Boiteux, M. 84
Bolle, F. 17
Bolton, P. 55
Bovenberg, A.L. 132
Bowitz, E. 7
BP 36, 37, 43, 156, 157
Braeutigam, R.R. 236
Breitmoser, Y. 17
Brenck, A. 13
Bruce, C. 46
Buckland, R. 53
Bundeskartellamt 199
Burtraw, D. 22
C
Cameron, P.D. 90, 91, 93, 94
Carruth, A. 52
CEC (Commission of the European
Communi-ties) 1, 11, 12, 16, 18,
28, 36, 47, 50, 53, 80, 89, 91, 96, 97-
101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 110, 149, 174,
178, 179, 188, 189, 191, 192-195, 197-
200, 203, 208
Centrica 157, 171, 187
CIEP (Clingendael International Energy
Pro-gramme) 29, 30, 35, 45, 55,
117-119, 122
Coase, R.H. 114, 116, 118, 127, 128
Collette, M. 17, 18
Common, M. 67, 68
Constantini, V. 37, 38
Correljé, A.F. 2, 4, 64, 80, 81, 119, 122,
123
Cournot, A.A. 61
Couwenberg, O. 121
Cowan, S. 88
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis 14, 19, 23, 71
Crawford, C. 127
Creti, A. 51, 126
Crew, M.A. 19, 85, 131
Crocker, K.J. 127, 128
Cross, E. 88, 95, 96
D
Dailami, M. 5
262 Author index
Dal Bó, E. 85
Dalen, D.M. 86
Dassler, T. 117
Davis, L.E. 30, 119
De Alessi, L. 114
De Jong, D. 48
De Jong, J.J. 79
De Joode, J. 146
De Kort, J.F. 42
Delgado, J. 37, 42
Delvaux, E.B. 88, 95, 96
Demers, F.S. 52, 53
Demers, M. 52, 53
Demsetz, H. 114, 116, 117, 236
Depoorter, B.W.F. 231, 235
De Vries, L.J. 122, 123
DG TREN (Directorate General for
Energy and Transport) 92-95, 106-
108
Dickerson, A. 52
Dijkgraaf, E. 88
Dinan, D. 76-78
Dixit, A.K. 52, 236
DTe (Office of Energy Regulation)
151, 152, 160, 161, 172
DTI (Department of trade and
Industry) 151, 160
E
Eberlein, B. 94
Eberly, J.C. 52
ECORYS 92
EFET (European Federation of Energy
Traders) 171
Egenhofer, C. et al. 103
Eggertsson, T. 85, 114, 120
Ellis, A. 7
ENI 191
E.ON 150, 187
ERGEG (European Regulators Group
for Electricity and Gas) 96, 103,
179, 186
Ernst and Young 18
Estache, A. 117
Estrada, J. 2, 4
Eurelectric 187
European Council 85
European Parliament 101
F
Ferroni, M. 62
Financial Times 39, 108
Finon, D. 4
Finsinger, J. 86
Fraser, P. 53
Fredholm, M. 93, 109
Frei, C.W. 13
Freixas, X. 86
Friederiszick, H.W. 37, 42
Futyan, M. 11
G
Gandolfi, M. 181
Gasmi, F. 88
Gasunie 130
Gazprom 148
Gegax, D. 239
Geradin, D. 8, 95
GDF SUEZ 149
GIE (Gas Infrastructure Europe) 186
Gilbert, R.J. 71, 236
Glachant, J-M. 116, 119
Global Gas Reporting 43
Goldberg, V.P. 117
Goldman, M.I. 106, 109
Gracceva, F. 37, 38
Graeber, B. 4
Granderson, G. 17
Gritsevskyi, A. 50
Groenewegen, J.P.M. 29, 118, 119, 121
Grübler, A. 50
GTS (Gastransport Services) 151
Guesnerie, R. 86
GUTS (Gasunie Trade & Supply) 171
Guthrie, G. 51, 52
H
Haase, N. 123, 124
Hallouche, H. 44
Hancher, L. 88, 95, 96
Harrington Jr., J. 231, 233, 236
Hartman, R. 52
Hauswald, R. 5
Heintzelman, M. 22
Helm, D. 16, 20, 22, 24, 25, 35, 42, 48,
85, 124
Henley, A. 52
Author index 263
Hernandez, F. 104, 108, 181
Hodgson, G.M. 60, 114, 115, 126
Honoré, A. 47-49, 81, 181
Hotelling, H. 68
Hubbard, R.G. 127
Hubert, F. 50, 54, 55
Hunt, S.D. 61
I
IEA 7, 8, 21, 28, 36, 97, 104, 106
Ikonnikova, S. 54
Interconnector (UK) 141, 165
J
Jamasb, T. 20
Jamison, M.A. 88, 233
Jenkinson, T. 25
Jensen, J.T. 45, 46
JESS 166
Johnsson, F. 44
Joskow, P.L. 13, 19, 69, 70, 82, 84, 88,
127, 128, 137, 231
K
Kalisch, F. 4
Kaserman, D.L. 26
Kemfert, C. 23
Kjärstad, J. 44
Klein, B. 127
Klein, P.G. 117, 122, 124, 126, 127
Kleindorfer, P.R. 19, 85, 131
Klevorick, A.K. 87
Knight, F.H. 124
Künneke, R.W. 119
L
Laffont, J.J. 50, 82, 83, 85, 88
Langlois, R.M. 114
Larouche, P. 180
Lavrijssen, S.A.C.M. 95
Leibenstein, H. 85
Leitzinger, J. 17, 18
Levine, P. 131, 132
Lewis, T.R. 132
Lise, W. 23
Loeb, M. 86
Lynch, M.C. 37
Lyon, T.P. 67
Lyons, B.R. 127
M
Ma, Y. 67, 68
MacAvoy, P.W. 20, 235
Madrid Forum 95, 102, 103, 106
Magat, W.A. 86
Maisonnier 5
Makholm, J.D. 142
Mañé Estrada, A. 121
Marcel, V. 40, 41
Markandya, A. 37, 38
Martimort, D. 117, 187
Masten, S.E. 127, 128
Matlary, J.H. 80
Mayo, J.W. 26
McGilvray, J. 67, 68
Menard, C. 117, 127, 136
Midttun, A. 119
Ministry of Justice 78
Moe, A. 2, 4
Mulder, M. 66
Myerson, R.B. 50, 83, 84
N
Nakicenovic, N. 50
Nelson, R.R. 114
Neuhoff, K. 64, 128
Neumann, A. 64, 128
Neven, D.J. 84
Newbery, D.M. 6, 8, 9, 18, 87, 129,
130, 142
NGT (National Grid Transco) 157
North, D.C. 30, 118-120, 123
Nowotny, K. 235
O
Odell, P. 2
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) 71
OFGEM (Office of Gas and Electricity
Markets) 151, 152, 156, 158, 160,
169
OMV 109
Östling, R. 23
P
Palmer, K. 22
264 Author index
Panzar, J.C. 233, 236
Pearson, P. 23
Percebois, J. 4
Perez, Y. 119
Perman, R. 67, 68
Perotti, E. 131
Perry, M.K. 70, 71
Petit, N. 95
Pindyck, R.S. 52
Pollitt, M. 18, 20
Polo, M. 121
Pongsiri, N. 40
Publigaz 149
R
Radetzki, M. 8-10
Ramsey, F.P. 84
Reynolds, R.J. 236
RIA (Russian news and information
agency) Novosti 109
Riahi, K. 50
Robinson, C. 136
Rodrik, D. 53
Roland, K. 7
Röller, L.-H. 37, 42, 84
Rutherford, M. 114
S
Salant, D.J. 87
Salop, S.C. 71
Sampat, B.N. 114
Sappington, D.E.M. 82, 85, 86, 132
Scarpa, C. 121
Scheffman, D.T. 71
Scheib, P. 4
Schmidt, K.M. 131, 132
Schwartz, M. 236
Senior Nello, S. 76-78
SERIS (Sheffield Energy and Resources
Infor-mation Services) 18
Servén, L. 52, 53
Sevi, B. 22
Sharkey, W.W. 233
Shelanski, H.A. 127
Shell 47, 187
Shirley, M.M. 136
Sibley, D.S. 86
Simon, H. 115
Sioshansi, F.P. 48
Slot, P.J. 25, 88, 95, 96
Spanjer, A.R. 41, 42, 46, 143, 182
Spulber, D.F. 235
Stangle, B.E. 235
Steiner, F. 19
Stern, J. 131, 132
Stern, J.P. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 41,
42, 46-49, 69, 80, 81, 101, 104, 110,
181
Stigler, G.J. 85
Stiglitz, J.E. 67
SUEZ 149, 191
Suleymanova, I. 54
Sydnes, A.K. 2, 4
T
Távara, J.I. 88
Teulings, C.N. 132
Tirole, J. 13, 19, 50, 70, 82, 83, 85, 86,
88, 231, 235, 236
Total 157
Transparency International 21
Trillas, F. 131, 132
V
Van Calster, G., 88, 95, 96
Vandenberghe, W. 88, 95, 96
Van der Linde, C. 4, 64, 80, 81
Van Dijk, T. 87
Varkevisser, M. 88
Varoufakis, Y. 59-61
Veblen, T.B. 115
Vernon, J. 231, 233, 236
Vicini, G. 37, 38
Vickers, J. 88, 131
Villeneuve, B. 51, 126
Viner, J. 236
Viscusi, W. 231, 233, 236
Vogelsang, I. 86
Vollebergh, H.R.J. 88
Von Hirschhausen, C. 13, 21, 38, 64,
128
W
Waddams Price, C. 25, 27
Wagbara, O.N. 44
Weiner, R.J. 127
Author index 265
Weisser, H. 14
Weitzman, M.L. 86
Westerwoudt, T. 4, 64, 80, 81
Williamson, O.E. 29, 51, 70, 86, 115,
117-119, 121, 122, 125-127, 129, 136
Willig 233, 236
Woerdman, E. 121
Worldbank 39
Woroch, G.A. 87
WRR (Scientific Council for
Government Policy) 20, 21, 55
Wybrew-Bond, I. 2
Z
Zanoyan, V. 39-41
Zwart, G.T.J. 66

Subject index
A
Access tariff 158, 163, 167
Access regulation 181, 182, 184
Adaptive efficiency 120
AH (access holiday) 182
Algeria 2, 4, 14, 15, 36, 41-44, 54, 106,
107, 190
Allocative efficiency 18, 19, 21, 61, 62,
120, 188
Antitrust 150, 185, 189, 191, 192, 199,
203, 204, 235, 236
Asset specificity 51, 64, 125-129, 135,
138, 139, 176, 177, 179, 180, 183
Asset sweating 12, 35, 55, 56, 142, 208
Asymmetric information 84-86
B
Balance of power (between NOCs and
IOCs) 39, 41, 42
Barrier(s) to entry 68, 193, 198, 200
BBL (Balgzand-Bacton Line) 91, 106,
141, 142, 145-183, 191, 203, 214
BBL Company 147, 148, 151, 154, 158,
162, 165-178, 180, 182, 183
Bilateral dependency 50, 51, 126, 177
Bounded rationality 115, 125, 130, 136
Buyer’s market 27, 49
C
Centrica 146-148, 153, 156-160, 162,
171, 177, 186, 187
Climate change 23, 28, 43, 47-49, 53,
54, 56, 124
Combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT)
22, 48, 49
Competition policy 30, 76, 82, 118,
119, 150, 180, 183
Complex externalities 136
Contractual incompleteness 125, 126,
129, 130, 135, 138, 139, 176, 177
Coordination 44, 94, 99, 100, 102, 138,
188, 189
Cross-subsidies 25-27, 70, 144
D
Delinking 46, 47
Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) 18, 151, 160, 166, 171
Distrigas 4, 21, 64, 133, 149, 185, 189-
204
Dynamic efficiency 19-21, 63
E
Electricity Directive 81, 82
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 23,
24, 66
Energy taxes 23, 65
Entry 20, 51-53, 68, 71, 86, 103, 121,
157, 161, 175, 188, 191,193, 231, 235,
236
Entry capacity 156, 157, 172
European Commission 1, 18, 19, 28,
76, 102, 142, 151, 152, 159, 166, 169,
170, 174
European Council 76, 77, 97, 101
European Court of Justice 76, 78, 133
European Economic Community
(EEC) 79, 81
European institutions 75, 76, 78, 111
European integration 75, 79-82, 89,
121
European Parliament 76, 78, 101
Exemptions 32, 69, 93, 99, 122, 141,
142-145, 150-152, 152-184, 191, 197,
200, 203-205
Externalities 15, 16, 23, 64-67, 74, 136
268 Subject index
F
Failure of competition 15, 21, 62-64,
74
Final destination clause 5, 64
First Gas Directive 12, 81, 88-91
Fluxys 104, 148-150, 154, 158, 168,
170, 189-191
Formal institutions 29, 30, 118-120,
123
Franchise bidding 116, 117
G
Gas bubble 44
Gasbuilding 148, 163, 170
Gas Regulation (1775/2005) 88, 95-97,
102, 111
Gasterra 4, 147, 148, 158, 159, 167
Gas-to-gas competition 10, 11
Gastransportservices (GTS) 105, 148,
150, 151-165, 167-173, 177, 178, 181,
182
Gasunie 3, 4, 8, 105, 146, 148, 154,
168, 159, 167-169
Gasunie Trade & Supply (GUTS) 146,
148, 153, 154, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164,
167, 168, 171, 177
Gazprom 3, 4, 10, 22, 39, 42, 54, 106,
108-110, 148, 149, 189
GECF (Gas Exporting Countries
Forum) 42-44
Golden share 133, 149, 190
Gold plating 20
H
Hazard
· ex-post (contractual) hazards
113, 124-126, 129-131, 135-139,
175, 176, 179, 180, 182-184, 200,
203, 205
· moral hazard 85, 87, 125
Hold-up 51, 54, 87, 126, 127, 132, 133,
135, 137, 138, 175
Horizontal integration 7, 69, 73, 74,
119, 137, 138
Hub 67, 103-105, 108, 109, 150, 191,
193
Hurdle rate 52, 53, 55, 179, 183, 204
I
Import dependence/dependency 6,
14-16, 36-38, 49, 51, 54, 56, 66, 13,
135, 166
Incomplete contracts 129, 179, 183
Incomplete markets 15, 21, 67, 74
Incumbents 20, 25, 26, 39, 56, 63, 70,
73, 80, 89-91, 94, 99, 101, 111, 117,
119, 187, 189, 201, 236
Independent system operator (ISO)
71, 72, 101
Industrial consumers 3, 7, 45, 96, 150,
190, 193, 195, 197, 198, 204
Informal institutions 29, 30, 94, 118-
120
Information failure 15, 16, 24, 67, 68,
74
Institutional arrangements 20, 21, 29,
30, 119, 121, 123, 124, 130
Interconnector (UK) pipeline 4, 10,
11, 14, 104, 146, 147, 153, 156-158,
160, 162, 167, 168, 177, 181, 190
Internal market 11, 12, 27, 28, 75-77,
79-82, 88, 89, 91, 93-97, 100, 102-112,
143, 152-155, 158, 164, 166, 168, 170,
171, 173, 175, 180
Internal organization 114, 117, 137
International oil companies (IOCs) 7,
39-42
Investments 1, 5-7, 9, 11-12, 15-17, 20-
25, 27, 28, 30, 32, 35, 39-41, 43-47,
49-56, 68, 69, 86, 87, 89, 93, 98, 103,
106-110, 112, 113, 118, 122, 123, 126-
132, 134, 135, 140, 142-146, 152, 154-
157, 159, 162, 163, 166, 168, 170-173,
175, 176, 186-188, 190, 197, 199, 200,
203, 205
Investment timing 52, 53
Irreversible investments 32, 50-52, 56,
86, 128
K
Kyoto Protocol 23, 24, 54, 66
L
Legal unbundling 93, 124, 148, 149,
158
Subject index 269
Liberalization 1, 11-28, 39, 41, 43, 44,
55, 64, 68, 79-82, 88, 89, 91, 98, 101,
110, 119-121, 124, 128, 134, 142, 143,
175, 183, 187, 188, 193, 202
Licenses 63, 66, 165, 170, 171
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 5-7, 14-
16, 43, 45-47, 50, 51, 78, 89, 92, 93,
99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 143, 146, 147,
149-152, 158, 162, 166, 169, 181, 190
Liquidity 11, 104, 105, 108, 193
Local distribution companies (LDCs)
3, 7, 17, 45, 96, 193
Long-term contracts 4-6, 25, 43, 46,
64, 95, 109, 114, 123, 127, 128, 137,
138, 148, 154-156, 162, 178, 185-189,
191, 192, 195-203, 205
M
Managed market 8, 10-12, 29, 48
Market failure 1, 12, 15-17, 22-25, 59,
62, 65, 68-70, 74, 82, 87, 116, 135,
136, 231
Market power 13, 18-21, 43, 70, 73,
74, 90, 91, 127, 138, 143, 235
Market structure 3, 4, 9, 13, 20, 22, 29,
62, 68, 69, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 110,
118, 120, 122
Market value approach 5, 6, 10
Maturity 7, 11, 31, 51, 105, 186
Ministry/Minister of Economic
Affairs 134, 151, 160, 161, 164,
172, 173
Missing markets 15, 16, 21, 24, 67
Monopoly 4, 8, 14, 26, 38, 42, 62, 63,
69, 70, 80, 142
Moral hazard 85, 87, 125
N
Nabucco pipeline 105, 107-110, 129,
145
National institutions 78, 79
National oil company (NOC) 39-42,
53, 56
Natural monopoly 11, 18, 50, 51, 63,
73, 82, 89, 93, 116, 231-236
Negotiated third party access (NTPA)
73,74, 90-92, 138, 143, 144
Neoclassical
· approach 31, 113, 114, 122, 135
· assumptions/core 59, 73-75, 84,
114, 115, 180
· economics 30, 32, 59-61, 75, 112-
115, 117, 121, 124, 136
· guiding
principles/underpinnings 12,
15, 24, 31, 57, 75, 129, 138, 141,
142, 144, 176, 183, 204
· perspective 12, 28, 30-33, 59, 65,
69, 70, 72, 74, 82, 102, 110, 112,
113, 114, 116, 117, 128, 129, 135-
139, 141-144, 175, 180, 183, 185,
189, 200, 203, 205
· prescriptions/recommendations
31, 32, 59, 69, 74, 113, 116, 135-
137, 139
Netback 5, 6, 10
New context for regulation 28, 29, 31,
32, 35, 50, 55, 56, 59, 112-114, 124,
128, 129, 139-141, 208
New Institutional Economics (NIE)
30, 113-115, 116-124
Nirvana fallacy 117
Nord Stream pipeline 14, 46, 54, 55,
106, 147-149, 153, 154, 160, 164, 187
Norway 2, 4, 10, 36, 41-44, 104, 105,
166, 189
Nuclear energy 6, 43, 65, 79
O
Office of Energy Regulation (DTe) 68,
151, 152, 160-165, 167,168,172, 173,
177, 180-182
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(OFGEM) 151, 152, 155-161, 163-
172, 173, 174, 177, 181, 182
Oil crises 3, 46, 79
Oil price linkage 5, 9, 64
Open season 144, 146, 147, 152, 154,
158, 161, 163, 164, 168, 173, 174, 176-
178, 181
Opportunism 125, 126, 129, 130, 135,
136, 138, 139, 175, 176, 179
Overinvestment 20, 54, 55
Ownership unbundling 18, 74, 98,
101, 110, 139, 148, 158, 164, 167, 196
270 Subject index
P
Perfect competition 12, 18, 25, 59, 61,
62, 64, 72, 74, 75, 82, 84, 89, 110-112,
114, 117, 124, 175
Permanent problems 17, 25, 27, 111
Political risk 37, 41
Power generation 6, 9, 22, 43, 48, 49,
54, 56, 133, 197, 203
Principal-agent problem 40, 82, 84
Private ownership 19, 116, 131-133
Privatization 26, 41, 88, 111, 124, 131,
132, 134, 235
Production sharing agreement 40, 41
Productive efficiency, 17, 19, 21, 61-63
Property rights 30, 114, 117-122, 138
Public goods 15, 16, 24, 64, 65, 74,
116
Public ownership 41, 131-133
Public service obligations (PSOs) 1, 8,
12, 24, 25, 31, 32, 80, 93, 94, 118, 139
Q
Quasi-rent 50, 126, 175
R
Real options theory of investments 52
Regulated third party access (RTPA)
56, 73, 90-92, 138, 143, 151, 158, 162,
163, 168, 174, 181, 182, 184, 226
Regulatory
· capture 84, 85, 87, 111, 126
· commitment 130-135
· contracts 82, 86, 131, 133
· credibility 51, 53, 55, 87, 130,
131, 180, 200, 203, 205
· intervention 1, 12, 13,15, 17, 18,
22-24, 28, 31, 59, 62-69, 74, 75, 82,
83, 87, 88, 113, 116, 135, 136, 139,
175, 203, 205
· opportunism 86, 87, 131, 139,
167, 169, 170, 178, 179-183, 200,
203-205
· reform 4, 31, 75, 88, 111, 113
· risk 51, 53, 178
Relinking 46, 47
Renewable energy 13, 53
Reputational equilibria 130, 131
Resource rent 40
Restructuring 17-19, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31,
47, 70, 73, 80, 88, 113, 119, 120, 132,
137, 148, 149, 169, 170
Russia 2, 9, 10, 14, 15, 21, 36, 37, 40-
44, 46, 47, 54, 55, 62, 63, 66, 105,
106, 108-110, 145, 147, 149, 154
S
Sakhalin 42, 66
Second Gas Directive 12, 81, 91-95,
108, 141-143, 148, 150, 151, 157, 159,
164, 165, 167, 174, 178, 183
Security of demand 6, 69, 146
Security of supply (SoS) 9, 13-17, 28,
37, 43, 49, 54, 65, 80, 93, 94, 98, 101-
102, 143, 152, 153, 160, 166, 175, 199
Sellers’ market 44
Short-term contracts 161, 163, 199
Small consumers 3, 7, 17, 19, 45, 96
Social institutions 44
Spot market 11, 27, 103, 114, 121
Stranded assets 25, 26
Structural reform 19, 70-73, 88, 137,
138
Subadditive costs 11, 232, 233, 235
Sunk investments 50, 86, 87, 95, 126,
131, 132, 182, 202
Supply security 1, 9, 12-17, 24, 35, 47,
49, 55, 56, 65, 100, 109, 110, 112, 124,
128, 140, 157, 160, 161, 164, 166, 171,
172
Sustainability 1, 12, 22-25, 48, 53, 55,
56, 110, 112, 128
T
Take-or-pay (TOP) clauses/contracts
2, 5, 6, 69, 92, 121, 142, 201
Tariff rebalancing 26, 27
The Netherlands 2, 8, 36, 63, 66-68,
79, 81, 91, 104, 106, 108, 134, 141,
145-147, 152-154, 160, 161, 164-166,
172, 177, 183, 190, 201, 202
Third Gas Directive (proposed) 81,
88, 97-102, 189
Transaction cost economics (TCE) 30-
33, 87, 113, 115, 117-119, 121, 122,
124-129, 135-140, 141, 142, 144, 175,-
Subject index 271
179, 180-184, 185, 189, 199, 200, 203-
205
Transaction costs 50, 114-118, 122,
126, 129, 136-139, 211, 213
Transit 14-16, 45, 46, 54-56, 60, 80, 81,
106, 109, 110, 149, 161, 162, 166, 193
Transitory problems 1, 25, 28
Transmission network 20, 81, 96, 103,
105, 150
U
Ukraine 14, 36, 46, 54, 55, 94
Uncertainty 24, 25, 31, 32, 43, 52-56,
67, 102, 110, 124-129, 130, 131, 136,
143, 145, 176, 178, 180, 189, 191
Underinvestment 20, 54, 55, 142
Uninsurable risks 15, 16, 21, 69, 174
United Kingdom (UK) 2, 7, 9-11, 14,
17, 18, 25, 26, 49, 67, 91, 103, 104,
106, 108, 141, 145-148, 150-153, 155-
162, 164-167, 169, 170, 172-178, 181,
183, 187, 190
United States (US) 11, 17, 18, 20, 21,
37, 47, 104, 128, 180, 183, 199
Upstream network 4, 92, 95
V
Vertical integration 7, 8, 25, 69-72, 74,
119, 120, 127, 137-139, 142, 175
Vertical separation 120
W
Wingas 10, 63, 147, 168
Z
Zeebrugge 10, 67, 104, 107, 146, 147,
149, 150, 157, 191, 193

Curriculum vitae
Aldo Spanjer, born 30 June, 1979 in Harlingen, the Netherlands, received
secondary schooling at the SimonVestdijk high school from 1991 to 1998 (HAVO
and VWO). In September 1998 he started a degree program in Economics at
the University of Groningen. After graduating in August 2002, he became a
PhD-Fellow at the Economics section of the Department of Tax Law and
Economics of the Faculty of Law at LeidenUniversity fromOctober 2002 until
October 2008. Aldo Spanjer pursues his career as a Regulatory Affairs and
Communication Advisor at Shell Energy Europe.
His thesis has been written under auspices of the research program ‘Secur-
ing the rule of law in a world of multilevel jurisdiction’ of the E.M. Meijers
Institute of Legal Studies at the Law Faculty of Leiden University. His publica-
tions focus on energy policy and the economics of gas markets and include
topics like Dutch gas banking, the relationship between the EU and Russia in
energy matters and specific topics in gas regulation such as unbundling and
the third party access exemptions regime.

In de boekenreeks van het E.M. Meijers Instituut voor Rechtswetenschappelijk Onderzoek van
de Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Universiteit Leiden, zijn in 2007 en 2008 verschenen:
MI-117 H.J.Th.M. van Roosmalen, Overheidsaansprakelijkheid in Engeland en Nederland (diss.
Leiden), Den Haag: Sdu 2007, ISBN 978 90 12 11846 0
MI-118 R.W.J. Crommelin, Het aanvullen van de rechtsgronden (diss. Leiden), Alphen aan den
Rijn: Kluwer 2007, ISBN 978 90 13 04635 9
MI-119 L.A.R. Siemerink, De overeenkomst van Internet Service Providers met consumenten (diss.
Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2007, ISBN 90 13 04357 7
MI-120 I.S.J. Houben, K.J.O. Jansen, P.Memelink, J.H. Nieuwenhuis & L. Reurich (red.), Europees
contractenrecht. Techniek en moraal, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, ISBN 90 13 04036 5
MI-121 S. Hillebrink, Political Decolonization and Self-Determination. The Case of the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba (diss. Leiden), 2007, ISBN 978 90 9021470 2
MI-122 B.W. Schermer, Software agents, surveillance, and the right to privacy: a legislative framework
for agent-enabled surveillance (diss. Leiden), Leiden: LeidenUniversity Press 2007, ISBN
978 90 8728 021 5
MI-123 C.G. Breedveld-deVoogd,Vorm, vrijheid en gebondenheid bij de koop van eenwoning (diss.
Leiden), Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2007, ISBN 978 90 5454 412 8
MI-124 T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden & E. Steyger (red.), Europees recht effectueren. Algemeen
bestuursrecht als instrument voor de effectieve uitvoering van EG-recht, Alpen aan den Rijn:
Kluwer 2007, ISBN 978 90 13046 28 1
MI-125 A.C. Beunen, Protection for databases, The European Database Directive and its effects in
the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom (diss. Leiden), Nijmegen: Wolf Legal
Publishers 2007, ISBN 978 90 5850 267 4
MI-126 Z. Deen-Racsmány, Active Personality and Non-extradition of Nationals in International
Criminal Law at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century: Adapting Key Functions of Nationality
to the Requirements of International Criminal Justice (diss. Leiden), Leiden: Leiden Univer-
sity Press.
MI-127 C.P.L. van Woensel, MERK, GOD EN VERBOD, Oneigenlijk gebruik en monopolisering
van tekens met een grote symbolische waarde (diss. Leiden), Amstelveen: Uitgeverij
deLex BV 2007, ISBN 978 90 8692 010 5
MI-128 J.A.J. Peter, Levering van roerende zaken (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2007, ISBN
978 90 13043 81 5
MI-129 A.C. Hendriks&H.-M.Th.D. tenNapel (red.),Volksgezondheid in een veellagige rechtsorde.
Eenheid en verscheidenheid van norm en praktijk, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer 2007, ISBN
978 90 13 04720 2
MI-130 H.R. Kranenborg, Toegang tot documenten en bescherming van persoonsgegevens in de
Europese Unie. Over de openbaarheid van persoonsgegevens (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer
2007, ISBN 978 90 13 04886 5
MI-131 M. Kaeding, Better regulator in the EuropeanUnion – Lost in translation or Full Steam ahead?
(diss. Leiden), Leiden University Press, ISBN 978 90 8728 026 0
MI-132 S. van Wingerden, M. Moerings & J. van Wilsem, De praktijk van schadevergoeding voor
slachtoffers van misdrijven, DenHaag: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2007, ISBN 978 90 5454
948 2
MI-133 Jubileumbundel Meijers Instituut, Ik zou het zo weer doen. Terugblikken op proefschriften
uit het 10-jarig bestaan van het Meijers Instituut, Leiden: Leiden University Press
MI-134 C.L.J. Caminada, A.M. Haberham, J.H. Hoogteijling enH. Vording (red.), Belasting met
beleid, Den Haag: Sdu 2007, ISBN 978 90 12 12470 6
MI-135 A. Vermeer-Künzli, The Protection of Indificudals by means of Diplomatic Protection.
Diplomatic Protection as a HumanRights Instrument (diss. Leiden) 2007, ISBN 978 90 9022
487 9
MI-136 I.S.J. Houben, K.J.O. Jansen, P. Memelink, J.H. Nieuwenhuis & L. Reurich (red.),
Samenloop, Deventer: Kluwer 2007, ISBN 978 90 13 05033 2
MI-137 T.C. Leemans, De toetsing door de bestuursrechter in milieugeschillen. Over rechterlijke
toetsingsintensiteit, bestuurlijke beslissingsruimte en deskundigenadvisering (diss. Leiden),
Den Haag: Boom Jurdische uitgevers 2008, ISBN 978 90 5454 986 4
MI-138 P. Kuypers, Forumkeuze in het Nederlands internationaal privaatrecht (diss. Leiden), Deven-
ter: Kluwer 2008, ISBN 978 90 13 04797 4
MI-139 A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann
Printing Service 2008
MI-140 P.C. Adriaanse e.a., Implementatie van EU-handhavingsvoorschriften, Den Haag: Boom
Juridische uitgevers 2008, ISBN 978 90 5454 862 1
MI-141 S.D. Dikker Hupkes, What Constitutes Occupation? Israel as the occupying power in the
Gaza Strip after the Disengagement, Leiden: Jongbloed 2008
MI-142 R.A. Visser, E. van Gemerden, P.A. More & R.C.J. de Roon, Sturing en samenwerking
in handhavingsprojecten, Leiden: Leiden University Press, ISBN 978 90 8728 0383
MI-143 B.M. Dijksterhuis, Rechters normeren de alimentatiehoogte. Een empirisch onderzoek naar
rechterlijke samenwerking in de Werkgroep Alimentatienormen (1975-2007), Leiden: Leiden
University Press, ISBN 978 90 8728 045 1
MI-144 F.P. Ölçer, Eerlijk proces en bijzondere opsporing, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2007,
ISBN 978 90 5850 376 3
MI-145 J.H. Crijns, P.P.J. van der Meij & J.M. ten Voorde, De waarde van waarheid. Opstellen
over waarheid en waarheidsvinding in het strafrecht, DenHaag: Boom Juridische uitgevers
2008, ISBN 978 90 8974 020 5
MI-146 G.K. Schoep, Straftoemetingsrecht en strafvorming (diss. Leiden), Deven ter: Kluwer 2008,
ISBN 978 90 1306 018 8
MI-147 A.R. Spanjer, Structural and regulatory reform of the European natural gas market - Does
the current approach secure the public service obligations? (diss. Leiden), Wageningen:
Ponsen & Looijen BV, ISBN 978 90 6464 300 2
Zie voor de volledige lijst van publicaties: www.law.leidenuniv.nl/onderzoek
